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ABSTRACT 
The study is premised on a notion of 'African crisis'. Since the notion of crisis is 
multi-dimensional, hence susceptible to variable interpretations and emphases, the 
study posits and argues two interconnected hypotheses, thus operating within a finite 
investigative and interpretive framework 
It is hypothesised that a crisis of the state in Africa to a significant extent is a crisis in 
the spheres of political legitimacy and social cohesion. As both spheres fall within 
the operational ambit of ideology, the study examines the concept in some depth. In 
order to investigate the problematic of ideology in decolonising and postcolonial 
Africa, a distinction is made between ideology per se and phenomena and practices 
deemed ideological. During a process of exploring and analysing this distinction, 
cognisance is taken of the interface between ideology and social science paradigms. 
From this interface emerges the notion of an 'ideological paradigm'. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesised that two dominant paradigms in Cold War era Africa, 
namely, modernisation theory and scientific Marxism, are implicated in the crisis of 
the state. Included in this proposition is an argument that the application of 
exogenous developmental schematics in effect reproduced a colonial ethos 
inhospitable to endogenous innovation and initiative, not least in respect to the 
formulation and application of ideologies adequately congruent with - hence 
intelligible to - the lived worlds of Africans. Moreover, to the extent that the post 
Cold War era is characterised by the dominance of a neoliberal paradigm, this 
contention is of continuing relevance. 
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The better to distinguish between an ideological paradigm and an ideology, the study 
investigates two significant departures from paradigmatic convention in decolonising 
Guinea-Bissau and postcolonial Tanzania. Both Amilcar Cabral and Julius Nyerere 
articulated and applied ideologies on the whole grounded more in local contexts than 
in exogenous paradigms. While Cabral's thesis is discussed at some length during the 
course of a literature review, Ujamaa in Tanzania comprises the dissertation's main 
case study. Tanzania is conceptualised as embarking on a post-independence quest 
for an inclusive epistemology on which to base an ideology at once locus-specific and 
informed by general tenets of human-centred socialism. From this quest emerged a 
national ethic that - in a post Cold War era - continues to influence state-societal 
relations in Tanzania, and thus has proven to be of lasting value. 
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ELABORATION OF CONCEPTS, 
THEMES AND ARGUMENTS 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING 'AFRICAN CRISIS' 
The 'crisis of the state' in Africa is - and has been for the past couple of decades - a central 
preoccupation of much of the research and publication undertaken by Africanists, whether 
scholars or journalists, and whether resident inside or outside the continent. As indicated 
below by a brief review of recent and relatively recent literature, the concept of'crisis' is multi-
faceted, ergo, susceptible to interpretation on a number of levels and from a variety of angles. 
This dissertation addresses as follows the notion of'African crisis'. Firstly, the dissertation 
largely confines itself to the Cold War era given a focus on two exogenous and competing 
paradigms of development. It is hypothesised that to the extent that adherents of 
modernisation and Marxist paradigms respectively have formulated premises and drawn 
conclusions designed not so much to chart the mutable contours of local landscapes as to 
affirm the immutable reality tracks embedded in their paradigms, they have contributed to the 
crisis of the state in Africa. 
Secondly, the dissertation hypothesises that the failure of ideology, more specifically in its 
capacity as generator and facilitator of political legitimacy and social cohesion, is a feature of 
state crisis. The study thus takes issue with the contention, for instance, that in Africa, 
political ideologies largely are irrelevant,1 and that while Africa is prey to the demons of 
division, ideology has nothing to do with it.2 Instead, it is suggested that if Africa is prey to 
the demons of division, it at least in part is due to the failure in key respects of applied 
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ideology, and further, that if ideology is unable to make an effective contribution to intra-state 
disputes, it either becomes or already is an aspect of state crisis. 
The hypotheses adumbrated above are linked by an argument that the Euro-North America-
centric ethos of the Cold War replicated colonialism's construction of a climate inhospitable 
to endogenous innovation and initiative, not least in respect to the formulation and 
elaboration of ideologies adequately congruent with - and hence intelligible to - the lived 
experience of a majority of state inhabitants. A relative lack of locus-specific ideologies thus 
has played a part in the tendencies of postcolonial states to mirror the coercive propensities of 
their colonial forebears. Moreover, this somewhat unpromising situation for the legitimacy of 
the postcolonial state has not necessarily been improved by post Cold War expansion of 
neoliberalism into all the regions at the periphery. 
The better to distinguish between on the one hand, conformity by ruling elites with the 
purportedly scientific imperatives of either of two dominant paradigms, and on the other, a 
more paradigm-critical approach coupled with construction of ideologies adequately 
congruent with lived worlds, the dissertation highlights the experiences of (decolonising) 
Guinea-Bissau and (postcolonial) Tanzania. More space is allocated to the latter experience 
since Amilcar Cabral did not live long enough to convert his thesis of revolutionary struggle 
into a legitimating and thus non-coercively unifying ideology for the postcolonial state of 
Guinea-Bissau. 
The introductory chapter has three primary objectives. Firstly, to contextualise within post-
Cold War Africanist discourse a dissertation informed in key respects by Cold War era issues, 
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debates and problematics. More specifically, to examine a variety of commentaries and 
arguments published within the last decade which highlight the - at best - slightly precarious, 
and at worst, violently contested legitimacy of the postcolonial state,3 and hence to indicate 
the longevity of problematics addressed by this study. During the course of an introductory 
review of pertinent literature, a second objective is pursued, namely, delineation of the 
interface between political ideologies and development paradigms. The third objective is to 
provide a preliminary outline of the dissertation's conceptual points of departure, that is, 
'ideology', 'ideological', and 'paradigm'. During the process of defining key terms, an outline 
of the dissertation's structure and content also is provided. 
Context of the research: an embattled sub-continent. 
Legitimacy and security issues 
In the above respect, two of Richard Joseph's recently published analyses of 'African crisis' 
are illuminating, particularly in combination. In Africa: Stales in Crisis, Joseph contends 
that: "Africa will not make sustainable progress in building democratic systems and fostering 
economic development until the continent acquires coherent, legitimate and effective states." 
Given that a bipolar Cold War era of competing economic and ideological power blocs has 
been replaced by neoliberalism's unipolar trajectory, and therefore that realpolitik in 
conjunction with regional and local pressures have induced one party and military regimes at 
a minimum to hold multi-party elections, Joseph's discussion unfolds against a post Cold War 
backdrop of state democratisation initiatives in Africa. In both papers, he pinpoints 
anomalies that infiltrate democratisation agendas. To cite one example: in Uganda, 
Museveni's 'Movement' has delayed the introduction of multi-party politics, thus bucking the 
trend. Yet this 'no party' (one party?5) regime "has made effective use of state institutions to 
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turn the tide of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to sustain one of the highest economic growth 
rates in Africa." Joseph both implicitly acknowledges and explicitly anticipates a looming 
contradiction by suggesting that as Uganda embarks on a process of reviving a multi-party 
dispensation, "ways must be found to protect the gains it has made in governance, state 
capacity and public service."7 This is his only reference to Uganda, but given the trend of his 
argument it can be inferred that the institutions and modus operandi of a comparatively 
capable and - in at least one important respect - progressive state will not necessarily or 
obviously be enhanced by the introduction of competitive multi-party politics. 
In Facing Africa's Predicament: Academe Needs to Play a Stronger Role, Joseph draws 
attention to a second anomaly, that is, logically incompatible messages embedded in the 
foreign policy of the United States (U.S.) Having noted that "in the post-cold war world, 
counterterrorism has replaced anti-communism as the major preoccupation of American 
foreign policy",8 he narrows his focus to Washington's mixed message to Africa, more 
specifically to oil producing and / or strategically located (in the context of the U.S. led war 
on terror) states. Such states are in a position to resist demands for political and economic 
reform, Washington's avowed commitment to competitive party politics, human rights, the 
rule of law and so on notwithstanding. Autocratic, even brutally repressive leaders duly trade 
on U.S. preoccupations. For example: "Even Charles Taylor, one of Africa's most war-prone 
leaders, calls his elite regiment in Liberia the Anti-Terrorist Unit."9 In combination, Joseph's 
papers thus highlight two areas of ambivalence in liberal democracy's would-be totalising 
discourse. One is domestic: the potential for the introduction of a multi-party system to 
undermine state achievements and capabilities. The other is external: reform initiatives are 
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waived by a superpower in search of strategic alliances. Indeed, concludes Joseph, some of 
Washington's foreign policy programmes "bear an eerie resemblance to cold war politics."10 
On balance, Joseph attributes endemic and ubiquitous insecurity in Africa not so much to the 
absence - or superficial and contested implementation - of liberal democracy as to the steady 
erosion of state legitimacy in the decades since independence. Investigating the causes of 
chronic instability, he touches on a number of problematics that are associated with "the 
unviable territorial configuration of African states",11 and observes that borders in any case 
are being reconfigured, albeit in destructive ways (war, smuggling, trans-state criminal 
networks). Hence, a pertinent question is: how can borders constructively be reconfigured to 
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enable "the emergence of cohesive and functional states?" An associated problematic is that 
the emergence of viable states is inhibited by "the disconnection between African societies 
and existing formal state systems" - a disconnection, he opines, that a series of multi-party 
elections held in a variety of states over the past decade or so have done little or nothing to 
rectify. Citing Krasner's contention that "one of the critical purposes of the state is to 
represent symbolically the existence and unity of the political community which is also a 
social and moral community'"3 Joseph laments the weakness of the "ethical filaments" that 
connect states and societies in Africa. In the absence of these ethical filaments, "political 
power will only replicate the money-changing bazaars of Nigerian politics."14 Further, 
ethnicity and religion will continue to attract the social attachments and loyalties that states 
crucially lack. 
Given the above assortment of problematics, Joseph contends that neoliberal strategies of 
democratisation are insufficient to restore capability and legitimacy to post Cold War African 
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states. They should be accompanied by truly democratic developmental processes including 
the revival and enhancement of social welfare services from which 1980s structural 
adjustment programmes compelled states to withdraw. In short, he appears to favour a return 
to "the ideals of social democracy", the better to ensure that marginalised groups "acquire 
stakes in the new democratic systems."15 While this suggestion of Joseph's is more implied 
than stated, a second recommendation is made fully explicit. He regrets that "with the end of 
the cold war, African studies - and area studies generally - were increasingly dismissed as 
outmoded" and avers that scholars have a major role to play in reviving and enhancing 
Africanist discourse. In this respect, he advocates "smart partnerships" between African 
scholars and their counterparts in the Northern hemisphere, the better to arrive at "a 
systematic understanding of how Africa's poor development performance can be reversed." 
Chronic economic underdevelopment 
Joseph's contention that "the security needs of the African people exceed those of any other 
on earth"17 is underscored by Colin Leys' claim - in Confronting the African Tragedy - that 
"in sub-Saharan Africa most people are facing a future in which not even bare survival is 
assured."18 Having noted that economic gains - albeit deeply flawed (since most of the 
benefits were diverted elsewhere) - were made by the expansion of the forces of production 
during the colonial era, Leys points out that: "African nationalist leaders and their western 
supporters were confident that with independence their countries' economic growth rates 
would accelerate and the gap between Africa and the industrial world would be progressively 
closed."19 Instead, two "development decades" later, high hopes stand revealed as "tragic 
delusions": poverty now is more widespread and more entrenched than was the case at 
independence, and "a chronic dependence on aid" has critically undermined the sovereignty of 
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African states. To compound a poverty-stricken, aid-dependent picture, a high level of 
corruption is the pervasive product of "the scramble for whatever surplus is still extracted 
from the direct producers", and accordingly has deprived African states of legitimacy. 
Infrastructures have collapsed, bribery and extortion are common currency, as is violent crime 
in the cities. Malnutrition is widespread, life expectancy generally is low. "In face of this" 
contends Leys, "'Africanists' have a lot of soul-searching to do. The original optimism about 
the post-independence future, questioned by very few, now looks like a serious failure of 
analysis, if not a lapse of objectivity." Leys then asks: "How should the African tragedy be 
explained?"22 
Questioning the accuracy of Davidson's premise23 that colonialism's systematic destruction of 
Africa's indigenous polities in tandem with the grid-like imposition of states "that took no 
account of the traditional political values of the people ... brought together within the colonial 
state boundaries", and thus that "the situation in Africa is primarily ... a crisis of 
institutions",24 Leys avers that Davidson's archetypal precolonial polity, the Asante state, does 
not adequately lend itself to a comparison with Yugoslavia (a comparison that constructs key 
elements of Davidson's thesis). Not the least of the differences that compromise an argument 
based on purported similarities is that while precommunist Yugoslavia was chronically 
underdeveloped by contrast with states in Western Europe, nonetheless levels of 
industrialisation and productivity were high relative to those in precolonial Asante. 
And this is the point: the ultimate cause of the weakness of the precolonial African 
states, vis-a-vis external capital and imperialism, was the extreme backwardness of 
their economies. It is not a question of the richness of their traditional cultures or of 
the dignity and meaning these cultures had afforded the African peoples. It is simply 
that they had no capacity to defend themselves against the forces - political and 
military as well as economic - developed by capitalism in the west. 
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The weakness of precolonial economic development then was compounded and entrenched 
by colonialism's destruction of indigenous economies and "the social orders based on them, 
without putting in their place economies or social systems capable of defending themselves 
against 'world market forces' after independence."26 Apart from attributing a long term aspect 
of the African tragedy to the failure of colonial regimes to transform - or to allow Africans to 
transform - the relations of production, Leys does not address in any detail issues of 
precolonial and colonial economic underdevelopment. However, his outline is mentioned 
and details are elaborated by Giovanni Arrighi in The African Crisis.21 In this paper, Arrighi's 
stated objective is to situate African crisis in a world systemic context. His method includes a 
comparison between the precolonial and colonial inheritances of Sub-Saharan Africa and East 
Asia respectively. 
In assessing economic underdevelopment in precolonial Africa, Arrighi highlights firstly, a 
(pre-Atlantic slave trade) shortage of labour attendant on an abundance of land and other 
natural resources relative to scarcity of population; secondly, "the subsequent depopulation 
and disruption of productive activities, directly or indirectly associated with the capture and 
export of slaves."28 Moreover, the slave trade not only materially exacerbated an extant 
population and production shortage, it further reduced production per se by channelling 
activities into "the protection-producing industry."29 Colonialism's contribution to an 
economically unpromising situation was to take over protection-producing activities while 
simultaneously making entrepreneurialism in trade and production the preserve of non-
Africans. By contrast, East Asia in both precolonial and colonial eras had an abundance of 
labour relative to natural resources. This determinant was supplemented firstly by 
commercial exchanges with Western Europe in the 16f and 17n centuries and secondly, by 
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East Asia's incorporation - beginning in the latter part of the 18 century - in Europe's world 
system. This said, the original determinant proved crucial because "under the conditions of 
escalating competition among Third World regions in the 1980s, the availability of a large, 
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flexible and low-cost labour supply" became the primary indicator of state and regional 
ability to compete. 
Like Joseph, Arrighi factors the role of the United States into his investigation of African 
crisis; unlike Joseph, he emphasises the impact of unevenly distributed economic aid. For 
instance, U.S. aid to South Korea between 1946 and 1978 came to a total of nearly $6 billion 
compared with a total of $6.89 billion in aid to the entire African continent during the same 
period. "By the time the world economic crisis of the 1970s set in, the Cold War had thus 
further increased the chances that East Asia would succeed and Africa fail in the coming 
competitive struggles of the next two decades." (i) 
Apart from an endorsement of Mamdani's analysis of the skewed political projects of 
postcolonial states (namely, Africanising urban and administrative centres while failing 
adequately to de-tribalise the rural peripheries33), Arrighi pays minimal attention to 
specifically political factors. This omission is partially remedied by Fantu Cheru in African 
Renaissance. Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalisation34 and remedied in full by Claude 
Ake in Democracy And Development.35 
(i) As a general rule, information and / or direct quotations are acknowledged by only one 
endnote if derived not only from the same text but also from the same page, and if cited 
within the same paragraph of this study. 
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Exogenous paradigms, entrenched elites and other developmental problematics 
While according all due weight to the considerable contribution made by external actors and 
adverse economic factors to the problem of governance in Africa, particularly during the Cold 
War period, Cheru contends that "a significant portion of the blame lies with African 
governments themselves, who have managed successfully to suppress the avenues of 
democratic expression, participation and self-government of their citizens." 6 Despite the 
triumph of democracy "as an idea" in much of Africa since 1989, the practice of democracy 
"is in profound trouble and has not moved beyond the holding of multi-party elections."37 
Like Joseph, Cheru highlights a disjuncture between state economic reform and the practice 
of democracy, but he approaches the anomaly from a different angle, viz, "an inherent 
contradiction" between democratic political reform and market-oriented economic reform. He 
contends that structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have "tended to encourage or 
reinforce authoritarian political forces that negate the ideals that the same donor community 
TO , 
seeks to promote." As does Joseph, Cheru points out that since SAPs increase poverty, not 
least by decreasing state expenditure on vital social services, they alienate citizens from the 
state and further erode the in any case problematic legitimacy of the African state. 
Additionally, Cheru notes that rapid economic growth in East Asian countries such as South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore has not been achieved under democratic conditions. "Their 
economic success can be attributed to the fact that they represent 'developmental states' -
states led by elites that... pursue national economic growth as their central objective, to the 
exclusion of other priorities."39 By contrast, "the paradox of the new wave of democratisation 
in Africa is that its 'success' is built upon the failure of development." 
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Conversely, Claude Ake contends that "the problem is not so much that development has 
failed as that it was never really on the agenda in the first place." In contradistinction to 
Arrighi's line of argument, Ake posits that by-and-large "political conditions are the greatest 
impediment to development."41 He cites the unusually statist nature (far more so than 
colonial experiences in other parts of the world) of colonialism in Africa. Not only were 
colonial states absolute, they also were arbitrary. (An example is the colonial government's 
decision not only to introduce previously unknown cocoa cultivation in the Gold Coast but 
also to make it the pivot of the economy). Utilising Gramscian terminology, Ake contends 
that colonial officials "showed hardly any interest in transforming domination into hegemony, 
beyond the notion that their domination was also a civilising mission." Given its focus on 
the crude accumulation of power and profit, colonialism's propagation of'civilising' values 
did not amount to the dissemination of legitimacy norms. In turn, the legitimacy vacuum that 
accompanied colonialism was reproduced by forces in opposition to it: in both cases, the de 
facto possession of power and the right to rule were conflated. "The result was an 
unprecedented drive for power; power was made the top priority in all circumstances and 
sought by all means." 
Political independence by-and-large did not reconfigure the nature of the state which 
continued to rely heavily on "an apparatus of violence", thus eliciting coercion-induced 
compliance from the population.44 Whereas nationalist discourse pre-independence had been 
radical and egalitarian, post-independence nationalist elites narrowed their focus: firstly, to 
the containment of "frustrations arising from the failure to effect the societal transformation 
that many had hoped for and fought for";45 secondly, to competition among themselves for 
the appropriation and accumulation of state power. Competing elites extended divisive 
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tentacles into their national constituencies by appealing to ethnic, communal and religious 
loyalties. The unifying trajectory of pre-independence nationalism thus was fragmented by 
the alienating tendencies of post-independence politics. Elites "created not only strong 
divisions within their own ranks but strong antipathies and exclusivity in society."46 
Given the weak material base of post-independence elites, a condition contingent on their 
economic marginalisation by discriminatory colonial practices and compounded by their lack 
of experience as entrepreneurs, they availed themselves of state resources in order to retain 
power. Elites in power felt no need to engage in entrepreneurial activities since their control 
of the state and its resources enabled effortless and risk-free appropriation of surplus; elites 
out of power "did not even have the option of channelling their ambitions into economic 
success, which was primarily a matter of state patronage." Within this setting of "lawless 
political competition amidst an ideological void" bequeathed by colonial to postcolonial 
states, development emerged "as an attractive idea for forging a sense of common cause and 
for bringing some coherence to the fragmented political system."47 It was an idea, Ake 
contends, towards the realisation of which elites made token gestures "while trying to pass the 
responsibility to foreign patrons." Economic dependence engendered by colonialism thus was 
extended and perpetuated by the political leaders and bureaucratic managers of postcolonial 
states operating in tandem with foreign donors and developmental experts. "But as it turned 
out, what was adopted was not so much an ideology of development as a strategy of power 
that merely capitalised on the objective need for development."48 
In Ake's explication of postcolonial state crisis, an ideology of development notionally filled 
the legitimacy vacuum (re) produced by the non-fulfilment of egalitarian and redistributive 
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promises embedded in the discourse of anti-colonial nationalism. Yet, given the extent to 
which African leaders relied on an exogenous development paradigm and its agents, they in 
effect transferred the onus for state legitimacy to non-African blueprints and expertise on the 
one hand, and on the other, to their people. In the former instance, Western agents of the 
paradigm marketed it as a science of development, and thus derived their legitimacy from 
their status as scientists. In the latter instance, leaders argued that only a nation-wide ethic 
of hard work could enable 'catch-up' programmes. 
The hard work was to be done literally in silence; the overriding necessity of 
development was coupled with the overriding necessity for obedience and conformity. 
African leaders insisted that development needs unity of purpose and the utmost 
discipline, that the common interest is not served by oppositional attitudes. It was 
easy to move from there to the criminalisation of political opposition and the 
establishing of single-party systems.50 
The exogenous development paradigm targeted for critical attention by Ake is modernisation 
theory. Having acknowledged that modernisation theory by no means is a seamless monolith, 
indeed that it incorporates "a complex unity of diversities",51 he interrogates the theory in its 
most common and characteristically teleological form. The paradigm's point of departure is 
an original - once universal - condition of backwardness. Operating on the premise that 
Western states represent the highest stage of evolution thus far, the paradigm's implicit 
assumption is that linear developmental progress is "a matter of becoming western." 
Furthermore, "when the theorists encountered cultural resistance, they proclaimed the need 
for the modernisation of attitudes."52 In consequence, the theory ignored or reduced (to 
backward social and political formations) the historical and cultural specificities of Third 
World countries. 
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In the 1960s, modernisation theory conflated the wealth of nations and the welfare of people. 
A 1970s shift in focus from wealth to welfare was no more than superficial. Despite the 
appearance of a new critical awareness, development continued to be equated with economic 
growth. Even though in the 1980s, the equation flew in the face of deteriorating African 
economies, "the validity of the paradigm was asserted so aggressively that the prospect of 
using another paradigm could no longer be seriously entertained."53 Moreover, since the 
paradigm was maintained by the specific interests of elite fractions of African and Western 
donor communities, both African leaders and foreign patrons "have made certain 
assumptions, used certain concepts, valued certain aspects of experience and not others, 
focussed on certain issues and ignored others [and] adopted a particular discursive practice 
and particular strategies for ordering experience."5 
Ake's argument thus imputes the primacy of ideological (in the sense of representation of the 
particular interests of dominant groups as national / global interests) substrata that generate 
and configure a given development paradigm. He explains the seeming inability of African 
elites and foreign experts to concede the inadequacy of the paradigm by positing a 
correspondence between its ideological and its scientific character. In the former respect, "the 
ideology was shaped decisively by the essentially political interests of its proponents." In the 
latter respect, the paradigm was a "conveniently abstract" science of development55 in that it 
enabled its adherents to overlook African specificities. He concludes his analysis of the 
failure of modernisation theory to formulate and implement sustainable development 
strategies by contending that scholars and agents of the paradigm have tended "to focus on 
ideologically derived answers to the problem of development that bear no relation to the 
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nature of the problem. Their concern is not so much to solve a problem on its own terms as 
to realise an image of the world."5 
In the argument sketched above, Ake does not refer to the (formerly) widespread application 
in Africa of a Marxist development paradigm. This gap in argumentation briefly is addressed 
by Issa Shivji, and addressed in more detail by Ato Quayson. Shivji, having cited the Cold 
War confrontation that "turned the newly ... independent states into pawns, and the continent 
into a chessboard of proxy hot wars" and averred that "the consequences of those hot wars 
have been devastating for the continent",57 alludes to the debates of the 1960s and 1970s, 
specifically to "radical political economy with its concepts of class and modes of production", 
contrasting it favourably with neoliberal discourse which lacks "theoretical vigour or political 
vision." This said, Shivji acknowledges that radical political economy was an elite and very 
often an elitist project. 
Addressing a Cold War-informed postcolonial context in Africa, Quayson notes that Marxism 
provided "a prime anti-hegemonic discourse with which to contest the West",59 but, like 
Shivji, highlights the elitist trajectory of the Marxist development project. Having alluded to 
"the tragic obfuscations that Marxist rhetoric has produced in the postcolonial world", 
Quayson contends that 
... within the dynamics of certain newly independent states that opted to turn to 
Marxism to mobilize the ordinary people for the business of building viable post-
independence societies, the rhetoric hardly ever matched with the practice, partly 
because this derivative ideology had to take shape within contexts that were riddled 
with their exacerbated cultural contradictions. Thus, in practice, the mobilization of 
the masses actually entailed the concentration of power in the hands of a radical elite 
who turned out to be not very different from the Western bourgeoisie they so 
vehemently criticised.61 
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Thus, like Ake, Quayson highlights the disjuncture between African particularities and the 
totalising trajectory of an imported development paradigm but unlike Ake, his critique 
includes a Marxist development paradigm. He cites Rattansi's assessment both of a Marxist 
linear narrative of the transition from one mode of production to another, and the equally 
linear, functionalist approach of modernisation.62 This said, it is worth noting that Quayson 
distinguishes between an overly determinist Marxist paradigm and the Marxian concept of the 
dialectic. Whereas the former treats as incommensurate any phenomenon that doesn't fit 
within the parameters of class analysis, the complexity of the dialectical model enables 
recognition that "the old and the new often persist side by side in language, in theoretical 
discourse and even in the disposition of the various social attitudes."63 Illustrating the point, 
Quayson cites the cult of the leader in postcolonial Africa, and notes that a cult of personality 
was utilised by Marxist, non-Marxist and capitalist-oriented leaders alike: "Both Kwame 
Nkrumah of Ghana and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi carefully cultivated a personality cult from 
different ideological positions, the first being ardently Marxist, and the other an unflinching 
capitalist. These could'be multiplied across the entire gamut of African politics." It takes, 
observes Quayson, a "complex model" adequately to explain this "peculiar process".65 
Citing Raymond Williams' notion of a dialectic of residuality and emergence, Quayson 
juxtaposes a precolonial concept of'culture hero' with a postcolonial leadership cult, and 
defines this combination of phenomena as "a dialectical mutation in which a variety of 'old' 
and 'new' ideas are sometimes reconstellated to produce new perspectives and realities." 
The postcolonial cult of the leader is a product of accommodation between old and new (or 
residual and emergent) forms of legitimation. It is a process in which a pivotal figure in 
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traditional narrative and "the imagining of the modern state itself are contiguous, and thus 
is a syncretic blend of traditional and modern modes of cultural authenticity. However, not 
least in light of Quayson's recent statement about "the amazing phenomenon of failed states"68 
in Africa, it seems that traditional modes of cultural authenticity have played an ambivalent 
role in the state's quest for legitimacy. He depicts the scenario as follows: the cultural 
heroism of the decolonising and early post-independence periods transmogrified into 
postcolonial dictatorship that deployed simple dichotomies as a way of forcing people to 
make the 'right' choices. Authoritarian binarisation of reality generated "nervous conditions"69 
among the populace; widespread anxiety in turn generated a new set of urban myths in which 
heroes are ordinary people who are able to trick their overlords. The rescripted narrative 
represents a decisive shift in the location of heroes. In the reconstituted mythology of cultural 
heroism, epic qualities no longer belong to political figures. They now belong to trickster 
figures: anyone can be a hero as long as s/he is astute enough to engage in a brand of 
subterfuge that undermines - while pretending to serve - the authority of elites. In short, a 
state-sponsored mantra of'culture hero' or 'man of the people' in the first instance was 
reinforced, and in the second instance, subverted by popular narrative. Where once the 
narrative was utilised to empower leaders, a shift in focus to 'trickster' heroes undermines 
ruling elites, and state legitimacy accordingly is eroded. 
Collation and contextualisation of themes. 
Between them, Africanists cited above provide an incisive survey of a number of the sub-
continent's chronic ailments, whether endogenous, exogenous or a lethal combination. While 
Leys and Arrighi focus on the role of economic determinants, in the process tracing sub-
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Saharan Africa's economic underdevelopment back to precolonial times, Ake argues that 
postcolonial Africa's development deficit is an outcome of political factors, in particular, the 
struggle for power. "Political power was everything; it was not only the access to wealth but 
also the means to security and the only guarantor of general well-being."71 Further, Ake, 
Joseph and Cheru all develop a theme of doubtful or non-existent state legitimacy, and 
question - Ake emphatically so72 - the capacity of neoliberalism and multi-partyism to address 
the legitimacy vacuum that characterises states in crisis. Additionally, Joseph discerns a 
normative vacuum at the heart of the postcolonial state - a problematic that in part is a 
consequence of postcolonial reproduction of the rift between African societies and colonial 
states. In a post Cold War era, this rift is widened by the application of neoliberal economic 
reforms that increase the divide between haves and have nots; moreover, multiparty elections 
by no means adequately address the de-legitimating paucity of substantive and participatory 
dimensions of democracy. 
Shivji's paper indicates that current arguments about the nature and purpose of democracy are 
rooted in an earlier period. He cites Cold War era debates at the University of Dar es Salaam 
between proponents of the dependency / underdevelopment paradigm on the one hand, and 
on the other, "mainstream American paradigms of political science centring around 
modernisation and nation-building."7 Ake elaborates in some detail a connection between an 
imported paradigm of modernisation and an ideology of development adopted by postcolonial 
elites to fill - at least notionally - the legitimacy vacuum attendant on the decay of anti-
colonial, radical nationalist ideology. He underlines the extent to which African leaders 
delegated the legitimating dimension of ideology to an abstract science of development. 
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Quayson extends - by including a Marxist development paradigm - the connection made by 
Ake between single party regimes, imported development paradigms and derivative 
ideologies. He distinguishes, however, between two brands of Marxism: an overly determinist 
ideological mode on the one hand, and on the other, a complex, dialectical and flexible mode. 
Cold War epistemological disputes. 
At this juncture in a review of salient literature and focal themes in the arena of 'African 
crisis', it is germane to flag two lines of enquiry that emerge ex hypothesi during the course of 
the dissertation. Firstly, while Ake's critical appraisal of modernisation theory incorporates 
its status as a science of development, Quayson refers to the elitist and authoritarian leanings 
of Marxism in Africa without touching on its claim to scientific stature. Yet it is precisely this 
claim that lent scientific authority to Marxist dismissal of the solutions posited by 
modernisation theory to problems of underdevelopment, and concomitant depiction of the 
paradigm and its proponents as agents of American imperialism. Likewise, given 
modernisation theory's declared commitment to a value-free science of comparative politics, 
Marxism was conceived as just another ideology to be judged solely - and clinically - in 
terms of performance criteria (at any rate, in principle.) Decolonising and postcolonial 
Africa's encounter with exogenous development paradigms thus was configured by the 
paradox of two competing, 'universal' sciences that - to borrow a phrase from Kuhn - talked 
through each other.7 Moreover, each science defined the other as ideology. 
A second line of enquiry is directed towards Marxism's division into linear (scientific) and 
lateral (dialectical) formats. These marked divergences between varieties of Marxism flag an 
epistemological disjuncture, summarised by Bernstein as "that pervasive tension at the heart 
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of any socialist or communist project between realism and utopianism, between the claims of 
Marxism as a science of social reality and a programme of human emancipation."75 In short, 
the issue (raised by Quayson) of incommensurability or - more moderately put -
epistemological incompatibility, applies not only to rival development paradigms operating in 
Africa during a Cold War era, but also to contestations between scientific and humanist 
Marxism. Marxist scholars and activists - mutatis mutandis - were located in either of two 
disputatious camps: one armed with scientific certainty, operating in support of actually 
existing socialism in the Second World, and its expansion into the Third World; the other 
"born from the defeat of mass politics"76 in the First World, providing socialist critiques of 
capitalism as well as moral support to anti-imperialist movements in the Third World.77 
Post Cold War neoliberal problematics. 
In light of'Western'78 Marxism's human centredness and deployment of analytic (dialectical) 
method in contradistinction to its alter ego's reliance on its global authenticity as a science, it 
is scarcely surprising if the former emerged from the demise of scientific socialism in better 
shape than the latter. This said, Perry Anderson, in the course of a survey of the lifespan to 
date of New Left Review - a journal closely associated with Marxist Humanist trends -
soberly asserts that: 
Four decades later, the environment in which NLR took shape has all but completely 
passed away. The Soviet bloc has disappeared. Socialism has ceased to be a 
widespread ideal. Marxism is no longer dominant in the culture of the left. Even 
Labourism has largely dissolved ... What is the principal aspect of the past decade? 
Put briefly, it can be defined as the virtually uncontested consolidation, and universal 
diffusion of, neo-liberalism.80 
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Anderson is emphatic that "neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided across the 
globe: the most successful ideology in world history"81 - a far cry from the conjuncture of the 
1960s when "a third of the planet had broken with capitalism."82 
Sawyerr, referring to the rise of neoliberalism with its pro-market / anti-state bias, notes that it 
coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union "and the discrediting of the alternative vision 
of society."83 Whereas Anderson perceives the (Clinton-Blair) 'third way' as "the 
best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today",84 Sawyerr cites the notion of a 'global village' 
as the ideological myth behind which neoliberalism conceals its exploitative agenda, and 
observes that "it takes a considerable leap of the imagination to locate much of sub-Saharan 
Africa within this 'global village'."85 He contends that Africa's current crop of ruling elites 
are locked into an ideology that places severe constraints on the ability of states to intervene -
with people-friendly policies - in the purportedly neutral trajectory of market forces. 
Concluding that neoliberalism, and the institutions that promote it, inhibit the fulfilment by 
the state of its principle function, that is, the defence and enhancement of the well-being of its 
people, he argues that: "this ... is the fundamental reality that lies at the base of the continuous 
crises of the sub-Saharan African state." 
Like Sawyerr, Abrahamsen highlights questionable attempts by international financial 
institutions, the World Bank in particular, "to absolve themselves from any responsibility for 
Africa's economic failure and to present their policy prescriptions as a set of technical 
truths."87 Arguing that development aid conditionalities are 'neutral' only from the 
'perspective of those who already accept the underlying neoliberal assumptions, she points 
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out that "for those who do not, the advice to cut food subsidies and introduce fees at health 
clinics is far from 'technocratic.'" 
In sum: given the decline of Marxism as a development paradigm in tandem with its loss of 
credibility as a science of social reality, it seems that only one avenue of rationally planned 
and executed development is open to underdeveloped countries. Following on from this, it is 
arguable that the modernisation paradigm, once marketed in the Third World as an alternative 
to Marxism, subsequently has metamorphosed into the only truly scientific, ipso facto, 
globally applicable mode of formulating and implementing development initiatives. Cold 
War era modernisation theory thus has re-entered post Cold War social science discourse as 
"one of the most important (positive or negative) points of macro-comparative reasoning."89 
Knobl includes en passant in his argument an observation that: "Marxism, the great macro-
theoretical rival in the 1960s and 1970s has lost much of its intellectual attraction."90 
However, to link yesterday's modernisation theory with today's neoliberalism is to beg the 
question (given that the focal concept of 'political system' is embedded in modernisation 
theory, whereas neoliberalism initially eschewed explicitly political criteria) of why - as the 
1980s shifted gear into the 1990s - did a science of Third World economic progress marry 
itself to a set of political conditions? What factors enabled neoliberalism's evolution from 
Western economic orthodoxy to globally dominant economic-political blueprint? This is a 
question of some significance since it is the latter - and later - development that underwrites 
juxtaposition of the term 'neoliberal' with the terms 'ideology' and 'hegemonic'. By not only 
attaching a set of political institutions and arrangements to an extant economic base, but also 
marketing a particular political format as indispensable to the successful functioning of the 
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doctrine, neoliberalism has endowed a political superstructure with scientific status by 
association (in the process generating anomalies, as noted by Joseph and Cheru, above). 
In the event that science fails - that is, if regular elections plus multi-partyism in tandem with 
macroeconomic development policies do not produce either a sufficient degree of political 
legitimacy or the predicted economic growth rates, a common outcome is that international 
financial institutions and donor countries blame the 'usual suspects', namely, governments 
and state apparatuses in recipient countries, for perpetuating the existence of a disenabling 
environment. It is worth noting, however, that Joseph Stiglitz, formerly the World Bank's 
Chief Economist, provides an exception to the conventional rule of fault allocation. Stiglitz 
argues that: 
The application of mistaken economic theories would not be such a problem if the end 
of first colonialism and then communism had not given the IMF and the World Bank 
the opportunity to greatly expand their respective original mandates, to vastly extend 
their reach. Today these institutions have become dominant players in the world 
economy. Not only countries seeking their help but also seeking their 'seal of 
approval' so that they can better access international capital must follow their 
economic prescriptions ... The result for many people has been poverty and for many 
countries social and political chaos. 
Speaking at the World Social Forum (convened in Mumbai early in 2004), Stiglitz warned 
that economic instability and social insecurity will lead to a rise in violence in the world 
because it is impossible to separate economic from social and political issues, and contended 
that economic policy cannot be delegated to the technocrats of international financial 
institutions but instead should be at the centre of democratic debate in each country.92 
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Statement of position and preliminary definition of terms. 
It is not the intention of this dissertation to operate as an apologia for corrupt and coercive 
governance in Africa (or anywhere else, for that matter), or to provide any semblance of 
endorsement for 'sit-tight' heads of state and their prosperous cohorts, including those who 
resort to populist, axiomatically anti-Western rhetoric as a means of diverting attention from 
state-wide violation of human rights. This said, my introductory chapter follows Stiglitz in 
highlighting the collapse of the communist bloc as a crucially enabling factor in the 
transmogrification of neoliberalism, from its 1980s inception in Thatcher's Britain and 
Reagan's America as an alternative to Keynesian economics, to its current status as globally 
dominant ideology. An additional and related issue is that the Soviet bloc's implosion did 
severe damage not only to an ideology but also to the epistemology by which it was 
underpinned and from which it derived much of its force and conviction. In consequence, the 
commanding heights of social science epistemology now are occupied by an elite caste of 
intellectuals primarily based in the First World, and methodologies are configured 
accordingly. 
Leaders of political and intellectual opinion in post Cold War Africa combine adaptation to 
and reaction against the global dominance of neoliberalism. While prominent politicians and 
statesmen revisit Pan-Africanist discourse in order to recast it in an 'African Renaissance' 
mould better suited to 21st century global realpolitik than its 20th century predecessor,93 social 
scientists call for a new paradigm with which to conduct Africa-specific intellectual enquiry.94 
In short, the quest for a distinctive 'African identity' with which to counter Eurocentric meta-
narrative has outlasted the Cold War. 
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This dissertation argues that nodal points of sub-Saharan Africa's endemic crop of debilitating 
ailments are derived - at least in part - from the Cold War, its ontological and epistemological 
binaries, ideologically driven dichotomies, and concomitant incommensurability of rival 
social science paradigms. While the era of decolonisation approximately can be dated from 
the end of the Second World War, at which juncture African nationalism definitively shifted 
into decolonising gear,95 postcolonialism is conceptualised as an ongoing process96 with its 
formal origin in the annus mirabilis of 1960. Although the time frame that informs the 
dissertation's title approximately coincides with the Cold War decades, it is worth 
emphasising that the trend of the dissertation is to regard postcolonialism not so much as a 
chronologically defined era but rather as a nuanced, unfolding continuum. As Abrahamsen 
puts it: 
The post in postcolonialism is not... to be regarded as a clearly dividing temporal 
post, but rather as an indication of continuity. Postcolonialism, in the words of Gyan 
Prakesh, 'Sidesteps the language of beginnings and ends.' It seeks to capture the 
continuities and complexities of any historical period, and attempts to transcend strict 
chronological and dichotomous thinking where history is clearly delineated and the 
social world neatly categorised into separate boxes. 
The argument outlined above incorporates a notion that zero-sum games played by Cold War 
warriors - whether of the pen or the sword - on both sides of a global schism generated a 
climate unfriendly to endogenous innovation and initiative, not least in the realm of context-
specific ideology in its capacity as politically legitimating and socially cohesive schematic 
within the boundaries of a given state. Further, this problematic has not been redeemed by 
the post Cold War pre-eminence of neoliberalism as a universal paradigm of development. 
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One consequence, both of Cold War and post Cold War meta-narratives, is that the lifespan 
of African nationalism has been over-extended, and in the process has mutated into a 
primarily defensive ideological instrument. The ever-diminishing ability of this relic of a 
once vibrant decolonisation ideology to endow its elite protagonists with sufficient legitimacy 
is indicated by rising levels of state (or state-sponsored) violence during and - in some cases -
well beyond the 1980s. "Exhausted nationalism"98 by definition is socially disruptive and 
nationally divisive. Far from providing a solution to 'African crisis', it both contributes to and 
is an aspect of the crisis of the postcolonial state." 
The chapter now moves on to a preliminary investigation of 'ideology'. According to 
Plamenatz, 'ideology' refers not to a single concept but to "a family of concepts." ,0° De 
Crespigny and Cronin cite "the load of meanings" carried by the term 'ideology'.101 Larrain 
notes that 'ideology' is "a concept heavily charged with political connotations and widely 
used in everyday life with the most diverse significations."102 He distinguishes between 
negative and positive interpretations of the concept.103 In similar vein, De Crespigny and 
Cronin distinguish between two approaches to ideology: "Those who hold that ideologies 
obtain ... their effects entirely through distortion" and those who "deploy the term in a more 
neutral fashion."104 
Having highlighted the difficulties inherent in arriving at a precise definition of the term, 
authors cited above conceptualise ideology as being or aspiring to be "a set of closely related 
beliefs or ideas ... characteristic of a group or community";105 as "systems of practically 
oriented beliefs or attitudes associated with social groups";106 or as "the expression of the 
world-view of a class."107 A notable feature of these definitions is the collective / communal / 
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social application (or alternatively, aspiration) of ideology. (Plamenatz, however, avers that 
one person may be deemed to possess an ideology - but adds a caveat, namely, that "the 
person whose ideas are so styled is held to be important... and what he does has grave 
consequences for others."108) Bearing in mind the socially collective application - or 
aspiration - of ideology, I embark as follows on an open-ended definition of the concept, viz, 
a theory-based programme of action that aims to integrate itself qua schematic of beliefs and 
activities with a given social constituency. 
Having arrived at a preliminary definition, it remains to be said that in Chapters Two and 
Three of the first section of the dissertation, origins and interpretations of'ideology' are 
explored in some depth and detail and, moreover, that this is a complex task. As De 
Crespigny and Cronin observe, "the diverse senses of'ideology' tell us much about the 
wanderings of our own recent history."109 In Chapter Two, particular attention is paid to the 
labyrinthine interface between ideology and science. Also, since 'science' imputes -
following Kuhn110 - the equivalent concept of'paradigm', the latter is examined in 
conjunction with science and ideology. During the course of this examination, the scientific 
(or paradigmatic) roots of Marxist and modernisation theories are explored. 
A further complication is that the distinction between 'ideology' per se and phenomena or 
practices negatively conceptualised as 'ideological' is not altogether easy to pin down. For 
instance, are all ideologies by definition ideological, or are some ideologies more ideological 
than others? It seems reasonable to surmise that if an ideology fits Hountondji's depiction of 
an assortment of (one party and military) state ideologies in Africa as "deceptive alibis in 
which the powers that be quietly do the opposite of what they say and say the opposite of 
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what they do",111 it is more, rather than less, ideological. Hountondji's observation suggests 
that ideologies in which ideological elements predominate are very largely the instruments of 
self-serving elites; it also imputes an admixture of conscious mendacity, and thus dovetails 
with Havel's depiction of Cold War era (in particular, Brezhnevite) ideology in 
Czechoslovakia: 
Ideology, in creating a bridge of excuses between the system and the individual, spans 
the abyss between the aims of the system and the aims of life. It pretends that the 
requirements of the system derive from the requirements of life. It is a world of 
appearances trying to pass for reality. 
Discernable in Havel's and Hountondji's respective anti-ideological stances is an inference 
that ruling elites knowingly misrepresent the lived experience of a majority of people. 
Mannheim, however, takes the point of view that situationally transcendent ideas rate as 
ideological if they do not succeed in realising their projected contents despite "the good 
faith" 113 in which their adherents and practitioners operate. Drawing on aspects of 
Mannheim's thesis, Chapter Three contains an analysis of Che Guevara's aptly titled African 
Dream.114 Guevara's somewhat anguished narrative provides a compelling, if harrowing 
account of his encounter, as practitioner of a scientific and universal paradigm of Marxism-
Leninism, with the lived world of the Congo, and the concomitant challenge to his 
(unmistakably sincere) commitment to the universal validity of his chosen science of 
revolution. 
Guevara's aptitude for self and paradigm interrogation resonates - mutatis mutandis - in 
Apter's retrospective contention that "too much of what passed for developmental 'science' 
was confusing. Too much that passed for political development was ideological."115 Apter, 
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however, does not explicate the precise meaning of'ideological' when applied to a 
development paradigm. In order to arrive at a definition of an 'ideological' paradigm, and 
bearing in mind that both modernisation theory and scientific Marxism incorporate key 
elements of positivism, Chapter Two discusses Bhaskar" s critique of empiricism"6 and 
Gramsci's disparaging review of Bukharin's attempt "to provide a schematic description and 
classification of historical and political facts, according to criteria built up on the model of 
natural science." 
In the first section of the dissertation, the concept 'paradigm' is unpacked according to 
Kuhn's use of the term. In brief: firstly, a paradigm ipso facto is scientific (this said, Kuhn's 
hesitations in regard applying the term to social - as opposed to natural - sciences duly are 
noted); secondly, it is "a preformed and relatively inflexible box","8 requiring "commitment 
to the same rules and standards""9 on the part of a given scientific community. Thirdly, it 
encapsulates a "strong network of commitments - conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and 
methodological", and "provides rules that tell the practitioner ... what both the world and his 
science look like."120 A paradigm, therefore, in relation to a specific community, is a world-
view incorporating shared values (which are important determinants of group behaviour)121 
and thus, fifthly, has a normative function, viz, the allocation of legitimacy criteria.122 
Finally in the first section, Chapter Four examines the paradigmatic roots of two models of 
nationalism, that is, 'revolutionary' and 'reformist', applied in Africa during the Cold War 
era, followed by an investigation of paradigmatic nationalism's converse within the 
nationalist genre, (African) cultural nationalism. Whereas a paradigmatic variant of 
nationalism - whether derived from a science of modernisation or of Marxism - defines itself 
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as scientific, cultural nationalism derives its momentum from a metaphysical essence that 
Africans are deemed to share, and to that extent is the antithesis of a scientific model. 
The second section (Chapters Five to Nine) begins with a review of the genre of African 
Studies with particular reference to its genesis and development during the Cold War era. 
The section then moves on to an in-depth survey of selected literature defined largely but not 
exclusively as paradigmatic. Exceptions to the paradigmatic rule also are explored, not least 
the context-specific, revolutionary theory of Amilcar Cabral. 
In the third section, Chapter Ten investigates Ujamaa in Tanzania. In so doing, the chapter 
illustrates the beneficial, long-term consequences for political legitimacy and social cohesion 
of an ideology at once humanist and locus-specific. At this juncture, the dissertation's theory 
and literature based analytic method is supplemented by information and ideas gleaned from 
interviews with individual Tanzanian respondents, conducted in Dar es Salaam in July 2003. 




OF IRON CAGES AND PARADIGMS 
Chapters Two, Three and Four launch three lines of enquiry that configure the dissertation's 
thematic trajectory. The first line of enquiiy takes in the genealogy of social science 
paradigms (or expert knowledge systems) imported to 20th century Africa from Europe and 
North America. During this process, the complex and disputed interface between science and 
ideology is explored. The second line of enquiry targets the interaction between a science of 
social reality (in this case, Marxism-Leninism) and the lived world, utilising - by way of a 
case study - Che Guevara's experiences in the Congo. The third line of enquiry traces the 
contours of nationalism in decolonising and postcolonial Africa. During the course of this 
investigation, several variations on a nationalist theme emerge, of which revolutionary 
nationalism and (behavioural) 'nation building' respectively are paradigmatic, hence of 
general developmental applicability. Conversely, cultural nationalism articulates and upholds 
the notion of an African cultural essence, and hence asserts African social and political 
specificity. 
Paradigms and ideology 
Social science paradigms. 
Widespread use in the social sciences of the term 'paradigm' can be dated from Kulin's 
seminal contribution to the philosophy of science. Initially, Kuhn expressed doubt about the 
applicability of the term 'paradigm' to social science research. "It remains an open question 
what parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all. History suggests that the 
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road to a firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous." However, in a later work in 
which he revisited his thesis, Kuhn modified his initial position, and indicated that the term 
'paradigm' is applicable to communities of scientists to the extent that shared examples of 
successful practice generate a sense of communal consensus that, in turn, enables "the 
unproblematic conduct of research."124 Referring to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Kuhn observed that .. 
...monitoring conversations, particularly among the book's enthusiasts, I have 
sometimes found it hard to believe that all parties to the discussion had been engaged 
with the same volume. Part of the reason for its success is, I regretfully conclude, that 
it can be too nearly all things to all people.125 
The text to which he refers (with a second edition in 1970) has sold over a million copies in 
20 languages and rates as one of the most influential academic books of the 20th century.1 
According to Oakley, Kuhn regarded the social sciences as being pre-paradigmatic,127 but 
"this did not stop social scientists from enthusiastically taking up his idea of paradigms, while 
not being totally clear what they were .... Kuhn himself apparently used the term in 22 
different ways."128 This said, and taking her cue from Kuhn's explication of the 
'sociological' meaning of paradigm, Oakley contends that "paradigms are not only produced 
from the doing of scientific work, they also play a key role in providing covert reference 
points; paradigms bind people together in a shared commitment to their disciplines." (ii) 
From this concise definition, three features of a paradigm can be inferred and expanded. 
Firstly, a paradigm is self-sustaining. It extends and confirms itself as an explanatory model 
through the affirmative work of its practitioners. Secondly, in a limited sense it is 
coextensive with a school of thought or body of theory although the latter terms do not 
(ii) Unless otherwise stated, all emphases in quotations are in the original. 
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necessarily include key characteristics of paradigms, for instance, the notion that a paradigm 
ipso facto is scientific. Thirdly, 'covert' suggests that a dig conducted between the lines of 
paradigmatic texts will uncover assumptions, not necessarily stated as such but nonetheless 
identifiable. 
Patton's definition of a paradigm covers more ground than than Oakley's. 
A paradigm is a world view, a general perspective, a way of breaking down the 
complexity of the real world. As such, paradigms are deeply embedded in the 
socialisation of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell them what is important, 
legitimate and reasonable. Paradigms are also normative, telling the practitioner what 
to do without the necessity of long existential or epistemological considerations. But 
it is this aspect of paradigms that constitutes both their strengths and their weakness -
their strength is that it makes action possible, their weakness is that the very reason for 
action is hidden in the unquestioned assumptions of the paradigm. 
Extrapolating from Patton's account, a social science paradigm firstly, is peripatetic since it 
takes a globe-trotting route rather than restricting itself to one slice of territory; secondly, is 
socially and culturally informed by the specific locus of its originators; thirdly, is exclusive 
since it excludes world views incompatible with paradigmatic epistemology, along with 
cognitive systems that are located outside paradigmatic boundaries and - ipso facto - are 
unscientific. The exclusivity of a paradigm in turn depends on fourthly, the "unquestioned 
assumptions' from which its practitioners draw their strength (action) and weakness 
(presumably, action which lacks a paradigm-critical component.) Arguably, these 
unquestioned paradigmatic assumptions can be likened to Berger's 'respectable motif. 
Citing the second Middletown study, Berger notes a "series of'of course statements' - that is, 
statements that represent a consensus so strong that the answer to any question concerning 
them will habitually be prefaced with the words 'of course!'"131 It so happens that the 
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Middletown studies were conducted within a setting of middle class American mores, but I 
see no reason not to apply the same principle, mutatis mutandis, to the bedrock of 
paradigmatic assumptions, indeed to any statement or inference that - shored up by consensus 
- presents itself in the light of a self evident truth. Such assumptions form the respectable 
motif of any given paradigm, and to offer a serious challenge to bedrock elements is to bring 
oneself- as Berger would put it - to the threshold of unrespectability.132 
Bearing in mind the locus-specific origins of paradigms, it seems reasonable to infer that 
bedrock assumptions in origin are space and time contingent: the socio-cultural texture of the 
space of origin informs the assumptions, as does the historical era from which a paradigm 
emerges. Again, given a finite space and time of origin with all the cognitive and predictive 
limitations attendant on finity, a paradigm can either declare itself relevant only in the context 
of, say, the 19th century aftermath of the industrial revolution in Western Europe, or 
alternatively, post World War Two North America, or it can find a way to transcend its 
bounded context, and thus declare itself possessed of global applicability as well as - at least, 
to the extent to which it projects itself into the future - possessed of more-or-less timeless 
relevance. Finally, a paradigm's ability to achieve this formidably large objective depends - at 
least in the first instance - not merely on an epistemology but - perhaps more to the point - a 
simplified epistemology.133 In the second instance, the success of a paradigm presumably 
depends on its ability to attract a solid and reasonably reputable body of theorists as well as a 
not inconsiderable number of practitioners. 
In past ages of the social world, only religious knowledge systems possessed attributes 
suitable for universal trajectories and global constituencies. Since religion qua widely 
34 
accepted epistemology over time largely has been replaced by science, it seems appropriate 
that the most successful - that is, widely travelled and practised - paradigms are grounded in a 
scientific epistemological base. Beyond this seemingly respectable scientific terrain, 
however, lies the thorny and tangled question of the extent to which it is possible or even 
desirable for the social sciences to model themselves on or to claim equivalent 
epistemological status with the natural sciences. This seminal question notwithstanding, 
during (approximately) the Cold War era, two social science paradigms in particular are 
emblematic of the allure of explanatory and predictive certainty in Africa and elsewhere in the 
developing world, namely, modernisation theory and Marxism, more specifically, the 
scientific variant. 
Social science and reflexivity. 
Arguably, the reflexivity of theory is emblematic of pitfalls inherent in social - or 'soft' -
science's attempt to emulate the 'hard' sciences. This section of the chapter begins by 
distinguishing between two ways of interpreting the concept of reflexivity, and then moves on 
to delineate similarities and differences between Marxist and modernisation paradigms in the 
light of their respective claims to equivalence with natural science. During the course of the 
delineation, a tendency on the part of social scientists is noted, namely that in the event of 
anomaly, fault is allocated not to a given paradigm but instead to the object/s of research. 
Rosenburg's unpacking of the concept of reflexivity reveals one general meaning but two 
textures - "thin' and 'thick' - within that meaning. In the thin (or unintentional) sense, theory 
is reflexive inasmuch as (and if) it shapes thought and action in the lived world of social 
experience and practice.134 For instance, if publication in a widely read national newspaper 
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in South Africa of a scholar's theory about racism, including explanations and predictions 
derived from an array of quantitative data, subsequently affects attitudes and outcomes in the 
society which is the subject of the research, the theory qualifies as reflexive. In other words, 
once a theory becomes known to the human beings constituting the raw material on which 
social science research focuses its expert attention, real outcomes duly are affected, either in a 
way that affirms the theory's predictive power or distorts / frustrates it. In the 'thick' or 
purposive sense, a reflexive theory is a normative theory, the aim of which is to affect human 
action. In sum: the 'reflexivity' of theory denotes an interactive component - intentional or 
otherwise - between scientific research and the social world to which it applies itself. 
The exemplar in Europe of reflexive theory in its 'thick' sense is critical theory (the Frankfurt 
school and humanist Marxism in general) which adopted Marx's critique of ideology qua 
alienation-inducing false consciousness as a humanist motif. According to Rosenburg's 
understanding of what critical theorists "mean by their demand for 'reflexive' theory", they 
mean theory that is not merely descriptive (describes the way the world is) but also 
prescriptive (describes the way the world ought to be), and that therefore "prescribes the 
direction in which action should be taken."135 In the world as perceived by Marxist 
humanists, there both is and ought to be a normative force which drives action, namely, the 
drive to emancipate oneself and other human beings from false (or ideological) beliefs. What 
Rosenburg seems to be suggesting is that any theory, the avowed intention of which is to 
emancipate people from false belief, ipso facto is reflexive. 
Since documented endeavours to emancipate others from false belief go back at least as far as 
Socrates, 'thick' reflexivity is a new term for a time-honoured endeavour. 'Thin' reflexivity, 
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on the other hand, has relatively modern roots in the science of the European Enlightenment 
and has introduced a novel (relatively speaking) problematic insofar as the certainty of a 
belief grounded in a scientific epistemology, and arrived at by way of an objectively 
formulated and applied set of methods makes it difficult, even well-nigh impossible for 
adherents and practitioners to entertain serious doubts about the universal validity of their 
paradigm. Instructive in this regard is Delanty's summary of the position of scientific - as 
distinct from humanist - Marxism. 
Marxist epistemology always assumed that science as a cognitive system was in 
possession of truth and that this truth corresponded in some way to the revolutionary 
and constructivist potential in the consciousness of the proletariat. Ideology was thus 
a "false consciousness' while science was true consciousness.136 
Scientific Marxism assumes that knowledge of reality coincides with the most historically 
advanced form of human consciousness to date, that of the proletariat. Given that science and 
the highest form of consciousness are indistinguishable from one another, all other modes of 
cognition and practice axiomatically are excluded - relegated to the dustbin of ideology. Ipse 
dixit. 'It is so because science says it is so.' Since modernisation theory also incorporates 
the above maxim, I now turn to the scientific genealogy of the modernisation paradigm. 
Modernisation theory's epistemological position and methodological approach owe much to 
the behaviouralist trend in positivist social science, in turn informed by psychology's science 
of behaviourism. For instance, Susser, in the course of a critique of behaviouralism, and 
having noted "the behaviourists' insistence on the desirability of a "value-free' science," 
quotes Easton: "Values can ultimately be reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the 
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individual's total life experience." Since in a behavioural lexicon, values (of a certain sort) 
and ideologies are coextensive, neither can be understood as having real or substantive 
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existence. To the behaviouralist, as Susser explains, an applied ideology is relevant solely for 
its effects. Estimating the utility or otherwise of a given ideology by extension, then, is 
restricted to evidence provided by behaviour affected by attitudes which in turn are informed 
by ideological commitments. Furthermore, an ideology, much like any other ideation system, 
is of interest to applied social science in a behavioural mode only to the extent that it affects 
the behaviour of a large enough number of people to rate as behaviourally significant, not 
least because it then is quantifiable and as such lends itself to precise measurement and 
rational adjustment. Even then, it is not significant in itself. "Ideas can be stated in terms of 
groups: the groups never in terms of the idea."139 
Whereas scientific Marxism attributes to proletarian consciousness the status of scientific 
truth, thus ultimately allowing human cognition at a certain level - the level of species-being -
freedom to be and to realise itself, behaviouralism allows no such possibilities or 
potentialities. Briefly put, behaviourist psychology rejects as meaningless - random or 
arbitrary - all forms of cognitively or viscerally induced behaviour which cannot be traced 
back to an identifiable (physical) cause. Cognitive attributes such as attitudes, personality 
traits, beliefs and so on, along with visceral attributes such as emotions, therefore are fully 
derivative and as such, have no substantive niche in behaviourist epistemology. Rosenburg 
summarises as follows the behaviourist approach: 
Taking their lead from Skinner, psychological behaviourists hold that the aim of their 
science is not to understand the mind, but to systematise observable behaviour. 
Systemising behaviour means providing general statements that enable us to correlate 
observable experimental conditions with the behaviour they trigger.141 
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Behaviouralists deviate from the behaviourist path inasmuch as they attribute meaning to 
cognitive constructs such as attitudes when they can be linked to empirical referents.142 Their 
ultimate objective, however, does not differ markedly from that of behaviourism. "Their aim 
is generalisation with predictive power."143 As argued by Hall, Durkheim's theory has played 
a part in constructing this telescoped method of uncovering objective reality. More 
specifically, Hall attributes it to ... 
... the selective manner in which Durkheim's work has been appropriated 
(expropriated might be more accurate) into mainstream American empirical social 
science. Durkheim is regarded as the 'father' of positive social science because he 
rejected all the Germanic nonsense about ideas, Mind, Spirit. He consigned 'ideas' to 
a little black box not because they were unimportant but because they could not be 
analysed. Instead, he determined to treat what could be analysed - patterned social 
interaction governed by norms and channelled by institutional structures. The 
observable aspects of these had to be treated as if they exhibited the hardness and 
consistency of objects in the natural world. Hence the famous admonition - to 'treat 
social facts as things'. 
But, continues Hall, during a process of selective appropriation what has been passed over is 
Durkheim's belief that social phenomena exist sui generis, and that the '"facts' which 
Durkheim wanted to treat as 'things' were social actions informed by ideas ..." Hall concludes 
that despite appearances, "Durkheim belonged to the neo-Kantian tradition. 'Noumenal' 
reality had to be studied through its forms of appearance - through 'phenomenal' reality." 
As outlined by Hall, the difference between Durkheim and his American expropriators is fine 
but nonetheless significant. To admit the reality sui generis of ideas, and of social 
phenomena informed by ideas, is not the same as excluding from the terrain of the real all 
ideas and social phenomena not susceptible to precise determination and quantification in 
terms of their effect on behaviour. From Hall's critique perhaps can be extrapolated a notion 
that the most significant point of difference between behaviouralists and Durkheim is located 
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in the slide rule with which a behaviouralist measures reality. Any effect observably 
determined by an ascertainable cause is susceptible to empirical investigation, and therefore 
qualifies as "real.' Whereas Durkheim despaired of the capacity of hermeneutics to provide 
adequate knowledge of the intention concealed in the mind of the individual actor, instead 
turning to collective representations of social action146 with which to inform his 
interpretation, behaviouralists retain as legitimate research material those cognitive attributes 
that morph into quantifiable forms of collective behaviour. In the process, however, they 
exclude "unmeasurable elements" from the study of particular groups, thereby 
disembarrassing behavioural epistemology of elements not amenable to precise measurement, 
and relegating them to "the shadowy domain of quasi-phenomena."147 
Referring to a frequently made connection between behavioural methodology and an ideology 
of conservatism, Susser contends that "behaviouralism's much criticised 'obsession' with 
stability and its insensitivity to change can be more fully appreciated if we recognise it as a 
concomitant of the scientific method and not merely another case of "establishment 
politics."148 This said, behavioural science hinges on a particular perception of natural 
science, namely, that "nowhere does nature present us with discontinuity or revolt against its 
laws." It is worth noting that this perception of a uniform, universal, hence generalisable 
by virtue of its causal laws, natural reality also applies to Marxism's perception of the natural 
order, and therefore of its own status within the practices and predictions of science. For 
example, in the preface to the first German edition of Capital, Marx compared his methods to 
those of the physicist.150 He would have liked to dedicate Das Capital to Darwin (who 
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declined the honour151) presumably to celebrate the affinity of their respective scientific 
discoveries - or, at any rate, so Engels contended during a eulogy at Marx's graveside.152 
Behaviouralism thus shares with scientific Marxism, firstly, a correspondence theory of truth 
in which there is a correspondence between scientific truth and natural necessity; secondly, a 
belief that science, whether natural or social, is the study of an objectively existing reality. 
These features, however, beg the question of a differentiation, described by Bhaskar as the 
central paradox of science, between scientific knowledge of things and the things themselves, 
that is, the intransitive objects of knowledge. Whereas knowledge (of things) is a social 
product, the objects of scientific investigation ... 
... are not produced by men at all: the specific gravity of mercury, the process of 
electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these 'objects of knowledge 
depends upon human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel 
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and heavy bodies fall to earth in exactly the same way ... 
If one argues that the objects (human societies) of social scientific knowledge are not 
intransitive in the sense deployed by Bhaskar,154 then the concomitant reflexivity of social 
science undermines the claim that a given social science paradigm is the equivalent of natural 
science. Pieterse, for instance, argues that "in the social sciences positivism is largely a past 
station" not least since "social sciences are of an extraordinary complexity because they 
involve political processes that are reflexive in nature, in the sense that social actors will act 
upon any theory, which is thus modified in action." 
An emblematic instance of the claim interrogated by Bhaskar and Pieterse can be found in a 
behaviouralist assertion that "science has no recourse to Utopia. The physical laws that the 
scientist encounters are fixed. No talent or will can change them. There is no sense in saying 
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of a particular phenomenon, qua scientist, that it is good or bad, or in calling for the reform of 
one of Newton's laws."156 In short, behavioural science assumes that its method, which it 
rates as equivalent to the method of the physicist, is constant and invariant. In the light of this 
behaviouralist belief, it is arguable that for Marxism's perfection of ends (world socialist 
revolution eventuating in global socialist society and the realisation of species being), 
behaviourahsm substitutes perfection of means. Hence, modernisation theory offers, not the 
vision of social perfectibility offered by scientific Marxism, but instead a perfect method of 
engineering modern societies - or at any rate, the best available method. In support of this 
constricted route to modernity, behaviourahsm asserts that "to dream of another set of givens, 
to criticise reality from the perspective of a vision of the potentially possible, is to fall prey to 
what Eulau called 'the normative fallacy.'"157 In the world inhabited by behaviouralists, 
social reality itself sets fixed limits to the possibilities of social change given that, firstly, the 
realm of the knowable by definition is restricted, and secondly, it is surface knowledge: we 
know only that which we physically can observe, quantify, calculate and so on. In short, 
modernisation theory offers a conservative model of change. 
Whereas 'early' Marx declared upfront the purposively reflexive nature of his theory, viz: 
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to 
change it"158, for behaviouralists, reflexivity is a non-issue in light of the neutral and 
dispassionate distance a behavioural scientist sets between him or herself and his/her objects 
of study.159 By the same token, the value-neutral texture of the behavioural paradigm ensures 
that judgements between ideologies are made on functional grounds only. However, against 
this purportedly neutral stance, it could be argued that in selecting the most appropriate 
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methods with which to implement modernising agendas in undeveloped societies, 
behaviouralists make choices - for instance, between private and state ownership, between 
free market and planned economies - which by inference indicate ideological preference. 
Furthermore, as Pieterse emphasises: "Stages theories of political modernisation could 
accommodate any form of authoritarianism as a 'necessary stage' ... provided they were not 
communist. Hence the crucial distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian political 
systems."160 Pieterse's statement that "modernisation is essentially social engineering from 
above and an operation of political containment rather than democratisation"161 is echoed by 
Susser's contention that at the end of the day, behavioural science does double duty as an 
ideology of conservatism.162 By focussing exclusively on what 'is' - as perceived by 
behaviouralism - behaviouralists attempt to construct a reality that conforms to their 
perception of it. In other words, if reality sets limits to social aspirations, so, too, do 
behaviouralists aspire to set limits to social reality. Furthermore, given their posture of 
scientific objectivity, behaviouralist denial (in effect) of the reflexivity of their theory 
suggests that they either consciously pretend to be value neutral or are self-deceptive.163 
Expanding the point, Elshtein maintains that behaviouralists start from rock bottom with 
brute-data identifiable behaviour, thus enabling simple questions that in principle can be 
answered. In the process, they exclude questions they consider unscientific, such as questions 
about social justice. By privileging certain questions and excluding others, they set the agenda 
within which research can (read 'should') be conducted.164 She concludes that "because the 
practitioners of an ostensibly value-free social science deny that their work is infused with 
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values, they cannot recognise and thus cannot articulate, the implications of their conclusions 
for human wants, needs and purposes within political and social life."165 
In sum, neither modernisation theory nor its behavioural parent acknowledge the reflexivity 
of theory. Additionally, unlike Marxists whose scientific certainties foundered somewhat on 
the undeniable evidence of Soviet bloc morbidity, behaviouralists (even if some now are 
postbehavioural), given their privileged niche as members of the only remaining global 
superpower's intellectual elite, are in a position to ignore the implications attendant on the 
reflexivity of their paradigm, or at any rate, to avoid acknowledging it in any way which 
reflects badly on themselves. There perhaps is an all too common assumption that - since 
scientific method is never at fault - if an experiment fails to achieve the predicted results then 
the objects of scientific method by definition are faulty. Cooper's anecdote provides a small 
but telling illustration of this mentality. 
In 1990,1 met one of the revered founding fathers of American comparative politics, 
who, on hearing of my area of specialisation, commented, 'nothing interesting is 
happening in African politics.' Whereas at one time, modernisation theory had led 
political scientists and sociologists to look toward Africa - and not leave its study to 
anthropologists - Africa's failure to behave in accordance with the theory seems to 
have led many of these disciplines to abandon the continent.166 
From the anecdote cited above can be garnered a supposition that if a social science paradigm 
is unable to account for anomaly, its practitioners react by relegating the object/s of research 
to the 'excluded middle'. Further, this exclusionary - that is, of alternate realities — approach 
on the part of exogenous paradigms arguably has been mirrored by the adoption of 
developmental ideologies intended to sanction not only construction and maintenance of one-
party states but also concentration of power in relatively few expert hands, thereby ironing out 
44 
difference and contradiction. The above suppositions, and the connection between them, are 
explained and elaborated in the next section of the chapter. 
Ideology and the excluded middle. 
Asked to deliver a paper about 'Disenchantment' as pervasive theme in highly industrialised 
societies, Gellner, suspecting that he is "expected to be agin it," decides to engage the theme 
via a less conventional route. First, he articulates the standard 'Disenchantment' position 
regarding ... 
... the Faustian purchase of cognitive, technological and administrative power, by the 
surrender of our previous meaningful, humanly suffused, humanly responsive, if often 
also menacing and capricious world. That is abandoned for a more predictable, more 
amenable but coldly indifferent and uncosy world. The Iron Cage is not merely one of 
bureaucratic organisation it is also a conceptual one. It places constraints not merely 
on our conduct but also on our vision.167 
He then suggests an alternative conceptualisation to the orthodox juxtaposition of the Tron 
Cage' thesis with a proposition that social tension and civil unrest inevitably are attendant on 
the dominion of specialised knowledge which is at the heart of modernity. He instead 
proposes "the Rubber Cage thesis, which is meant to apply to a later or fully developed stage 
of industrialisation."168 
It is noteworthy that Gellner does not dispute the applicability of the Iron Cage thesis "to the 
emergence of industrial society."1 In juxtaposing an iron with a rubber cage, his intention is 
to contrast serious and arduous knowledge with a cognitive mode that is accessible enough to 
accommodate the public domain in highly developed countries. The illustration he provides 
is drawn from the realm of politics,170 specifically, the role of constitutional monarchy in an 
established democracy characterised by the separation of powers. Constitutional monarchy 
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serves a useful function precisely because it is symbolic and therefore is not tainted by the 
failure of government policies. A monarch attracts the loyalty of the national public, yet at 
the same time his or her political role is taken no more than half seriously. This, argues 
Gellner, is a useful way to ensure that real power is not sacred.171 However: "The question is 
whether the argument can be transferred to the sphere of belief or ideology, as opposed to the 
sphere of politics."172 In other words, in the sphere of belief / faith / ideology (Gellner uses 
the three terms interchangeably), should there be a separation of powers between iron and 
rubber cages, or should the iron cage extend its domain to encompass the lived world? 
As Gellner illustrates, there are two categories of response to the above question. According 
to one response, the "potency of modern knowledge, and its rapid growth and consequent 
instability, make it unsuitable and unsafe as the foundation of one's moral, social, human 
vision. It is subject to dramatic transformations. The great discovery of today becomes the 
fallacy of tomorrow."173 According to this argument, iron and rubber cages should occupy 
separate and distinct spaces, thus leaving the lived world to be experienced in a "personal, 
warm, human, intelligible" way.174 The converse argument, however, asks the question: 
"how useful is half-serious belief?"175 and thus queries the usefulness (to modernity) of the 
lived world if it is insufficiently informed by scientific cognition and serious belief. 
Instructive in the context of this dissertation's lines of enquiry is Gellner's depiction of'the 
God of the excluded middle.' 
It is plausible to suspect that we owe the remarkable knowledge which is the 
foundation of modern society to a certain intolerant seriousness. The religions of 
Abrahamic tradition proposed a jealous God. A jealous and exclusive God, when 
rearticulated in terms of Greek thought, became the God of the excluded middle. His 
intolerance of divine rivals became also the intolerance of simultaneously held 
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contradictory beliefs. Without the impulse to systematise and eliminate incoherence, 
could it ever have happened? Is this not the crucial clue to the miracle of Cognitive 
Growth?176 
Extrapolating from Gellner's discussion: the argument against keeping iron and rubber cages 
separate and distinct is an argument against the bifurcation of thought into two streams: 
scientific (serious) and everyday (half serious). At first glance, the argument seems 
egalitarian since a division between the two seems elitist ('real thinkers' in one space and 
'messy thinkers' in another), whereas to conflate the two seems democratic and inclusive. 
This said, given 'the intolerance of simultaneously held contradictory beliefs' which 
characterises the iron cage, is it not, perhaps, an argument in favour of inflicting jealous, 
exclusive and intolerant denizens of the iron cage on the luckless inhabitants of the lived 
world in order to transform their cognitively untidy existence into a reasonable facsimile of 
iron cage order? Additionally, given Gellner's acerbic depiction of the simplifications, hence 
distortions (of complex and difficult knowledge systems) that are a sine qua non of applying 
expert knowledge to the lived world,177 it looks like a process of mutual distortion. On the 
one hand, 'ordinary people' are instructed by experts in scientific theory and its application in 
practice; on the other, experts - in order to enter a public domain - are obliged to turn their 
silk purses into sows' ears. 
Wrapping up his thesis, Gellner revisits the argument in favour of keeping the two modes of 
cognition separate. 
It might be said that the God of the Excluded Middle was merely required as the First 
Cause of the genuine Cognitive Growth on which we now all depend. Once that 
movement has developed, it can be carried on by its own momentum, and no longer 
depends on the psychic set of men in their daily life.178 
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The above proposition intimates that in a highly industrialised country, the iron cage is 
powered by its own generator which functions irrespective of lived world mentalities. 
Nonetheless, Gellner declines explicitly to commit himself to either argument. ("Which of 
these two attitudes is correct? Quite obviously, we do not know."179) At this juncture, 
however, it is instructive to revisit his distinction between countries in which industry is 
highly developed and countries in which industry is emergent. It is a distinction that overall 
he approaches en passant, but his point becomes clearer if one considers the link he makes 
between cognitive (scientific) growth and stage of economic development. The populations 
of countries only now embarking on this dual path, by inference must learn to co-exist with 
the god of the excluded middle. What other choice do they have? 
The above point of conjecture is highlighted by statements and estimations made in the 1960s 
by two of newly independent Africa's high profile heads of state. Nkrumah described his 
government's formidable task, that is, the generation of economic development and national 
unity as "almost analogous to a state of war and national emergency which is always met in 
the older established countries by the formation of coalition or national governments."180 
Nyerere, arguing - in the first decade of Tanzania's independence - in favour of one party 
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rule, referred to '"our state of emergency." He expanded the argument in "Democracy and 
the Party System". 
In any country which is divided over fundamental issues you have the "civil war' 
situation we have been talking about. If, on the other hand, you have a two-party 
system where the differences between the parties are not fundamental, then you 
immediately reduce politics to the level of a football match. A football match may, of 
course, attract some very able players; it may also be entertaining; but it is still only a 
game, and only the most ardent fans (who are not usually the most intelligent) take the 
game very seriously. This, in fact, is not unlike what has happened in many of the so-
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called democratic countries today ...Our critics should understand that, in Africa, we 
have to take our politics a little more seriously.182 
Returning to Gellner: his depiction of iron cage cognition contains two main emphases: 
firstly, its seriousness; secondly, its instability. In a subsequent publication, he revisits the 
relationship between iron cage and lived world, and - five years after the dismantling of the 
Berlin wall - he takes the side of the argument against importing the iron cage to the lived 
world since "the attempt to impose it in Marxist societies, at the end proved catastrophic, and 
helped bring about their eventual disintegration."183 Citing "the instability, contestability and 
often incomprehensibility" of serious cognition, he concludes that the contents of an iron cage 
are "incompatible with any imposition of a social consensus."184 
If Gellner's assessment is supplemented by Havel's ironic but apt contention that it is the task 
of (mythologised) ideology to identify the centre of truth with the centre of power,185 this 
scenario is clarified. The contents of an iron cage are transported to the lived world in 
ideological mode, the function of which is to operate to the advantage of elites by 
representing political leaders and their expert advisors as definitive possessors of scientific 
truth. 
Exploring the science - ideology interface 
Positivism and ideology 
Since the origins of the expert knowledge of modernisation and Marxist sciences respectively 
are located in the positivist science of the Enlightenment, this section of the chapter begins 
with an outline of key characteristics of positivism. In positivist science, 'positive' means 
that which really exists and can be observed.'86 Positivism thus embraces empiricism which 
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holds that the basis of science is observation and verification by means of the scientific 
method in which "the scientist carries out experiments in order to uncover objectively 
existing, general laws from which hypotheses can be made that can be used to predict what 
happens."187 Empiricism imputes naturalism which maintains that the objects of study exist 
outside science and can be neutrally observed, along with scientism which denies that there 
are any significant differences in the methods appropriate to studying social and natural 
objects,188 and thus not only argues for the unity of the natural and social sciences but also 
equates knowledge with science. Finally, positivism incorporates within its operational 
matrix a realist formula of binary design, defined by Sardar as the basis of modern science's 
modus operandi, that is, "Either/or Aristotelean logic (X is either A or non-A)."189 Given an 
absolute distinction between A and non-A, no substantive, intermediate categories 
are admissible. As Larrain puts it, "positivism petrifies what is rational and non-rational into 
autonomous separate entities, given once and forever." In consequence, "science overcomes 
ideology as truth overcomes error."190 
Like 'paradigm', widespread adoption of the term 'ideology' in origin can be traced to the 
work of one person. Operating within the cognitive matrix of the French Enlightenment, 
Destutt de Tracy coined the term to describe a new science of ideas "based on observation 
and free from prejudices."191 According to Bluhm, the governing assumption of de Tracy and 
the ideologues was that strife and misery were the product of the inexact reasoning of 
common sense. Bluhm adds that "the first meaning of "ideology' set by its proponents, thus 
had positive connotations much like those which attach to the word 'science' in our own 
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In its initial manifestation, then, "ideology' can be viewed firstly, as a cognitive product of the 
French revolution: a reason-centred concept at the interface between an ancien regime 
embedded in sacral epistemology and the secular 'rule of reason' that in Europe heralded the 
onset of modernity; secondly, as an 18th century tributary of the stream of scientific discourse 
in Europe that has its point of first origin in the Italian Renaissance. Whereas the spirit of 
Renaissance science, perhaps best exemplified by Leonardo da Vinci's statement that: "No 
human enquiry can become true knowledge until it has been proved mathematically"193 was 
mathematical and realist, Newtonian physics, that is, a deterministic theory of causal 
mechanisms that made prediction a requirement of scientific achievement,194 informed the 
ethos of the Enlightenment. At roughly the same time that Destutt de Tracy was formulating 
"an analysis of the origin of ideas"195 Comte - who coined the term 'sociology' - was 
proposing a social science modelled on (Newtonian) physics, namely, "a value free, 
explanatory, descriptive and comparative science of general social laws." Included in his 
notion of science is "useful and certain knowledge" that in its emphasis on empirical 
methodology, defines itself in contradistinction to "imaginary knowledge."196 Overall, the 
Comtean position, as summarised by Delanty, is that "there can be no truth without 
observation. The empirical henceforth refers to the domain of objectively existing facts and 
science is the observation of those facts."197 
Real politics versus ideology 
Unlike Comte who is known as the father of positivism, Destutt de Tracy usually is 
remembered only as the originator of the term 'ideology'. He certainly would not be called 
the 'father of political science' (which in its positivist form claims descent from Comte). By-
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and-large, the concept of ideology has shared the politically uncertain career of its 18 1 
century author. Napoleon, at first an enthusiastic patron of the ideologues, turned on them 
when they opposed his increasingly despotic rule. He ridiculed their scientific pretensions 
and - in effect - dismissed them as woolly idealists with no understanding of'real polities'. 
Destutt de Tracy and the other ideologues, having lost their encounter with the centre of 
power in France, faded into the shadows of past history. 
Napoleon's distinction between ideology and politics resonates - albeit on different grounds -
in a Cold War differentiation between the 'politics' of Western democracies and (totalitarian) 
'ideologies' of fascism and communism. For instance, Crick avers that "ideological thinking 
is an explicit and direct challenge to political thinking."198 Crick also defends politics against 
democracy which he defines as "perhaps the most promiscuous word in the world of public 
affairs."199 Arguing that the label 'democracy' most often is applied to majority rule, or at any 
rate, majority consent, he points out that the German election of 1933 (in which Hitler 
acceded to power) was democratic.200 Crick, therefore, does not use the term 'democracy' to 
signify the 'self of Western Europe in contrast to her Eastern European 'other'. Instead, his 
binary division is between 'politics' (West) and 'ideology' (East). ' Following Aristotle, 
Crick defines politics as the 'master science' - not in the sense that it encompasses all other 
sciences but in the sense that it adjudicates between them and allocates order of priority "in 
their rival claims on the always scarce resources of any given community." He concludes that 
political practice comprises deliberate and continuous individual activity that realises itself in 
politics in its capacity as " the market place and the price mechanism of all social 
demands."202 
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Against Crick's notion of politics in the West as a master science that occupies the 
commanding spot in a pluralist marketplace of contending demands, whereas ideology 
"means an end to politics,"203 can be set Bottomore and Rubel's interpretation of Marx's 
assertion that: "It is not the consciousness of men which determines their being, but on the 
contrary, their social being which determines their consciousness."204 This statement, or so 
they argue, 
... is not a philosophical (epistemological) proposition, but a statement about the 
genesis of ideological constructions, law, politics, religion, art, and philosophy. It is 
these 'ideological forms', according to Marx, which constitute the principle 
stumbling- block for scientific investigation, when they are considered in themselves, 
without taking into account the correlations which can be established between a 
certain stage of economic development and the various cultural products.205 
That set of activities which Crick counts as 'politics,' Marx would define as an ideological 
construction since "polities' secures the interests of an economically dominant class, with 
Crick himself operating (if one takes into account Gramsci's nuanced branch of the Marxist 
trunk) as a 'deputy' of the dominant class. In this view, the notion of politics as a master 
science is a hegemonic deployment of the term 'science' that accordingly hinders scientific 
investigation. For a Gramscian, Crick's position would be in the connective tissue between a 
bourgeois state and "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private."206 
Lenin's variation on a theme 
Unlike Marx for whom 'ideology' was epiphenomenal, hence had no real or substantive 
existence, Lenin posited two separate and distinct categories of both scientific and ideological 
systems, that is, 'bourgeois' and "socialist". (Since he didn't distinguish between ideology as a 
broad category, and science, it could be said that Lenin attributed to ideology the status of 
epistemology - in which case, different epistemological positions underwrite bourgeois and 
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socialist ideologies respectively.) According to Carlsnaes, Lenin's thesis is an "adumbrated 
doctrine" that is not developed in any length or detail - yet has proven extraordinarily 
influential. It centres on a notion of ideological duality that occupies the entire 
superstructure of ideas since "mankind has not created a "third' ideology, and moreover, in a 
society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class 
ideology." For Lenin, then, 'ideology' is a material force to the extent that it is tethered to 
class and class struggle. 
In distinction to Marx, who derives his doctrine of ideology as false or mystifying 
consciousness from a basically ontological conception of the nature of man as species-
being, Lenin's conception is a direct derivative of the sociological concepts of'class' 
and especially "class conflict'. Hence it is not only a broader, simpler and far more 
palpable doctrine than that of Marx, but also (probably because of this) an eminently 
practical one, well suited to a frame of mind which, as Trotsky writes, was above all 
dominated by the ambition of being 'the great engineer of history' rather than - as in 
the case with Marx - 'the midwife of revolution'.209 
What are the implications of Lenin's thesis for the relationship between ideology and science? 
Firstly, in the context of class struggle, theory is an aspect of the struggle, specifically, "the 
struggle of and over mind and consciousness in which impartiality is as impossible as within 
the other and more tangible forms of the revolutionary movement."210 Secondly, 'ideology' 
per se is a neutral concept. Its scientific content, and concomitantly its veracity, are 
contingent on the class to which it is attached. As Larrain notes of the Marxist orthodox 
tradition initiated by Lenin, the allocation of scientific content to an ideology "is sometimes 
supported by a notion of ascendent and descendent classes. This allows a proletarian 
ideology to be called 'scientific' whereas bourgeois ideology is considered non-scientific."211 
In short, a scientific ideology by definition is the property of a progressive or revolutionary 
class. Thirdly, given that a major contribution made by Lenin to Marxism is his 
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reconfiguration of Marx's (stage of the) dictatorship of the proletariat to fit the contours of a 
hegemonic AvantGarde (or vanguard party), scientific knowledge - at least, in the first 
instance - is the property of a "a narrow dedicated band of professional revolutionaries, led 
from the centre."212 
Behaviouralism and physics envy 
Returning to Crick: he argues the case for non-positivist political theory insofar as he has 
strong reservations about "the idea of a value-free science of politics" which he defines as 
"pseudo-science."213 His rejection of an American science of politics is attendant on his 
dismissal of the notion that methodology is or can be neutral. He argues as follows: firstly, a 
science of politics is an attempt to take the politics out of politics by avoiding the purposive 
element in political theory. Here, Crick can be taken as implying that scientific analyses of 
political behaviour potentially operate in a normless wilderness. "There are some things, as 
Leo Strauss has said of the concentration camps, of which a purely objective description 
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would seem like a satire on mankind." Secondly, he contends that American political 
scientists make a specious distinction between method and doctrine. "Every methodology is 
itself a political doctrine. It is a case of Erst kommt die Politik: dann kommt die 
Methodologie."216 On this view, a science of politics begins with a political doctrine and then 
constructs a methodology that underwrites the doctrine in a scientifically objective way. 
Worth inserting at this juncture is a defence of the primacy of scientific method cited by 
Coleman and Halisi. "Reality must mean something and the question of reality is one of 
method." In contradistinction to this emphasis on the scientific integrity of method, Crick 
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posits that in behavioural science, doctrine and methodology combine to produce a series of 
tautological affirmations for 
... a type of specifically liberal and democratic political doctrine of far more limited 
applicability than the authors supposed. Values were taken for granted amid the 
enervating unity of belief of American liberalism, so it was believed that the mere 
discovery of facts would create a kind of spontaneous national therapy.218 
Crick's sketch of a behavioural tendency in which norms are whittled down to vacuous 
shadows of their former selves bears comparison with Susser's depiction of what remains 
after the normative claims of ideology have imploded, namely, "a reductionist position which 
supports a consensual agreement on the 'rules of the game.'"219 Crick and Susser differ 
inasmuch as Crick allocates norms to purposive political theory, Susser to ideology, but the 
deducible conclusion on both counts is that to drain social norms of their substantive content 
is to create a so-called science of human action that "is just... an empty exercise in physics 
envy."220 
According to Larrain, positivists hold that ideology is the absolute other of science given that 
science is "the antithesis of a mythical world."221 Science achieves its decisively non-mythical 
content via two closely related routes. One is empirical observation or experimentation; the 
other is the application of a method that delivers substantive results. The combination, as 
Larrain notes, "guarantees in a precise manner that knowledge comprehends reality, a reality 
made of objective facts." Positivism thus represents itself as a "special sphere of knowledge 
exempt from ideological distortions as long as it complies with method." Method, it 
reasonably can be concluded, is the alpha and omega of iron cage knowledge in its positivist-
behavioural format. 
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Bhaskar's critique of empiricism and implications thereof 
Whereas Kuhn challenges an assumption that knowledge in the natural sciences occurs in an 
environment abstracted from historical contexts and peer consensus, Bhaskar, referring to the 
social sciences, disputes the notion that the prediction-enabling methods of the natural 
sciences are applicable to social objects. (It is worth noting that Bhaskar and other 'critical 
realists' stand for the separation of natural and social sciences223 and thus stand against 
scientism). He contends that whether or not the objects of social scientific enquiry are 
perceivable, that is, susceptible to empirical enquiry, or unperceivable ("imaginary') is not 
really the point. The point rather is that the objects of social science research "only ever 
manifest themselves in open systems; that is, in systems where invariant empirical regularities 
do not obtain. For social systems are not spontaneously, and cannot be experimentally, 
closed."224 The key term here is 'invariant'. As mentioned above, behaviouralism assumes 
the invariance of its methodology. Yet, as Bhaskar points out, the aim of an experiment is to 
get a single mechanism going in isolation and record its effect.225 Experimental activity in 
science is sufficiently intelligible only if conducted within a closed environment, and only on 
the basis of regularities observed to occur within a closed setting can scientific predictions be 
made with any degree of certainty. 
Put together with Bhaskar's contention that any given social system is not, nor can it be a 
closed system, the argument suggests overall that in social systems, the conditions which 
enable scientifically certain predictions are unavailable. "Hence for ontological, as distinct 
from purely epistemological, reasons, social scientific (unlike natural scientific) theory is 
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necessarily incomplete." Bhaskar then adds a codicil to his argument: "The most powerful 
explanatory theory in an open world is a non-deterministic one."227 
From arguments presented above, the following inferences can be drawn. Firstly, that by 
combining explanatory with predictive modalities, positivist - behavioural social science is 
the architect of its own disasters, particularly in the sphere of failed prediction. The second 
inference is attendant on Delanty's observation that for Bhaskar and other critical realists, the 
case for an anti-positivist philosophy of social science cannot be made on the basis of an 
attack on positivism in natural science. This imputes that an examination of the 
relationship between social science and ideology requires an additional dimension of analysis. 
One way to expand the analysis is to uproot 'X is either A or non-A' from the domain of 
natural science and plant it squarely in social science territory in order to examine the 
implications. 
For an empiricist, substantive knowledge is arrived at via observation/experimentation -4 
verification. If successful (X is A), the process then can be deployed to uncover causal laws. 
If, however, X is non-A, the process is abandoned. This process of verification or 
abandonment dovetails with Bhaskar's observation about empiricist belief "that only the 
actual (identified as the determinate object of the empirical) is real."229 Against empiricism, 
critical realism argues that identifying observable surface phenomena as 'real' requires a 
concomitant assumption that closure is possible in social systems, whereas "true closure is 
impossible, for well-known reasons of incomplete experimental conditions and, more 
fundamentally, because persons are involved in scientific experimentation, and social 
psychological life is itself an open system." 
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In other words, empirical realism depends upon a reduction of the real to the actual and of the 
actual to the empirical, and in so doing presupposes a closed world and a completed 
science.231 That this presupposition qualifies as ideological is suggested by Bhaskar's 
allusion to "the objectionable ideological consequences of an assumption that the social world 
is a closed system (from the point of view of the practice of science) that whatever men 
currently experience is unquestionably the world."232 On this view, reductionism is 
ideological, as is, for instance, a statement that 'nothing interesting is happening in African 
politics.' 
Gramsci 's critique ofpositivist Marxism and implications thereof 
Gramsci's attack on the positivist methods and assumptions which pervade Bukharin's 
Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology bears comparison with Bhaskar's critique of (Western) 
empiricism. (An editorial footnote explains that what Bukharin terms 'materialism,' Gramsci 
understands as empiricism and positivism.233) Whereas Bhaskar refers in passing to the 
objectionable ideological consequences of empiricism, Gramsci is more explicit. One must, 
he contends, examine the way in which Bukharin "has remained trapped in Ideology."234 He 
then makes a distinction between "historically organic ideologies" and ideologies that are 
"arbitrary, rationalist or 'willed.'" Historically organic ideologies are those that have the 
power to organise and mobilise "human masses"; arbitrary ideologies, on the other hand, 
"only create individual 'movements', polemics and so on."235 Gramsci's motive for relegating 
Bukharin's Popular Manual to a mechanistic slot within the ideological genre can be descried 
in his appraisal of Bukharin's notion of science, equated by Gramsci with sociology as 
... the philosophy of non-philosophers, an attempt to provide a schematic description 
and classification of historical and political facts, according to criteria built up on the 
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model of natural science. It is therefore an attempt to derive 'experimentally' the laws 
of evolution of human society in such a way as to 'predict' that the oak tree will 
develop out of the acorn.236 
Having highlighted the teleology and scientism of'mechanistic' Marxism, Gramsci mounts 
an offensive against the idea that laws of tendency in the political realm unproblematically 
can be equated with "the laws of statistics or to the laws of large numbers which have helped 
to advance various of the natural sciences."237 He points out that it is possible to posit a 
correspondence only by deploying a series of problematic assumptions, itemised as follows. 
Firstly, the assumption that the human objects of research are essentially passive. Secondly, 
the assumption that a simple inversion of idealist logic in which speculative categories are 
replaced by empirical concepts and classifications is a process that enables scientific 
discovery yet somehow escapes the abstract and anti-historical bent of idealism.238 Thirdly, 
the assumption that everything can be reduced to a single ultimate or final cause that at one 
blow will resolve "the practical problem of the predictability of historical events,"239 hence 
gratifying an immediate need for certainties - a psychological condition Gramsci attributes to 
young people or "a public which, from the point of view of scientific discipline, is in a 
condition like that of youth".240 
Judging by Gramsci's acerbic and quite lengthy attack on Bukharin's rendition of Marxism, 
he thinks Bukharin culpable of turning Marx's silk purse into a sow's ear of "mechanical 
(vulgar) materialism"241 which far from posing a serious challenge to bourgeois ideology, 
rates as an reductio ad absurdum. Against Bukharin, Gramsci defends an idea of science 
that he believes is closer to Marx's real meaning. 
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A new science proves its efficacy and vitality when it demonstrates that it is capable 
of confronting the great champion of the tendencies opposed to it and when it either 
resolves by its own means the vital questions which they have posed, or demonstrates, 
in peremptory fashion, that these questions are false problems.242 
It is worth noting, however, that Gramsci's non-positivist Marxism stems - as mentioned by 
the editors of The Prison Notebooks - from a distinctive feature of his thesis, that is, constant 
underplaying of the materialist element in Marx's work.243 Nor is it clear whether, for 
Gramsci, Marxism is a science or an ideology. It is clear, however, that in his efforts to 
rescue Marxism from positivism, and hence to critique Marxism qua mechanistic ideology, 
he constructs an alternative version, viz, a notion of 'organic ideology'. This notion bears 
comparison with Mannheim's 'transcendent idea', (iii) 
Social science and ideology: some conclusions 
In wrapping up this chapter, and on the basis of preceding discussions and arguments, I 
conclude that in positivist social science, the concept of 'ideology' by-and-large occupies the 
position reserved for non-A phenomena in a formula designed to distinguish that which is real 
from that which is imagined. Even if Lenin is viewed as an exception to the rule since he 
allocated the term 'ideology' to a wide spectrum of knowledge, and to this extent did not 
posit a binary division between ideology and science, he nonetheless reproduced the binary 
configuration of a realist formula by distinguishing between proletarian ideology and its 
absolute 'other', bourgeois ideology. As a general rule, A is a substantive category and is 
reserved for phenomena that the paradigm - whether Marxism or modernisation theory - is 
(iii) Since these somewhat related concepts are integral to an argument that an applied 
ideology is likely to prove ineffectual if insufficiently grounded in the lived world 
within which it operates, they are explored in the next chapter. 
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able to recognise as 'real' and thus as meriting serious consideration. Phenomena that fall 
outside scientifically recognisable limits, however, are assigned to a kind of cognitive limbo. 
I further conclude that each paradigm fits the contours of Gellner's depiction of the god of the 
excluded middle, namely, a jealous and exclusive god, intolerant of rivals - an intolerance 
that transmutes into an impulse to systematise and eliminate the incoherence attendant on 
simultaneously held, contradictory beliefs. This amounts to progress-by-elimination. A 
paradigm advances, and best serves its own cause, by eliminating the opposition - in which 
case any phenomenon, be it belief or practice, that the paradigm is unable to assimilate while 
retaining its own inner coherence rates as an anomaly or problem for the paradigm. 
It is the potential problem for the paradigm posed by cultural particularities and regional / 
local specificities that both Marxism and modernisation theory proposed to iron out by 
casting themselves in a comparative (viz: the same observations and propositions can be 
made, and the same conclusions drawn across time and space) and globally applicable mould. 
This solution to the problem of logical anomalies and local incongruities is justified by both 
paradigms with reference to universal regularities uncovered by physics. Yet this tendency on 
the part of the paradigms to align themselves with natural science begs three questions. One 
(articulated by Bhaskar) is that the objects of social science research are not intransitive, that 
is, are not objects with which the seeker after knowledge has no necessary relationship. Since 
social science researchers (or paradigm agents) and the objects of their research are human 
beings, the reflexivity of social science paradigms is imputed. In short, to some extent at 
least, the relationship between a social scientist and her or his research material not only is 
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mutually constitutive, but also is constituted in ways not necessarily intended - or 
acknowledged - by the researcher or paradigm agent. 
Secondly, the question of fault allocation is moot since no natural scientist worth the name 
would blame the object (viz: nature) of his or her research in the event that an experiment 
fails to deliver the expected results. In this context, and to this extent, 'Afro-pessimism' 
more appropriately should be termed 'paradigm-pessimism', in which case, the search for a 
new paradigm becomes - or at any rate, in a crisis-ridden era should become - a scientific 
imperative. As Kuhn observes: "As in manufacture so in science - retooling is an 
extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demands it. The significance of crises is the 
indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived."244 
Finally, if a paradigm - crisis notwithstanding - is unable or unwilling to retool, it seems fair 
enough to question the motive for resistance. At this juncture, a paradigm's temporal and 
spatial point of origin is of some relevance. By way of illustration, a paradigm that emerged 
from Eastern Europe or alternatively, North America during the Cold War era well might be 
configured by affiliation to one or the other ideology. Scriven, for instance, contends that 
It is increasingly clear that the influence of ideology on methodology and of the latter 
on the training and behaviour of researchers and on the identification and 
disbursement of support is staggeringly powerful. Ideology is to research what Marx 
suggested the economic factor was to politics and what Freud took sex to be for 
psychology.245 
In other, more moderately phrased words, the line between an ideology and a social science 
paradigm is neither as clear nor as unwavering as social scientists might like to believe. 
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Moreover, if both a dominant ideology and a dominant paradigm (for instance, a neoliberal 
development paradigm) are not least the products of an unequal relationship between centre 
and periphery, then their practitioners in effect, even if not in intention, are conflating the 
centre of power and the centre of truth. In this scenario, an iron cage or "preformed and 
relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies"246 doubles as a cognitive and perceptual 
trap not only for its adherents and practitioners but also for its target constituencies in the 
Third World. This trap configures not only the parameters of the dominant paradigm but also 
the conceptual matrix of the counter-discourse it generates, (iv) 
(iv) See Chapter Four, pp 116-118 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OF PARADIGMS AND LIVED WORLDS 
As indicated in the conclusion to the previous chapter, it is not always easy to locate the point 
where a paradigm ends and an ideology begins. The difficulty is more than usually 
pronounced in the case of an ideology that proclaims its scientific status. This chapter begins 
with a discussion and comparison of aspects of Kuhn's and Mannheim's theses in an effort to 
uncover and elaborate points of overlap. It moves on to an examination of the similarities 
between Mannheim's and Gramsci's notion of a definitive characteristic of a non-ideological 
transcendent idea (Mannheim) and an organic ideology (Gramsci). The chapter then itemises 
and analyses key facets of Guevara's Congo experience in the light of the above discussions 
and comparisons, the better to explore the interaction between a paradigm and the lived world 
- in this case, of post-independence Congo. 
Kuhn and Mannheim: crises and worldviews. 
At the heart of Kuhn's thesis is the paradox of 'normal' or 'ordinary' science enabled by a 
paradigm that both generates the conditions necessary for successful research and contains the 
seeds of its own and therefore, normal science's destruction. On the one hand, research 
cannot proceed coherently and systematically in the absence of a paradigm. Kuhn avers that 
"something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends 
both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual-conceptual experience has 
taught him to see. In the absence of such training there can only be ... 'a bloomin' buzzin' 
confusion.'"247 A paradigm "provides rules that tell the practitioner ... what both the world 
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and his science look like."248 Ergo: normal science focuses on finding solutions to problems 
pre-defined by a dominant paradigm as legitimate. "One of the reasons why normal science 
seems to progress so rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their 
own lack of ingenuity should keep them from solving."249 A paradigm, therefore, is self-
limiting. Far from encouraging practitioners to take detours into uncharted territory, it keeps 
them on the beaten track and focuses their attention on familiar horizons. Within these limits, 
normal science is capable of steady, systematic and successful prosecution of research. 
On the other hand, the limits that enable successful research also constitute the price paid by 
normal science if its practitioners encounter an anomaly pronounced enough to form a major 
obstacle in the paradigm's prescribed route. The paradox is that "anomaly appears only 
against the background provided by the paradigm."250 Paradigms and anomalies, it seems, are 
coterminous - at any rate, in the final analysis. As I understand Kuhn's meaning, human 
scientific knowledge, articulated within the confines of a paradigm, sooner or later generates 
its own contradictions since normal science is "an attempt to force nature into the preformed 
and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies."251 Furthermore, "normal science 
does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none."252 In other 
words, the success of normal science depends both on the presence of a paradigm and the 
absence of anomaly. A period of'revolutionary' (or 'extraordinary') science is preceded by 
"the awareness of anomaly, ie, with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the 
paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science."253 At this juncture, either a new 
paradigm emerges or the successful practice of science is indefinitely stalled given that the 
old, no longer functional paradigm has become "a monster".254 
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Kuhn thus posits two separate and distinct eras of scientific time: periods of normal science 
(defined by a paradigm) and periods of revolutionary science (delineated by a major paradigm 
shift.) In the former era, scientific knowledge progresses steadily and cumulatively; in the 
latter era, scientific knowledge undergoes a dramatic change, not least of perception given 
that scientists learn to see things in new ways via "a change in visual gestalt."255 
A revolution in scientific knowledge differs from its 'normal science' predecessor in that it is 
characterised by risk-taking, in turn preceded by a crisis. It is precisely because a 'normal 
science' paradigm purveys a steady, cumulative, consistent and - in this sense - stable picture 
of the world as known to scientists that periods of paradigm change occur at a high-risk 
premium, and require "neural reprogramming."256 Indeed, a paradigm revolution involves so 
radical a reorganisation of previous (paradigmatic), nowledge that Kuhn explicitly compares 
it to a political revolution. He cites the "genetic aspect of the parallel between political and 
scientific development "257 inasmuch as both constitute radical disruption of a 'normality' that 
has ceased to function adequately. "In both political and scientific development the sense of 
malfunction that can lead to crisis is prerequisite to revolution."258 A second aspect of the 
parallel is that both scientific and political crises herald periods of instability. 
Political revolutions aim to change political institutions in ways that these institutions 
themselves prohibit. Their success therefore necessitates the partial relinquishment of 
one set of institutions in favour of another, and in the interim, society is not fully 
governed at all. Initially it is crisis alone that attenuates the role of political 
institutions as we have already seen it attenuate the role of paradigms. In increasing 
numbers individuals become increasingly estranged from political life and behave 
more and more eccentrically within it. Then, as the crisis deepens, many of these 
individuals commit themselves to some concrete proposal for the reconstruction of 
society in a new institutional framework. At that point the society is divided into 
competing camps or parties, one seeking to defend the old institutional constellation, 
the others seeking to institute some new one. And, once that polarisation has occurred, 
political recourse fails. Because they differ about the institutional matrix within 
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which political change is to be achieved and evaluated, because they acknowledge no 
supra-institutional framework for the adjudication of revolutionary difference, the 
parties to a revolutionary conflict must finally resort to the techniques of mass 
persuasion, often including force. Though revolutions have had a vital role in the 
evolution of political institutions, that role depends upon their being partially 
extrapolitical or extrainstitutional events.259 
Kuhn then adds a codicil to his comparison. "Like the choice between competing political 
institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible 
modes of community life." Further: "As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice -
there is no standard higher than that of the relevant community."260 
As can be inferred from the above statement, Kuhn argues against the notion of an 'out there' 
reality which in some fashion is external to and independent of human perception of it. He 
argues for the notion that in the final analysis, 'reality' at any given time in any given 
community is the product of communal consensus. Moreover, 'reality' is susceptible - in 
times of crisis - to radical reinvention. Kuhn thus disposes of two tenets central to 
positivism, namely, the notion that there is a correspondence between scientific truth and 
natural necessity, along with the belief that science, whether natural or social, is the study of 
an objectively existing reality, (v) 
The scientific community's reaction to the publication of Kuhn's thesis was both dramatic 
and polarised, dividing scholars into pro- and anti-Kuhn camps.261 Kuhn was accused by the 
latter camp of promoting a dangerously relativistic, hence destructively negative perception of 
scientific progress.262 Referring to positivistic denouncements of Kuhn's 'relativistic' theory, 
Gouldner observes that "since science is defined as the dominant form of rationality, any 
(v) See Chapter Two, p 49 
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critique of it exposes the critic to condemnation as anti-scientific, anti-intellectual, and even 
as irrational and nihilistic." He adds that "precisely this attitude prompted the denunciation 
of Thomas Kuhn's careful critique of 'normal' science, even though the critical facet of 
Kuhn's view of science is greatly muted."263 According to Fuchs, Kuhn suffered the 
additional indignity of being taken further that he had intended to go: 
Incommensurability has become a popular theme in scepticism with Kuhn, despite 
Kuhn's frequent disclaimers that he was not a Kuhnian. The theme comes in 
varyingly radical versions. The most radical version, meaning incommensurability, 
has it that different cultures or forms of life make sense only in their own terms, and 
cannot really be understood, let alone evaluated, from the outside. Incommensurable 
forms of life pass each other like ships in the night.264 
Kuhn himself, responding to his critics, contended that "there is ... no theory-independent 
way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a 
theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle."265 
Moreover: "The proponents of different theories are like the members of different language 
communities. Recognising the parallelism suggests that in some sense both groups may be 
right. Applied to culture and its development that position is relativistic."266 Kuhn, however, 
did not agree that his thesis necessarily expounds relativism in science. Declaring that he is 
"a convinced believer in scientific progress", he emphasises that "Newton's mechanics 
improves on Aristotle's and that Einstein's improves on Newton's as instruments for puzzle-
solving." This said, he descries in the puzzle-solving progression (from Aristotle to Newton 
to Einstein) "no coherent direction of ontological development. On the contrary, in some 
important respects ... Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than either 
of them is to Newton's."267 In short, in terms of a current paradigm's ontology (as distinct 
from its instrumentality qua puzzle-solving activity), it may bear a closer resemblance to a 
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paradigm constructed in ancient Greece than to a paradigm constructed in 18 century 
Britain. 
Given Kuhn's contention that paradigms not only are constitutive of science, they also - in the 
sense that a paradigm views nature through "a constellation of mental sets"268 - are 
constitutive of nature, he asks the rhetorical question: "Is it really any wonder that the price of 
significant scientific advance is a commitment that runs the risk of being wrong?"269 From 
this question of Kuhn's can be distilled the possibility that to Bhaskar's observation that the 
objects of natural science research are intransitive, (vi) Kuhn might respond 'yes and no' 
since, while the observation applies to nature per se, scientists view nature through a 
constellation of mental sets - and their perception does not necessarily or inevitably 
correspond with nature. A given perception is representative of a particular cultural and 
historical milieu but not necessarily representative of nature as such. In other words, given 
the limits imposed by cultural and historical finity, paradigmatic perceptions, or the findings 
of normal science in any given era are 'as good as it gets'. The possibility of this response to 
Bhaskar is supported, for instance, by Kuhn's injunction to his students, when reading the 
works of an important thinker, for example, Aristotle's Physica, to ... 
... look first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible 
person could have written them. When you find an answer, I continue, when those 
passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones you 
previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning.270 
Kuhn defines the above manner of reading a text as "the discovery of hermeneutics"271 and 
attributes it to his realisation that "the permanent ingredients of Aristotle's universe, its 
(vi) See Chapter Two, p 41 
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ontologically primary and indestructible elements"272 are quite distinct from the world as 
perceived by Galileo. It is the ontological element of a paradigm that underwrites Kuhn's 
contention that an emergent paradigm in key respects is incommensurate with its immediate 
predecessor (and rival), and - concomitantly - underwrites the notion of scientific revolutions 
as "changes of world-view".273 
Returning to Kuhn's comparison between scientific and political revolutions: he makes the 
comparison in the context of institutional malfunction, of crisis, and of institutional change 
initiated by an extra-institutional force. He does not refer - in this particular context - to 
changes in world-view. However, given his contention that a requirement of scientific 
revolution is change in world-view, the same genre of change reasonably can be assumed to 
apply in the case of political crisis. In this regard, Mannheim's thesis is illuminating, not 
least because it bears comparison in certain respects with Kuhn's, that is, the polarising 
effects of crisis and the incommensurability of competing world-views. 
Whereas Kuhn restricts the notion of changes in world-view to a given scientific community, 
Mannheim applies the notion to social groups in general. Referring to "the alarming fact that 
the same world can appear differently to different observers",274 he contends that social 
mobility, specifically, vertical mobility, impels "the mind to discover the irreconcilability of 
conflicting conceptions of the world."275 It is during processes of democratisation "that the 
thinking of the lower strata, which previously had no public significance, acquires prestige 
and influence."276 The ideas of the lower strata then "confront the ideas of the dominant strata 
on the same level of validity."277 The dramatic political and social changes of the modern era 
(from absolute monarch to hegemonic political parties; from exclusive systems of class power 
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and privilege to the inclusiveness of the universal franchise) precipitated an intellectual crisis 
that hinged on an "irreconcilable plurality of lifestyles"278 in relation to which the same object 
appears differently depending on "the set of concepts with which we view it."279 
According to Mannheim, a negative consequence of the clash between competing sets of 
concepts is that political parties have tried to set the intellectual agenda for society, leading in 
a number of cases to the creation of the absolute state, which "claims as one of its 
prerogatives the setting forth of its own interpretation of the world."280 
Ideology and Utopia. 
It is within the context outlined above that Mannheim sets his interrogation of the concepts 
'ideology' and 'utopia'. Having first distinguished between absolute Utopias (pie in the sky) 
and relative Utopias (ideas which seem unrealisable only from the perspective of status quo 
vested interests), Mannheim goes on to explain why only certain sorts of ideas qualify as 
Utopian in the relative sense. Both modes are situationally transcendent but "ideologies are 
the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realisation of their 
projected contents."281 Mannheim provides an example, namely, the idea of Christian 
brotherly love that - in a society founded on serfdom - remains an unrealisable and 
ideological idea "even when the intended meaning is, in good faith, a motive in the conduct of 
the individual."282 
If one transfers Mannheim's concept of an 'ideological idea' to Africa, an example that comes 
to mind is the idea of 'proletarian internationalism' in countries where the urban working 
class comprised a miniscule fraction of the population. Such ideas, as Mannheim emphasises 
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in relation to beliefs of this type, pose no direct threat to the status quo - which, in post-
independence, Cold War Africa, predominantly was that of elite (one party or military) 
dictatorships. Conversely, Utopian ideas directly threaten the status quo in that they both 
transcend reality and break the bonds of the existing order. A Utopia, as Mannheim points 
out, seems unrealisable only from a status quo perspective.283 This said, he acknowledges 
that the most accurate way of distinguishing between ideological and Utopian modes is 
retrospective. "Ideas which later turned out to have been only distorted representations of a 
past or potential social order were ideological, while those which were adequately realised in 
the succeeding social order were relative Utopias."284 As Larrain points out, "this solution by 
confining ideological analysis to the past, makes difficult the elucidation of ideologies and 
Utopias in the present."285 
An additional twist is that ideology and Utopia have in common a denial of aspects of reality. 
This grey area in Mannheim's thesis is explicable, however, in terms of his bifurcated 
conceptualisation of ideological thought. On the one hand, ideology is situationally 
transcendent if in practice somewhat ineffectual. On the other hand, ideology as a mode of 
reality representation emerges from ruling groups, usually political parties, perceived by 
Mannheim as the organisations that - with the onset of modernity - replaced the Church. In 
the Middle Ages, monopolistic control of intellectual production was enjoyed by the clergy; 
scholasticism gave sanction to the ruling mode of thought, itself embodied in the "organised 
collectivity" of the Church. Mannheim pinpoints as the "decisive fact" of modern times, 
"the collapse of the intellectual monopoly of the clergy."287 However, the initial stimulus of 
replacing a religious world view with its "rationalistic-naturalistic"288 successor and 
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competitor was experienced only by a small group of intellectuals. Since for a majority of 
people "a model of life which is devoid of collective myths is scarcely bearable",289 an 
alternative - or substitute for the intellectual dominance and control of a priestly caste - had 
to be found. The rise to prominence of political parties qua emblems of modernity enabled in 
some instances the creation of the absolute state that claimed "as one of its prerogatives the 
setting forth of its own interpretation of the world." In all instances, political parties 
"incorporated rational and if possible scientific arguments into their systems of thought" and 
in consequence, every type of politics "was given a scientific tinge."290 
In sum: if a link is made between Mannheim's portrayal of the signifiers of modernity and 
Gellner's, then it seems that political parties provide a bridge between the iron cage of expert 
knowledge and the lived world, thus taking over the function of the clergy. By the early part 
of the 20th century in Europe, parties had become 
... public corporations and fighting organisations. This in itself forces them into a 
dogmatic direction. The more intellectuals became party functionaries, the more they 
lost the virtue of receptivity and elasticity ... Crises affecting political thinking also 
became the crises of scientific thought. 
Mannheim then describes the two concepts, ideology and Utopia, as the final intensification of 
the intellectual crisis. Here, he describes ideology as a property of the collective unconscious 
of the ruling groups which "obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others 
and thereby stabilises it." This condition of unconscious denial is shared by Utopia, which, 
"guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides certain aspects of reality. It 
turns its back on everything which would shake its belief or paralyse its desire to change 
things." It is worth noting that in this dimension of Mannheim's exposition, ideology and 
utopia seem strikingly similar inasmuch as their proponents conceal from themselves and 
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their constituencies those aspects of reality which might contradict or undermine their 
verisimilitude. 
While there are distinct limits to which an even moderately exact comparison can be made 
between Kuhn's 'normal science' and Mannheim's 'ideology', these limits do not necessarily 
vitiate the extent to which a given paradigm reasonably may be termed 'ideological'. In 
Kuhn's depiction of normal science, for instance, can be glimpsed the potential for the 
hardening of knowledge into an inflexible format, deeply resistant to novelty and innovation, 
and thus conducive to the binarisation of reality into 'A or non A' in perpetuity. To the 
extent, then, that a given centre of power is served by a paradigm's dichotomous 
configuration, that paradigm serves the status quo, not least by stigmatising other truths, other 
realities, as fictional. Moreover, freezing the world into an immutable entity renders 
necessary the extra-institutional character of advocacy for major change, given that the 
paradigm / ideology itself prohibits such change. In this respect, Mannheim's argument is 
that an extra-institutional force for change is not inevitably a 'Utopia' insofar as - while 
situationally (or institutionally) transcendent - it incorporates an unrealisable, hence 
ideological idea and as such, fails to pose a serious challenge to the status quo. 
In his preface to Mannheim's book, Wirth provides clear and unambiguous definitions of 
ideologies (those complexes of ideas which tend to generate activities toward the 
maintenance of the existing order) and Utopias (those complexes of ideas which tend to 
generate activities toward changes of the prevailing order293) that do not reflect the play of 
light and shade in Mannheim's multi-facetted portrayal of ideology and his nuanced 
perception of the ambiguities embedded in Utopian schema. However, Mannheim makes at 
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least one point abundantly clear, namely, that situationally transcendent ideas part company 
with "wish projections"294 if and only if the Utopian conception of the individual is in close 
alignment with 
... currents already present in society and gives expression to them, when in this form 
it flows back into the outlook of the whole group and is translated into action by it, 
only then can the existing order be challenged by the striving for another order of 
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existence. 
In other words, situationally transcendent ideas escape the perils of wish projection (and 
therefore of ideology) only if sufficiently in synch with pre-existing social ideas or trends. 
The point, then, is social agreement that yes, these ideas make sense and represent desirable 
goals. It seems likely, therefore, that Mannheim would concur with Kuhn's contention that 
"there is no standard higher than that of the relevant community."296 
Arguing along similar lines to Mannheim, Gramsci defines an organic ideology as a material 
force in that it is informed by popular conviction. Conversely, an ideology that exists 
separately from popular belief is no more than an individual fancy with no basis in social 
(hence, material) reality.297 It thus is possible to posit a close correlation between 
Mannheim's 'utopian idea' and Gramsci's 'organic ideology' in that both are informed by and 
hence enjoy the support of the relevant community. By contrast, their opposite numbers, that 
is, the wish projection embedded in an 'ideological idea' and the sterility of a 'mechanistic' 
or 'arbitrary' ideology, seem doomed to failure as developmental schema. In the light of this 
hypothesis, Guevara's somewhat disastrous Congo adventure lends itself to analysis in this 
dissertation not as the failure of an individual leader and his band of Cuban soldiers to 
accomplish their objectives, but as the inability of a science of revolution to cope with the 
lived world as anomaly. It further is surmised that the intensely competitive ideological 
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climate of the Cold War facilitated the development of paradigm-driven expectations, perhaps 
best described as wish projections or (as Gramsci might say) the psychological condition 
usually associated with young people. 
Guevara's dawa. 
Che Guevara's Congo adventure provides a telling example of an exercise in would-be 
proletarian internationalism and the intensification of a world-wide struggle for socialism that 
became hopelessly bogged down in unanticipated and unwelcome regional and local 
particularities. The merit of Guevara's Congo diaries is located not only in his retrospective 
self-criticism but also in the meticulous detail with which he records an assortment of 
particularisms, diverse and usually incompatible purposes, and contradictory elements that in 
combination defeated the clear and unambiguous pathway he in advance had mapped for 
himself and his band of Cuban revolutionaries, viz: "In relation to Yankee imperialism, it is 
not enough to be resolute in defence. It has to be attacked in its bases of support, in the 
colonial and neo-colonial lands that serve as the underpinning of its world domination." (It 
is worth noting in parenthesis that his diaries make instructive reading only if situated within 
the binary configuration of Cold War grand narratives. Selected aspects lifted from the 
surface of the text give a misleading, not least because ahistorical, impression.299) 
Given Mannheim's delineation of a grey area between 'ideology' and 'utopia, it seems 
apposite to introduce the Congo diaries by highlighting a wish projection element, 
pronounced enough to remove the Cuban mission to Congo from Mannheim's category of 
relative Utopia and relocate it in one of the dimensions of an ideological mode, namely, 
situationally transcendent ideas fated not to succeed in the realisation of their projected 
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contents. This element, best articulated in Guevara's own words, is uncovered by a debriefing 
process 30° at the conclusion of his seven months in an eastern enclave of Congo's vast and 
diverse landscape. Guevara poses the question of what selection and training requirements -
in the event of further Cuban involvement in armed conflict in Africa - should be applied to 
"a militant, so that he can overcome the violent trauma of a reality with which he must do 
battle." He then highlights a salutary discovery. "Revolutionary militants who go off to take 
part in a similar experience must begin without dreams, abandoning everything that used to 
constitute their lives and exertions." 
The text of Guevara's Congo experience in the main comprises a closely woven chain of 
Marxist / African disjunctures triggered when a science of revolution collided with the lived 
world of the Congo. The first link in the chain manifests itself in a tense encounter between 
the agent (Guevara) of a paradigm, European in its origin but global in its assumptions, and 
the by-and-large Afrocentric bent of the leaders of various (four in all) fractions of Congolese 
liberation fronts along with "50 or more people, representing Movements from ten or more 
countries, each divided into two or more tendencies."302 Guevara distils into two sentences 
the primary source of divergence: "Our view was that the Congo problem was a world 
problem" whereas "they thought the right slogan must be: 'the Congo problem is an African 
problem.'"303 The irony is that to the communist bloc, Congo-Kinshasa represented a 
paradigmatic exemplar. Of the liberation wars fought in Africa during the 1960s and "70s, 
Congo's was one of very few not waged against an extant colonial regime. It was or seemed 
to be (at least, from a distance) a reasonably clear-cut case of a petit-bourgeois dictator 
(Tshombe) in league with neo-imperialism and shored up by white mercenaries from pariah 
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states in Southern Africa ranged against progressive forces in Congolese society fighting to 
preserve the radical legacy of Lumumba. "I set off with more faith than ever in the guerilla 
struggle, yet we failed."304 This pronouncement encapsulates the paradox in which Guevara 
became enmeshed. 
Vset off with more faith than ever ...' 
Why? Arguably because the zero-sum nature of the Cold War both generated faith in 
contending protagonists and trapped them in their faith, constraining them not only to justify 
their agendas in terms of scientific imperatives but also to believe their justifications. In 
respect to Africa, the Cuban agenda, "not always appreciated by those who required their 
help" was to construct "a Third World Alliance of all those opposed to American 
imperialism."305 Intrusive, often destructive United States (U.S.) foreign policy in South 
America, not least a habit of supporting oppressive regimes or providing active assistance in 
the ejection from power of popular but radical leaders, demonstrates that during the Cold 
War, U.S. estimation of what constituted acceptable regimes in Third World countries 
primarily was defined by realpolitik factors, and was surprisingly flexible at best, downright 
bizarre at worst. Chomsky, referring to Figueres and Costa Rica in 1955, illustrates the point. 
He notes that the attack mounted by a small force of armed dissidents in the border area was 
met by draconian measures that, however, did not prevent the United States from providing 
assistance to quash the rebellion. Nor did Figueres forfeit his 'acceptable' credentials by 
instituting widespread abuse of civil rights "permitted for U.S. clients."306 By the same token, 
oppressive and kleptocratic postcolonial African presidents figuratively speaking displayed 
on their foreheads an indemnity clause: 'permitted for U.S. clients.' 
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Guevara, present in Guatemala during the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted 
overthrow of Arbenz' radical regime, "acquired an implacable hatred of the United States," 
a hatred which was continually refreshed by further outbreaks of U.S. foreign policy in South 
America and Asia. Since it's quite likely that Patrice Lumumba, independent Congo's first 
Prime Minister, signed his own death warrant the moment he applied for assistance (to quell 
secession and return Katanga to the Congo fold) not merely from the United Nations but also 
from the Soviet Union, Guevara's dedication of his services to the Congo cause to this extent 
is explicable. In addition, Congo provided him with an opportunity, perhaps much needed in 
the wake of Cuba's "bureaucratised revolution" to renew his faith. 
It would be disingenuous, however, to assume that Cuban motives were strictly altruistic. 
Guevara himself, in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations after the 1964 
Stanleyville paratroop landings, highlighted the stakes with a reference to "the Congo's vast 
resources which the imperialists wish to keep under their control."309 Nzongolo-Ntalaja 
provides an indication of how high African and global stakes were in 1960s Congo (and still 
are). Firstly, the most important strategic minerals needed for the 21st century are found in 
three countries of the world: Russia, China and the Congo. Secondly, the ecological diversity 
of the Congo is such that it also abounds in non-mineral resources, and much of its terrain is 
fertile enough, claims Nzongola-Ntalja, potentially to feed the entire continent.310 Thirdly, the 
Congo river is "one of the five longest rivers in the world and the first with respect to 
hydroelectric potential"311 - a potential vast enough to light up Africa from Cairo to Cape 
Town. 
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Certainly, the Congo's enormous natural riches are a major factor in explaining its role as an 
active battleground of the Cold War from independence in 1960 to the eviction from office of 
Prime Minister Tshombe in 1965 (along with eviction of Belgian and Southern African 
mercenaries) - a gesture on the part of Congo's then President Kasavubu that enabled a 
reconciliation between the Congo and other independent states in Africa, thus making the 
continuing presence of Cuban insurgents an embarrassment Tanzania - as a Cuban-facilitating 
country - no longer could afford. The Congo's natural riches also help to explain why 
Mobutu (Tshombe's Commander-in-Chief) then was able to seize power from Tshombe's 
replacement, Kimba, and, having deposed Kasavabu as well, remain in power for the next 32 
years - more than enough time to pillage his country and acquire vast wealth in overseas 
holdings and Swiss bank accounts, not least thanks to his U.S. endowed indemnity clause. 
Another explanatory factor for the arrival in Congo of Cuban guerrillas is that the ultimate 
success of American objectives in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa and the Third World 
had - as a prerequisite - a clampdown in South America, comprehensive enough to ensure that 
Cuban revolutionary visitors were personae non grata with South American governments. 
As a result of successfully prosecuting an exclusionary foreign policy in South America, the 
CIA was able to set up in Panama a training ground in counter-insurgency techniques for the 
officer corps of an assortment of South American defence forces. As Gott puts it, "the 
Cubans, on the opposing side, could do no less."312 
Guevara, therefore, had two immediate and strategic reasons for his project in the Congo. 
One was to break out of the international straitjacket imposed on the Cuban revolution by the 
United States by taking advantage of the existing liberated zone on the Congo side of Lake 
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Tanganyika to create a tit-for-tat training ground for Congolese guerrillas as well as for 
trainees from other liberation movements in Africa. A related motive, as mentioned above, 
was to go to the Congo "because it is the hottest spot in the world now ... I think we can hurt 
the imperialists at the core of their interests in Katanga."313 (He first had to negotiate with the 
People's Republic of China, however, since the Chinese were the chief external supporters of 
the Congolese rebels. This was a delicate mission, given the Sino-Soviet dispute, and China's 
annoyance because South American communist parties were not of the Chinese faith - for 
which China held Cuba responsible.314) 
\.. yet we failed.' 
As indicated above, the Congo, during the course of five tumultuous years of extremely 
qualified independence, had become an archetypal Cold War zone. Lumumba having been 
assassinated "on orders from President Dwight D. Eisenhower as part of the anti-communist 
crusade,"315 all semblance of national cohesion had disappeared. President Kasavabu, Prime 
Minister Tshombe and General Mobutu operated out of Kinshasa with a defence force trained 
and accompanied by exiled Cuban pilots (surviving members of an abortive, U.S. trained Bay 
of Pigs invasion), Belgian and Southern African mercenaries. In the rest of the country, four 
territorially distinct and politically fractious liberation movements, whose top echelon le.aders 
spent much of their time in the capitals of independent African states squabbling over the 
potential spoils, operated with varying and variable degrees of success. 
Furthermore, the fraction of the armed struggle notionally led by Kabila in the territory 
fringing Lake Tanganyika contained - unknown to Guevara prior to his arrival - an admixture 
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of approximately 4,000 Tutsis. "Many of the Tutsis had lived in these parts for centuries, 
while others had taken refuge there after a Hutu massacre at the time of independence; ousted 
from Rwanda, they were hoping to return to their country on the back of a successful 
revolution in the Congo."316 In the joint and prolonged absence from the front of Kabila and 
his Rwandan counterpart, Mundandi, relations between Congolese and Rwandans at best 
were unfriendly, at worst terminal. Guevara largely was unable to ease the friction. 
Referring to the Rwandans' "excessive distrust of the Congolese," he recalls that he urged 
unity, "arguing that the outcome of the struggle in Rwanda depended on the outcome of the 
struggle in Congo, since the latter involved a broader confrontation with imperialism." While 
agreeing -at least in principle - to try and improve relations with the Congolese, "they did not 
touch on the second point - which suggested that they did not agree with my remarks ..."3I8 
This is scarcely surprising given an entrenched problematic of inter-ethnic hostility, product 
not least of the imposition of fixed colonial borders where previously had existed porous 
frontiers and flexible ethnic demarcation.319 
A number of other postcolonial problematics unknown to or wished away in advance by the 
Cubans are embedded in Congo's colonial history. Belgian colonialism can be described as 
brutally exploitative on the one hand, and brutally neglectful on the other, particularly 
during the era (1855-1908) when Congo was the personal fiefdom of King Leopold of 
Belgium and in 1885 was named the Congo Free State, as well as given legal status, by the 
Congress of Berlin. Prior to the Congress, the region's biggest and most notable 
precolonial polity, the Kongo Kingdom, already had been cannibalised by Leopold, the 
French in Congo-Brazzaville and the Portuguese in Angola, thus dividing Kongo speaking 
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peoples into three separate colonial territories. Randrianja notes that this splintering of a 
language and culture into disparate territorial units is merely "one illustration among 
countless others" of the negligible importance colonial powers in Africa attached to "the 
cultural homogeneity of human groups." He observes that, in consequence, Benedict 
Anderson's concept of the nation as an 'imagined community' applies par excellence to 
postcolonial Africa.322 
Smith and Tordoff respectively contend that when the Belgian government took over 
Leopold's fiefdom, renaming it the Belgian Congo, a more humane and welfarist colonial 
regimen was instituted - but nonetheless, education largely was left in the hands of the 
Church and did not go beyond primary level, the idea being to delay indefinitely the 
emergence of an African political elite. As a consequence of this prolonged policy of 
minimalist education, only a minuscule group of nationalist leaders (caveat: nationalists 
without a nation) were available to lead Congo to independence and, among them, only 
Lumumba was capable of generating enough support on the ground to enable the creation - in 
1958 - of a political party with an adequate claim to national status. The Belgian government, 
demonstrably unable to cope with mounting unrest, within three months abruptly orchestrated 
colonial withdrawal from the Congo - that is, formal withdrawal. (They maintained a strong 
neocolonial interest in Katanga.) Needless to say, given an imperialism-sustaining education 
policy, one of the Congo's most severe difficulties on the eve of independence was "the 
virtual absence of trained technical, political and military personnel."324 
Since the rural Congolese, compared with Africans in settler colonies like Kenya, Rhodesia 
and South Africa, in the main had not been alienated from their land, this eliminated an 
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important prerequisite for successful guerrilla movements in the rural areas. Guevara 
identifies the Congolese peasants as one of the most difficult problems of the war. He 
explains that he is accustomed to the situation in South America where revolutions in the 
rural areas are fuelled by land hunger, product of "latifundists, feudal lords and ... capitalist 
type companies." This is not the case in the Congo which is vast and sparsely populated, 
where there is an abundance of land, much of it fertile, and where "the concept of land 
ownership hardly exists." He believes that there is evidence of feudal relations in part of the 
northern territory, but that otherwise "peasants are completely independent."326 He notes that 
capitalism operates only in superficial and peripheral forms through small traders, and that 
"Imperialism gives only sporadic signs of life in the region; its interests in the Congo is 
mainly based on the strategic mineral resources of Katanga ..."327 This unpromising picture is 
compounded firstly, by the lack of an industrial proletariat (except in Katanga); secondly, by 
the complete lack of a national bourgeoisie; thirdly, by the fact that even "the petty 
bourgeoisie of middlemen is not very developed."328 
Davidson explains as follows the lack of a national bourgeoisie in Congo, as in many other 
postcolonies. Citing Fieldhouse's statistics, he notes that while the white fraction in the 
Belgian Congo comprised 1% of the population, it owned 95% of total assets. "Here there 
was a society in which 110,000 whites and a very few large overseas firms controlled almost 
the entire modern economy." Guevara therefore found himself asking a largely rhetorical 
question: "What could the Liberation Army offer these people? That is the question which 
always bothered us."330 Against his intense frustration with the unmilitary conduct of 
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Congolese guerrillas who are "of peasant stock and completely raw"331 can be set his 
estimation of the condition of peasant farmers. 
Poverty was absolute among the peasantry. But it is a poverty for which the balance-
sheet is no more negative today than it was ten years ago. Except in the war zones, 
the peasant does not feel inclined to pick up a gun because objectively declining 
conditions of life make it a virtual necessity.332 
From those peasants who did 'pick up a gun' Guevara, initially at least, seems to have 
expected a great deal, as if a Marxist-Leninist science of revolution somehow is donned along 
with guerrilla combat kit. His angry denunciations seem surreal: the anger of a revolutionary 
caught up in the claustrophobic paradox of a science which bears little resemblance to the 
lived world of the people among whom he, at that point in time, is operating. 
In retrospect, Guevara's traumatic seven months in the Congo induced in him a conclusion 
that: "If the liberation struggle is to be successful in the present conditions in Africa, it is 
essential to bring some of the Marxist analytic schema up to date."333 More specifically, he 
(now sadder but wiser) recommends to Cuban theorists and strategists that: 
The impact of socialist ideas must reach the broad masses of the African countries, 
not as a transplant, but as an adaptation to new conditions. And it must offer a down-
to-earth image of major changes that can be, if not actually felt, then clearly imagined 
by the population.334 
The above modification of scientific socialist orthodoxy echoes an earlier statement by 
Amilcar Cabral when reflecting on the liberation war in Guinea-Bissau: 
Keep always in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for the things in 
anyone's head.335 They are fighting to win material benefits, to live better and in 
peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future of their children.336 
To Cabral's observation, Davidson adds an assertion that: "Anyone who ran ahead of the 
majority's willingness to follow would soon be running alone"337 which resonates in 
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Guevara's depiction of his embattled retreat from the Congo. "During those last hours of our 
time in the Congo, I felt more alone than I had done even in Cuba or in any of my wanderings 
around the globe. I might say: 'Never have I found myself so alone again as I do today after 
all my travels.'" Perhaps Guevara neglected sufficiently to consult the lessons offered by a 
struggle he describes as "an incomplete example of a well-conducted people's war"339 given 
that Cabral's revolutionary praxis deviates from the beaten path of 'normal science.' 
According to Turok, Cabral never acknowledged himself as a Marxist. Be that as it may, 
both Cabral's and Guevara's (eventual) advice regarding a situationally appropriate ideology 
of revolution bear close comparison with Gramsci's definition of an historically organic 
ideology. 
Nodal points of Gramsci's concept of an ideology that corresponds to the historicity of a 
given society or culture can be found firstly, in his distinction between common sense and 
good sense. By the former he means a cognitive mode "mechanically imposed by the external 
environment." An individual uncritically accepts "in a disjointed and episodic way" the 
"'intellectual activity'" (a phrase Gramsci places in quotation marks, presumably to indicate 
that his tongue is in his cheek) "of the local priest or aging patriarch whose wisdom is law, or 
in the little old woman who has inherited the lore of the witches ..." 4 By the latter, he means 
the result of working out for oneself... 
... one's own conception of the world and thus, in connection with the labours of one's 
own brain, choose one's sphere of activity, take an active part in the creation of the 
history of the world, be one's own guide, refusing to accept passively and supinely 
from outside the moulding of one's personality.342 
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To the above depiction of "good sense' Gramsci appends a caveat. Good sense is only to a 
limited extent a product of individual cognition since, in the final analysis, all thought is 
collectively produced. The same 'collective product' principle applies also to "common 
sense,' albeit in uncritical and incoherent form. Gramsci discerns in a 'common sense' 
individual a "strangely composite" personality which "contains Stone Age elements and 
principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local 
level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the 
world over." In order to chart the route from common sense to good sense, Gramsci 
recommends a Socratic map as cognitive guide. "The starting-point of critical elaboration is 
the consciousness of what one really is, and is "knowing thyself as a product of the historical 
process to date which has deposited you in an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory. 
The first thing to do is to make an inventory."344 
A second nodal point is located in the link between good sense and philosophy. Given the 
context in which I am deploying Gramsci's arguments, his depiction of the link is worth citing 
in its entirety. 
Creating a new culture does not only mean one's own individual 'original' discoveries. 
It also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in a critical form of truths already 
discovered, their 'socialisation' as it were, and even making them the basis of vital 
action, an element of co-ordination and intellectual and moral order. For a mass of 
people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the real 
present world, is a 'philosophical' event far more important and "original' than the 
discovery by some philosophical 'genius' of a truth which remains the property of 
small groups of intellectuals.345 
Thus, for Gramsci, if an expert knowledge system is to extend itself into the lived world -
which, in order to assist in the development of an organic ideology, it logically must do - the 
extension should be articulated and configured by "organic intellectuals", that is, the thinking 
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and organising element of a particular, fundamental social class.346 (It is in this light that the 
significance of Dalmayr's assertion that Cabral, "by remaining rooted in the African people he 
guided while simultaneously learning from them along the way,"347 qualifies as an organic 
intellectual best can be grasped). 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that for Gramsci, an organic ideology 
is the end product of emergent 'good sense' mediated by philosophy. Furthermore, such an 
ideology, made "coherent on a scientific plane" by the cognitively transformative activities of 
organic intellectuals, "never forgets to remain in contact with the 'simple' and indeed finds in 
this contact the source of the problems it sets out to study and resolve."348 By the same token 
an organic ideology, once established as a set of guiding and interpretive principles, mediates 
the relationship between expert knowledge and the lived world.349 
In concluding this section on Guevara's Congo experience, and in light of Gramsci's thesis, it 
is illuminating to pinpoint firstly, Guevara's comment regarding Congolese dawa - a liquid 
concoction deemed to provide protection from physical and spiritual harm. "The dawa is 
treated as an article of faith. The most politically advanced say that it is a natural, material 
force, and that they, as dialectical materialists, recognise its power ..."35°; and secondly, to 
take his ironic comment in conjunction with one of his key revelations, namely that: 
Despite all the fears, we kept trying to incorporate Congolese into our little army and 
to give them the rudiments of military training, so that this nucleus might save the 
most important thing: the soul, the presence of the revolution. But the Cubans 
charged with imparting the divine breath had an ever weaker grip on it themselves. 
The effects of the climate were still being felt, as gastro-enteritis was added to the 
endemic malaria. Until the rigours of the job got the better of my scientific spirit, I 
noted in my field diary the statistics of my own case: I had the runs more than 30 
times in 24 hours. Only the scrub knows how many more there were after that.351 
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It doesn't seem to have occurred to Guevara that the Congolese rebels speak ofdawa in much 
the same spirit that he and his band of Cuban revolutionaries speak of Marxism-Leninism, 
nor that his professed science operates as a kind of magic muti with which to contest the muti 
of the Cold War 'other', and thereby to fend off the depredations of Western imperialism. 
Given that the zero-sum essence of the Cold War codified the binary divisions of a realist 
formula, Guevara, his insights notwithstanding, failed to recognise that 'dawa' and 
'dialectical materialism' share - if nothing else - an element of wish projection. 
In sum: it is at the ambiguous frontier between 'ideology' and 'utopia' that it is instructive to 
locate the unravelling of Guevara's scientific certainties. Under the pressures inflicted on 
him by the lived world of the Congo, his faith - his dawa, as it were - inexorably was 
crumbling. In such a case, the realist formula 'X is A or non-A' is revealed in all its 
ontological and epistemological limitations. Moreover, Guevara - in endeavouring to fit the 
lived world of the Congo within "the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the 
paradigm supplies"352 - primarily was the architect of his own disaster. Following on from 
this, I surmise that Guevara and his group of Cuban insurgents were not in any manner or 




VARIETIES OF NATIONALISM 
Before leaving the Cuban Embassy in Dar es Salaam and embarking on a course which led to 
Bolivia and his death, Guevara recommended that a revised Marxist recipe in the Congo 
should include, as fundamentals, the following ingredients: firstly, the inculcation of a 
national vision as an antidote to "the tribal concept" that he believed bedevilled the Congo; 
secondly, "revolutionary seriousness and an ideology that can guide action";354 thirdly, a party 
"with a real national basis and real prestige among the masses";355 fourthly, a national 
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leader. His outline highlights a quartet of developmental priorities espoused by both 
Marxist and modernisation paradigms, as demonstrated below. 
Paradigmatic nationalisms 
For adherents and practitioners of both paradigms, the political party is considered to be the 
most effective nationalist vehicle in which to convey the developmental contents of an iron 
cage to a newly liberated but largely rural and tradition-bound populace. Leader and party 
must be capable of simultaneously creating and leading a nation within state boundaries 
inherited by new nations from old empires. In this regard, ideology putatively has a dual role. 
It is the binding agent connecting leader and political party to the people, not least by making 
a development agenda at once explicable and compelling. It also operates as a catalyst in that 
it speeds up the growth of the nation and therefore, of development. As this by any standards 
is a dual task of Herculean proportions, the faith necessarily invested by both paradigms in 
their applied developmental instruments deserves special mention and, in the case of 
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modernisation theory, requires further investigation since for behaviouralists, the sole worth 
of an applied ideology is contained in its functionality. 
According to Plamenatz, for beliefs to fit the contours of ideology, "they must be shared by a 
group of people, they must concern matters important to the group, and must be in some way 
functional to it: they must serve to hold it together or to justify activities and attitudes 
characteristic of its members." The definition is instructive in that it contains the notions 
both of attitudes and of functions. Also, as a definition it presumably would be acceptable to 
behaviouralists because it links together the key variables of attitudes and actions. However, 
Plamenatz neglects to mention the focal concept, for behaviouralists, of political 
socialisation. This omission is remedied by Easton. 
The literature on nationality and nationalism has dealt exhaustively with the varied 
devices for stimulating a sense of cohesion. Concrete responses for the expression 
and reinforcement of a sense of community appear in patriotic ceremonies, the 
physical symbols of group identity such as totems, flags, songs, canonised heroes ... 
The processes of political socialisation operate on maturing members of a system and 
contribute to the internalisation of supportive attitudes towards the political 
T CO 
community. 
The communal function of ideology, continues Easton, is that of mobilising support for the 
regime. Ideology carries out this function in two primary ways: firstly, it plays an important 
role in promoting a sense of political community, described by Easton as "a we-feeling among 
a group of people, not just that they are a group but that they are a political entity that works 
together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny."359 Secondly, ideology, by 
interpreting and codifying the shared history of a political community as well as its current 
collective experiences "in a form that makes them readily visible, accessible and 
transmissable over the generations,"360 functions as a "mechanism contributing to the 
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persistence of a political community." If ideology is functioning at optimal levels, it will 
replace particular ties to "tribe, village, region or class" with a common political bond.361 
It is noteworthy that Guevara and Easton share a preoccupation with the replacement of tribal 
particularities and divisions by national unity, and uniformity of vision. Both see ideology as 
playing a central role in the transformation of "tribes' into 'nations.' By definition such an 
ideology would have to incorporate a strongly nationalist element. It is at this juncture, 
however, that adherents of Marxist and modernisation paradigms would part company, one 
set arguing that the inculcation of nationalist affiliations is just one function (that is, the 
communal function) among a number that an ideology should perform, the other contending 
that nationalism is the collective property of a given socio-economic class. For instance, for 
Guevara in his capacity as a paradigm agent, the identity of the class that produces a 
nationalist discourse is crucial since it flags the divide between scientific- progressive 
nationalism on the one hand, and bourgeois-liberal or merely ideological nationalism on the 
other. 
In general, the two paradigms are emblematic of two variants of nationalism, one reformist 
and the other revolutionary. The variants share a common objective predicated on their 
mutual apprehension of the flawed (colonial) origins of the modern state in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and a corresponding and urgent need to remedy the perceived problems of 
particularist identities and tribal rivalries. Both variants of nationalism are vested in the 
politics of identity but while the Marxist version avowedly is the scientifically informed 
praxis of a national proletariat, the variant propagated by modernisation theory realises itself 
in a concept of 'the nation'. 
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In the above respect, Munck contends that from the viewpoint of revolutionary nationalism 
"the nation is understood as the product of the creative activity of the masses" whereas 
bourgeois nationalism "presents the nation as something abstract and symbolic, separating it 
from the concrete labour of those who have built it."362 Prima facie, it does seem 
paradoxical that modernisation theory should posit as the end point of an ideological function 
an abstract concept of the nation. Here, one would have to bear in mind that for a theory such 
as modernisation with its positivist-behavioural parentage, there is an exact correspondence 
between the reality of a concept and its function/s. No positivist would posit the substantive 
existence of a concept (X) if its function (A) does not demonstrably exist. Since the existence 
of X is a consequence of empirically observable and quantifiable behaviour mediated 
(engineered?) by an ideology performing its communal function, one reasonably could argue 
that there is nothing notably abstract about modernisation theory's concept of the nation since 
it, too, is a product of concrete labour, albeit divorced from considerations of class struggle. 
The difference, then, is situated not so much in the aim - in both cases, a concretely produced 
'nation' - but in the method of achieving it. In other words, what category of human action 
and interaction is deemed to produce 'a nation' as distinct from 'a tribe' or an ethnic group? 
The authoritarian trend: 'revolutionary nationalism '. 
A theory of the revolutionary production of an African or more generally, Third World, 
nation can be presumed to encode Lenin's belief that bourgeois and socialist (proletarian) 
ideologies are locked in a struggle for exclusive possession of a scientific apprehension of 
reality. By extension, then, if an iron cage or expert knowledge system is to infiltrate the 
lived world of Africans, in the process achieving the conversion of a pre-scientific (non-A) 
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concept of tribe into a scientifically constituted nation, then revolution itself is an implicitly, 
or at any rate, potentially scientific process. This in turn presupposes a scientific category of 
leadership for, without such leadership, a revolution merely will be "spontaneous'. Since a 
spontaneous revolution itself presupposes the existence of an ordinary or non-scientific class 
of leadership, a nation produced by a spontaneous revolution of the workers cannot be a 
scientifically constituted entity. It instead will approximate to a bourgeois or abstract concept 
of the nation. 
The ease with which a workers' revolt, if unsupervised by a revolutionary AvantGarde, 
eventuates in domination by bourgeois elements, is explained by the Leninist thesis that 
bourgeois ideology is far older in origin, more fully developed and has at its disposal far more 
resources than its socialist counterpart.363 For this reason, the active presence and vigilance 
in the struggle of a revolutionary AvantGarde rates as an objective necessity. Further, Lenin 
shared with Kautsky a belief that "modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis 
of profound scientific knowledge."364 In this way, Marxism-Leninism co-opts nationalism to 
the service of the vanguard party. 
Lenin's thesis of decolonisation is modelled on a Russian (economically undeveloped) 
scenario and thus posits a double manoeuvre in the struggle for national liberation. Firstly, 
both bourgeois and proletarian nationalists of necessity must unite to eject reactionary 
(whether feudal or colonial) regimes. Success in this initial stage of the struggle then 
necessitates a second phase in which protagonists of a science of revolution ensure that the 
struggle continues. In other words, a period of revolutionary watchfulness is necessary to 
contain reformist elements among the national bourgeoisie and ultimately, to eliminate all ties 
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to Western capitalism. In Lenin's view, communist movements in the Third World were still 
too weak to achieve the first phase on their own, and thus temporary rapprochement with all 
elements of the national bourgeoisie was called for. Munck highlights the intervention of an 
Indian Marxist, M.N. Roy, who "argued vigorously that the colonial world was not an 
undifferentiated category, and that with capitalist penetration the indigenous bourgeoisie 
would lose its nationalist inclinations." Roy further contended that the bourgeoisie in the 
colonies is not "an objective revolutionary force."365 At the back of Roy's argument was his 
thesis of decolonisation, namely, that the basic trend in the colonies was one of increased 
capitalist penetration achieved with the cooperation of the indigenous bourgeoisie, and that 
therefore the objective interests of imperialist and indigenous bourgeoisie are one and the 
same - in which case, the national bourgeoisie in perpetuity (or for as long as imperialism 
lasts) by definition is a counter-revolutionary force. 
After Lenin's death, and despite the reservations of Roy and others, the Comintern took 
Stalin's line, namely, that imperialism retards industrialisation in the colonies, in which case 
the struggle for independence of a nationalist elite counts as revolutionary, bourgeois 
tendencies notwithstanding, and is organically linked to the revolutionary aspirations of the 
masses. From this thesis was derived the concept of an undifferentiated national front, along 
with a Comintern resolution that it is the duty of communists actively to support all and any 
nationalist movements in the Third World.366 
A critique of the Stalinist notion of an undifferentiated popular front against imperialism is 
imputed by Ake's critical analysis of ideologies in Cold War era Africa - at any rate, to the 
extent that a concept of 'national front' forces against imperialism elides the objective 
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distinction between progressive and reactionary regimes. Commenting on the material 
absence of radical ideology in post-independence Africa, Ake contends that so-called radical 
ideologies exist only on an epiphenomenal plane. Regimes that call their economies 
'socialist' in fact have adopted institutional structures and policies similar to capitalist 
regimes. He itemises the similarities on both sides of an apparent ideological divide between 
'capitalist' and 'socialist' states in Africa. Firstly, in all cases, leaders have held tenaciously 
to power, and a change in regime is brought about only by force. Secondly, political systems 
in Africa uniformly are administered from the top, and power increasingly is centralised. 
Thirdly, all African countries are de facto one party systems in which the political 
participation of the masses has been reduced to inconsequential choices.367 
From Ake's argument can be extrapolated a notion that the category of human action deemed 
to produce a nation - as distinct from a 'tribe'- is derived from the modus operandi of a 
nationalist political party, not from a state's citizenry as such, and further, that this notion 
applies across the board irrespective of (more apparent than real) socialist / capitalist or 
radical / bourgeois distinctions. Nationalism, then, is configured as an elite discourse whether 
its roots are in a behavioural, 'nation-building' paradigm or in a scientific socialist paradigm, 
since science - of whatever ideological colouration - exclusively is the possession of a party 
elite. 
However, the above argument begs the question of capitalism's status - strictu sensu - as an 
economic system, not a political ideology. Thus, an issue that remains to be addressed is that 
of the conversion of pre-independence liberal-nationalist discourse into post-independence, 
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capitalist one party systems in which a liberal ethos typically is abandoned along with the 
banning of opposition parties. 
The authoritarian trend: 'bourgeois nationalism'. 
In charting the changing contours of bourgeois nationalism in Africa during the eras of 
decolonisation and postcolonialism, aspects of Ake's, Mazrui's and Davidson's respective 
theses in combination provide an instructive guide to the conversion of liberal nationalist 
discourse pre-independence into authoritarian (single party) nationalism post-independence. 
Ake and Mazrui take as their point of departure the ideology (Ake) or political values 
(Mazrui) of imperialism. Mazrui cites imperialism's dual mandate "of civilisation and of 
exploitation." These mandates "are carriers of explicit and implicit political values." Against 
them, African opponents of imperialism propounded two sets of political values: pluralism 
and nationalism.36 
Liberal values were adopted by African nationalists for two primary reasons. Firstly, colonial 
education policy. "Schooling in colonial Africa was linked to the promotion of religion rather 
than the dissemination of science."369 As Ake explains: "a minimum of technical and 
scientific education was offered because colonial domination owed much to the spell of the 
coloniser's technological and scientific superiority."370 However, an educational programme 
designed to preserve colonial domination contained the seeds of African resistance since 
liberal education led to the discovery of Western liberal ideas and from there to political 
consciousness and the development of political skills. "Liberal education generated an 
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indigenous leadership and equipped its members with a common language. It helped create 
the conditions for eradicating colonialism."371 
While future elites were garnering the skills necessary to oppose imperialism on liberal and 
nationalist grounds, labourers and peasants, denied welfare schemes by colonial 
administrations, resorted to "traditional solidarity groups, especially ethnic groups. These 
became centres of resistance, means of self-affirmation..."372 It was from these associations 
that nationalism in African colonies derived its popular impetus and mass base. Davidson 
adds that "without the mass pressure that surged into the streets of colonial cities and made its 
impact felt even in remote corners of the bush, the educated elite would have remained upon 
"3 "7 "3 
the sidelines of everyday life ..." 
Secondly, Ake maintains that in an era of decolonisation, the great virtue for African 
nationalists of liberal ideology was its dual utility. On the one hand, it could be utilised to 
mobilise public opinion in the European metropole against colonialism by deploying values 
and doctrines that made sense in the political and cultural world of Europeans. On the other, 
liberalism is the companion ideology of the capitalist mode of production that a number of 
nationalist leaders fully intended to retain after independence.374 Mazrui, having noted that 
the value of political pluralism was expressed most forcefully by African leaders who had 
adopted a course of negotiated evolution towards independence, adds that liberal ideology 
provided an arsenal of legal formulae and political methods. Thus nationalism and liberalism 
were in strategic and tactical alliance375 in a fashion not dissimilar to the strategic and tactical 
alliance between imperialism's twin themes of civilisation and exploitation. Against 
imperialism's self-endowed mandates, firstly, to exploit natural resources and human labour 
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in the colonies, African nationalists set the right to national self-determination; secondly, to 
civilise 'backward' tribes, African elites set the liberal discourse of human rights. 
To the above apt formula in opposition to Europe's clutch on African territories and peoples 
was added a third element, defined by Mazrui as follows: 
In their struggle for independence, African nationalists were often aiming not at the 
emancipation of a particular territory but at putting an end to the submission of 
African peoples. The values of nationalism were almost always associated with the 
"inf. 
values of African unity as indissolubly linked elements. 
This third element - in which pan-African unity is perceived as the most effective and durable 
method of combating (neo) imperialism - derived its primary (and on-going) impetus not least 
from the link made by imperialism between the concepts of'race' and 'civilisation', itself a 
product of 19th century European science, (vii) 
Mazrui distinguishes between nationalism - "the defence of or the quest for nationhood and 
its sociocultural attributes" - and 'dignitarianism' - "a defence of collective dignity in the face 
of a hostile or condescending environment." He contends that it was out of dignitarianism 
that Pan-Africanism first emerged as "a deep-seated African rebellion against humiliation" 
whereas "at best, nationhood has been just the means to an end."377 In similar vein, Davidson 
contends that the aims of nationalism were indistinguishable from demands for "the removal 
of the colonial incubus."378 By extension, it is inappropriate to interpret or apply the concept 
of 'nationalism' in Africa from within an historical and cultural matrix shaped by European 
experience. To Davidson's way of thinking, 'African nationalism' in the main meant no more 
and no less than anti-colonialism and anti-racism - "which amounted in practice to the same 
(vii) See next section of this chapter 
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thing." He further avers that while African nationalism mostly is not informed by a concept 
of the nation, it is thoroughly imbued with a concept of freedom.379 
Arguably, a potential danger in equating nationalism with freedom may become actual if 
markedly different perceptions of freedom inform the periphery of the post-independence 
state and its newly empowered centre. If differences then are made concrete in constitutional 
statute or military decree, the discourse of African nationalism mutates into party-state or - in 
some cases - military-state ideology in which the centre of truth is coextensive with the centre 
of power and, in practice, power is concentrated in a few expert hands. 
Once the pre-independence conflation of nationalism and liberty had mutated into a post-
independence, single party discourse of national unity, it stands to reason that a pre-
independence strategic alliance with (multi-party) liberalism lost its utility for 'Afro-
capitalist' regimes. With the abandonment of liberalism, nationalism acquired an 
increasingly authoritarian trend. 
Moreover, that capitalist one-party regimes "generally deny any ideological attachments at all; 
'pragmatism', it is said, is their only creed"380 is logically congruent with modernisation 
theory's privileging of functional efficacy and political order (as key facilitators and indices of 
development) at the expense, for instance, of ideas about social justice and the redistribution 
of wealth - unless, that is, a climate of social unrest is severe enough to constitute a 
developmental crisis. 
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Referring to the analytical tradition embodied in the American Social Science Research 
Council (SSRC) Comparative Politics Committee, "often labelled liberal modernisation 
theory", Young alludes to the SSRC's argument that development can be understood as the 
resolution of a series of'crises' encountered on the pathway toward consolidation of the 
nation state, and that crisis resolution entails (among other things) responding to "the 
increasingly powerful normative claims for equality." The SSRC, however, failed to translate 
this and other crisis triggers "into measurable indicators."381 Noting the search by Eckstein 
and the SSRC for "a set of empirical measures that could be reliably assessed by quantitative 
indicators,"382 Young observes that: 
Survival and absence of collective disorder, in an authoritarian setting, do not 
seem very convincing indicators of developmental accomplishment. Legitimacy and 
decisional efficacy are more reasonable standards, though highly resistant to the kind 
of measurement Eckstein sought. This venture into performance measurement quietly 
expired; it is most interesting for its demonstration of the severe difficulties of the 
task.383 
Since orthodox modernisation theory in post-independence Africa proved unable or unwilling 
to salvage the pre-independence marriage of nationalism and liberalism, a minor paradigm 
shift from orthodox to revised modernisation occurred. Modernisation revisionism (viii) 
explicitly equated social order and economic growth with political authoritarianism, thus 
underwriting a conflation of nationalism and authoritarianism in 'Afro-capitalist' states. 
In sum: once the authoritarian leanings implicit in orthodox modernisation theory (ix) had 
been made fully explicit by its revisionist successor, a science of modernisation did not 
markedly differ from its Marxist-Leninist rival in respect the following methods and 
(viii) Particularly in its Huntingtonian incarnation - see Chapter Seven, passim 
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objectives. Firstly, the elimination of factional differences by dint of institutionalising one-
party regimes; secondly, an authoritarian brand of elite-formulated nationalism; thirdly, the 
injection 'from without' of expert knowledge into the lived world of Africans; fourthly, 
strong and charismatic leadership as sine qua non of national development, thus reinforcing 
and expanding the central role of 'big men' in postcolonial Africa. 
Scott, who applies a concept of "high modernist ideology" to modernisation and Marxist-
Leninist paradigms alike, compares "late colonial rule" and its "social engineering aspirations 
and ability to ride roughshod over popular opposition"384 with a postcolonial authoritarian 
state that brings to bear the full weight of its coercive power, the better to implement its 
developmental designs. Further, Scott contends that both the late colonial and the 
postcolonial state typically ignore or negate the fund of valuable knowledge embedded in 
local practices.385 In general, Mudimbe's definition of colonialism as "a discourse in which 
an explicit political power presumes the authority of a scientific knowledge and vice-versa"386 
equally can be applied to postcolonial single party nationalism, whether 'revolutionary' or 
'bourgeois'. 
Inverting a realist formula: cultural nationalism 
In contradistinction to exogenous paradigms that advocate varieties of nationalism deemed 
appropriate for the developing world in general, cultural nationalism is an endogenous and 
sub-continent-specific discourse, with origins in early 20th century Pan-Africanist resistance 
to European imperialism. 
(ix) See Chapter Six, pp 155-158 
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Science, race and culture 
By the late 19th century, European science had been raised to an absolute standard both of 
knowledge and of justification for imperial over-lordship, in the process endowing an 
imperial 'super-subject' with rights commensurate with scientific status. Lesser scientific 
status meant lesser human rights, as illustrated by Bancel et al in a discussion of late 19th 
century human zoos in Western Europe. Their focus on the rationale behind commercial 
display of 'exotic natives' to a credulous European public reveals that it mirrored 
imperialism's dual mandate, viz, an interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship 
between that which is commercially profitable and that which is promoted as civilised (or 
civilising). Among the exhibits on display were Africans, Aborigines, Samoans and Lapps, 
all defined as 'natural tribes.' As commercial demand increased, travelling exhibits were 
formed and moved from town to town with their cargo of exotic prototypes. 
This was how millions of Europeans first encountered people different from themselves -
as exotic strangers in cages. The social effect of such spectacles in forming the image of 
the other was enormous. The creation of human zoos, and their huge success, was the 
outcome of three concurrent developments: the construction of a social image of the 
other; the emergence of scientific theories of racial superiority; and the pursuit of colonial 
empires, then in full swing.387 
Bancel et al discern a dialectical relationship between imperialism on the one hand, and on 
the other, positivism (with its emphasis on observable and measurable phenomena), 
phrenology (that constructed a grammar of the physical characteristics of racial groups), 
eugenics (that proposed the improvement of hereditary characteristics of population groups by 
systematic selection) and social Darwinism (that distinguished between primitive and 
civilised races).388 Thus, a visual representation of 19l century scientific knowledge was 
conveyed to the lived world of Europeans in sensationalist format. In the process, travelling 
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cages and their human cargoes - or objects of research - popularised scientific perceptions of 
reality while simultaneously underwriting imperialism's dual mandate. 
In order to elucidate a 'science is might is right' supposition, Biakolo cites Taylor's argument 
that even if we can find no theoretical grounds for adducing superior rationality to Western 
scientific and technological culture, there remains one hard and unassailable fact, that of 
Western technological and therefore, military superiority. "Indeed" comments Biakolo, 
"confronted with a Gatling gun argument such as Taylor's, what hope of refutation have 
we?"389 When science is utilised to negate the history of a conquered people or a silenced 
majority by banishing it "to the kingdom of unmeaning" along with the stories that are 
"mysteriously able to impart meaning to human life",390 then: 
The web of direct and indirect instruments of manipulation is a straitjacket that binds 
life and necessarily limits the fundamental ways it can appear to itself and structure 
itself. And so it languishes, declines, wastes away. It is cheapened and levelled. It 
becomes pseudo-life.391 
Havel's assessment, above, of the long-term effects of protracted and widespread penetration 
of the lived world by an ideology that asserts its superiority on scientific grounds bears 
comparison with the penetration of Africa by imperial science, notably in regard to theft of 
history and concomitant erosion of an endogenous world of meaning. Masolo defines the 
ultimate effects of this process as "double alienation - alienation from history, alienation into 
cultural staticism and anachronism, alienation into underdevelopment."392 This said, the 
science that invaded the lived world of Czechs and other Eastern European peoples largely 
was devoid of an element that - arguably - represents the definitive point of contact between 
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imperial Europe and the lived world of Africans, that is, a 19 century science of race which 
allocated to people with black skins a lowly niche in a linear schematic of civilisation. 
In his critique of a schematic that hinges on a notion of inherent racial difference, Appiah 
isolates as follows a few key assumptions. Firstly, an assumed connection between a 'race' 
and a 'nation' that in turn posits the nation as a product of culture informed by inherited racial 
traits. From the outset, European nations conceived of themselves in terms of descent. Given 
this conception, "all that happened was that descent came in the mid 19th century to be 
understood in terms of race". Secondly, the view "that the cultural inferiority of the non-
white races flowed from an inherited racial essence." 
When examining the consequences for Africans of a racial hierarchy that places people of 
European descent at its apex in tandem with a conflation of (superior) race and (imperial) 
nation, Mamdani's observations are illuminating. He notes that the concept of'tribe' was 
deployed not least to justify treating Africans as subject peoples in their own territories since -
in the cognitive inventory and circular logic of imperialism - tribes were presumed to have no 
social history and therefore no legitimate claim to political rights.394 In this fashion, 
imperialism's dual mandate was established, justified, and then shored up by the findings of 
European anthropologists and administrators. In the former category, as Biakolo sees it, "the 
anthropology of Levy-Bruhl marked a watershed in the understanding of the 'Other'".395 
Levy-Bruhl characterised the "collective representations of primitives" as evidence of a 
"prelogical mentality"396 in which objective validity and abstract reasoning are absent; 
instead, memory and participation mystique are allocated priority in the collective cognitive 
representations of tribes. Although Levy-Bruhl's conclusions moved away from an earlier 
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anthropological dichotomy of'civilised' and 'savage', instead contrasting 'logical' with 
'prelogical', he nonetheless reproduced a binary configuration, as well as pinning down and 
specifying the previously rather nebulous meanings associated with notions of'savage' and 
'civilised'. "Primitive culture is participated in collectively, it is a shared reality. The idea of 
individual, and, by implication, dissident, grasp or assessment of reality, individual creativity, 
i n n 
and so on, runs counter to the ethos of primitive culture." 
Pan-Africanist counter-narratives: Negritude and African personality 
It was in the context of the formulaic reduction of non-European races that the philosophy of 
Negritude 398 arose as a resistance discourse by taking a formula of A (European) and non-A 
(non-European) and re-configuring it to affirm the authenticity of "blackness' as a substantive 
category. In this respect, Negritude's position is clarified if viewed in the light of Mamdani's 
and Derrida's respective critiques of binary logic. According to Delanty, Derrida argues 
against the logocentrism inherent in Western culture (that is, the idea that there is a truth to be 
uncovered by science) "by saying that for every fixed idea there is also an 'absent' idea: 
identity requires non-identity; the self needs an other."399 For Mamdani, a paradigmatic 
representation of social reality that deploys a series of binary oppositions as methodological 
devices necessarily operates along a bipolar continuum of'lead' and "residual' terms. 
Whereas the lead term has analytical content, the residual term lacks "both an original history 
and an authentic future."400 From within this interpretive matrix, the mission401 of Negritude 
can be conceptualised as a reaction to the negation of Africa by Europe. 
We had been taught, by our French masters at the Lycee, that we had no civilisation, 
having been left off the list of guests at the Banquet of the Universal. We were tabula 
rasa, or, better still, a lump of soft wax which the fingers of the white demiurge would 
mould into shape.402 
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Senghor, having made his point, then defines Negritude as "the whole complex of civilised 
values - cultural, economic, social and political - which characterise the black peoples, - or, 
more precisely, the Negro-African world."403 
The term 'Negritude' was coined in 1939 by Aime Cesaire, an African of the Diaspora (in his 
case, Martinique). In Cesaire's work, Negritude, a phrase that encompasses the humanity and 
dignity of Africans, is conceptualised in tandem with a notion of 'return.' 'Return' endows 
African dignity and humanity with historicity, and in so doing "opens the way to the 
definition of negritude as a historical commitment, as a movement."404 It is worth noting that 
Negritude, like Pan-Africanism, in its first inception was a cognitive product of the African 
Diaspora - the descendants of slaves in North and South America and the West Indies - and 
was informed by a dual conceptualisation of space: firstly, Africa as a space of origin and of 
spiritual return, a symbolic referent both of suffering and of pride; secondly, current spatial 
location whether American or Caribbean. 
In the second location, the purpose of expressing Pan-African solidarity and the humanity of 
black peoples is less metaphysical than the notion of spiritual return given that the objectives 
are concrete political and civil rights. In the context of the first space, and referring to the 
writers, poets and artists associated with the Harlem Renaissance movement of the 1920s and 
'30s, Masolo contends that "All these people saw Africa, with its rawness and anchorage to 
base natural forces, as an essential antithesis to the domineering industrial civilisation of the 
white world."405 Africa was re-imagined and, in that sense, re-claimed by Africans of the 
Diaspora. A re-imagined Africa was an emblem of creatively conceptualised 'African 
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difference' and a symbolic assertion both of equal human rights and equal global citizenship 
as Africans, not as imitators of Europe or America. In the words of du Bois: 
... the advance guard of the Negro people - the 8,000,000 people of Negro blood in the 
United States of America - must soon come to realise that if they are to take their just 
place in the van of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is not absorption by the white 
Americans. That if in America it is to be proven for the first time in the modern world 
that... Negroes are ... a nation stored with wonderful possibilities of culture, then their 
destiny is not a servile imitation of Anglo-Saxon culture, but a stalwart originality 
which shall unswervingly follow Negro ideals.406 
In the quotation above, it is noteworthy that European perceptions (as itemised by Appiah, 
above) of essentialist connections between nation, race and culture, all are present and 
correct. A conceptual matrix designed as a vehicle of Europe's self-expression is utilised to 
assert the singularity, dignity and cultural creativity of the black race. It is somewhat ironic, 
as illustrated by an excerpt from Senghor's poem, New York, that European essentialism is 
adopted and adapted by the discourse of Negritude to highlight African exceptionalism in 
contradistinction to that which is perceived as intrinsically European: "New York! I say New 
York, let the black blood flow into your blood / Let it wash the rust from your steel joints, 
like an oil of life / Let it give your bridges the curves of hips and the pliancy of vines."407 
In an analysis of Senghor's New York, Mezu, having described Senghor's observations as 
"poetically true and acceptable" nonetheless expresses reservations. He notes that New York, 
and other poems along similar lines, contain disturbing echoes of the work of de Gobineau 
who, in 1854, described Africans as prodigiously endowed with emotions and artistic prowess 
but almost completely lacking in rational and scientific intelligence or mathematical vision. 
Senghor ... seems to be giving credence to the erroneous belief that the blacks alone 
are endowed with artistic talent, to the exclusion of other races, a position as false as 
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the theory of Gobineau that whites and more particularly Germans are endowed with 
more intelligence than other peoples. 
Images embedded in Senghor's depiction of the mechanistic, mathematically configured and 
numbingly scientific culture of the 'other' in contradistinction to the warm, organic and lyrical 
landscape of the 'self, are expressed with more force and defiance in Cesaire's 
representations of African 'self and European 'other', as illustrated by an excerpt from Return 
To My Native Land. 
Those who invented neither powder 
Nor the Compass 
But who ecstatically leave themselves 
To be carried away 
Toward the essence of everything 
Not caring about dominating others ,.409 
"My Negritude" continues Cesaire, "is neither a tower nor a cathedral. It thrusts into the red 
flesh of the soil, it thrusts into the warm flesh of the sky ... "41° Irele emphasises that 
Cesaire's vision is not merely personal but also, and more importantly, collective. It is firstly, 
a vision of the black race "founded upon a novel apprehension of the meaning of Africa, 
which serves as the mediating symbol of a new consciousness" and secondly, the contestation 
of a colonial hierarchy of values and the constitution of a counter-myth. In both meanings of 
the term 'negritude' is contained a purpose defined by Cesaire as "the invention of souls." 
That which Irele depicts as 'counter-myth' is defined by Appiah (along with other varieties of 
cultural nationalism or 'nativism') as "reverse discourse" in which ... 
... the terms of resistance are already given us, and our contestation is entrapped 
within the Western cultural matrix we affect to dispute. The pose of repudiation 
actually presupposes the cultural institutions of the West and its ideologies. Railing 
against the cultural domination of the West, the nativists are of its party without 
knowing it.412 
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It is worth noting that Appiah's incisive critique of'reverse discourse' as a meta-phenomenon, 
rather than as a discourse specific to French or former French colonies is modified by Irele's 
contention that Negritude forms a distinctive current of a larger movement of African 
nationalism. It is distinctive because French-speaking intellectuals, whether of the diaspora 
or the continent, "faced special problems in their relationship to French colonial rule."413 They 
produced a body of imaginative and ideological writings that incorporated "a romantic myth 
of Africa", (alternatively known as "romantic primitivism'414) and to some extent 
distinguished them from their English-speaking counterparts.415 Irele suggests, however, that 
differences between French and English speaking Pan-Africanists should not be exaggerated 
since nationalist leaders in both French and British colonies were united by their rejection of 
colonialism irrespective of whether colonial policy was that of assimilation or indirect rule. 
The notion of'African Personality' utilised by English-speaking nationalists - notably, 
Nkrumah - invests in the same conceptual matrix, viz, firstly, a notion of the collective 
personality of black people; secondly, the idea that a nation is the product of cultural unanism 
informed by race.416 
Nkrumah delineates as follows the significance of a concept of "African Personality': 
For too long in our history, Africa has spoken through the voices of others. Now, 
what I have called an African Personality in international affairs will have a chance of 
making its proper impact and will let the world know it is through the voices of 
Africa's own sons.417 
As defined by Nkrumah, African Personality would seem to refer to the post-independence 
role of African states in world affairs, in which case the notion of an essentialist African 
personality is utilised to assert the right of African leaders to speak on behalf of their peoples. 
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The quotation also suggests that Nkrumah expects the leaders of African states to speak with 
one voice in international forums. Irele interprets as follows Nkrumah's meaning. 
... he took 'the African personality' as a given point of departure; primarily, his 
intention was to go beyond the framework of its affirmation - of its "defence and 
illustration' - in order to conceptualise a new relationship of this personality with the 
modern world. In this sense, Nkrumah sought to transcend Negritude; it was no 
longer a question of defining the African personality but of inserting it within the 
historical process. 
Irele concludes that there is a fundamental unity of African thought underlying the various 
forms of ideological expression in Africa, and that this unity is the product of efforts "to 
define as it were a founding myth."419 He clarifies the point (of a single founding myth for an 
assortment of decolonising and newly independent states) by referring to the way that Du 
Bois conceptualised "nation' in an African context. Since an African-American imaginative 
projection of Africa is all of a piece, that is, a cognitive and visceral space of spiritual return 
for any member of the black race irrespective of where s/he resides in corporeal space, Du 
Bois advocated and practised loyalty to an 'African nation' conceived as a single spiritual 
entity.420 This conception of'nation' undergirds the African nationalism of the Diaspora, as 
well as the theory of Negritude and, in general, Pan-Africanism. 
Pan-Africanism and territorial nationalisms 
To the above discussion, Irele appends a caveat, namely that "the practical divergence 
between the Pan-African ideal and the concrete objectives of African nationalism which 
began to take place as soon as the latter took the form of independence movements, took what 
one might call a "territorial turn.'"421 Given the territorial division of colonial Africa to suit the 
interests and ambitions of imperial powers rather than the cultural homogeneity of human 
groups, African nationalism is the somewhat paradoxical product of widespread disjunctures 
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between relatively homogenous cultural and linguistic communities on the one hand, and 
territorial states on the other. In theory, leaders of nationalist movements upheld the unifying 
principles of Pan-Africanism; in practice, they were riven by "the idea of national unity as a 
political need, and that of African unity as an ideological value."422 The tensions between 
principles and practices in the run-up to territorial independence then were entrenched in a 
post- independence era of nation-building and state sovereignty. Citing Ghana as a primary 
example, Irele notes that... 
... in order to emphasise Ghana's new status after 1957, Nkrumah expended 
considerable effort in giving to the state those external attributes of sovereignty that 
would not only mark its formal break with the colonial past but also foster a new 
sense of national belonging among the various peoples of the state... the same logic 
obliged Julius Nyerere to abandon his first intention to wait for the other two East 
African countries with which his country shared common frontiers and services, and 
to press for independence in Tanganyika. 
Since Nkrumah also devoted considerable energy to arguing the case, in various continental 
forums, for a United States of Africa,424 Irele's assertion requires clarification. He to an 
extent unravels the conundrum by describing Nkrumah as "the living pivot on which the 
ideological and affective reciprocity between Pan-Africanism and African nationalism 
revolved."425 As I understand the gist of Irele's meaning, Nkrumah's role in newly 
independent Africa is emblematic of stresses and strains inherent in "the peculiarity of 
African nationalism."426 On the one hand, the reinvention of Africa, or retrieval of the 
continent from the disempowered margins of Eurocentric ontology, requires a significant 
measure of continental unity premised on a notion of shared cultural essence from which, in 
turn, is distilled an African vox populi. Essentialist perceptions in Europe and North America 
of'self in contradistinction to "other' thus are reproduced, albeit in inverse order, in a 
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nationalist emphasis on African one-ness, not least for the purpose of constructing collective 
fortifications against the depredations of imperialism and, more latterly, neoimperialism. On 
the other, the Europe-endowed exigencies and anomalies within which territorial 
independence occurred, when taken in combination with the developmental paradigms 
adopted by newly independent states, made nation-construction within received state borders 
a top priority. The outcome of the relationship between these two, by no means compatible 
imperatives is "the triumph of the territorial principle" - a triumph that "underlines the minor 
role of the national principle in African nationalism."427 
Critique of cultural nationalism 
In the light of the paradox adumbrated above, it is scarcely surprising that post-independence 
narratives of cultural nationalism and nation-construction tend to conflate essentialist and 
functionalist premises. An illustration of this conflation of logically incompatible elements 
can be found in Abraham's carefully crafted argument in The Mind of Africa (1962). 
Abraham posits a dual thesis in which culture is valuable both for its functional contribution 
to nation-building (in his case, construction of a national political culture in Ghana), as well 
as for what he believes is the ability of African cultural essence to transcend national and 
regional boundaries. Arguing the unanimity in key respects of African cultures, Abraham 
contrasts Africa with Europe: "Indeed, the fullness of Africa's cultures is the strength of the 
cultural argument for pan-Africanism, just as the fullness of Europe's economies is the 
strength of the economic argument for pan-Europe."42 He juxtaposes European economies 
and African cultures, attributing to them equal weight as harbingers of continental unity. In 
other words, what Africa lacks in an economic context, she more than makes up for in a 
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cultural context, hence Pan-African unity is within reach - as long as (an important caveat) 
Africans can be convinced both of the functionalist utility and the essentialist value of culture. 
"I wish to put forward culture as that knock-down rhetoric by means of which political 
objectives are sold."429 
Commenting on Abraham's thesis, Kanneh contends that "for him, 'real' Africa, as a unified 
concept, is to be found in rural peasantry, and its paradigm is the world-view of the Akan in 
Ghana." Conversely, Kanneh believes that "Africa, with its plural cultures and influences 
cannot be reduced to a single political aspiration or spiritual unity."430 The attempt to do so 
arguably has resulted in an over-simplified and to that extent distorted portrayal of social 
realities and meanings in Africa. This effect perhaps is more pronounced in Chinweizu's 
polemical variation on a cultural nationalist theme than in Abraham's generally well received 
text.431 
In Decolonising the African Mind (1987) Chinweizu takes a markedly interventionist (social 
engineering) stance. He cites, as the central objective of decolonising the African mind, 
elimination of the authority that "alien traditions exercise over the African."432 Such 
elimination, he argues, will allow Africans to establish distance between themselves and alien 
cultures; distance sufficient, he believes, to enable the retention of that deemed to be useful. 
Even so, foreign items should be retained only if no equivalent African item exists -
"otherwise, we will clutter our culture with unnecessary borrowings."433 In addition, a crucial 
aspect of the process of nation construction is "the willed enactment into history of some 
myth or idea of a nation." This role should be reserved for African writers, given that their 
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"stock in trade is the inventing of lives for individual characters, and of plausible worlds for 
sets of characters."4 4 Chinweizu refers to the literary genre in question as "national-patriotic" 
and contends that: 
African literature would have to be consciously didactic. It would have to supply us 
with an abundance of appropriate fables, proverbs, exemplary tales of heroic and 
unheroic behaviour which, from being told and retold, would form the ethical fibre of 
the new African who would accomplish the project.435 
Above all, national patriotic literature must assert and affirm "African identity and bring out 
its historical significance." Chinweizu singles out Chaka as an archetypal African nation 
builder, and, as an archetypal African identity fable, a Zulu tale about an eagle reared among 
chickens who discovered his eagle-ness only when taught by a hunter to fly. "Essentially, the 
job is to din into each of us that 'You are an eagle, not a chicken!'"436 
Thus, against all non-African communities which would like us to adopt their identity, 
and so give our primary loyalty to them (Christendom, Islam, the Free World, the 
Socialist World, the various European 'Commonwealths' etc) African literature must 
affirm, validate and give concrete meaning to our African-ness, and proclaim the high 
destiny of African civilisation.437 
Three analyses in particular - Appiah's, Kanneh's, and Masolo's - provide illuminating 
critiques of an essentialist-functionalist conflation that configures nationalist discourse in 
postcolonial Africa. Appiah, having noted that most nationalist discourse has moved beyond 
monolithic notions like Negritude or "African personality', warns that even so, insufficient 
attention is paid to the real nature of modern African identities which, like all other identities, 
are constructed. Citing Ranger's findings, he argues that identities assumed by nationalists to 
be natural to Africans often are the product of imperial imagination that, particularly in the 
case of indirect rule in British colonies, "had the effect of monumentalising the flexible 
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operations of pre-colonial systems of social control as what came to be called "customary 
law'".438 
... the very invention of Africa (as something more than a geographical entity) must be 
understood, ultimately, as an outgrowth of European racialism; the notion of Pan-
Africanism was founded on the notion of the African, which was, in turn, founded not 
on any genuine cultural commonality but... on the very European concept of the 
Negro.439 
Appiah concludes that cultural nationalism, with its persistent pursuit of alternative 
genealogising, ends always in the old location, and that its only achievement is to have 
invented a different past for the same place.440 
Kanneh alludes to nationalism's "tortured relationship with and resistance to cultural 
imperialism in such a way that claims of equality interchange with claims of radical 
difference."44' He further argues that Chinweizu's self-conscious elaboration of African 
identity is couched in terms that both reject and mirror European discourse. The notion of 
'culture' posited by Chinweizu and others is implicitly a philosophy of racial determinism. 
"In this way, African-ness overreaches itself to become an expression of national identity, 
racial identity, political consciousness and heritage which achieves its only coherence in 
opposition to the (White) West."443 
Masolo, having cited Dewey's assertion that humankind is given to formulating beliefs in 
terms of Either-Ors, between which it recognises no intermediate possibilities, argues that the 
nationalist school in Africa "bases its reasoning on the 'Either A or not-A, but not both A and 
non-A' logic of the excluded middle."444 
117 
Extrapolating from and extending Masolo's argument: this formulaic method of arriving at an 
exclusive knowledge of reality is problematic in that culture is conceptualised as a 
phenomenon that in some fashion is external to the human beings who constitute it - in other 
words, it is assumed that African culture comprises a reality 'out there'. Further, proponents 
of African cultural nationalism assume, as do Marxists and modernisation theorists, that 
nationalist ideologies can and should be engineered by elites. By inverting a realist formula, 
the icon of'African culture' is substituted for 'Western science', and processes of reification 
and binarisation are replicated. Operating in African terrain and at the behest of 'big men', 
the logic of the excluded middle repudiates - for instance - Said's notion of hybrid, 
permeable cultures of "appropriations, common experiences and interdependencies of all 
kinds .. ,"445 Rather, African and Western cultures are conceptualised as by-and-large 
impermeable entities in more-or-less permanent differentiation from one another, thereby 
excluding the possibility of substantive intermediary cultural categories. 
Arguably, cultural nationalism's claim to innovation rests on its perceived task of recasting 
diverse African histories in a mould at once heroic and monolithic, thereby creating a 'new 
African'. If, in the process, real histories are obfuscated, even obliterated (for instance, by 
nationalist systems of education) a constructionist conjuncture between cultural imperialism 
and cultural nationalism stands revealed, rendering problematic the notion of an innate 
'African essence' given that this essence, in its first incarnation, was the invention of imperial 
Europe. 
In sum: the outcome of a mutually reinforcing relationship between (neo) imperialism and 
African cultural nationalism is that the latter, outraged by the former, persistently invokes the 
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past in an elite-driven attempt to re-invent the present and in so doing, to endow incumbent 
regimes with cultural authenticity, hence political legitimacy. In this respect and to this 
extent, cultural nationalism, like its paradigmatic counterparts, qualifies as 'ideological', not 
least in terms of its delineation of the attributes of the 'other', in contradistinction to which 
the 'self is conceptualised. 
Section One: summary of argumentation. 
As argued in this section of the dissertation, it is at the contested frontier between a social 
science paradigm and a political ideology that an 'ideological paradigm' is located, efforts by 
paradigm practitioners to make an unequivocal distinction between the science of the 'self 
and the ideology of the 'other' notwithstanding. It further is argued that if a given paradigm 
conflates the centre of scientific truth and the centre of power, it qualifies as ideological in the 
sense of serving the vested interests of a miniscule - relative to overall population - quota of 
African elites. 
This section, however, does not contend that paradigm practitioners necessarily or inevitably 
perceive their paradigms as operating at the behest of power elites, whether in Africa or 
elsewhere. In this respect, Mannheim's explication of a mutually occupied territory of 'wish 
projection' between 'ideology' and 'utopia' is instructive. In short, paradigm practitioners 
well may operate in good - if misconceived - faith. The example utilised to elaborate this 
supposition is Che Guevara's attempt to apply a universal science of revolution to the locus-
specific, lived world of the Congo. 
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Nor does the dissertation in general contend that good intentions are the exclusive terrain of 
Marxist revolutionaries in the Third World. For instance, modernisation theory - at any rate, 
in its early incarnation - is informed by an optimistic - albeit teleological - assumption about 
rapid and relatively smooth economic and political development in the Third World. 
However, citing Kuhn's thesis of paradigm revolution in the natural sciences, I argue that if a 
paradigm is unable significantly to retool in response to anomaly, it is more of a liability than 
an asset. Further, in the case of social science, the reflexivity of theory renders a 
reconfiguration of mental sets all the more urgent given that an ideological paradigm, far from 
providing a solution to a given crisis, itself is an aspect of that crisis. 
Both modernisation theory and scientific Marxism are grounded in key tenets of positivist 
social science first propounded during the Enlightenment era in Europe. Both privilege a 
realist formula of binary design which excludes the possibility of substantive intermediate 
categories, and thus both paradigms - whether putatively or actually - underwrite political 
authoritarianism. For instance, both paradigms endorse nationalist ideologies that - while 
varying widely in other respects - are notably similar in their support for the installation and 
indefinite maintenance of developmental elites. To this extent, both paradigms reasonably 
can be regarded as implicated in the mythology that a given elite's perception of a given 
reality is generally and objectively true, hence developmentally compelling - alternate realities 
and other truths notwithstanding. In consequence, locus-specific configurations of social 
knowledge and meaning are relegated to the "kingdom of unmeaning"446 - subjugated, as it 
were, to the god (or logic) of the excluded middle. In sum, this section argues that in the case 
of an ideological paradigm, the realist formula 'X is A or non-A' is premised on the location 
120 
of power - as distinct from legitimacy - both in Africa and globally, and reflects 
configurations of reality only to that extent. 
However, it is not contended that a Pan-African discourse of cultural nationalism offers a 
substantive challenge to paradigmatic ontology and epistemology. Rather, it is argued that 
cultural nationalism is emblematic of the cognitive restrictions imposed by binary reasoning, 
given that it operates - albeit in inverse order - within the same conceptual matrix of 'self 
and 'other'. Further, to the extent that cultural nationalism invests in the myth that African 
leaders also are 'cultural heroes' (x) it, too, is implicated in authoritarian outcomes. 
In order to uncover a source of political and social legitimacy which enables avoidance of the 
plethora of retributive techniques commonly associated with failed ideology, the section 
investigates Mannheim's concept of a 'transcendent idea' in conjunction with Gramsci's 
concept of'organic ideology', (xi) Mannheim's and Gramsci's theses are strikingly similar 
inasmuch as Mannheim advocates epistemology at least partially grounded in "currents 
already present in society",447 and Gramsci espouses ideology that "never forgets to remain in 
contact with the 'simple'".448 On this basis, it is concluded that non-coercive conveyance of a 
developmental agenda to the lived world requires an ideology that to an adequate extent has 
integrated itself with local realities and knowledges, thus enabling development along lines 
that make sufficient 'good sense' (xii) to local populations. 
(x) See Chapter One, pp 16-17 
(xi) See Chapter Three, pp 74-75 
(xii) See Chapter Three, p 87 
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SECTION TWO 
PARADIGM AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW AND CRITIQUE 
CHAPTER FIVE 
AFRICAN STUDIES: GENESIS AND CONTEXTS 
While the chapters in the second section are informed by the first section's thematic 
trajectory, they take the form of a detailed review and critique of thematically relevant 
literature. The section begins with a chapter that provides a brief overview of the genesis of 
African studies - set against both its decolonising and Cold War backdrops - and situates the 
origins of modernisation and (neo-Marxist) dependency theories within the post-1945 era. By 
contrast, application of a scientific socialist paradigm to African, and more generally, Third 
World conditions can be traced back to the second decade of the 20th century. 
In the mid-20fh century that which previously had been the raw material of imperial and anti-
imperial narrative underwent a process of filtering and absorption into a number of academic 
disciplines, notably in the social sciences. In roughly the same post Second World War era, 
conceptual binaries such as 'modern' and 'traditional', 'First World' and 'Third World', 
"developed' and 'underdeveloped' made increasingly regular appearances in newspaper 
columns and academic texts. African Studies, as the genre came to be known, commonly was 
located within the broad context of 'Third World' or 'Development' Studies which included, 
as part of its territory, Latin America and much of Asia. More particularly, the events that 
triggered exponential growth of Africanist academe can be symbolically located in the annus 
mirabilis of 1960, a year that was followed by four decades of ongoing decolonization 
throughout the continent. 
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The second section's tour of the literature largely is confined to intellectual production that is 
informed by one paradigm or another. This said, it would be misleading to depict the 
paradigms as monoliths, or even as necessarily representative of methodological orthodoxies 
since each plays host to a wide range of variably paradigmatic research.449 However, not least 
because each paradigm is named for the broad epistemic locale within which it situates itself, 
a name that indicates not only methodological terrain but also explanatory and predictive 
framework, a certain amount of simplification unfortunately seems inevitable when 
embarking on a review and critique of selected protagonists. 
Any paradigm which has been publicised and popularised by its best known adherents offers 
a secure base camp from and within which to conduct research. The advantages of following 
in accredited footsteps along well-trodden paths are self-evident, particularly if the general 
direction and design bear some resemblance to one's own preferences, priorities - and 
preconceptions. On the other hand, there is a disadvantage in that individual scholars may 
find themselves tied in with a particular paradigm in a fashion tantamount to 
oversimplification and perhaps even outright mislocation. Right from the start, therefore, a 
paradigm and literature review should operate on the understanding that nomenclature and 
categorisation are deployed as ways of systematising and organising intellectual production 
into reasonably coherent formats, and are not necessarily intended to confine scholars and 
activists within paradigm 'boxes'. 
It stands to reason - given the Cold War context within which this review of the literature is 
conducted - that both modernisation and (neo-) Marxist paradigms to greater or lesser extents 
are informed by the ideological preoccupations of a bipolar era.450 This said, some of the 
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most notable intellectual production to come out of a bifurcated and adversarial era is 
attributable to scholars, activists and political leaders who, while they work within the broad 
context of their respective locales, nonetheless have blazed their own distinctive and 
influential trails. This section therefore focuses on selected authors and materials not only 
because in one way or another they contribute to the subject matter of this study, but also 
because none of the texts to which close attention is paid can be described as paradigmatic 
potboilers. Thus, all the authors quoted and discussed in this survey can be considered 
leaders - in one way or another - in the field of Cold War era Africanist production. 
Decolonising contexts. 
As mentioned above, in the recent history of Africa a label commonly applied to 1960 is 
annus mirabilis. The "miracle year' flags an historic watershed. Colonised areas of North 
Africa, including Sudan, became independent states in the early to mid-1950s, followed, in 
sub-Saharan Africa, by Ghana in 1957. In 1960, French colonies in West Africa achieved 
territorial independence, along with Nigeria, a former British colony. By the mid-1960s, 
thirty postcolonial states had emerged from the demise of imperialism. In the mid-1970s, the 
path to independence was followed by the Lusophone countries which - owing to the 
territorial aggression of both metropolitan power and settler populations - pursued a more 
violent course than was the case in British and French colonies - with the exception, that is, of 
Algeria and Rhodesia (liberation wars) and to a lesser extent, Kenya (Mau-Mau rebellion). In 
1980, protracted combat between liberation forces and a settler-led army in Rhodesia 
culminated in the negotiated victory of the former and majority rule in the territory renamed 
Zimbabwe. Namibia, also the scene of armed struggle, in 1990 became a sovereign state with 
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a democratically elected government. Finally, in 1994, internal and external pressures having 
broken the tenacious and increasingly brutal grip of Africa's 'white tribe', the Afrikaner ruling 
elite, South Africa made a negotiated transition from white minority to black majority rule. 
In the spectrum of newly independent African states, relatively few had pursued the armed 
struggle path to 'national self-determination'. At the end of the imperial day, a majority of 
transitions to sovereign independence were negotiated by African and metropolitan elites, 
both sets making global media mileage out of an appearance of ritualised, mutually agreeable 
transfers of power in which necessity was dressed up as virtue, and - as Davidson observes -
withdrawal was more speedy than substantive. 
It is fruitless to believe that the end of political empire was a programme arranged and 
designed to give colonised peoples 'the best possible start' to their independence. 
Much was said and done, true enough, to present the imperial withdrawal as a process 
planned and prepared in advance, and any subsequent mishaps and miseries were to be 
explained as entirely the fault of Africans failing to carry out 'the plan'. But the full 
extent of any plan, most obviously in the case of the French empire, was to conserve 
as much as possible of the colonial legacy; and even that much of a plan, when 
perceived, looks like mere opportunism.451 
The scramble out of Africa, continues Davidson, "gave rise to understandable African 
rejoicing as huge inherent problems were swallowed or thrust aside."452 Given that "the state 
as it exists in Africa today is a legacy of colonialism",453 a number of flaws and fissures that 
characterised the colonial state were passed forward to the postcolonial state. A 
representative sample is sketched below. 
• Arbitrarily delineated borders454 and concomitant balkanisation of - in particular -
Africa south of the Sahara. Africa (at roughly double the land mass of South 
America) comprises 53 states (in comparison to South America's 14 states). Of these 
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53 states, 6 (including Mauritania and excluding Sudan) are north of the Sahara. As 
Mazrui puts it, "this fragmentation is a handicap in Africa's struggle for social and 
material improvement."455 Yet, as Cohen points out, even Nkrumah, a well known 
and more than usually emphatic critic of the splintering effects of Europe's scramble 
for Africa, agreed to accept territorial decolonisation on the model proposed by the 
British, thus effectively conceding the balkanisation of the continent.456 
• Colonial systems of education and administration were based on policies of 
firstly, coopting or constructing indigenous traditions in tandem with traditional 
elites457 thus undermining their perceived authenticity and legitimacy; secondly, 
corralling a majority of Africans into rural ghettos while - thirdly - constructing a new 
Western educated elite from an infinitesimal percentage of the population. For 
instance, even in Ghana, regarded by British administrators as a model colony, and 
"which boasted some of the finest educational institutions in Africa, over 70% of the 
population was illiterate on the eve of independence."458 The educated leadership of 
the nationalist movement in Ghana in the early 1950s comprised less than a thousand 
people. "In comparative terms, the African elite was even smaller in most other 
colonies."459 Newly independent states, therefore, typically were led by (relative to 
overall population) a minuscule Western-educated, urban fraction that - as leaders of 
nationalist resistance movements - had guaranteed materially to improve the lives of 
Africa's rural majority, most of whom were subsistence farmers, and were further 
separated from their leaders by a not inconsiderable cultural divide, given the 
selectively Westernising trajectory of colonialism. 
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• Colonial economic systems entrenched a process begun by the slave trade of 
allocating to Africa a profoundly unequal place in the global market, and of defining 
her primary role as that of contributor to the economic development of metropolitan 
powers.460 At independence, African leaders typically inherited firstly, in rural areas, 
mono-crop export economies that accordingly made postcolonial economies 
vulnerable to fluctuations in global market prices; secondly, in urban and industrial 
areas, a focus on extractive (as distinct from manufacturing) industry, often largely 
limited to one mineral in particular. The generally fragile and unstable (because 
unevenly developed) economic configurations of postcolonial states then were 
exacerbated by ill-affordable economic mismanagement among other negative factors. 
Increasing pauperisation impacts most acutely in the rural areas, further reducing the 
in any case limited bargaining power of rural majorities. 
• While the form of administrative policies differed between metropolitan powers, a 
definitive feature, that is, highly centralised, bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial 
rule applied across the board. In this key respect, the liberal, multi-party constitutions 
with which newly sovereign states were endowed added an anomalous note to the 
pomp and ceremony that accompanied the death throes of empire. Taken in 
conjunction with firstly, optimistic nationalist refrains that raised the hopes and 
expectations of marginalised majorities; secondly, underdeveloped and unstable 
national economies, and thirdly, the de facto lack, in many cases, of anything 
amounting to a postcolonial national consensus, an almost uniform outcome was the 
abandonment of liberal constitutions in favour of de jure and in the main, 
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authoritarian one party or military regimes, the better to cope with national 'states of 
emergency'. 
In sum, the euphoria that animated African independence ceremonies in a majority of cases 
proved brutally short lived. At this juncture, it is worth noting that not only Africans 
'swallowed or pushed aside huge inherent problems.' On the contrary, it was a process 
replicated and reinforced in the field of scholarship by orthodox modernisation theory. In the 
1950s and early 1960s, 'overseas experts' typically were American social scientists.461 Their 
privileged educations, lifestyles and resource packages comparatively speaking were of 
Olympian proportions (not unlike their mistakes). As Apter retrospectively put it when 
referring to the conceptual parameters of an orthodox developmental paradigm: "we need to 
become aware of the ways in which these concepts deny negative possibilities, filtering out 
inconvenient variables that might pollute the models and the teleologies they represent."462 
The key term in the above quotation is "teleologies' given that the confident expectations 
which informed orthodox modernisation theory were enabled by a vision of Africa's future 
that bore more than a passing resemblance to the present of the United States of America. 
Then again, if Samuel Huntington's revisionist text, Political Order in Changing Societies, is 
interpreted not least as a reaction to the misconceptions of his predecessors and peers, he can 
be described as a leader in the field of Afro-pessimism, and to that extent a trail-blazer. 
However, it wasn't until dependency theory began to make an impact on Africanist discourse 
in (approximately) the early 1970s that long-term legacies of colonialism, along with the on-
going effects of neocolonialism were taken into adequate account. Even so, while 
dependency theory highlighted and to some extent rectified the more glaring lacunae and 
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defects of modernisation theory, it is arguable that dependistas (xiii) - at least to some extent -
and more orthodox Marxists - to a greater extent - replicated modernisation theory's tendency 
to promote an exogenous knowledge system as the primary and formative reality, in the 
process generating epistemological distortions marked enough to necessitate methodological 
gymnastics. 
To round off this portion of the chapter, a phrase deployed by Chabal - "the politics of the 
mirror" - connotes a key ingredient in processes both of 'othering' and of assigning elsewhere 
the culpability for failed paradigims. 
I refer here to the way in which Africanists have approached Africa, nowadays as in 
the past. Partly because Africa has been seen as both mysterious and exotic, 
Africanists have been prone to seek in Africa a counterpoint to their own history ... 
This is particularly noticeable and consequential when it comes to the work of 
postcolonial (economic or political) developmentalists. Indeed, the assumptions they 
have made on the trajectory of contemporary Africa have in large part issued from 
their notion of the 'backwardness' of the continent in relation to the development of 
the West. 'Politics of the mirror', therefore, is that the main effect of such a 
teleological perspective has been to search in Africa for an image of the African that 
would confirm our developmentalist assumptions about ourselves.463 
Chabal highlights the extent to which explaining the politics of the "other' is "such an 
eminently subjective activity"464 along with "the general handicap under which we, Western 
Africanists, labour is our heritage - by which I mean the accumulated weight of what our 
culture says about Africa." 5 Since culture can either be inherited or adopted, the 'politics of 
the mirror' also is an aphorism applicable to Africanists who adopted (some version of) 
Marxist culture as their own. 
(xiii) Also known as dependentistas. This dissertation utilises the shorter form throughout. 
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Cold War contexts. 
A definitive shift in 'old Europe's' imperial order of things was signified by the consolidation 
of America's status as a fully-fledged global power466 - but she did not hold the field alone. 
The emergence of Soviet Russia as the other commanding protagonist in the struggle for 
global dominance led to a Cold War between West and East. Superpower manoeuvring for 
spheres of influence did not leave unaffected the world of social science research. Not least 
due to strategic considerations as perceived by American foreign policy mandarins, American 
social scientists were actively encouraged to broaden their research interests and activities to 
encompass the developing world 467 - a process in which the Comintern already was 
j 468 
engaged. 
Given the era-defining role of superpower rivalry, as well as the problematic context of 
decolonisation, Young's claim, in one of relatively few texts published during the Cold War 
that provide an overview of an assortment of ideologies in Africa, that Afro-Marxist and 
Afro-Capitalist regimes "emerged largely through internal processes, not through the 
machinations of external forces"4 seems dubious. According to Menkhaus, for instance, the 
Africanist debate about what type of developmental ideology, that is, state capitalism or state 
socialism, postcolonial states should adopt, in retrospect appears highly politicised by Cold 
War and radical nationalist logic. 
Betts points out that in its post 1945 role as one of two ascendant superpowers, an 
international dispensation in which the 'Great Powers of Europe' became secondary states, 
the position of the United States on the colonial question was notable for its ambivalence. On 
the one hand, U.S. foreign policy was liberal and anti-colonial in regions where communist 
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influence was perceived as relatively negligible. On the other hand, in regions where Cold 
War tensions were marked, such as Indochina (for example, Korea in 1950) America 
supported imperialist regimes that resisted the spread of communist influence. Again, 
America's intervention in Vietnam is in strong contrast to Eisenhower's punitive reaction to 
British and French intervention in Egypt during the Suez crisis in 1956. Betts further notes 
that Cold War tensions reached new heights with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 - a crisis 
that gave even greater impetus to a U.S. policy of aggressive containment of communism. 
Citing the Belgian Congo where rival factions received rival support in a country which as a 
colony had been offered no preparation in the art of self-government, he argues that it was in 
Africa that the chilling effect of the Cold War was most strongly felt. 
The CIA saw in the person ... of Joseph Mobutu a likely client and supported his 
brutal takeover of power in 1965. Restyled Mobutu Sese Seko, he stood against 
communism and allowed the gross exploitation of his nation's resources by foreign 
corporations; for which reason his own bank accounts rose as the nation's population 
i • 471 
sank into poverty. 
Also worth noting is Bett's inference that East-Central Europe functioned as a Soviet 
backyard in much the same way as Latin America was regarded by the U.S. as its backyard. 
Once Soviet troops had crushed the Hungarian uprising in 1956, thus securing, pro tern, 
Moscow's grip on the Tands inbetween', Soviet Russia was in a position to turn its attention 
to decolonising regions of the world. "Cuba and Ethiopia were the most obvious beneficiaries 
of Russian aid, but support to the liberation forces in Angola was also disconcerting to the 
United States."472 
A process of ever-deepening American conservatism was given further impetus by the trauma 
of Vietnam along with outbreaks of acute civil unrest in the late 1960s at home and in 
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Western Europe. The liberal multi-party models that had been applied to decolonising and 
postcolonial Africa now fell out of favour, in particular with U.S. based Africanists -
assuming that the liberal model had been regarded as wholly suitable for modernising African 
states in the first place473- to be replaced by a preoccupation with political order as a 
necessary prerequisite of modernisation. For instance, Menkhaus cites Wallerstein (in his 
early incarnation as a modernisation theorist) as contending that the first problem for all 
African governments is how to hold the country together.474 Ironically, given a not 
inconsiderable Western contribution to chaos in the Congo, Menkaus observes that the "first 
generation of Africanists was influenced by the aftermath of the Congo crisis and its leitmotif 
of disintegration and political chaos, an image that would be even more difficult to dispel 
with the advent of the Nigerian civil war in 1966."475 Thedisin genuous quality of Western 
reactions is highlighted by Nigeria's status as an emblematic 'state in search of a nation,' as 
emphasised by Awolowo's statement in 1947 that "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere 
geographical expression."476 The civil war that induced consternation in Western-based 
Africanists not least was the product of arbitrary borders conjoined with colonial policies of 
divide and rule, hence exacerbating ethnic and regional tensions. In a postcolonial era, 
imperial dynamics in this beleaguered section of West Africa were replaced by Cold War 
realpolitik - to a destructive extent.477 
The State and Eurocentricity. 
According to Lonsdale, the territorial configurations and political, social and economic 
dispensations of precolonial polities did not necessarily correspond to the European notion of 
the state.478 He argues that until the end of the 19th century, most Africans did not live under 
132 
states as conceptualised in the First World, and contends that a defining characteristic of the 
state as it exists and has developed in Europe is command over the instruments of coercion, 
whereas most African polities had little or no concentrations of force to use against their 
people. He concludes that "compared with European states of the time, even African 
kingdoms commanded, most of them, very little violence. For Europe has been the continent 
of war, not Africa. And it has been war that has built states, states that have sustained 
war."479 
The absence in much of precolonial sub-Saharan Africa of "jealous and exclusive' (xiv) 
monotheistic, text-based religions, and therefore of the religious wars that in Europe laid the 
bloody foundations of the early modern state 480 clearly distinguishes much of African 
historicity from that of Europe. To this extent, then, a thesis such as Callaghy's that 
postcolonial African states bear a strong resemblance to their (alleged) early modern forebears 
4S 1 
in Europe is derived from an ahistorical premise. The wars that reconfigured Europe were 
fought between Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations of the Christian faith, and also 
between Christianity and Islam. In short, it is a history of conflict between and within 
monotheistic, scriptural religions that shaped modern Europe as well as - involuntarily - the 
201 century destinies of other regions of the world.4 2 
Grey updates an equation connecting monotheism, religious wars and early modern states by 
adding to it the dominant ideologies of the Cold War. 
For polytheists, religion is a matter of practice, not belief; and there are many kinds of 
practice. For Christians, religion is a matter of true belief. If only one belief can be 
true, every way of life in which it is not accepted must be in error. Polytheists may be 
(xiv) See Chapter Two, p 46 
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jealous of their gods, but they are not missionaries. Without monotheism, humankind 
would surely still have been one of the most violent animals, but it would have been 
spared wars of religion. If the world had remained polytheist, it could not have 
produced communism or 'global democratic capitalism.' It is pleasant to dream of a 
world without militant faiths, religious or political. Pleasant, but idle. Polytheism is 
too delicate a way of thinking for modern minds. 
Arguments along the above lines notwithstanding, the natural necessity of state creation in 
Europe, and colonial state creation elsewhere, has been taken for granted by a critical mass of 
Africanists. One assumption in particular has proven formative in the constitution of Africa 
as an object of research, namely, a mutual modernisation - Marxist assumption that 
precolonial Africa materially is 'without history.' If sub-Saharan African polities gained at 
least partial admission to a substantive lexicon of world affairs only when welded into lesser 
but still recognisable rational-legal, bureaucratic colonial shape, it is scarcely surprising that 
both paradigms in the main assume that in Africa, substantive political activity begins with 
the colonial state.48 A related constitutive factor is that while the universalising trajectories 
of modernisation and (neo-) Marxist paradigms are shaped by globally-applicable concepts 
that enable systematic analysis of and comparison between Africa and other regions of the 
world in a way that disenables "the theory of the exotic and the particular which had so 
marked colonial accounts of Africa"485 there is a corresponding disadvantage insofar as any 
paradigm that is or purports to be universally applicable denies an assortment of cultures their 
respective historicity and to that extent, their cultural singularity, or at any rate, very much 
downplays same. As Bayart puts it, "both groups, led astray by their structuralist precepts, 
invoke explanatory categories which, thanks to their lack of historical consideration, shared a 
fictional coherence."486 
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Additionally, a dynamic worth highlighting in the constitution of Africa as an object of 
research is a world order informed by a working assumption that real politics necessarily 
occurs in a world composed of nation states. As Young, writing after the Cold War, points 
out: "In contrast to such other master concepts in contemporary paradigms as world capitalist 
system, bourgeoisie, or system adaptation and maintenance functions, state is a living reality 
and not simply an abstract analytical category." 
In the above respect, and despite Marx's vision of communist society without borders, Stalin 
dealt the cause of proletarian internationalism a heavy blow with his notion of socialism in 
one country. Stalin's death and subsequent de-canonising notwithstanding, the vested 
interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) as one of two global 
superpowers ensured that Marx's vision of world communism continued to take a back seat to 
the ideology of the Soviet state, (xv) As Munck notes, following the Soviet invasion of 
Hungary in 1956, many radicals looked to what would become the Third World for the 
realisation of proletarian internationalism. Expectations were heightened when "victorious 
revolutions in Algeria and Cuba cemented the legend of the people's war against 
imperialism." However, far from charting a Utopian course, "Che Guevara died and Castro 
supported the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Realpolitik was taking over from Utopia 
again." It seems reasonable to infer from Munck's depiction that to the Soviets, and 
thereafter, to the Cubans, the only Third World political ideology of any realpolitik 
significance was 'pro-Soviet' and/or "pro-Cuban'. By the same token, Betts contends that: 
"Determined to assure the United States and its way of life against any potential threats, 
(xv) See Chapter Eight, p 228-229 
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postwar administrations made a blanketing ideology of anti-communism and a regular 
practice of military support to friendly nations the two principal elements of their foreign 
policy."489 
In a dissection of the major characteristics of a received from Europe concept of the state, 
Young singles out 'legitimacy' as a typical imperative of the operational code of the state. 
"Through investing its institutions with legitimate authority, the state seeks habitual 
acquiescence in and consent to its rule ... Ideology as an expression of the ultimate aims and 
final source of authority plays a critical role."4 ° Historically, religion qua legitimating 
doctrine preceded the ascent to prominence of ideologies. Since by-and-large only Islamic 
states retain religion as dejure instrument of legitimation, secular state ideologies from which 
religion either is explicitly excluded (Marxism-Leninism) or retained as a matter of lifestyle 
choice, thus conforming with liberal principles (Western democracy) dominated the Cold War 
era. 
In the vanishing domain of state socialism, the state clothed its operation in Marxism-
Leninism, justifying its behaviour in terms of its congruence with this official dogma. 
The capitalist state advances liberal democracy, individual rights, and protection of 
. . . . . 491 
property as its legitimating creed. 
(Note that the statist nature of Marxism-Leninism is imputed.) 
Given, firstly, the hegemonic global trajectory of the European concept of the state in 
conjunction with its definitive status in international law beginning with the rise of the 
Westphalian system of states492, and secondly, a Cold War dispute concerning the 
legitimating ideology of the state, a Cold War political dispensation emerged in which the 
legitimating motifs projected by contending power blocs restricted choices of ideology in 
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other parts of the world. Putatively, the same limitation applied to the developmental 
paradigms of newly independent states in Africa. 
Post-1945 origins of modernisation and dependency theories. 
As depicted by Chabal, modernisation theory derives from an attempt, in the main by 
American political scientists, to meet foreign policy imperatives generated by the related 
challenges of Third World poverty and the spread of communist influence. "They 
endeavoured to spread a non-Marxist science of politics which would both reveal the 
superiority of Western polities and explain the politics of the new nation states."493 This 
process had been preceded, as Almond recalls, by the addition, beginning during the interwar 
years, of a behavioural dimension to social science research. In an instructive contribution to 
the history of the academic discipline of political science, Almond describes a process of 
secondment to the war effort enabled by disciplinary developments that originated in the 
Chicago school (1920-1940), led by Merriam whose "wartime experience with foreign affairs 
and propaganda sensitised him to 'new aspects' in political science."494 Merriam's empirical 
and quantitative innovations then were taken up and extended, particularly in the realm of 
political psychology, by Lass well who was "the first investigator of the interaction of 
physiological and mental-emotional processes to use laboratory methods." Lasswell then 
published the results of his experiments "in relating attitudes, emotional states ... and 
physiological conditions as they were ... reflected in pulse rates, blood pressure, skin tension 
and the like."495 This research was followed up during the war and subsequently during the 
post war behavioural revolution. 
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World War Two, asserts Almond, was "a laboratory and an important training experience for 
many of the scholars who would seed the 'behavioural revolution.'"496 Among other 
endeavours, he lists recruitment and training of soldiers, sale of war bonds, control of 
consumption and inflation, and monitoring internal and enemy morale and attitudes. The war 
effort "created pools of social science expertise which ... were fed back into the growing 
academic institutions of the cold war decades."497 In conjunction with a burgeoning Cold War 
climate, social scientists increasingly were seconded to the service of government and big 
business. In addition, "the new and developing nations of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and 
Latin America, now seen as threatened by an aggressive Soviet Union, required area 
specialists and specialists in economic and political development processes and problems."4 
In regard to funding and stimulation of research, Almond refers to the Social Science 
Research Council, in particular to two political science research committees, the Committee 
on Political Behaviour and the Committee on Comparative Politics. Thanks not least to 
funding and support from these committees, "Talcott Parsons and others developed "system' 
frameworks for the comparison of different types of societies and institutions, building on the 
work of such European sociological theorists as Weber and Durkheim. Drawing on these and 
other sources David Easton pioneered the introduction of the 'system' concept into political 
science."499 (Noteworthy is Almond's interchangeable use of the terms 'behavioural' and 
'scientific' revolutions as if to indicate that they constitute the same phenomenon.) 
The increasing sense of urgency that drove the cross-disciplinary quest for a scientific 
paradigm in the interwar years is attributed by Apter to the following factors: firstly, the 
failure of the Weimar regime in Germany and its replacement by totalitarianism (fascist 
138 
species), a development replicated - mutatis mutandis - in Italy; secondly, the rise of 
totalitarianism (communist species) in Russia; thirdly, in other parts of Europe, the 
strengthening of Marxist parties and other radical groups. These factors in combination 
posed an increasing threat not only to the way democracy works, but also to democracy itself. 
Thus it "became obvious that more attention had to be paid to psychological, economic, social 
and organisational factors"500 in ways outside the purview of the old-fashioned, unscientific 
study of politics. 
Apter goes on to describe the essential ambivalence of the first decades of the post-war era. 
A sense of optimism infused the new science of comparative politics with its emphasis on 
growth and development; conversely, the gathering clouds of a Cold War climate cast a 
lengthening shadow over sunny teleological assumptions. "If the premise and promise of 
development represented the good, the evil was communism and the Cold War. In the west, 
every move to the left was a gain for the Soviet Union. Every move towards democracy was 
a gain for the United States and its allies."501 In addition to the binary reasoning that 
increasingly infiltrated the research designs of Western-based social scientists, the creed of 
developmentalism acquired a certain ambiguity owing to the Manichean nature of Cold War 
foreign policy in which developmental agendas in the Third World "were to some degree 
morally diluted (if not contaminated)" by an intention to defeat Soviet objectives. Apter adds, 
however, that Third World regimes were not slow to take advantage of Cold War fever. 
"Indeed, so morally clouded were the politics of development that the main metropolitan 
countries allowed themselves to be almost as much manipulated as manipulating."502 This 
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said, he singles out U.S. developmentalist practices in Latin America - under the Alliance For 
Progress - as positing an ambiguous and questionable neutralism.503 
Johnson locates the adversarial origins of dependency theory in neo-Marxist reactions to the 
U.S. role in Latin American economies in the 1950s, not least through the medium of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). In order to combat "the nationalist and 
reformist formulations" of the ECLA and to redress "the inability of the left... to develop a 
coherent response to developmentalist reformism",504 Baran and Frank published ground-
breaking texts that launched dependency theory. Frank introduced his thesis with a statement 
"which sums up his position admirably: "I believe, with Paul Baran, that it is capitalism, both 
world and national, which produced underdevelopment in the past and which still generates 
underdevelopment in the present.'"505 
Menkhaus notes that although the transfer of neo-Marxist dependency theory from Latin 
America to postcolonial Africa "was largely absent in the early to mid-60s, by the late 1960s 
it constituted an important intellectual current."506 He adds that: 
A cursory glance at the theoretical literature of the 1970s (and much of the 1980s as 
well) suggests that divisions between theorists were both bitter and absolute. The 
once genteel and clubby atmosphere of the Africanists of the 1960s was transformed 
into acrimonious debate between warring ideological camps.507 
The volume of 'acrimonious debate' increased with the addition, in the mid-1970s, of a 
current of more orthodox Marxism. By the 1980s, according to Menkaus, this trend among 
Marxist Africanists "towards a return to class analysis and away from dependency theory 
would gain strength in studies throughout Africa"508 - fuelled not least by Marxist reaction to 
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the pessimism of dependency theory and its insufficiently - that is, by the standards of 
orthodox Marxists - scientific premises and conclusions, (xvi) 
Whereas a major portion of the impulse that launched modernisation and neo-Marxist 
dependency theories on a polarised course can be located in their very different reactions to 
post-1945 U.S. foreign policy objectives, the first stage of Marxist-Third World involvement 
is traceable to an antecedent world order, that of 'old Europe'. Marxist interest and 
investment in the Third World goes back at least as far as Lenin's conditions for membership 
of the Third International or Comintern, (xvii) At this juncture, it is worth noting that 
Marxism-Leninism clashed with Pan Africanism in key respects. For instance, a concept of 
worldwide black solidarity is incompatible with a scientific socialist objective to unite the 
world's workers irrespective of race.509 
The differences between Marxism-Leninism and Pan Africanism perhaps are best exemplified 
in the decision to opt for the latter by two prominent members of Africa's intellectual 
diaspora, George Padmore and Aime Cesaire. Padmore, a member of Comintern, resigned 
not least as a result of his attendance at the 1945 Pan African Congress in Manchester. In 
1956, Cesaire resigned from the French communist party. While Cesaire's disillusionment 
perhaps was more pronounced than Padmore's - who, according to Cohen, made a clear 
distinction between rank and file communists on the one hand, and high level representatives 
of Soviet foreign policy on the other - they were mutually suspicious of Comintern and 
Euro-communist party motives for encouraging African membership. For his part, Padmore 
(xvi) See Chapter Eight, pp 210-212 
(xvii) See Chapter Eight, p 222 
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asserted that "the oppressed Negro workers and peasants are regarded by the Communists as 
'revolutionary expendables' in the global struggle of Communism against Western 
capitalism."5H Cesaire, in his letter of resignation, condemned not only the excesses of 
Soviet communism, but also the acquiescence of the French communist party. He further 
contended that adoption of an ideology conceived in Europe and constructed by European 
experience would have a negative effect on African potentials, which would "sicken and fade 
in organisations that are not their own; not constructed for them; not built by them and 
adapted to ends only they can fix." 
Cesaire's observation, while at the time intended to criticise the Eurocentrism of scientific 
socialist premises, equally could be applied to the North America-centric design of the 
orthodox modernisation paradigm which - as argued in the next chapter - incorporates an 
implicitly authoritarian, top-down orientation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ORTHODOX MODERNISATION THEORY 
A defining feature of the orthodox version of the modernisation paradigm is its formulation of 
a ideological solution to the problem of retarded growth in which Third World acorns, or so 
it was predicted, would develop into oaks at greatly accelerated speeds owing to intensive 
fertilization by American expert knowledge and financial aid.513 Two mutually reinforcing 
methodologies most often applied at this time to unravel, reassemble, label and file societies 
and polities in Africa were structural-functionalism and systems analysis. Both were 
undergirded by behaviouralism, in turn informed by psychology's science of behaviourism. 
As Scruton indicates, a behaviourist sub-text in a political science paradigm is informed by an 
intention to manipulate the human objects of research. 
The leading idea is that behaviour is formed in response to previous behaviour, and to 
the "rewards' or 'reinforcements' of the environment which condition it, so that the 
self-consciousness of the subject plays no important part in the process of social 
development. Hence political activity should be directed towards creating the 
conditions which reinforce the behaviour that is desired. This raises the question, 
Desired by whom?514 
As suggested in the previous chapter, a partial answer to the above question is: desired by 
American foreign policy mandarins. In this respect at least, modernisation theory can be 
depicted as the academic equivalent of cannons fired to announce the imminent arrival of 
American hegemonic intentions. 
A distinguishing characteristic of orthodox modernisation theory is its curious combination of 
'cold' behavioural analysis and 'hot' teleological optimism. Genesis rewritten suggests that 
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on the seventh day, orthodox modernisers can rest. Huntington explains as follows an 
assumption by his peers that American experience can be universalised: 
In confronting the modernising countries the United States was handicapped by its 
happy history. In its development the United States was blessed with more than its 
fair share of economic plenty, social well-being and political stability. This pleasant 
conjuncture of blessings led Americans to believe in the unity of goodness: to assume 
that all good things go together and that the achievement of one desirable social goal 
aids in the achievement of others. In American policy toward modernising countries 
this experience was reflected in the belief that political stability would be the natural 
and inevitable result of the achievement of first, economic development and then of 
social reform.515 
It is noteworthy that in Huntington's apologia, America appears to be exclusively populated 
by direct descendants of Pollyanna, counting in unison their multitude of blessings. Not only 
does he expand the experience of all Americans to include blessings most often enjoyed by a 
predominantly WASP elite, he also presents American foreign policy in the best possible 
light.516 
This chapter unpacks the various epistemological and methodological facets - as indicated by 
sub-headings - that in combination configure an orthodox paradigm of modernisation. Some 
conclusions then are drawn, prior to proceeding to an analysis - in Chapter Seven - of a 
minor paradigm shift from orthodox to revised modernisation. 
Systems theory. 
Modernisation theory's systemic base of operations owes much to David Easton's elaboration 
of systems analysis as a means of constructing "reliable, empirically based research" with 
which to inform policy decisions. In the preface to the 1979 edition of A Systems Analysis Of 
Political Life, Easton, referring to American social science research in the 1950s and 60s, 
concedes that: "Incentives and rewards tended to go to those whose research seemed to 
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promise movement towards this ideal."317 A 1979 retrospective, however, does not serve to 
disillusion him with 'this ideal' of government funded and policy driven empirical research. 
On the contrary, given the turbulence of the 1960s and 1970s: 
In the world at large, the stirring of the student generation, the emerging self-
awareness of various ethnic groups, the gathering resistance against racism and 
sexism; in the United States, the temporary mobilisation of the black ghettos, 
Vietnam, Watergate; in France, the student revolt - these and similar events all served 
to nibble away at the trust and confidence in governing authorities in mass 
industrialised societies. 
Easton concludes that the need for a science of politics to uncover and remedy the factors 
underlying a steady erosion of popular support for democratically elected governments is 
even more urgent in the 1970s than it was in the socially stable 1950s. His thesis therefore 
interrogates (among other phenomena) the relationship between systemic norms and their 
corresponding functions. He embarks on this investigation by isolating the normative 
features of a system and subjecting them to microscopic enquiry as to function. Value-
imbued sub-systems are perceived as no different, for instance, to organisational or 
distributive sub-systems when viewed in terms of their function. 
It is with the question: "What elements of a system are most relevant to its capacity to persist 
in the face of a threatened loss of support?" l that Easton launches an enquiry into what he 
terms "Three basic political objects: the authorities, regime and political community." 
It is worth noting that Easton's methodological innovations made a formative contribution to 
non-Marxist political science's paradigmatic format. Prior to examining his depiction of 
political objects of support, I therefore shall address his methodological approach. 
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According to the inner logic of systems theory, any given political system may be assessed in 
terms of firstly, the sub-systems that comprise it and, secondly, the interaction between the 
system and the environment in which it is located. The latter relationship Easton examines 
with reference to "outputs' and 'inputs'. The environment feeds the system with inputs -4 the 
system in turn produces outputs which are fed back into the environment -4 the response to 
the outputs is returned to the system in the form of the newest set of inputs. Each sub-system 
receives, processes and returns the input (now an output) appropriate to its particular function. 
Ideally, then, a political system should function like a well-oiled machine, built to weather its 
environment and operating smoothly and efficiently to fulfil its central task, that is, the 
conversion of inputs into outputs. When considering the phenomenon of political stability, it 
stands to reason that the extent to which a system is able to control its environment will 
determine the extent of the stable equilibrium between the two. (The environment is 
described by Easton as the broader society of which the system is a part). In his diagram, 'a 
simplified model of a political system', Easton reduces inputs and outputs to two broad types 
within each category, viz: inputs consist of demands on the one hand and support on the 
other; outputs consist of decisions followed by actions. 
Turning now to the political objects whose function it is to receive, process and maximise 
support: 
• Political community. This may be likened to a political environment generated by the 
system and interacting in a variety of ways with broader society. The political 
community encompasses the political nodes of society and thus has the function of 
constructing and maintaining the political identities of social actors, in the process 
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producing "affective solidarity" and "subtleties of sentiment" which nourish the 
system. The more tightly-knit and cohesive an object of support the political 
community is, the more oriented it is towards affirmation of the system. Conversely: 
"Perhaps the most decisive indicator of the withdrawal of support from a political 
community consists of group separation."523 Group separation automatically knocks 
off course the trajectory of support; this in turn has a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of the system. 
• Regime. It is the regime which orders and regulates the political relationships within a 
community according to basic rules and procedures. In the absence of a regime, 
political community would be no more than potential. Regime function therefore is to 
refine and drive the potential of a political community firstly, by setting constraints 
and secondly, by providing purpose and coherence. These functions within a function 
are enabled by the authoritative allocation of values.524 
• Authorities. Effective allocation of values requires that authority roles are occupied 
by people whose occupational legitimacy is widely accepted. It is this sub-system of 
occupation, as it were, that Easton designates 'the authorities' as distinct from 
authority roles themselves which are part of - instituted and maintained by - the 
regime.5 Support is channelled by the instruments of the system along two parallel 
routes: one leads to the authority roles, or institutions, which exist in perpetuity - or 
for as long as the system lasts. The other route leads to the occupants - by definition, 
temporary given the fact of mortality - of the permanent institutions. Accordingly, 
the scope of political authorities is wider than that implied by the concept of 
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government. Easton states that "the authorities need not be co-extensive with the 
politically relevant members."526 Bearing in mind that his analytical emphasis is 
function, an authority is anyone who holds a commanding position in respect of the 
allocation of values which binds environment to system.527 
The focus of Easton's discussion now shifts to those aspects of a system whose function it is 
to negotiate the safe passage of support from the environment to the appropriate political 
objects. The success of this exercise in logistics is fully related to the perceived legitimacy of 
authorities and regime. Legitimacy, as Easton points out, is generated in different ways by 
different systems. To establish method of generation, one first must locate source of 
legitimacy. Here, ideology in its legitimating capacity plays a seminal role. Echoing 
Rousseau, Easton contends that "the most stable support will derive from the conviction on 
the part of the member that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities 
and to abide by the requirements of the regime."529 He defines a legitimating ideology as 
comprising "those sets of beliefs which go to the heart of the regime"530 and adds that the 
identification of a regime already presupposes the experience of ideological or belief systems 
in all political systems. 
As noted above, a regime can be presumed to exist in any community that operates according 
to basic rules and procedures. Those sets of beliefs that go to the heart of a regime therefore 
are "the operating values of the system."531 It is the task of the authorities to apply in practice 
the operating values that embed a system in its community. The values are normative or 
expressive, comprising ethical interpretations and principles, and have the potential to capture 
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the imagination.532 They therefore, argues Easton, can be used for manipulative or 
instrumental purposes "to corral the energies of men."533 
It is worth noting that Easton's identification of the mobilising capacity of ideology shifts his 
thesis into behavioural gear. If an ideology is enacted in policies that meet the expectations of 
the members, it will stimulate gratification that in turn will generate support for the system. 
In general, the extent to which an ideology offers a means for promoting diffuse 
support will depend upon its success in capturing the imagination of most of the 
members in the system and in thereby fostering in them sentiments of legitimacy 
towards the authorities and the regime. It is clear that ideologies will vary in their 
effectiveness. They represent means that can be controlled or manipulated to achieve 
given ends.534 
Easton then adds a rider: to work, an ideology must convince its adherents that it "correctly or 
truthfully explains the real world", as well as "allay anxieties and concerns roused by the 
apparently unpredictable turns of a rapidly changing culture and society."535 Referring again 
to systems going through processes of rapid change, he contends that in such cases it is useful 
if the affective aspects of ideologies are concretized in the persons of vigorous and trusted 
leaders who embody the new norms and personally bridge the gap between norms and 
authority structures. "Without this personal focus for the membership of a system, it would 
be extremely difficult to mobilise its energies."536 
Easton distinguishes between ideology viewed 'from below' as a vehicle for self-expression, 
and ideology as it necessarily appears to a ruling elite, that is, as an instrument of control. 
"From the point of view of the leadership among the authorities, the ideology provides it with 
categories of thought for manipulating the support of the members in a direction interpreted 
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by the leaders themselves as appropriate." In sum, Easton outlines a behavioural schematic 
for the manipulation and control of societies by ruling elites. 
Easton further contends that in systems undergoing wide-ranging changes, power should -
functionally speaking - be personalised. He arrives at this conclusion by way of a distinction 
between normative and instrumental values in which it is clear that no matter how 'good' or 
'right' the normative content of an ideology might seem to be, if it lacks manipulative 
capabilities, it is functionally useless. In other words, and according to behavioural tenets, the 
normative or affective dimensions of ideological belief are politically relevant only insofar as 
they enhance the capacity for control of people by leaders. Since the potential for disorder is 
commensurately greater in systems undergoing processes of rapid and comprehensive change, 
so is the need for an ideology that enables a climate of social quiescence. Noting that "some 
students of modernising nations have observed ... that the breakdown of a sense of obligation 
to the old authorities leaves attitudes of'free floating obedience'" Easton suggests that: 
These can readily be attached to an appropriate leader who is clever enough to 
recognise and take advantage of such loosened attitudes. The new leaders fill the void 
created by the absence of objects to which these attitudes of obligation may attach 
themselves.538 
Modernising systems. 
Apter, when applying systems theory to an analysis of change, denotes 'environment' as the 
socio-economic context within which the system operates. A system develops by keeping 
pace with and adapting itself to changes in the socio-economic context.539 The configurations 
of Apter's model suggest that the system plays a somewhat passive role and that the 
environment provides the dynamic element. His notion of the relationship between system 
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and environment thus corresponds with neo-liberal notions of the minimal state in which 
"outputs' are intended to secure the system while allowing the environment qua free market 
forces a maximum of free play. 
However, an extension from home base in the United States to the developing world of a 
rather more active version of systemic modus operandi earlier had been undertaken by 
Almond and Coleman. They took Easton's notion of 'feedback loop', that is, the process by 
which inputs are converted into outputs, and elaborated the notion of'conversion functions' 
by distinguishing between input and output functions. Input functions they designate as those 
of political socialisation and political recruitment, followed by interest articulation and 
interest aggregation. Output functions they define and organise within the categories of rule-
making, rule-implementation and rule-adjudication.540 Finally, a meta-function straddling 
input and output functions is isolated and described as political communication, that is, the 
manner in which "differentiated media of communication" conveys opinions back and forth 
between system and environment.541 
Since environment and system interact with and influence one another, it stands to reason that 
the more efficiently a political system functions, the more compelling is its effect on the 
environment. It seems reasonable to surmise, then, that the effective application of systemic 
functions must be the primary objective of systemic structures. In order to achieve its primary 
objective, the system perforce must survive. One thus can deduce that firstly, the survival of 
the political system and secondly, the authoritative allocation of values by the system are the 
twin pivots on which systems theory turns. Furthermore, according to Almond, political 
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socialisation provides the fertile ground - both cerebral and visceral - in which the political 
system embeds and then reproduces itself. 
What do we mean by the function of political socialisation? We mean that all 
political systems tend to perpetuate their cultures and structures through time, and that 
they do this mainly by means of the socialising influence of the primary and secondary 
structures through which the young of the society pass in the process of maturation.542 
Earlier in the text, Almond refers to Hyman's depiction of political socialisation "as a 
continuous learning process involving both emotional learning and manifest political 
indoctrination ..."543 From this strong behavioural intimation can be inferred the role of 
ideology in developing systems, deduced as follows from aspects of Almond's analysis. 
Almond refers to ideology only once and then in a context other than systemic survival. 
However, in the light of Easton's postulates, it seems reasonable to assume that in the 
spectrum of legitimating ideologies, the ideology that represents a peak of functional 
excellence closely will conform with and feed into formative learning experiences derived 
from political socialisation. Ideology in its capacity as legitimating instrument cannot exist in 
a social vacuum. It must mesh itself with the institutions and techniques of political 
socialisation. Further, Almond's ideal model is American-style democracy. Political 
pluralism, subsumed under "interest articulation"544 is presented as the systemic Mecca 
towards which developing countries should angle their prayer mats. 
Finally, in regard to the system's ability to control the environment, a process of 
authoritatively allocating values is fundamental. The function of value allocation is to ensure 
that the mediating pluralist virtue of the interactive pattern does not enable the environment to 
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get the upper hand and dominate the system to the detriment of political and social order. 
Note, however, that it is the orthodox emphasis on the functional virtue of pluralist 
interaction and mediation between system and environment - in other words, political 
pluralism itself - and its application to developing systems that Huntington subsequently 
problematises, viz, where systemic structures are weak and the environment, by contrast, is 
awash with strong social forces, it is all too likely that environment will dominate system to 
the detriment of development. 
Structural-functionalism. 
Almond and Powell provide guidelines for developing systems within a structural-functional 
framework. Their schematic is based on an assumption that the more complex, that is, 
modern, a system is, the more differentiated are its functions, and hence the greater its 
capabilities.545 A key objective of their research is to isolate the capabilities of a new political 
system and then to match them up with an analysis of the problems attendant on modernising 
traditional environments. This accomplished, the equation also will work in reverse - roughly 
as follows: extension of capabilities -4 functional differentiation -4 expansion of problem-
solving activities -4 evolving development of a network of specialised structures. Thus the 
modernising equation moves back and forth between ever-expanding structures and functions, 
with problems at one end of the equation and problem-solving capacities at the other end. 
Since the definitive problem with which a modernising system must contend is its traditional 
environment, a focal task of the system is transformation, that is, of environment by system. 
The modernisation dynamo revolves on an axis of prompt problem identification, followed by 
on the spot solutions courtesy of rapid development of appropriate structures + functions. 
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Challenges identified are: 
• Nation building (or identity) 




Corresponding functions are: 
• Symbolic 
• Extractive 
• Regulative (a dual function mechanism that deals with problems of both legitimacy 
and participation) 
• Distributive 
and finally ... 
• Responsive (a kind of supervisory or facilitating function which ensures that systemic 
conversion functions stay in touch with the environment to an extent that enables 
rapid and effective conversion of inputs into outputs).546 
What of political socialisation, bedrock - as mentioned above - of system survival? Political 
socialisation is defined as "the process by which political cultures are maintained and 
changed."547 Given that Almond and Powell are offering strategic guidelines for modernising 
political systems whose meta-task is the transformation of traditional environments, it stands 
to reason that the process under consideration is one of controlled and managed change. In 
this respect, the two main agents of political socialisation cited are firstly, the family and 
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secondly, the school structure. As schooling is a function largely of the system and as 
family is a unit of the environment, one reasonably can assume that in the case of a 
modernising system and a traditional environment, no small amount of complex "problem-
solving' will be engendered by inevitable conflicts of values between these two main agencies 
of socialisation. In short, the component units within traditional lived worlds - family, 
extended family, village, clan - must be reconfigured by a modernising educational function. 
In this way, non-useful aspects of traditional culture will undergo the necessary process of 
conversion, thus facilitating further modernisation of the system. 
Almond and Powell appear to perceive culture in a peculiarly mechanistic way; almost as 
something provided by a benevolent providence for American social scientists to spend many 
useful hours tinkering with. It also is evident, given the linear development of the argument, 
that aspects of culture which actively hinder teleological systemic trajectories should be 
purged and replaced with appropriately sanitised modern versions. As Apter observes, in 
effect summarising the objectives of orthodox modernisation theory: "We can therefore 
compare societies in terms of degrees of modernisation by assessing the spread and 
proliferation of modernising roles."549 
With regard to nation building, Almond and Powell observe that the creation of a national 
sense of purpose is made more difficult by the existence within the environment of a number 
of "sub-cultures"550 that putatively are sub-nationalist. Yet, apart from a passing remark 
about the introduction of African cultural history to the school syllabi of emergent nations,551 
Almond and Powell pay surprisingly little attention to the central - or so one reasonably may 
presume - issue of education. They do, however, emphasise the vital role of ideology as 
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channel of affirmative obedience to the appropriate political objects. Echoing Easton, they 
refer to "the desperate need for the support of a familiar ideology, a political party, or a 
charismatic leader, which even the most secularised citizen may feel in those moments of 
crisis when the social, economic and political structures of society seem to be crumbling." 
Anticipating Huntington. 
In the context in which the above quotation occurs, Almond and Powell's reference is to 
modern societies and secularised political cultures. How much more vital, then, is the 
question of a legitimating ideology to shore up a modernising political system? It is the 
instability of transitional systems with which, in the final analysis, Huntington is 
overwhelmingly concerned. According to the logic of systems theory, the position of a 
modernising political system ipso facto is endangered, given an incompatible environment. 
By deciding that pluralism is a luxury that fragile systems are ill-equipped to afford, 
Huntington merely takes to its logical conclusion the application of behavioural tenets to 
modernising systems. 
The teleological bias of orthodox modernisation theory inclines its adherents to favour 
political pluralism as a universally good thing, a position that contrasts too sharply with 
behavioural science, as does the optimistically expansive framework of structural-
functionalism, not to generate anomalies. This said, a section of Almond and Powell's text, 
sub-titled 'Interest aggregation and political parties' is worth a visit since its contents indicate 
the fertile nature of the soil in which Huntington planted his authoritarian departure from 
pluralist liberal orthodoxy. 
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Having first distinguished in some detail between totalitarian and democratic - or monolithic 
and pluralist - systems in highly developed regions of the world, Almond and Powell broach 
the issue of the function of political parties in developing countries. Their premise that: 
"Political stability and achievement of political goals are dependent upon the ordered 
behaviour of the masses of individuals composing the society"553 sets the tone. Aspects of 
their follow-up argument acclaim the function of the political party as a powerful agent for 
socialisation in a modernising system. Here, they differentiate between two broad categories 
of party-system, namely, "hegemonic' and "turnover', as well as between two strata in the 
bedrock of political socialisation, that is, firstly, reinforcement of existing political culture 
and secondly, initiation of significant political-culture patterns.554 They then develop their 
thesis along lines that strongly suggest their preferred style of party-system, namely, a 
hegemonic party that will enable a modernising system more effectively to convert inputs 
into outputs and therefore to survive. 
The symbols of "party' and "leader' are capable of imposing a coherence and order 
upon the frightening newness and instability of a transitional society. They may 
satisfy underlying emotional needs for security and identification engendered by the 
breakup of traditional society.555 
Almond and Powell then isolate two important elements, ideology and charisma, in an 
implicit supposition that a hegemonic party system is functionally best suited to order and 
control a problematic environment. They argue that the function of both elements is to 
engender a sense of security. In the case of ideology, "adherents are rewarded by a sense of 
order, a sense of identity, and a respite from the emotional confusion brought about by 
change." 
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In the case of charisma: the party "harnesses charisma as a foundation for stable authority", 
thus "touching deep-seated psychological needs in a way which provokes widespread 
response"556 
Earlier in their thesis, Almond and Powell identified contrasting dimensions within any given 
political culture, notably, cognitive, affective and evaluative dimensions.55 Thus, from the 
adumbrated formula, namely: hegemonic party + charismatic leader + reassuring ideology = 
stable and orderly environment - can be adduced the extent to which the affective dimension 
is privileged, presumably with the intention of reconstructing the cognitive and evaluative 
dimensions to ensure the survival of the system. 
All things considered, one now can see why Almond and Powell paid a minimum of attention 
to the schooling function, despite stating their token approval of a "five nation study" which 
established that an educated citizen is usually an aware and politically competent citizen. 5 
Indeed, it seems possible that not despite but because of the empowering potential of 
education, Almond and Powell seem strongly inclined to promote ideology and charisma as 
functionally more useful to the survival of the incumbent political objects. This 
possibility invites a question: which environment is more threatening to the survival 
of a modernising system pre-configured by colonialism to be led and administered by a 
minuscule fraction of the overall population? An environment comprising increasingly 
educated and politically aware citizens or an environment tightly controlled by a hegemonic 
party, in turn reinforced by the ubiquitous and persistent presence of a charismatic authority 
figure? In sum, the above analysis suggests that prior to the publication of Huntington's 
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paradigm revision, the number of cheers for American style pluralism in postcolonial Africa 
already had been reduced to two. 
Behaviouralism 
As indicated earlier in the dissertation, (xviii) behavioural science posits that human values 
are encapsulated in human attitudes which in turn affect group behaviour: ergo, values are 
quantifiable. To this extent, behaviouralists deviate from the behaviourist premise that the 
mind ("black box') is inaccessible to science. On the contrary, behavioural political science, 
or so Apter claimed at the time, "looks inside the actors."559 How does Apter support his 
claim? 
Referring to his methodology, Apter explains that he deploys both the structural and the 
behavioural modes: "The structural deals with the organisation of roles and their functional 
relationships. The behavioural deals with the ideas of right conduct embodied in the roles 
and the consequences of those ideas in the formation of personalities."560 Thus he affirms 
cognitive phenomena, including value systems, as processes susceptible to empirical enquiry 
utilising behavioural methods. More particularly, behavioural techniques are employed to 
sift through value systems in order to determine whether the values in question are 
'consummatory' or 'instrumental.' Consummatory values are "methodologically non-
rational" in the sense that they "have consequences for individual and social actions that go 
beyond purely empirical ends ... they involve empirical means germane to non-empirical 
ends." Instrumental values, on the other hand, are "methodologically rational" in the sense 
(xviii) See Chapter Two, pp 37-39 
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that they are "empirical means germane to empirical ends." Furthermore, "most economic 
objectives are of this nature."562 
Observation of instrumental values in operation - that is, deploying empirical means to an 
economic end - provides, or so Apter argues, "a norm of rationality." Societies with 
predominantly instrumental values are societies in pursuit of predominantly rational, that is, 
economic ends. Hence they also are societies in which "consummatory aspects are reduced 
to a minimum or segregated."563 Apter further contends that social mobility is a key 
consequence of the pursuit of instrumental ends. To the degree that the values of a society 
are predominantly instrumental, "it may be assumed to be interested in maximising resources 
and, therefore, concerned with social mobility." This type of society, then, is "the one most 
directly involved in modernisation and development."564 
Apter's prima facie deployment of neutrally descriptive modalities and his seeming 
avoidance - to a greater extent than Almond, Coleman and Powell - of prescriptive inferences 
in the final analysis is somewhat deceptive since his thesis demonstrably assumes that 
Western style (scientific) modernisation is a universally good thing. He does not have to 
spell it out that consummatory values are all very well - in their place and within reason -
but should not be allowed to block or decelerate the free flow of instrumental values, or to 
frustrate resource- maximisation pursuits, since it is this presumption that drives his 
discourse. 
What, then, of societies where consummatory values irrationally are privileged? According 
to Apter, such societies by definition are traditionalist. He defines traditionalism as 
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"validation of current behaviour by reference to immemorial prescriptive norms." A 
definitively traditionalist society is one that does not draw a clear line between sacred and 
secular, and in which "religion is pervasive as a cognitive guide. Such systems have been 
hostile to innovation ... not only ancient Greece and Rome but many contemporary African 
societies are examples of this type of system." Progress begins when such societies 
convert religion from consummatory to instrumental purposes. 
Among the examples cited by Apter are firstly, the rise of the Athenian trade empire once the 
Delphic oracle had been persuaded to dispense advice favourable to Athenian economic 
interests and secondly, 17f century Igbo use of their best known oracle, the Aro Chuba, 
which had a status in the region akin to the Delphic oracle's status in Greece, for 
predominantly economic ends, that is, the establishment and maintenance of Igbo trade 
colonies.5 7 It can be inferred from Apter's argument that the beginnings of modernisation in 
traditionalist societies are located at the juncture where religion is put to instrumental as well 
as consummatory use, an innovation that inserts a 'norm of rationality' into social values and 
attitudes. Conversely, where religion permeates all aspects of life and retains its ability to 
hold people in thrall to sacral purposes, a pervasive and persistent norm of irrationality 
suggests that modernisation, in the absence of outside intervention, will be indefinitely 
delayed. 
Drawing on a study by Evans-Pritchard, Apter cites the Nuer people of the Sudan as a prime 
example of a society whose values appear to be irredeemably consummatory. In a discussion 
leading up to his inclusion of Evans-Pritchard's observation that "it is impossible to live 
among Nuer and conceive of rulers ruling over them"568 Apter argues as follows: 
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Embodied in the structural differences between the sacred and the secular, and of 
interest from a behavioural point of view, are the patterns of gratification peculiar to 
each. Gratifications that follow from the transcendental values associated with an act 
we will call consummately, and gratifications that come from the empirical ends 
realised through an act we will call instrumental. In the comparison of different kinds 
of traditionalism, it becomes important to distinguish the kinds of gratifications 
common in a system and the varying and diverse patterns in which they are 
combined.569 
The significance of making a clear distinction between consummately and instrumental 
patterns of stimulus and response is that it enables a behavioural scientist to assess the degree 
of difficulty that new governments of predominantly traditional societies in Africa are likely 
to experience when implementing modernising policies. To facilitate the construction of a 
continuum - with instrumental value systems at one end and consummately value systems at 
the other - along which to locate a series of African societies in order of their modernising 
potential, Apter suggests that a useful indicator is their "different adaptive responses to 
colonialism, a force for modernisation."570 Segmental societies, such as the Nuer, whose 
structural flexibility preserves the consummately belief system, are profoundly indifferent to 
the advantages of innovation and development, and therefore are able "to resist modernisation 
without fighting it." Their indifference to progress is a product of "a wide range of emotional 
relations that serves as the primary satisfaction."571 However, segmental organisation per se 
is not a definitive factor given that the Igbo, also a segmental society, are placed by Apter at 
the opposite end - to the Nuer - of a developmental continuum. The privileged place in a 
modernisation scheme of things awarded to the Igbo hinges on the transformation of 
consummately values into instrumental values. Once the award of social titles had shifted to 
favour individual achievement, particularly in an economic sphere, Igbo cultural norms 
"easily translated into local commercial lending and other trade associations."572 
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At this point in my review, it is worth emphasising that Apter is not rating African societies 
on a scale of their response (submission/resistance) to colonialism. On the contrary, he notes 
that the Igbo became a major force in nationalist politics in Nigeria. Instead, societies are 
rated in terms of economic adaptability and capacity for innovation. For instance, in the case 
of the Asante who mounted protracted and determined resistance to the onset of territorial 
imperialism,573 Apter notes that firstly, "the chiefs had to be ordered to send their children to 
school"; secondly: "In Ashanti, those in power serve the present by serving the past"; thirdly, 
only the introduction and spread of Christian values undermined "the control exercised by the 
dead ancestors over the living."574 Accordingly, Apter concludes that a consequence for the 
postcolonial state of Ghana of Asante consummatory values in which there is no distinction 
between sacral and secular purposes, is that "the past became a dead weight on the 
government... the burdens of modernisation in Ghana were intense and resulted in a 
relatively autocratic system."575 Here, Apter seems to be making a direct causal link between 
the increasingly authoritarian intervention of the Convention People's Party (CPP) - he refers 
in passing to "kicks and blows"576 - and a society that obdurately privileges consummatory 
values, thus impeding economic progress. The Igbo, on the other hand, "willingly adjusted 
their local organisations and communities to modernisation" while resisting active 
administration by the British, and "readily took to exogenous innovations in the economic 
sphere."577 
A key presumption that emerges from Apter's depiction of a plethora of African societies in 
terms of their structures and their value systems is that the key enabling / disenabling 
variables are not so much structural as behavioural, and therefore not so much a matter of 
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societal organisation as of collective value systems. As noted above, both Nuer and Igbo 
societies are segmentally organised, whereas Asante society is structured along "pyramidal" 
lines.578 
The emergence - as Apter's thesis unfolds - of the relationship between instrumental value 
systems and behaviour that conforms to a norm of rationality as - so to speak - alpha and 
omega of modernisation has important implications for his suppositions concerning ideology 
in modernising societies. In his discussion of ideologies, Apter equates consummately value 
systems with "vulgar ideologies" of nationalism and socialism, and instrumental value 
systems with an ideology of science. In Apter's teleological hierarchy, instrumental values -> 
ideology of science represent a peak of functional excellence, ergo, the ideology of science 
reigns supreme in Western societies.57 His estimation of a definitive connection between 
ideological configuration and category of value system is examined in more detail below. 
Science as hegemonic ideology. 
Apter begins by distinguishing between ideology as dogma and ideology as science. He 
explains that he includes science as an ideological category because it is "a more hopeful 
alternative"580 to dogma. Thus he launches a discussion of ideological beliefs and resultant 
behaviour by delineating a seminal binary opposition between science and dogma. To this 
delineation he appends a prediction inherent in his thesis: "An underlying assumption is that 
socialism and nationalism will fluctuate vis-a-vis each other and that in the process of 
modernisation, and especially industrialisation, the ideology of science will increasingly gain 
influence."581 
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The argument that elaborates Apter's prediction therefore focuses on "nationalism, socialism 
and science (considered as an ideology)."582 In order to establish the right of science to 
occupy the top rung in a linear evolutionary scheme, he itemises stages of the development of 
ideology in reverse order of evolutionary rank. Firstly, "the growth of multiple images'" held 
in common by elites and counter-elites. Hence, despite divisions in society, there is "a 
common denominator of meaning."583 Secondly, the stage of "selective recall"™ in which 
earlier points of agreement are pushed out to the margins, and disagreements move to centre 
stage. Thirdly, a "relative threshold"5*5 is passed. Disagreements harden and become fixed; 
society is dotted with points of polarised conflict. Fourthly, "hortatory realism"5*6 is a 
product of the combination of various points of disagreement in a way that configures a wider 
theoretical context. This is rapidly followed by fifthly, "political fantasy" which, according 
to Apter, emanates from "the particular talent of the charismatic leader to manipulate political 
fantasy, which also serves to create new consummatory values." Apter further contends 
that: 
Nationalist and socialist ideologies are typical during the periods of horatory realism 
and political fantasy. Such periods, common immediately after a revolution or after a 
new nation has obtained its independence, give exceptional opportunities to political 
leaders to exert their leadership in the moral sphere.588 
Sixthly, science in its capacity as ideology provides the ultimate stage, that of "practical 
realism."5*9 Once a society has evolved to this point, the grievance, anger and bitterness that 
to greater or lesser degrees have informed all previous stages now have disappeared. The 
ideology of science involves both the application of rational methods and experimentalism to 
social affairs and the logic of fact and verification as the basis of rationality.590 However, the 
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secure position of science as the primary ideology in "highly advanced development 
communities"591 is contingent on the existence of the following socio-economic conditions: 
• The redundancy of nationalism as an explicit cohesive mechanism given widespread 
acceptance of common social membership 
• Since the main objectives of development have been achieved, "social dislocations 
require fine adjustments rather than 'gross' solutions'"592 
• Broad social consensus on fundamental issues of policy and the meaning of 
593 
progress. 
Implicit in Apter's thesis is an 'end of ideology' presumption in the sense of termination in 
the West of ideologies of nationalism and socialism along with the foreseeable end of same 
in other parts of the world. Also noteworthy is Apter's contention that the post-Stalinist 
Soviet system is exhibiting a shift to instrumental values. 
As the system has become industrialised ... and as new generations have emerged that 
are less committed to Marxism as a consummatory value, instrumentalism and the 
measurement of achievement as material output rather than moral expression have 
become more and more evident.594 
He adds that the process is by no means complete, but that although Marxism and the older 
forms of socialism continue to operate, they are a steadily decreasing source of moral 
inspiration. Instead they function as ritualised expressions of antecedent values.595 
At this juncture it is worth emphasising that Apter clearly distinguishes between the 
purportedly scientific content of Marxism and science per se. While socialism "may claim to 
be scientific, as in the case of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union ... sooner or later the 
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scientist will implicitly ignore this claim and possibly reject it."596 Even lower down the scale 
are varieties of socialism in developing areas. While the claims of socialism to be scientific 
boost the authority of leaders, "their socialist ideologies do not belong in the same intellectual 
class as nineteenth century socialism or, for that matter, Marxism."597 Accordingly, while he 
pays lip service to African choices between revolutionary and African socialism,598 Apter 
tends to treat socialist ideologies in Africa as an undifferentiated whole. Additionally, his 
distinction between socialist ideology (motivational and disciplinary) and an ideology of 
nationalism (solidary) is qualified by his assertion that "quite often, the socialism of Africa is 
merely another name for nationalism."599 In this scenario, nationalism's emphasis on 
common membership in the national state is supplemented by socialist ideological features, 
namely, developmentalism, egalitarianism, "and a sense of shared purpose in the scientific 
evolution of the society."600 
Given Apter's uncompromising distinction between socialist science and science per se, it 
seems reasonable to deduce that a shared notion of scientific social evolution is equivalent to 
a collective political fantasy. The deduction is supported by Apter's contention that "the 
leaders may draw a picture of a new society in terms of socialism and nationalism, both 
ideologies being manipulated to prevent the operation of political realism." Apter's 
statement imputes the incompatibility of ideology as dogma and ideology as science. He -
slightly mystifyingly - adds that: 
The ideology of science functions only in a period of practical realism, and is 
ultimately antagonistic to any other ideology, even though in the short run it may 
work for it. For this reason, the ideologues of modernising societies which for 
political reasons use ideology to maintain authority, cannot fully accept science. 
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In regard to Apter's point in the passage quoted above, revisiting his distinction between 
instrumental and consummately values provides a measure of clarification. Prima facie, a 
modernising system - functionally speaking - ought to downgrade or relegate to the social 
periphery consummately values since - if permitted to flourish - they are impediments to 
science. However, the developmental necessity of periods of hortatory realism + political 
fantasy preclude dispensing with or marginalising consummately values since they provide 
moral imperatives conducive to mass participation in nation building and other 
developmental activities. In short, a modernising system utilises consummately values to 
inject a sense of unity and commitment into an environment that otherwise might splinter 
into hostile camps or sink into apathy.603 
Because consummately and instrumental values are so often in direct conflict with 
one another (for example, the 'old' versus the 'new'), coercion is required to restrict 
such conflicts and information is needed to avoid them. Quite often it becomes a 
primary aspect of government activity to create new consummately values and 
therefore establish, as much as possible, different solidarities and identities. 
Characteristically, mobilisation systems do this by elevating ideology to the level of a 
religion.604 
Apter further contends that the successful operation of a mobilisation system is contingent on 
the existence and nation-wide activities of a party of solidarity. He describes the paradox in 
which a party of solidarity finds itself. On the one hand, it is the main instrument for carrying 
out the mobilisation objectives of government - a role that not infrequently requires it to 
operate as an instrument of coercion. On the other, "it is supposed to remain close to the 
people and by this means gather information." The way in which the party attempts to 
reconcile its conflicting objectives is by displaying "a devotion to populism."605 The party's 
populist recipe contains two major ingredients: heroic leadership + a strong Utopian element 
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that provides the basis of social discipline. In combination, these elements comprise an 
ideology that amounts to a political religion. 
The essence of Apter's behavioural methodology arguably is contained in his assertion that 
"political religion is the means used because it translates morality into authority."607 Firstly, 
this statement suggests that political religion is the medium through which a phenomenon -
morality - which is unmeasurable and belongs to 'the shadowy domain of quasi-
phenomena' (xix) is translated into a quantifiable factor - authority. Secondly, it facilitates a 
structural approach in that "another use of political religion is to impose an organisation on 
the political structure of society - that of a secular church in which party cadres carry the 
primary role of indoctrinating the youth."608 
Apter thus simultaneously affirms the necessary existence of firstly, a mobilising system, 
secondly, a party of solidarity, and thirdly, their mutual and interdependent modus operandi 
(coercion / populism) that, once it has generated authority roles and concomitant loyalty or 
obedience, can be unravelled, categorised and projected into a scientifically hypothesised 
future by behavioural science. In short, the conclusions he draws from his research validate 
the methodological approach with which he started out. To the extent that Apter's thesis is 
circular, or self-fulfilling, Hawkesworth's critical comment seems apposite: 
Political scientists have used their leverage as 'experts' to advise developing nations 
to adopt strategies that produce the world prophesied by political scientists. However 
flawed their foundation, scientific assertions have been used to dictate 'rational 
strategies' for political development which foreclose options and drastically curtail the 
freedom of citizens in developing countries.609 
(xix) See Chapter Two, p 40 
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According to my reading of Apter's text, his purportedly descriptive and empirical exercise 
contains a dual wish projection in the form of firstly, an assumption about the future of 
modernising societies, namely that the ideology of science will increasingly gain influence, 
that emerges from his teleological framework of analysis, and secondly, an affirmation of the 
scientific method (behavioural-structural) utilised by Apter in his capacity as a proponent of 
the modernisation paradigm. If assumption and affirmation are symbiotic, then it equally can 
be argued that Apter applies his wishful perception of reality to the objects of his research. In 
this respect, a question posed by Susser is pertinent: 
If conviction, moral outlook and values cannot penetrate the epistemological 
framework of the behavioural world, and if these convictions and the actions that 
stem from them can be analysed only in terms of being 'systematically related' to a 
series of empirically accessible factors, are we not very close to a full blown doctrine 
(implicit though it may be) of social and psychological determinism? Conviction 
cannot justify itself but must be stated in terms of some other supporting factor. It 
follows that thought is a derivative conditioned process.610 
Susser concludes that it is in the "inclination to social and psychological reductionism or 
determination" that behaviouralism merges with its counterpart in psychology. ' ' 
By way of conclusion, I revisit Apter's binary division between ideology as science and 
ideology as dogma in order to highlight a linkage between his binary logic and his 
teleological framework. Western policy, asserts Apter, is based on the assumption that the 
long-term prognosis for democracy is hopeful, just as: 
Soviet policy vis-a-vis the modernising nations is based upon an opposite viewpoint, 
namely that mobilisation systems will eventually build up those forms of unity 
essential to the collectivist society as conceived in Marxian terms. I hold to the first 
view as an article of faith. But I also hope to show the superior utility of the 
libertarian system in its handling of complexity. In this sense I believe that 
modernisation ultimately produces libertarian systems.612 
As defined by Apter, the libertarian model is like a vast marketplace in which 
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governments are the sellers, citizens are the buyers, and the primary value is liberty. "This 
concept of the polity parallels the pure theory of economic competition and accepts the same 
ft] ^ 
values." In other words, a libertarian system is one in which economic values take pride of 
place and the dominant "behavioural characteristics of human beings" are "the ability to 
reason and the ability to know self-interest."614 Liberty is pivotal because it allows real 
science (as opposed to the dogma-imbued science of socialism) to flourish. In addition, "in a 
functional and rationalistic universe, scientists (and social scientists) are accorded an 
increasingly powerful position in political life." The increasing power of scientists is not 
least a product of their "superior insight into the conduct of their fellows."615 
Implicit in Apter's supposition is the conflation of knowledge (or information) and power, 
albeit incrementally since he contends that scientists do not actively seek power, and that it is 
only in the stage of practical realism that politicians are able to accept the comprehensive 
extent of their dependence on scientific expertise in the formulation and application of policy. 
"The information elite is a scientific elite ... In societies where modernisation has been 
extensively achieved, this elite tends not only to displace the older elites (lawyers, for 
example) but, in addition, to make the old-fashioned politicians obsolete."616 In highly 
industrialised countries, appropriately enlightened leaders are aware that the ideology of 
science "buttresses the authority of politicians with a universal appeal to scientific reason."617 
However, because the ideology of science can do little to promote solidarity and identity,618 
in modernising nations the position of scientists vis-a-vis politicians is considerably less 
privileged given the primacy of consummately values. Nonetheless, Apter believes that 
scientific experts in modernising countries have two major advantages over other elites. 
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Firstly, they are members of a universal scientific community and as such, they look to "their 
much more powerful counterparts in the industrial countries for support."619 Secondly, 
scientists are teleological signifiers. In this regard, scientific elites in the industrial nations 
show to their less fortunate counterparts in Africa the image of their own future. Here, it is 
worth bearing in mind that according to Apter, his 'article of faith' is supported by scientific 
evidence - in which case, Marxist systems by definition are constructed on a pseudo-
scientific base. 
Finally, while prima facie scientific, hence value-neutral, the research and recommendations 
reviewed above clearly are oriented towards prescriptive analysis. As Menkhaus puts it, "no 
meaningful distinction can be made between the field of political development and the study 
of politics in Africa. Most works written on African politics since 1960 have had a decidedly 
prescriptive tone."620 It thus seems reasonable to conclude that modernisation theory is 
purposively reflexive inasmuch as it combines an intention to liberate target constituencies 
from unscientific, ipso facto, false belief with prescriptive endorsement of a Western, more 
specifically, American 'ideal model'. Yet, the orthodox modernisation paradigm also 
exhibits a somewhat paradoxical - given its pluralist ideal model - leaning towards 
incipiently authoritarian solutions to Third World problems. This normatively ambivalent 
trajectory prefigures Huntington's conflation of'might' and 'right'. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
REVISED MODERNISATION THEORY: HUNTINGTON 
The text at the centre of this chapter, Political Order in Changing Societies, is a quasi-
revisionist modernisation classic.621 While Huntington's thesis is informed by behaviouralism 
and structural functionalism, his version of the modernisation paradigm is distinctive in a 
number of ways. For instance, from the outset he explicitly draws attention to burgeoning 
problems of violence and disorder in modernizing countries. 
Apter, when revisiting modernization theses that emerged during the middle decades of the 
20 century, identifies two main trends within the paradigm's broad spectrum. The first trend, 
Modernization I, concerned itself exclusively with the modernisation of traditional societies. 
This "development project," having delineated structural, normative and behavioural 
components, then added ideology to the mixture. These components, it was assumed, would 
become mutually reinforcing and so achieve "the same 'steady state' in the 'periphery' as 
obtains in the 'metropole.'"622 The framework sketched by Apter fits the Americanism623 of 
orthodox modernisation theory, not least the blithe assumption that a scientifically conceived 
and managed political system can simultaneously exercise effective control over the 
environment and peacefully co-exist with it in a (modernising) relationship of dynamic 
equilibrium. 
The second trend Apter defines in contradistinction to Modernization I. Modernization II 
concerns itself with transitional societies and "describes the contradictions of growth ... It is a 
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form of conflict theory." In the case of Political Order In Changing Societies, it perhaps 
would be more accurate to posit that Huntington defines and then argues a form of conflict 
management theory since his central preoccupation is how best to bring order, discipline and 
stability to disorderly, violence prone and haphazardly (if at all) governed transitional 
societies. More specifically, and by way of introduction to Huntington's thesis, its distinctive 
attributes are summarised below. 
Firstly, some of his more trenchant premises and arguments, for instance, when referring to 
the modernising countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: 
With a few notable exceptions, the political evolution of these countries after World 
War II was characterised by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and 
mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic 
leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, widespread and 
blatant corruption among cabinet ministers and civil servants, arbitrary infringement 
of the rights and liberties of citizens, declining standards of bureaucratic efficiency 
and performance, the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, the loss of 
authority by legislatures and courts, and the fragmentation and at times complete 
disintegration of broadly based political parties. 
... offer a punchy antidote to the anodyne insinuations of paternalist social engineering 
deployed by his more orthodox counterparts. This said, it - more pertinently - is contended in 
this chapter that the tenor of his main premises, arguments and conclusions imputes 
authoritarian, potentially oppressive solutions to the problems encountered by modernising 
political systems. As these recommended solutions purportedly derive from strictly empirical 
analysis, given that Huntington, like his peers, operates on the assumption that behavioural 
science enables its practitioners to produce clinical diagnostics and prognoses, the 
implications, for instance, of the purportedly objective relegation of African polities and 
societies to the very bottom of a teleological heap, are disturbing. In this respect, Huntington 
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may be argued to have lent considerable impetus to an Afro-pessimistic trend that - despite 
subsequent modifications in behavioural methodology 626 - continues to thrive in Western 
academies. 
Secondly, Huntington seems to be advising America (and the West in general) to make 
common cause with the Soviet Union. His analysis of the modernizing potential of single 
party systems takes the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as an ideal model. In 
addition, he brackets the Soviet Union in the same 'civic polity' category as Western states, 
and describes the strength and durability of the CPSU and its organs of governance with an 
unmistakable air of approval. Explicitly to privilege considerations of functional efficacy 
ahead of the ideological imperatives of the Cold War prima facie seems to affirm him as a 
practitioner of value-free, neutrally descriptive and evaluative political science. However, as 
argued below, this impression is not much more than superficial. At a deeper level, 
Huntington substitutes one value-laden concept, authority, for another, liberty. In so doing he 
both affirms and predicts the teleological necessity of developmental dictatorships in 
postcolonial Africa. 
Thirdly, a particularly innovative aspect of Huntington's thesis is his rejection of the notion 
that the American system is an appropriate model for modernising countries. Here, he departs 
markedly from the conventional wisdom of his predecessors and contemporaries - but not, 
however, from a teleological orientation. Eschewing North America as developmental 
exemplar, he instead locates the ancestry of all modernizing political systems in 16th and 17th 
century Europe. Fourthly and relatedly, it is not difficult to discern the spirit of Thomas 
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Hobbes at the back of Huntington's intense preoccupation with political authority and its 
functional concomitant, order. 
Binary organisation of key concepts. 
As Mamdani observes, modernisation theory views social reality as though it plausibly can be 
reduced to and adequately understood within an organisational framework of binary pairs.627 
Huntington's text is emblematic of this approach. The binaries that construct his thesis are 
deployed as foundational concepts on the basis of which he formulates his arguments and 
conclusions. In the discussion below, key binary pairs are isolated and the manner in which a 
given binary pair plays host to a number of contingent binaries is indicated. 
Political institutions / social forces 
Prima facie, the above concepts in polar juxtaposition do not necessarily contain binary 
inferences. However, as Huntington's argument proceeds, their binary character628 emerges. 
Institutions are defined as "the behavioural manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual 
interest"629 and as "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour."630 Moving from concept 
to process, Huntington defines institutionalisation as "the process by which organisations and 
procedures acquire value and stability." Since political institutions do not take shape 
overnight, "political development, in this sense, is slow, particularly when compared to the 
seemingly much more rapid pace of economic development."632 
The true test of an institution is its capacity to survive - not as a result of resistant immobility 
but through a process of dynamic adaptation - major changes in its operational environment. 
Huntington therefore contends that "functional adaptability, not functional specificity, is the 
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true measure of a highly developed organisation." Since political parties are included 
under the rubric of institutions, it stands to reason that the more functionally adaptable a party, 
the greater the probability of its survival. 
A nationalist party whose function has been the promotion of independence from 
colonial rule faces a major crisis when it achieves its goal and has to adapt itself to the 
somewhat different function of governing a country. It may find this functional 
transition so difficult that it will, even after independence, continue to devote a large 
portion of its efforts to fighting colonialism.634 
The example most often cited by Huntington of a functionally adaptable, hence enduring 
political party in a modernising country is India's Congress Party which proved able to adapt 
its function from the attainment of independence to the meta-task of governance. In general, 
one can deduce from Huntington's argument that political institutions, as long as they meet 
the criterion of functional adaptability, inherently are valuable in the sense that they create 
and maintain stability as well as public morality. By contrast, the meaning invested by 
Huntington in the category of social forces seems somewhat sinister. In effect, social forces 
are conceptualised as the problem political institutions perforce must overcome in order to 
survive. "Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions. A society with 
weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial 
desires. Politics is a Hobbesian world of unrelenting competition among social forces."636 
Huntington's initial definition of'social forces' is provided early in the text. "A social force is 
an ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status group." As the definition prima facie is 
free of pejorative inference, its wider significance is not immediately evident. Only as his 
argument proceeds does a perception emerge that what primarily defines a social force is the 
very quality it most lacks: "a sense of political community."638 Furthermore, without a sense 
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of political community, there can be no "art of associating together. It follows, then, that 
neglect or ignorance of the art of association undermines or stunts the development of 
political institutions in their structural and moral capacities. 
Since Huntington by degrees has moved from a neutral seeming proposition about 
institutional function to a conclusion overtly informed by a notion of institutional construction 
of public morality, it is of some importance to uncover the meaning he vests in "public 
morality.' He asserts that "morality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and 
predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behaviour."640 It is 
noteworthy that in the discussion following this statement, he substitutes "interest' for 
"morality' as if, in a context of political institutions, the two concepts are one and the same. 
By inference, then, his understanding of public morality corresponds to that which is in the 
public interest. He develops this line of argument by addressing the question of who is 
responsible for defining and promoting the public interest. His answer is that political 
institutions are key sites of public morality. Since Huntington equates morality with interest, 
and since public interest is vested in institutions of governance, it is possible to surmise that 
public morality corresponds to that which is in the best interests of such institutions. 
As an aid to clarifying the position thus far, the steps in argumentation via which Huntington 
arrives at his conflation of public morality and the interests of political institutions are 
itemised below. 
• Following in Easton's footsteps, Huntington makes a distinction between public office 
and office holder, for example, between the institution of the Presidency and the 
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current incumbent. The latter, being mortal, has short-term interests whereas the 
interests of the former are long term. By inference, then, the first law of public 
morality is long-term institutional survival. 
• The interests of political institutions not only are long-term, they also are finite, hence 
susceptible to empirical observation and measurement. Huntington maintains that 
previous approaches to estimating the precise nature of the public interest have 
deployed problematic because abstract reasoning.641 In contradistinction to such 
approaches, he asserts that "governmental institutions have interests of their own. 
These interests not only exist, they are also reasonably concrete."642 
• The interests of political institutions correspond to that which is in the national 
interest. From this equation can be extrapolated a formula that proceeds as follows: 
public morality -4 long term interests (functional survival) of institutions of 
governance -4 permanent national interest. "What's good for the Presidency is good 
for the country."643 
• The next step in the argument is summarised by Huntington's assertion that: 
Ask any reasonably informed group of Americans to identify the five best 
presidents and the five worst presidents. Then ask them to identify the five 
strongest presidents and the five weakest presidents. If the identification of 
strength with goodness and weakness with badness is not 100 per cent, it will 
almost certainly be not less than 80 per cent.644 
As a consequence of this step, Huntington has developed a proposition that equates 
public morality not only with national interest but also with the strength and durability 
of institutions of governance. In this scenario, strength is good and its binary opposite, 
179 
weakness is bad. The example he cites (above) is the Presidency. At this juncture it is 
instructive to note a reworking of the same theme in a subsequent text. Unlike 
orthodox modernisation theorists who posit a teleology in which the American polity 
represents an ideal - in both senses of the word - model, Huntington is preoccupied 
with the weakness, ipso facto, badness of the American political system. He defines 
the central problem of American politics as the weakness of political institutions 
relative to the strength of society. He underpins his argument with a comparison 
between the historical development of the modern American polity with that of the 
modern state in Europe, and indicates his approval of the latter process of historical 
development, or at any rate, its outcome which assured the paramountcy of political 
institutions over social forces.645 
• Huntington now takes his line of argument one step further by extending it into a 
comparative realm and then drawing a general proposition from the regularities he has 
uncovered. "Just as a strong Presidency is in the American public interest, so also a 
strong party is in the Soviet public interest."64 He thus draws attention to structural 
similarities across nations and continents that derive from institutions, their functional 
adaptability and strength. By inference, ideological differences between states and 
regions of the world pale into insignificance compared with Huntington's primary 
criterion, namely that "the most important political distinction among countries 
concerns not their form of government but their degree of government." 7 In other 
words, do governments govern! If so, to what extent and how effectively? 
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• Note, however, Huntington's link between two distinct institutions, that is, (American) 
presidency and (Soviet) party. By inference, a stable and enduring political party is 
equivalent to a permanent executive arm of the state. It therefore is deducible that the 
significant link between the American presidency and the CPSU is not so much 
institutional (or structural) as functional (authority -* order). 
• Huntington's focus is not on ideology per se. Unlike his orthodox counterparts, he 
does not really address the extent to which authority, and therefore legitimacy, are tied 
in with ideology. Instead, he argues that "governmental institutions derive their 
legitimacy and authority not from the extent to which they represent the interests of 
the people or of any other group, but to the extent to which they have interests of their 
own apart from all other groups."648 Again, he cites the presidency in support of his 
case: "The interest of the Presidency ... coincides with that of no-one else ... the 
Presidential perspective is unique to the Presidency. Precisely for this reason it is both 
a lonely office and a powerful one. Its authority is rooted in its loneliness."649 
The above final step in argumentation heralds the onset of another key binary configuration. 
"The existence" continues Huntington, "of political institutions (such as the Presidency or 
Central Committee) capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically 
developed societies from undeveloped ones." 
Politically developed / undeveloped societies 
Huntington's elaboration of this binary site highlights a curious anomaly in a purportedly 
scientific thesis, viz, value-imbued concepts and definitions. A binary distinction between 
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developed and undeveloped societies utilises structural and functional criteria. What, then, is 
one to make of Huntington's use of normative criteria in delineating contingent binaries? 
Whereas defining a weak government as a bad government is not too startling a departure 
from a value-free standard, the criteria contained in "a weak government, a government which 
lacks authority, fails to perform its function and is immoral" to say the least are mixed. In 
similar vein, he declares that a distinction between politically developed and undeveloped 
societies "also distinguishes moral communities from amoral societies."651 In general, 
Huntington's use of normative terms such as 'amoral', 'moral' and 'immoral' in conjunction 
with structural-functional estimates such as 'simple', 'complex', 'undeveloped' and 
'developed' bears close investigation. To this end, the sequential development of criteria 
briefly is revisited and unpacked below. 
• Proposition 1. 
The existence of political institutions capable of giving substance to public interests 
distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones. {Structural-
functional) 
• Proposition 2. 
It also distinguishes moral communities from amoral societies. {Normative). 
• Propositions. 
A government with a low level of institutionalisation is not merely a weak 
government, it is a bad government. {Structural-normative blend) 
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• Proposition 4. 
A weak government is a government which lacks authority, fails to adequately 
perform its functions and is immoral. (Normative-functional blend.) 
The above itemisation outlines an area of fact-value overlap in Huntington's thesis in which 
structural and functionalist designations inexplicably are conflated with moral worth. By 
'inexplicable' I mean that he does not offer any overt or compelling justification, ergo, the 
reasoning behind the conflation perforce has to be inferred from the direction and design of 
his thesis - an exercise on which I embark below. 
The meaning vested by Huntington in the term "moral community' has been noted above. To 
reiterate and expand, he defines a moral community as one in which people have developed 
the art of associating together. Civic associations are formed in society to fulfil specific 
functions. An example cited is that of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis. A 
town chairman is quoted as saying: "We can fight polio .. if we can organise people. If we 
can organise people like this we can fight anything."652 The inference is that for good deeds 
to flourish and worthy causes to be won, society needs organisation. Given that the growth of 
organisations makes society more complex, there is a connection between organisations, 
achievement of worthy causes and social complexity, and hence there is a connection between 
that which is complex and that which is beneficial to society as a whole. 
However, against Huntington, it can be argued that there is nothing inherently or necessarily 
beneficial about the existence of social organisations. To what extent, for instance, is a Flat 
Earth society a developmental asset? How socially beneficial are the causes of neo-fascist, 
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racist or xenophobic associations? The art of associating together and the complexity that 
ensues as increasing numbers of civic groups form and organise themselves, is not an 
inherently advantageous or necessarily developmental process - yet Huntington presents his 
definition of a "moral community' as though it is self-evidently true. Perhaps he is merely 
positing that there can be no developmentally progressive activity or long lasting social 
benefit without association and social organisations? If so, he fails to state or clarify his 
position. In short, an argument that hinges on a materially unargued assumption that only a 
complex society rates as a 'moral community' is logically incoherent. 
In addition, his equation of a plethora of civic associations with social complexity and 
therefore with morality begs the question of his inclusion of the Soviet Union in the category 
of participatory or civic polities. Since independent civic associations were not permitted to 
form at all, let alone flourish in the Soviet Union, Huntington's reasoning does not make 
sense. 
A final point is that his social complexity -> moral society formula includes an inference that 
any society complex enough to have formed a variety of civic associations by definition 
already has developed political institutions. In other words, developed political institutions are 
the sine qua non of a moral community. Q.E.D. By extension, the idea of a moral community 
sans political institutions and formal governance is a non-starter. 
Turning now to Huntington's definition of an amoral society. Given his antecedent 
proposition, it seems reasonable to deduce that a society qualifies as amoral if it has no 
political institutions separate and distinct from itself, that is, if its political and social 
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functions are fused, for instance, in a group of elders or a village council. How, then, does 
such a society achieve moral status? 
An (indirect) answer to the above question can be found in Huntington's depiction of the era 
of state building in 16l and 171 century Europe. "Historically, political institutions have 
emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces, and the gradual 
development of procedures and organizational devices for resolving these disagreements."653 
It thus is through a developmental process of generating authoritative political institutions that 
a formerly amoral society ultimately acquires moral status. Prior, however, to crossing this 
developmental Rubicon: 
In a society lacking political community,... loyalties to the more primordial social and 
economic groupings - family, clan, village, tribe, religion, social class - compete with 
and often supersede loyalty to the broader institutions of public authority. In Africa 
today tribal loyalties are strong: national and state loyalties weak.654 
By the same token, it seems that in a linear ascent from amoral to moral, the normative 
Rubicon is crossed when a society separates itself from its political institutions. More than 
this, society - having created something superior to itself - must defer to its own creation. By 
contrast, primordial loyalties are those offered by a society to itself. 
Summing up: a moral community is not moral in and of itself, it is moral because it has 
developed and renders obedience to the authority of political institutions. The test of the 
morality of a society is whether or not it is willing to submit to political institutions. The test 
of a moral political institution is whether or not it is able to assert its authority over society. 
In both cases, if yes, it is moral. If no, it is immoral. However, this method of defining a 
society and its institutions begs two (related) questions. Firstly, is Huntington equating 
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morality with society's submission to the authority of organically developed, endogenous 
political institutions? Secondly, if he is, how does he rate forceful imposition on a simple 
(amoral) society of exogenous institutions? For instance, does a simple (amoral) society 
which resists conquest and the imposition of exogenous political institutions, and which 
musters an array of social forces to fight an occupying power then qualify as an immoral 
society? If morality is equated with modernity, then colonialism in its capacity as harbinger 
of modernity presumably rates as moral. If so, might (as long as it is modernising might) is 
right. 
In following up an intimation in Huntington's argument that modernising might by definition 
is right, it is instructive to revisit his contention that "historically, political institutions have 
emerged out of the interaction among and disagreement among social forces and the gradual 
development of procedures and organisational devices for resolving these disagreements."655 
At first glance, he might almost be describing a moderately peaceful, if lengthy process of 
negotiation among social forces. However, as his argument proceeds, this impression is 
rapidly dispelled. Referring to an era of state building in Europe, Huntington asserts that "the 
prevalence of war directly promoted political modernisation. Competition forced the 
monarchs to build their military strength"656 and "war was the great stimulus to state 
building."657 
It is in the context of the above causal link between the history of war and the history of 
modernisation in Europe that a connection made by Huntington between the art of war and the 
art of politics slots into place. 
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Unity, esprit, morale and discipline are needed in governments as well as in regiments. 
Numbers, weapons and strategy all count in war, but major deficiencies in any one of 
those may still be counterbalanced by superior coherence and discipline. So also in 
politics. The problems of creating coherent political organisations are more difficult 
but not fundamentally different from those involved in the creation of coherent 
military organisations ... The capacities for coordination and discipline are crucial to 
both war and politics, and historically societies which have been skilled at organising 
the one have also been adept at organising the other.658 
The above analogy, if taken in combination with Huntington's methodological deployment of 
binary pairs contains an unmistakable inference that in the final analysis, "survival of the 
fittest' is the organising principle of modernisation and that just as some polities in early 
modern Europe were better able to survive a protracted process of war and state building than 
others, so can today's transitional societies be classified as 'fit' or 'unfit'. 
However, despite his evident attachment to a 17th century model, Huntington in effect 
acknowledges that the passage of time weighs against an exact comparison. Having noted 
that in modernising Europe "the centralisation of power was necessary to smash the old order" 
and appended the assertion that "in modernising societies, the centralisation of power varies 
directly with the resistance to change,"659 he concedes that the development in 18th century 
Europe of democratic aspirations led to the expansion of participation via the gradual 
extension of the franchise.660 Since it no longer is practicable entirely to exclude the masses 
from the political arena, the 17n century European monarch retires into the shadows of past 
history to be replaced in 20th century modernising societies by the monolithic party. 
In elaborating the connections and developments sketched above, Huntington reasons as 
follows. The new doctrines in Europe of absolute sovereignty and concomitantly, of the 
subject's absolute duty of obedience to his king, are "the seventeenth century counterparts of 
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the theories of party supremacy and national sovereignty which are today employed to break 
down the authority of traditional local, tribal and religious bodies."661 In the absence of a 
theory of absolute sovereignty with which to forge the modernisation of Europe, 
developmental progress, Huntington intimates, would have been indefinitely disenabled by 
"the medieval pluralistic order."662 The same principle applies in today's transitional societies. 
In the twentieth century, the broadening of participation and the rationalisation of 
authority occur simultaneously, and hence authority must be concentrated in either a 
political party or in a popular charismatic leader, both of which are capable of 
arousing the masses as well as challenging traditional sources of authority. But in the 
seventeenth century the absolute monarch was the functional equivalent of the 
twentieth century's monolithic party.663 
However, against Huntington's Eurocentric teleology, hence inference of the necessary 
hegemony of Western-style modernity, it can be argued that there is nothing inevitably 
progressive about the long duration of a European habit of war and conquest. If Huntington's 
analogy between war and politics is taken as evidence, not of the survival of the fittest but of 
the origins of European imperialism, it then can be contended that having temporarily fought 
herself to a standstill, Europe turned her warlike attention to foreign parts. Once an imperial 
pattern of conquest complemented by the subordination of indigenous societies to imperial 
political institutions is taken into adequate account, Huntington's teleology looks like 
tautology, given his conflation of conquest and modernisation. By the same token, his binary 
trajectory leaves a trail of self-fulfilling prophecy in its wake. Ipse dixit. It is so because the 
conqueror says it is so - in which case, the closing passage of Chinua Achebe's Things Fall 
Apart is apposite commentary. 
The Commissioner went away, taking three or four of the soldiers with him. In the 
many years in which he had toiled to bring civilisation to different parts of Africa he 
had learnt a number of things. One of them was that a District Commissioner must 
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never attend to such undignified details as cutting down a dead man from the tree. 
Such attention would give the natives a poor opinion of him. In the book which he 
planned to write he would stress that point. As he walked back to the court he thought 
about that book. Every day brought him some new material. The story of this man 
who had killed a messenger and hanged himself would make interesting reading. One 
could almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps not a whole chapter but a 
reasonable paragraph, at any rate. There was so much else to include, and one must be 
firm in cutting out details. He had already chosen the title of the book, after much 
thought: The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger 664 
Prior to investigating a third binary site, I include below a tabular version of Huntington's 
evaluative categories. (Note that within Huntington's system of categorisation, the United 
States occupies a unique if ambiguous position. It is rated as a developed, complex polity, 
comprising a strong society and a comparatively weak set of political institutions). 
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SOCIETY STRUCTURAL MORAL AUTONOMOUS FUNCTIONAL VALUE RATIO OF REALPOLITIK IDEOLOGY EXAMPLE 
CONDITION CONDITION POLITICAL CONDITION CATEGORY POLITICAL CATEGORY 
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STATES OF WESTERN 
EUROPE 
U.S.S.R 
Huntingtons's evaluative categories. 
190 
Civic polity /praetorian polity 
It is in his definition of a praetorian polity that Huntington deviates most markedly from 
orthodox modernisation theory. He re-evaluates and reconfigures received wisdom about 
theoretically well-adjusted political systems and their meekly behaved environments, in the 
process displacing liberty from its commanding position on the functional high ground of 
pluralism, and substituting authority. 
Huntington's given reason for a reconstitution of priorities is - or appears to be -
straightforward: 
The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men 
may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order. 
Authority has to exist before it can be limited, and it is in scarce supply in those 
modernizing countries where government is at the mercy of alienated intellectuals, 
rambunctious colonels, and rioting students.666 
In this account, authority and its behavioural signifier, order, are prerequisites for liberty - a 
notion not necessarily offensive to liberals. The proposition with which Huntington opens his 
argument at first glance does not seem hostile to liberty as such. On the contrary, he quotes 
Rousseau's contention that: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, 
unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty."667 
However, Huntington subsequently indicates his opinion of Rousseau's Utopian solution to 
the vexed question of the proper location of sovereignty: 
Men are, however, reluctant to give up the image of social harmony without political 
action. This was Rousseau's dream ... It is the eschatological goal of the Marxists 
who aim to recreate at the end of history a perfect community where politics is 
superfluous. In fact, this atavistic notion could only succeed if history were reversed, 
civilization undone and the levels of human organisation reduced to family and 
hamlet.668 
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It seems evident that Rousseau's moral community which is administered but not governed as 
such, and Marx's vision of a self-regulating global socialist community are the very antithesis 
of Huntington's perception of modernity. However, 'modernity' is a condition Huntington 
seems unable to define in and of itself. Instead, every definition of modernity contained in his 
text is arrived at via a process of comparison with the 'other' - not, as in the orthodox version, 
a traditional "other' but instead a praetorian (transitional) 'other'. It is this alteration of 
conventional binary design that perhaps most notably flags Huntington's distinctive place 
within the modernisation paradigm. His underlying motives are less straightforward than his 
given reason suggests, hence for purposes of clarification his supporting arguments are 
unpacked and itemised below. 
• Traditional societies usually are stable societies. They also are dying out - overtaken 
by the teleological imperatives of modernisation - at an exponential rate. Traditional' 
therefore no longer is a particularly useful category: the only real interest Huntington 
demonstrates in polities ruled along traditional lines is whether or not the type of rule 
is likely to facilitate modernisation. For instance: "Tribes and villages with more 
highly concentrated power structures innovate more easily and more rapidly than 
those with more dispersed power structures."669 
• Huntington's focus on traditional societies per se then is abandoned for an intensive 
evaluation of the modernising process, an evaluation he mainly conducts by isolating 
and then reviewing its component parts. From this process of evaluation emerges a 
conception of modernity ('that which is') in contradistinction to modernisation ('that 
which might become'). For instance: "Modernity breeds stability, but modernisation 
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breeds instability." "Modernity means stability and modernization instability." 
"In the absence of strong and adaptable institutions ... increases in participation mean 
instability and violence. Here in dramatic form can be clearly seen the paradox that 
modernity produces stability and modernisation instability." 72 
• Simply put, the component parts of the modernisation process are economic, political 
and social. They are linked by social responses to modernisation itself. If economic 
modernisation is not accompanied by a sufficient degree of political modernisation, 
the inevitable result is social violence. A society that tends to manifest violent 
responses to the inequalities and contradictions of economic modernisation is a 
disorderly society, rent and distorted by competing social forces. If recourse to 
violence sets in and becomes endemic, the polity then is distinguished by its 
instability, and fits the category 'praetorian'. It is a society in which "participation in 
politics has outrun the institutionalisation of politics." 
• In this context of violence, disorder, instability, what does Huntington mean by 
'participation'? In relation to a praetorian society, participation in politics may take 
either of two forms, depending on who has the upper hand at any given time. If forces 
that defy the authoritative process of governance, such as an angry mob or disaffected 
elements in the military, are able to dominate the political arena, then praetorianism is 
a system "where social forces using their own methods act directly in the political 
sphere."674 If, however, at a given time the political leadership has an adequate grip 
on the reins, then the "masses are available for mobilisation by elites."675 
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In the final analysis, the factor that configures Huntington's interpretation of the dynamics at 
work in a praetorian polity is the lack of weighty, well-developed and authoritative political 
institutions to act as safety barriers and shock absorbers between alienated intellectuals, 
rioting students, rambunctious colonels el al, on the one hand, and the political leadership on 
the other. The chaotic scenario depicted by Huntington is a far cry from Easton's smooth 
rendition of a political system converting inputs to outputs like a precisely conceived and 
well-maintained machine, simultaneously pacifying and managing its environment, or 
Almond's elastic structural functional model which, python-like, ingests problems whole and 
then filters them through various sub-strata of the system until they have been reduced to 
manageable proportions. 
In sum, the steadily ascending graph adumbrated by orthodox modernisers676 is replaced in 
Huntington's thesis by an image of steep descent into political decay and social chaos: in a 
word, by praetorianism. Huntington certainly cannot be accused of constructing a Pollyanna 
paradigm, or even of telling American foreign policy makers what they want to hear. On the 
contrary, he depicts the CPSU, post-Stalin, as having fulfilled the functionally admirable task 
of retrieving Soviet Russia from its Stalin-induced descent into praetorianism.677 In this view, 
the CPSU is the political institution that enables the inclusion of Soviet Russia in the category 
of 'civic polity'. In the Cold War decades, this was a view not altogether likely to be well 
received by a political establishment that favoured a perception of America as a moral 
superpower, and by extension, the Soviet system as irredeemably 'other' to the American 
'self. 
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However, it should not be assumed on this basis that Huntington bore then or bears now any 
resemblance to a radical academic and bane of the establishment like Noam Chomsky, for 
instance. On the contrary, Huntington seems to be advising the American establishment to 
'get real' along lines not dissimilar to Machiavelli's advice, in The Prince, to Giuliano and 
Lorenzo de' Medici. 
... the one thing communist governments can do is to govern; they do provide 
effective authority. Their ideology furnishes a basis of legitimacy, and their party 
organisation provides the institutional mechanism for mobilising support and 
executing policy. To overthrow the government in many modernising countries is a 
simple task: one battalion, two tanks and a half-dozen colonels may suffice. But no 
communist government in a modernising country has been overthrown by a military 
coup d'etat. The real challenge which the communists pose to modernising countries 
is not that they are so good at overthrowing governments (which is easy), but that they 
are so good at making governments (which is a far more difficult task). They may not 
provide liberty, but they do provide authority; they do provide governments that can 
govern. While Americans laboriously strive to narrow the economic gap, communists 
offer a tested and proven method of bridging the political gap. Amidst the social 
conflict and violence that plague modernising countries, they provide some assurance 
of political order.678 
In his mission statement above, which occurs early in the text, Huntington indicates and in 
some sense justifies the order of his binary design. At this early stage, however, he has not 
explained how a vanguard party in the Soviet mould responds to that cumbersome item of 
20l1 century haute couture, popular participation in politics. Additionally, an issue left 
hanging is that of the correct rules of navigation through the rocky shoals of popular 
participation for non-communist political parties. It is only as the trend of Huntington's 
reasoning unveils itself that his position emerges. In general, his suppositions hinge on the 
key factor of party organisation, and his argument proceeds as outlined below. 
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Endorsement of authoritarian one-party states 
Two factors configure Huntington's evaluation of the slow maturation and traumatic delivery 
of a modern polity from a modernising polity: firstly, social and economic equality or rather, 
an idea of equality disseminated by rising levels of education and literacy; secondly, mass 
participation in politics. These factors flag the centuries' wide gap between modernising 
states in Western Europe and their 20th century counterparts in the Third World. The gap 
between the low expectations of 17' century masses in Europe and the high expectations of 
their 20th century counterparts is what gives modernising polities in the Third World their 
uniquely problematic configuration. 
The political backwardness of the country in terms of political institutionalisation, 
moreover, makes it difficult if not impossible for the demands upon the government to 
be expressed through legitimate channels and to be moderated and aggregated within 
the political system. Hence the sharp increase in political participation gives rise to 
political instability.679 
It already has been demonstrated how the negative scenario unfolds. It is a forcefully 
depicted map of the road most travelled by transitional societies. What, then, distinguishes 
the road less travelled? Towards what ideal model should a modernising polity lay in a 
course? It is not easy to uncover a clear and unequivocal response to this question since the 
term 'modern' makes rather random appearances throughout the text of Huntington's thesis, 
and alternates with the terms 'civic' and 'participatory', hence creating a somewhat disjointed 
big picture. I thus have selected the criteria cited below on the basis that they convey an 
adequately consistent message. 
"Political systems ... can be distinguished by their levels of political institutionalisation and 
their levels of political participation."680 "As political participation increases, the complexity, 
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autonomy, adaptability, and coherence of the society's institutions must also increase if 
political stability is to be maintained."681 Further, "political systems with a high ratio of 
institutionalisation to participation may be termed civic polities."682 
Given the criteria so far cited, it seems that Huntington's ideal model caters for expanding 
levels of popular participation in politics through a process of institutional adaptability and 
expanding complexity. In addition, an essential feature of political institutions in a civic 
polity is their independence of social forces, in general, their independently authoritative 
existence. Thus far, his definition of a civic polity hinges on functional qualities of 
adaptability, complexity and autonomy and does not significantly differ from a pluralist ideal 
type. Summing up: "In the participant polity ... a high level of popular involvement is 
organised and structured through political institutions" and "the distinctive institution of the 
modern polity consequently is the political party." 
However, it is in the comparison with praetorianism that Huntington's ideal model shifts into 
Hobbesian gear. "In the mass society political participation is unstructured, anomic and 
variegated. Each social force attempts to secure its objectives through the resources and 
tactics in which it is strongest."685 Since praetorian polities and mass societies are two sides 
of the same coin, the anarchic interaction between them is such that "apathy and indignation 
succeed each other: the twin children of the absence of authoritative political symbols and 
institutions."686 In sharp contradistinction to a civic polity and its participatory society, "mass 
society lacks organised structures which can relate their political desires and activities to the 
goals and decision of their leaders."687 As a result, "a direct relationship exists between 
leaders and masses"688 whereas in a participant polity: 
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Each social force must transform its sources of power and forms of action - be they 
numbers, wealth, knowledge or potential for violence - into those which are legitimate 
in and institutionalised in the political system. The structure of a participant polity 
may assume a variety of forms and power may be dispersed or concentrated. In all 
cases, however, participation is broad and is organised and structured into legitimate 
channels.689 
It is at this juncture, and as a direct outcome of a continuous process of comparison with its 
binary opposite, that Huntington's depiction of a civic polity makes a definitive break with the 
pluralist model, viz, "constitutional democracies and communist dictatorships are both 
participant polities."69 Judging by this development in Huntington's argumentation, it 
matters not whether a civic polity allows for the dejure existence of only one or a number of 
political parties. The idea of a dejure multi-party dispensation at the heart of liberal theory of 
the state thus summarily is dismissed by Huntington. 
As can be highlighted by revisiting an assertion that appears early in the text, it is a 
reasonable assumption that Huntington's linear apotheosis, the civic polity, has as its lowest 
common denominator and - in the final analysis - definitive characteristic, strong and 
effective governance: "The one thing communist governments can do is govern; they do 
provide effective authority."691 It therefore follows logically that his primary recommendation 
to the government of a transitional society is along the lines sketched below. 
If a society is to maintain a high level of community, the expansion of political 
participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex and 
more autonomous political institutions. The effect of the expansion of political 
participation, however, is usually to undermine the traditional political institutions and 
to obstruct the development of modern political ones. Modernisation and social 
mobilisation, in particular, thus tend to produce political decay unless steps are taken 
to moderate or to restrict its impact on political consciousness and political 
involvement.692 
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This final point, that is, the moderation or restriction of political consciousness and 
involvement instructively is supplemented firstly, by a contention made early in the text: 
Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organisation. The 
problem is not to hold elections but to create organisations. In many, if not most, 
modernising countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and 
often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority.693 
Secondly, by a claim made towards the end of the text that "in modernising states one party 
systems tend to be more stable than pluralistic party systems."694 In short, orthodox 
modernisation theory's two cheers for pluralism now have been replaced by Huntington's 
three cheers for authoritarian one-party states. 
The long shadow of Hobbes' Leviathan. 
An investigation of certain thematic conjunctures between Leviathan and Political Order in 
Changing Societies seems apposite given that Huntington's 'modernisation as conflict' model 
has a teleological point of origin in 17' century Europe, specifically in an idea of absolute 
sovereignty that was closely linked to the concept of the state as Leviathan. Referring to 
Hobbes' idea of absolute sovereignty, Huntington locates its primary significance in the 
doctrine of "the subject's absolute duty of obedience to his king." This doctrine, he asserts, 
"helped political modernisation by legitimising the concentration of authority and the 
breakdown of the medieval pluralistic political order."695 He then draws a line that spans 
centuries and continents firstly, from monarchical state sovereignty to party-state sovereignty; 
secondly, from medieval pluralism to Third World local, tribal and religious bodies.696 Since 
Huntington cites Hobbes' doctrine of political obligation to a monarch as equivalent to the 
political obligation of Third World masses to a monolithic party, his thesis to this extent can 
be conceptualised as a 20th century counterpart of Hobbes' thesis. Moreover, Hobbes and 
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Huntington start from the same baseline, that is, a strongly worded depiction of an 
undesirable condition, the better to articulate and defend their preferred scenario. 
Leviathan is grounded in Hobbes' perception of the quality, or rather lack of it, of life in the 
absence of strong and sovereign political authority. 
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep 
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war ... where every man is 
enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without 
other security, than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them 
withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is 
uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the 
commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments 
of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the 
face of the earth: no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst 
of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short. 
Leviathan emerged from the depths of Hobbes' experience of civil war in England. "For he 
that hath seen by what courses and degrees a flourishing state hath first come into civil war, 
and then to ruin ..."698 Political Order In Changing Societies has been described as "part of 
the vanguard of conservatism reacting to America's experience with the trauma of Vietnam 
and other disorders in the late 1960s."699 Further, a report on the governability of 
democracies, co-authored by Huntington and published in 1975, contended that democracies 
are overloaded by claims to social justice and participation, and that governability and 
democracy are warring concepts. The report recommended that the balance should be tilted 
back in favour of governments.700 
Comment along the above lines locate Huntington within the emergence and consolidation of 
'new right' thinking in the late 1960s and 1970s. By extension, I surmise that Hobbes' 
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depiction of 'men who live without a common power to keep them all in awe' penetrated the 
passage of the centuries and lodged itself deep within the inner ear of conservatism. 
Both Hobbes and Huntington envision human equality (or, in Huntington's case, an idea of 
equality) as a primary source of conflict. For Hobbes, however, conflict-inducing human 
equality is real (in the sense of natural701) whereas for Huntington, a demand for equality in a 
transitional society is the wishful product of increased expectations generated by urbanisation, 
literacy, education, and mass media that "expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new 
standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction."702 Since Huntington makes no 
definitive pronouncements about human essence, he avoids the conundrum of that which is 
'natural' to human beings. He, however, ventures into normative territory to the extent that 
he defines as immoral a political system that is unable to authoritatively allocate values, thus 
unable to control the expectations and by extension activities of its citizens. 
Hobbes in the main deploys severely instrumental and prudential reasoning - that is, within 
the cognitive limits set by a deeply religious era of purportedly divine monarchy. Plamenatz 
avers that Hobbes speaks of religion much as Machiavelli did before him, viz, as a powerful 
influence on behaviour, and, since he recognises its power, he wants it controlled by the 
sovereign in the interests of peace.703 Plamenatz describes Hobbes as "the heir of Ockam and 
the ancestor of Hume"7 and goes on to contend that since God is useless to Hobbes' 
argument, indeed an "unnecessary hypothesis," his references to commands of God are 
puzzling. Since Plamenatz isn't sure how to understand Hobbes' apparent fidelity to that 
which is God-given, he concludes that "it is idle to speculate."705 
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Plamenatz' retreat in the face of the passage of centuries and concomitant obscuring of 
Hobbes' motives seems reasonable enough. However, to retreat before Huntington's curious 
combination of empirical and normative criteria is less reasonable, not least because firstly, 
bearing Ockham's razor in mind, his addition of normative criteria to a purportedly scientific 
analysis rates as superfluous, and secondly, his conflation of descriptive and prescriptive 
reasoning provides one party developmental systems in Third World countries with moral 
potential, hence normative justification. Yet if political authority and its behavioural 
signifier, social order, provide their own (developmental) justification, thus rendering 
ideology in its normative capacity irrelevant, why bother with value criteria? A partial 
answer to this question can be discerned in the answer to another question: 'why obey?' Since 
for both Hobbes and Huntington, achievement and maintenance of political authority and 
social order are the imperatives that drive their respective explanatory, evaluative and 
exhortatory exercises, the issue of political obligation accordingly is pivotal, and in turn is 
tied in with legitimacy. 
Both theorists posit a social contract, Hobbes explicitly, Huntington implicitly since the 
independently authoritative nature and long term interests of political institutions in, or rather 
above society imputes a contract of some sort. However, Hobbes' theory of contractual 
legitimacy is not only far more overt, it also is a good deal simpler since there is no inbuilt 
modernisation clause, nor a teleological endpoint - both functional and normative - towards 
which to strive. There merely, at its most basic, is the sovereign's undertaking to preserve 
peace and order in return for loyal obedience from his subjects. Thus, the contract that 
produces a Leviathan state is grounded in solidly prudential imperatives of self-preservation. 
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The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no 
longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men 
have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no 
covenant be relinquished. The sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; which 
once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. 
The end of obedience is protection. 
In sum: inasmuch as Hobbes' theory of political obligation contains a normative element, it is 
vested in a contract between society and the political institution it simultaneously creates and 
sets above itself. If the contractual bottom line is breached, the contract itself is rendered null 
and void since no normative claim to loyalty and obedience can outlast the termination of a 
sovereign's power to protect his subjects. By extension, sovereign might is right to the extent 
that it is directed towards the preservation of subjects' lives. No matter what one thinks of 
Leviathan qua ideal model, it has to be conceded that Hobbes demonstrates the courage of his 
instrumental convictions, and thus that his argument at least is logically coherent. 
The same cannot really be said of Huntington. The lengthy paragraph with which he launches 
his thesis contains a welter of conflated categories and logically contradictory reasoning, thus 
setting a standard he successfully maintains throughout. 
Communist totalitarian states and Western liberal states both belong generally in the 
category of effective rather than debile political systems. The United States, Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union have different forms of government, but in all three 
systems the government governs. Each country is a political community with an 
overwhelming consensus among the people on the legitimacy of the political system. 
In each country the citizens and their leaders share a vision of the public interest of the 
society and of the traditions and principles upon which the community is based. All 
three countries have strong, adaptable, coherent political institutions: effective 
bureaucracies, well-organised political parties, a high degree of popular participation 
in public affairs, working systems of civilian control over the military, extensive 
activity by the government in the economy, and reasonably effective procedures for 
regulating succession and controlling political conflict. These governments command 
the loyalties of their citizens and thus have the capacity to tax resources, to conscript 
manpower, and to innovate and to execute policy. If the Politburo, the Cabinet, or the 
President makes a decision, the probability is high that it will be implemented through 
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the government machinery. In all these characteristics, the political systems of the 
United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union differ significantly from the 
governments which exist in many, if not most, of the modernising countries of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.707 
In the quotation above is contained Huntington's meta-binary pair, viz, functional / 
dysfunctional states. In this respect, a point worth emphasising is that Huntington's mutually 
constitutive epistemological position and methodological approach between them construct 
an assumption that the universal grounds of knowledge are rooted in the state building history 
of the West. Yet, paradoxically, the Soviet Union is deemed to be the functional and 
normative ('legitimate', 'associative', 'participatory', 'based on an overwhelming consensus' 
and so forth) equivalent of Western political systems. In the final analysis, then, the function 
of the normative aspects of Huntington's thesis is to promote an ideology of common cause 
between global power blocs.708 'Might is right.' 
I conclude that modernisation revisionism - at least, in its Huntingtonian incarnation - did 
not significantly retool in response to anomaly. Rather, by relating a given society's 
normative status to its degree of functional complexity and efficacy, Huntington took the 
modernisation paradigm one step further into a normless wilderness, (xx) 
(xx) See Chapter Two, pp 54-55 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INTRA-MARXIST DISPUTES AND EUROCENTRIC 
ANTECEDENTS. 
Chapters Eight and Nine explore issues of Marxist epistemology and its application in 
decolonising and postcolonial Africa. More specifically, Chapter Eight delineates the broad 
and disputed theoretical framework within which is set Chapter Nine's review and critique of 
selected scientific socialist, neo-Marxist or Marxist-oriented scholars, leaders and activists in 
decolonising and postcolonial Africa. 
This chapter begins by sketching the contours of dependency theory which - in the Cold War 
era - posed a major challenge to modernisation theory. However, since Marxists by no 
means uniformly endorsed dependency theory's premises and conclusions, the chapter 
includes scientific Marxism's critique of dependency theory. 
Whereas the rise of science-centred and human-centred interpretations of Marxian theory date 
back to the early decades of the 201 century, dependency theory is a relative newcomer which 
first emerged from Latin America in the 1960s - not least in reaction to the modernisation 
paradigm - as a theory of Third World underdevelopment. Before embarking on an outline of 
general tenets of dependency theory, it should be noted that not all dependistas subscribe to 
Marxist analysis of Third World conditions. For instance, of the two political economists 
primarily responsible for launching the theory, Paul Baran argues from a Marxist 
standpoint,709 but Andre Gunder Frank has never claimed to be a Marxist.710 While the focus 
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in this dissertation is on the neo-Marxist category of dependency theory, it nonetheless is not 
presented as an undifferentiated category of analysis. 
General tenets of dependency theory. 
• European mercantile expansion from the 15l century onwards in the long run is 
responsible for economic conditions in the Third World that are unpropitious for 
development. 
• The development of the highly industrialised Northern hemisphere was and is made 
possible by corresponding underdevelopment in the South. Since they are two sides 
of the same coin, underdevelopment in the regions at the periphery is necessary for 
continuing economic progress in the regions at the highly developed centre. The 
dominant position of highly developed countries in the international capitalist arena 
ensures that economic surplus flows from periphery to centre, thus perpetuating the 
development of underdevelopment, and accordingly ... 
• maintaining "a chain of dependence extending from the very centre of the world 
(capitalist) economic system down to its furthest periphery."711 
More particularly, points of departure and lines of argument that distinguish neo-Marxist 
dependency theory from other Marxist configurations are located in dependency theory's 
recasting of premises about capitalism and class. 
According to Marx and Engels, capitalism is a dynamic source of economic and industrial 
development, and thus is the sine qua non of socialism. Conversely, dependency theory 
defines capitalism in the case of regions at the periphery as a source of stagnation and, in the 
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context of a profoundly unequal distribution of global power, set to remain so - that is, unless 
anti-capitalist revolutions in the Third World succeed in altering the balance. Samir Amin, 
one of the best known dependistas domiciled and researching in Africa, outlines as follows 
the disjunctures between Marx and his dependency descendents. 
Marx ... considered that no power would be able to hinder for long the local 
development of capitalism on the European model... In fact, the monopolies, the rise 
of which Marx could not imagine, were to prevent any local capitalism that might 
arise from competing. The development of capitalism in the periphery was to remain 
extraverted, based on the external market, and could therefore not lead to a full 
flowering of the capitalist mode of production in the periphery.712 
Marx, Amin implies, was unable to make forecasts that extended beyond the parameters of 
his own time, that is, a time before "capitalism developed and became monopolistic" and 
hence "the world conditions of the class struggle altered."713 
Dependistas shifted the focus from national dispensations of class conflict between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat centred in the contradictions of developed capitalism in the First 
World to the contradictions inherent in unequal exchange between the developed and 
underdeveloped regions of the world.714 
Since underdevelopment - particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where the condition is at its 
most extreme715 - predicates against the growth of a national bourgeoisie in its capacity as 
indigenous class of owners of the means of production, dependistas outlined the contours of 
an intermediary class, or comprador bourgeoisie, which is absent from Marx's class analysis. 
"Marx did not use the word 'imperialism', nor is there anything in his work that corresponds 
at all exactly to the concepts of imperialism advanced by later Marxist writers."716 
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Magubane explains the emergence and contours of a comprador class in the Third World by 
comparing it with a process of organic revolution in Britain that produced an indigenous 
capitalist class "securely rooted in the social structure and culture."717 By contrast, exogenous 
dispensations in the colonised regions meant that the commanding heights of colonial 
economies were occupied by expatriate groups with privileged access to resources in their 
respective metropoles "which were far in excess of anything which indigenous groups could 
hope to acquire."718 The privileged position and economic dominance of expatriate groups 
configured the emergence of indigenous social formations in ways that impeded their ability 
to establish "an autonomous base for the exercise of political and economic power."719 
Magubane concludes that the net result for post-independence states in Africa ... 
.. has been well described by Fanon, who distinguished between the dynamic 
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie of 19th century Europe and the corrupt, enfeebled 
administrative bourgeoisie of postcolonial Africa ... As a group, these elites had no 
autonomy of their own; they had no being without metropolitan backing which 
dominated the colonial economies. That is, their class position did not stem from the 
classical ownership of the means of production; they were rather class agents or allies 
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of the foreign bourgeoisie. 
Finally, Amin, for instance, grounds dependency theory in Lenin's theory of imperialism. 
Referring to monopoly capitalism, a development beyond the reach of Marx's crystal ball, 
Amin asserts that: 
This was clearly expressed by Lenin ... namely that, 'in the last analysis, the outcome 
of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, China, India etc., account 
for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe.' This meant that the 
central nucleus of the proletariat henceforth lay at the periphery and not at the 
721 
centre. 
However, Amin's invocation of Lenin begs two issues highlighted by Brewer. Firstly, while 
Lenin extended and adapted Marxian theory to include imperialism, he, like Marx, divined a 
worldwide acceleration of capitalist development,722 modelled on capitalist development in 
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Europe. Secondly, or so Brewer argues, Lenin's theory of imperialism is "slight and 
derivative."723 
According to Chazan, dependency theory has been almost uniformly pessimistic in its 
evaluation of the prospects for the continent. She adds that "barring revolution or total global 
structural transformation, dependency theory provided precious few indications of possible 
guidelines for action in local arenas." Chazan's rather negative estimate is reflected in 
orthodox (or scientific) Marxism's reaction to dependency theory. On the other hand, 
Marxists commend dependistas for their definitive refutation of key premises of the 
modernisation paradigm. These mixed reviews are explored below. 
Dependency theory's critique of the modernisation paradigm. 
Dependency theory is considered to have exposed modernisation theory's major fault lines in 
the following areas. Firstly, modernisation theory's presentation of binary concepts as givens. 
For example, concepts of'developed' and 'backward' were divorced, in the case of the latter, 
from historical and exogenous factors such as the slave trade and colonialism. 'Backward' 
societies were examined as isolated, almost pristine units and analysed solely in terms of their 
internal functioning. By tracing the underdevelopment of African societies by European 
mercantile capitalism back to the 15th century, and by outlining the long term effects of the 
slave trade on African demographies and economies, Rodney, for instance, comprehensively 
addresses the historical vacuum in which behaviouralists situated their analyses, thereby 
exposing the extent to which modernisation theory ignored or avoided the issue of Africa's 
historical role in the development and expansion of European capitalism.725 
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Secondly, modernisation theory's absolute distinction between 'modern' and 'traditional'. 
The concepts are linked only by the stages of growth which separate them. Again, this linear 
and crudely empiricist perspective seems to operate on the assumption of a more-or-less 
complete lack of historical contact between Africa and Europe, and hence of Africa's 
'undeveloped' condition as entirely her own doing. Commending dependency theory's 
critique, Goulbourne points out that: 
A crucial assumption in this type of analysis has been the view that the backward 
areas have remained in this condition because they have failed to move from this state 
of backwardness... There is a tautology in the argument which of course explains 
nothing - these areas are backward because they are backward - and the tautology is 
avoided only by identifying tradition as the fount of backwardness.7 
In similar vein, Angotti - while generally antagonistic to dependency theory - endorses its 
"critique of dualism."727 He notes that prominent in bourgeois development theory is an 
assumption that 'traditional' and 'backward' are phenomena inherent in underdeveloped 
societies and cultures; this assumption is an inevitable corollary of the notion that 'modernity' 
and 'development' are inherently Western qualities. Dependency theory's critique of so 
ahistorical an approach is its most progressive feature, and "has helped direct attention to 
imperialism's role in national oppression and underdevelopment."728 
Thirdly, in line with dependency theory's critique of the modernisation paradigm's 
teleological stages of development in which 'traditional' moves up to 'transitional' and then to 
'modern', dependistas dispose of the idea of developmental stages. Instead, they reconfigure 
the pattern into two broad categories: developed (centre or core) and underdeveloped 
(periphery). In order for the former to maintain its primacy, the latter perforce must remain 
underdeveloped. Dependistas thus posit a mutually inter-locking pattern of continuous 
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reinforcement in which the condition of one category is contingent on the condition of the 
other. It is noteworthy, however, that it is this 'static' configuration for which dependency 
theory came under heavy fire from scientific Marxists who argued that it offered no viable 
alternative to an indefinite perpetuation of the development of underdevelopment and thus 
undermined faith in and progress towards world socialist revolution, (xxi) 
Finally, modernisation theorists ignored class - or rather, they subsumed class under political 
culture, an extremely broad category that seems to incorporate a wealth of human 
collectivities from 'tribe' to 'status group'. As a result, "politics and the state appear to exist 
without a socio-economic base thus giving the false impression that the political is 
independent from these forces." Dependistas address this lacuna by paying detailed 
attention to the economic base of intra and inter-state relations. 
Scientific Marxism's critique of dependency theory. 
From the standpoint of scientific Marxists, perhaps the most controversial aspect of 
dependency theory is its reconfiguration of class and class struggle. Dependistas by no means 
neglect class struggle, but in the process they - logically contiguous though their 
reconfiguration is with the general tenor of their thesis - commit a form of heresy (that caused 
something of a schism in the Marxist church in Africa.730) Dependency theory removes class 
formation and struggle from their position as focal elements within national relations of 
production, and instead makes class formation and struggle contingent on modes of exchange, 
thereby shifting the geography of class from states to regions, and the demography of 
revolutionary forces to the regions at the periphery. 
(xxi) See next section of chapter 
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By way of critique, Edelstein contends that: 
In its beginnings as a negation of bourgeois theories of development, radical 
dependency had strength in simplicity, but also a weakness ... It ignores the labour 
process and thus tends to understand history as a conflict among the owning classes. 
It fails as a guide to revolutionary action.731 
He concludes that "an analysis can only be useful as a guide to revolutionary action if it 
includes an understanding of the labour process as the locus of social existence, shaping class 
consciousness and the forms of class struggle."7 In similar vein, Weeks - who, for liturgical 
reasons, defines himself as a materialist - finds dependency theory wanting in that 
"accumulation is not related to the social relations under which a surplus product is produced 
or appropriated..." 
Angotti asserts that "the most significant political impact of dependency theory has been to 
divert and dampen support for socialist revolution." He locates this negative effect largely 
in dependency theory's treatment of class which ... 
... tends to substitute a schematic stratification of society for an objective, 
particularised analysis of the class struggle. According to the ultra-'left' version, all 
classes in the 'periphery' are somehow 'dependent' and all classes in the 'core' are 
'dominant'. This blurs the distinction between the working class and the peasantry, 
obviates the need for any vanguard society, and ... leads to pessimism. It removes any 
independent role for the national bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist front... In effect, 
it abandons the class struggle ... It does not allow for a scientific understanding of the 
historical process of the transition from capitalism to socialism.736 
Angotti then explains his emphasis on the scientific trajectory of historical materialism. "Our 
concern here is not in 'preserving' a 'pure' Marxism, but in demanding that dialectical and 
historical materialism, like every science has a certain integrity upon whose maintenance 
depends the future course of the revolutionary process." 
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It is noteworthy that Angotti makes a causal link between "scientific Marxism' and the 
'revolutionary process.' It thus can be inferred that to abandon one's fidelity to the scientific 
integrity of historical materialism is to cast doubt on the socialist nature and by extension, on 
the point of revolution. Extrapolating from Angotti's denunciation of dependency theory, I 
surmise that the real heresy is to formulate premises and arrive at conclusions that are at odds 
with historical materialist epistemology and methodology, in the process raising doubts about 
the value of revolutions depicted as socialist. This close and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between science and normative belief arguably is somewhat characteristic of 
orthodox critiques of dependency theory. For instance, from the combined arguments of 
Edelstein, Weeks and Angotti can be deduced a sub-text that to lose sight of the immanently 
scientific nature of historical materialism is also to endanger normative conviction. This dual 
loss heralds the onset of pessimism. ('God is dead, Marx is dead and I'm not feeling too well 
myself.') 
Conflation of science and values 
According to Walicki, the conflation of a scientific understanding of history and normative 
belief can be traced back to Marx's invocation of the authority of science the better to 
underwrite the historical necessity of dialectical movement from capitalism to socialism, not 
least through the medium of class conflict. In 19l century Europe, the idea that history had 
immanent meaning was strong and influential, particularly for Marxists who "used the term 
necessity as a value-laden concept."738 Walicki cites Merleau-Ponty's contention that "to 
remain a Marxist in the classical sense ... meant to believe in the rationality of history, and to 
uphold this intense belief even at the time of universal skepticism and despair"739 and argues 
that Merleau-Ponty was right to perceive the Marxist philosophy of history as one of 
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boundless optimism predicated more on subjective faith in science than on science per se. 
The origin of'this intense belief can be located in Marx's ontology in which socialism is 
equated with man's ultimate fulfilment, not as an individual, nor even as a proletarian, but as 
a species-being. 
By "true self ... Marx meant nothing less - and nothing more - than man's species 
essence. He assumed, therefore, that all other more narrow and concrete areas of 
identification such as group consciousness, corporate ties, religious affiliation, 
historical tradition, nationality, and so forth - were ultimately different forms of 
alienation from man's essential nature.740 
Since Marx's conception of freedom is tied in with his ontology, a consequence is that for 
Marx, "freedom was conceived of not as individual freedom here and now, but rather as a 
collective salvation in history."741 Worth noting is Walicki's reminder that the long term 
perspective contains heavy but - in Marx's view - necessary human costs. 
The habit of conceiving human liberation as a long, cruel historical process in which 
entire generations and classes have to be ruthlessly sacrificed for the sake of the 
unfettered development of human beings in the future is perhaps one of the most 
characteristic, although sometimes conveniently forgotten, features of Marx's 
thought.742 
Walicki further points out that as a consequence of the long-term historical necessity of 
collective human suffering, "the liquidation of different forms of personal dependence, such 
as direct slavery or feudal bondage, should not be treated as the equivalent of achieving 
freedom" and "in many respects the rise of capitalism brought about a marked increase in 
unfreedom."74 
Aspects of the Manifesto of the Communist Party underwrite Walicki's analysis. Having 
lavishly praised the achievements of capitalism,744 Marx and Engels take note of the 
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inevitable costs in the suffering of wage labourers. However, the upside is that capitalism 
forges its own destruction, not least by trading in the misery of workers. 
Now and then the workers are victorious, but only for a time. The real fruit of their 
battles lies not in the immediate result but in the ever expanding union of the workers. 
This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by 
modern industry and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one 
another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralise the numerous local 
struggles ... into one national struggle between classes.745 
Since dependency theory presents firstly, capitalism in a thoroughly negative light and 
secondly, highly developed nations as uniformly advantaged, the nature of its heretical detour 
is demonstrable. For much the same reasons, Goulbourne contends that dependency theory is 
not really a theory at all. 
The radical critique of development theory rests largely upon a moral injunction of 
capitalism, or, at any rate, the critique levelled at capitalism is a moral one. 
Consequently, underdevelopment theory in most cases where it addresses itself to the 
political does so from the perspective of capitalism's supposed failure to develop the 
backward areas and a humanistic political creed is juxtaposed with the apparently 
heartless development theory.746 
Arguing along similar lines, Angotti characterises dependency theory as idealist. "The 
idealist world is made up of substances or things that are simply 'transformed' gradually in 
time but do not significantly alter their inner essence."747 He contends that the consequence of 
idealism "is either reformist politics ... or pessimism."748 In consequence, dependistas are 
unable to provide a correct strategy for changing the world.749 In much the same vein, 
Goulbourne asserts that "a decade or more after the appearance of radical underdevelopment 
theory there is still no adequate theoretical structure in which analysis of the political in 
backward or underdeveloped formations may be carried out."750 
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In sum: scientific Marxists contend that dependency theory's scientific deficiencies result in 
lack of an adequate political theory thus defeating the cause of socialist revolution, since the 
scientifically delineated window of opportunity for total transformation also is absent. 
Dependency theory is perceived as indulging in a kind of shallow humanism in the form of 
moral criticism of monopoly capitalism; furthermore, this short-term humanist impulse 
obscures the ontological imperative of substantive transformation in the long run, that is, the 
realisation of species-being. In other words, dependency theory is deemed to sacrifice science 
to spontaneity, thereby reducing the objectively - because scientific - normative ontology of 
Marxism to shallow humanist critique and subjectively normative criteria. 
Issues of Marxist identity in Cold War era Africa. 
Needless to say, Marxist discourse in decolonising and postcolonial Africa was not immune 
to wider disputes about Marxist identity. For instance, the purposive reflexivity of humanist 
Marxism is imputed by Waterman's definition of radical Africanists as having two distinct 
tendencies in common. Firstly, an overt moral or political commitment which manifests itself 
"as a declaration of personal values, as identification with national interests, or with the 
masses within the continent." Secondly, "opposition to imperialism (seen as a social system 
dominating Africa politically and exploiting it economically)"751 Waterman distinguishes 
between this radical brand of engaged scholarship and the dogmatism and Eurocentrism of 
"official Marxism".752 
Allen, when compiling a bibliographical guide to radical themes in African Social Studies, 
explains as follows a significant omission: "I have cited very little material from official 
communist publications. This is in part because much of it is strident, misinformed and 
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irrelevant."753 Benot attributes to Stalinism a definitive schism between Western-based 
Marxist scholars and their Soviet oriented counterparts. Further, as he dryly notes, "the 
Stalinist system itself, the control of a single party, of the news media, and of statistical 
information (to mention but three aspects which are found in independent African states) has 
not failed to impress and captivate African politicians."754 
However, while there is evidence of marked divergence between Western and Soviet oriented 
Marxists in Africa, this does not necessarily mean that Western Marxists escaped Cold War 
era polarities. Much radical literature, as Allen observes, is devoted to critiques of rival 
concepts,755 in particular the concepts put forward by "American idealogues"756 and other 
bourgeois theorists. According to Law, Marxists of all hues and persuasions are "agreed on 
the superiority of the Marxist method to 'bourgeois' thought." This said, "there seems to be 
little agreement among them about the precise nature of this Marxist method."757 As Copans 
puts it, "the theoretical divergences between Marxists are as numerous as those between 
Marxists and non-Marxists."758 
In sum, during the Cold War era in Africa, otherwise conflicting Marxisms were united in - if 
nothing else - their rejection of bourgeois theory, notably the version propounded by 
American political scientists qua idealogues. Apart from this solitary confluence of various 
streams of Marxist theory, epistemological and methodological divergences are quite 
profound. Marxist humanism, for instance, is a more flexible and inclusive category than the 
scientific variant, and designates as "radical" - hence acceptable - the "implicit Marxism"759 
of Basil Davidson, as well as the non-Marxist dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank,760 
not least because radical theories - whether Marxist or not - are characterised by a normative 
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commitment to people, as distinct from their ruling elites. This identification with 'ordinary' 
people distinguishes radical humanism not only from the elite privileging thrust of 
modernisation theory, but also from Marxist-Leninist advocacy of a scientifically advantaged 
AvantGarde. 
In the case of Marxism-Leninism, the reflexivity of theory is subsumed under the 'natural 
necessity' of socialist science, and social norms are defined according to their place - or lack 
of it - within the progressive trajectory of scientifically ordained global revolution. 
Putatively, then, an outcome of Marxism-Leninism - informed as it is by the positivism of 
Engels - is the infliction of a normless wilderness on the lived worlds of Africans. 
Bearing this potential outcome in mind, and given that epistemological disputes between 
Marxists in Africa originated in Europe, the next section of the chapter addresses lines of 
division in 20' century Europe. 
Science-centred versions of Marxism in Europe. 
In the early decades of the 20th century, two influential streams of Marxist thought -
Kautsky's and Lenin's - propounded the scientific status of Marxism. Both streams drew 
from Marx's later work, since his early, more humanist than scientific work wasn't published 
until the late 1920s.761 Prior to the publication of Marx's pre-1848 work, his most influential 
posthumous interpreter was Engels who - according to Lukacs - completely misunderstood 
the epistemological implications of Marx's concept of praxis, instead replacing it with a 
positivist concept of scientific experiment.762 Walicki, however, adds a caveat to Lukacs' 
contention that Marxist positivism derives solely from Engels: 
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Lukacs obviously forgot that Marx himself, in his preface to the first German edition 
of Capital, chose to stress that his method was similar to that of the physicist who 
'either observes physical phenomena where they occur in their most typical form and 
most free from disturbing influence, or, whenever possible, he makes experiments 
under conditions that assure the occurrence of the phenomenon in its regularity.'763 
Walicki's observation notwithstanding, it is arguable that the full range of Marxian ambiguity 
and nuance escaped Engels' attention, and thus that his retrospective interpretation was more 
positivist than was strictly justified. However, as clearly demonstrated by Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, Marx and Engels mutually endorsed a proposition that expert knowledge is 
the possession of an intellectual elite, viz, "a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have 
raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a 
whole."764 As this chapter now illustrates, both Lenin and Kautsky followed Marx and 
Engels' lead by vesting in an intellectual elite the capacity to arrive at an objective overview 
of the historical process. 
Iron cage knowledge 
A point at which the evolutionary science of Kautsky converges with the revolutionary 
science of Lenin - respectively derived from differing interpretations of the scientificity of 
Marxism - is their mutual perception of expert knowledge as by definition injected into the 
labouring masses 'from without'. Lenin makes derogatory reference to 
... all those who talk about 'overrating the importance of ideology', about exaggerating 
the role of the conscious element, etc, imagine that the labour movement pure and 
simple can elaborate, and will elaborate, an independent ideology for itself, if only the 
workers 'wrest their fate from the hands of the leaders'. But this is a profound 
mistake. To supplement what has been said above, we shall quote the profoundly true 
and important words of Karl Kautsky ...765 
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The aspect of Kautsky's thesis of which Lenin approves, and quotes at length, runs (in part) as 
follows: 
Modern socialist consciousness can arise only on the basis of profound scientific 
knowledge. Indeed, modern economic science is as much a condition for socialist 
production as, say, modern technology, and the proletariat can create neither the one 
nor the other ... The vehicle of science is not the proletariat but the bourgeois 
intelligentsia ... Thus, socialist consciousness is something introduced into the 
proletarian class struggle from without and not something that arose within it 
spontaneously.766 
Lenin concludes that: "Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by 
the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is - either 
bourgeois or socialist ideology."767 (xxii) Furthermore, if the AvantGarde allow the working 
class movement to develop spontaneously, the inevitable result will be "its subordination to 
bourgeois ideology" in the form of trade-unionism, itself a symptom of "the ideological 
enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie."768 It therefore can be surmised that for both 
Lenin and Kautsky, the lived world is the backdrop against which science realises itself. 
However, given Lenin's emphasis on revolution in contradistinction to Kautsky's 
evolutionary trend, they arrived at different conceptualisations of the structure and modus 
operandi of the party in its capacity as vehicle of iron cage knowledge. 
While Kautsky did not abandon all commitment to revolution, he made a seminal distinction 
between a revolutionary party and a revolution-making party. The former he designated 
'revolutionary' in the sense that: "We know that our goal can be attained only through 
revolution. We know that it is just as little in our power to create this revolution as it is in the 
power of our opponents to prevent it." 769 From Kautsky's argument can be deduced a notion 
(xxii) See Chapter Two, pp 53-54, for Lenin's conflation of science and the ideology of an ascendant class. 
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that a revolution-making party, such as Lenin's Bolshevik party, forces the pace of social and 
economic evolution, thus flouting iron laws of economic development. Hence, while 
Kautsky and Lenin agree that the party is a necessary vehicle of scientific progress, Kautsky 
favours a mass party - albeit led by an intellectual elite - operating openly and within legal 
limits. 70 According to McLellan, Kautsky believed that the inevitable evolutionary outcome 
would be the majority rule of the proletariat under fully democratic - and parliamentary -
institutions.771 Thus, given time, the proletariat indubitably will be in a position to radically, 
yet democratically, reconfigure the bourgeois state. 
Conversely, Lenin, citing conditions in Tsarist Russia, asserts the necessity for a party of 
professional revolutionaries since "it is more difficult to unearth a dozen wise men than a 
hundred fools." 772 It is noteworthy that he makes a distinction between the 'organisation' -
professionally trained in the art of combating the political police - and the 'movement'. The 
latter comprises the broad mass of working class Bolshevik supporters, whereas the former 
operates with "that degree of secrecy without which there can be no question of persistent and 
continuous struggle against the government."773 
In line with their divergent perceptions of the operational code of the party, Kautsky and 
Lenin differed in their interpretations of Marx's notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Whereas Kautsky, as noted above, interpreted the phrase as meaning The majority rule of the 
proletariat', Lenin's position was somewhat more ambiguous. According to McLellan, it is 
not clear whether he meant the dictatorship of the AvantGarde or of the proletariat per se -
and, as things turned out in post 1917 Russia: 
221 
The gradual shift from dictatorship of the proletariat to dictatorship of the party and 
the equivalence of party and state was aided and abetted by three main factors: the fact 
that the Party found power thrust into its hands; the growth of bureaucracy; and the 
lack of an effective workers' voice.774 
By 1921, an explicitly elitist party had emerged from Bolshevism. It declared itself to be the 
only organisation in Russia that "is capable of withstanding the inevitable petty-bourgeois 
vacillations" of the working masses, as well as "the inevitable traditions and relapses of 
narrow craft unionism or craft prejudices of the proletariat."775 Two years after Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia, Kautsky accused them of throwing overboard all their 
democratic principles. "When democracy was being abandoned in the State they became fiery 
upholders of democracy within the proletariat, but they are repressing this democracy more 
and more by means of their personal dictatorship."776 
Comintern and the god of the excluded middle 
Lines of division between evolutionary and revolutionary variants of scientific Marxism were 
codified by Lenin's conditions for membership of Comintern. The creation of Comintern in 
1919 was the product of a decisive break between Lenin and a majority of the Second 
International's socialist parties and movements, attendant on Lenin's definition of the 1914-
18 war as imperialist, and his corresponding expectation that the war should be utilised to 
hasten the destruction of capitalism in Europe. Instead, most socialist parties came out as 
'social patriots' - hence Lenin's decision to replace the Second International with "a 
genuinely revolutionary body ... with the result that the Third International (or Comintern) 
was founded in March 1919, and the world labour movement was sharply divided into 
Marxists and social-democrats."777 As Lenin put it in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism: "Kautsky's followers all over the world have now united in practical politics with 
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the extreme opportunists (through the Second, or Yellow International) and with the 
bourgeois governments (through bourgeois coalition governments in which socialists take 
part.)"778 
Comintern set strict conditions for membership, and drew an implacable distinction - for 
instance, in condition 17 - between social democrats and communists: 
The Communist International has declared a decisive war against the entire bourgeois 
world, and all the yellow Social Democratic parties. It is indispensable that every 
rank-and-file worker should be able clearly to distinguish between the communist 
parties and the old official 'Social Democratic' or 'Socialist' parties which have 
betrayed the cause of the working class.779 
Of twenty-one conditions, eight contain explicit reference to the mandatory exclusion of 
reformists / social patriots / yellow labour organisations / petty bourgeoisie from the ranks of 
bona fide communist parties. The only reality permitted by Comintern was that of Soviet 
designed and led communism - thus condition 14 asserted the dominant position of Russia in 
relation to Euro-communist parties: "Every party ... should be obliged to render every 
possible assistance to the Soviet Republics in their struggle against all counter-revolutionary 
forces".780 Taken in conjunction with condition 3's contention that "the class struggle in 
almost every country of Europe and America is entering the phase of civil war",781 condition 
12, which definitively asserts the right of the Soviet communist party to absolute power, 
comes as no surprise. 
At the present time of acute civil war the Communist Party will only be able fully to 
do its duty when it is organised in a sufficiently centralised manner, when it possesses 
an iron discipline and when the party centre enjoys the confidence of the party 
membership and is endowed with complete power, authority and ample rights.782 
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In sum, by 1919, Marxist intra-science disputes had mutated into lines of battle, and 
accordingly, Lenin's theory of the party had hardened into battle formation, as had his 
conception of morality. "We say that our morality is entirely subordinated to the interests of 
the class struggle of the proletariat"783 - a subordination attendant on his perception of "the 
struggle of classes as the basis and the driving force of all development."784 
Extension to the Third World of Lenin's science of social reality. 
Condition 8 commits members of Comintern to anti-colonial struggles. "Every party desirous 
of belonging to the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all 
the methods of 'its own' imperialists in the colonies, supporting not in words only but 
practically a movement of liberation in the colonies."785 From Lenin's perception of class 
struggle as the motor that powers economic and social development world-wide can be 
inferred his premise that a binary formula of irreconcilable, class-bound versions of reality in 
Europe also is applicable to the colonised regions of the world. This is a premise elaborated 
by his thesis that capitalism in the era of imperialism is "based on the economic division of 
the world; while parallel to it and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between 
political alliances, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the 
struggle for colonies, of the 'struggle for spheres of influence.'"786 Lenin described 
imperialism's drive for domination as leading to "annexation, to increased national 
oppression",787 and predicted that imperialism would generate its eventual destruction in the 
increasing resistance of the oppressed classes, as well as in the internal tendencies of finance 
capital.788 
Monopolies, oligarchy, the striving for domination and not for freedom, the 
exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak nations by a handful of the 
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richest or most powerful nations - all these have given birth to those distinctive 
characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it as parasitic or decaying 
capitalism.789 
He concluded his theory of capitalism in the era of imperialism by paying homage to the 
enduring veracity of "Marx's precise, scientific analysis"790 in contradistinction to bourgeois 
science which "strives to obscure the essence of the matter, to hide the forest behind the 
trees."791 
While declaring his fidelity to the precision of Marx's scientific analysis, Lenin, via his theory 
of imperialism, extended Marx's thesis of class struggle to incorporate a common front of the 
peoples of the oppressor countries and those of the oppressed. This extension meant that 
every country at the sharp end of imperialist exploitation "became ipso facto a suitable target 
for revolution irrespective of its stage of economic development."792 However, Lenin did not 
necessarily believe that 'backward countries' were ready for immediate proletarian 
revolution.793 This caveat leaves open to question the applicability to the Third World of 
Lenin's assertion that class struggle is the engine of social and economic development. 
Alavi unravels as follows the conundrum of Marxism-Leninism's application to Third World 
conditions. Lenin projected on to the colonised world a Russian model in which the 
concurrent existence of two modes of production, capitalist and feudal, produced social and 
economic contradictions. However, in terms of class-based revolutionary leadership, Lenin 
distinguished between a strong proletarian vanguard in Russia and a weak indigenous 
bourgeoisie in the colonies. In an attempt to reconcile these incompatible leadership modes, 
he deployed two assumptions. Firstly, an assumption that bourgeois democratic revolution in 
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the colonies in time would do away with pre-capitalist formations, thus enabling the rapid 
development of a proletarian class. Secondly, an assumption about the uniformity, hence 
predictability, of capitalist development.794 
Given Lenin's estimate that the bourgeois fraction of colonised peoples constituted the 
vanguard of the liberation struggle, he insisted on an alliance between the communist 
movement in Europe and the national bourgeoisie in the colonised territories. However, 
according to Alavi, Lenin conceded that the indigenous bourgeoisie in the colonies were "as 
capable of compromise with imperialism as of opposition to it."795 This concession was 
accompanied by a differentiation between 'bourgeois democratic movements' and 
'revolutionary liberation movements'. The latter were deemed to represent the progressive 
national bourgeoisie in the colonies, as distinct from their less progressive counterparts. An 
outcome of Lenin's conceptual juggling and problematic assumptions was that "the 
distinction between the 'progressive national bourgeoisie' and the reformist bourgeoisie in 
later years became convenient designations used by the Soviet state to legitimate its dealings 
with postcolonial states in accordance with the exigencies of Soviet interests."796 
In sum: Lenin's Eurocentricity is imputed by his bourgeois versus proletariat dichotomy, and 
his corresponding inability convincingly to transfer a binary formula of class struggle to pre-
capitalist and / or peripheral capitalist formations in the Third World. This intimation of 
Eurocentricity further is highlighted by Lenin's belief that proletarian revolution in Western 
Europe was imminent,797 and thus - in its capacity as teleological end-point - would operate 
as a globally applicable role model. 
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Stalinist and post-Stalinist mutations. 
Lowy makes an instructive comparison between on the one hand, the positivism of Engels and 
Lenin, and on the other, Stalin's dialectical materialism, or 'diamat'. 
With Stalinism, a new and unprecedented phenomenon appears in Marxism: an 
attempt to 'ideologize' the natural sciences themselves. It is true that Engels and 
Lenin ventured into the field of the natural sciences, but (rightly or wrongly...) they 
did so in order to develop philosophical considerations relating to natural facts (their 
dialectical or materialist character) and not in order to impose ideological norms on 
research in the natural sciences as such. The idea that the existing natural sciences are 
"bourgeois' is quite alien to classic Marxist thought: it is a Stalinist theoretical 
innovation that might be described as an inverted positivism. Whereas positivism 
wanted to 'naturalise' the political and social sciences, Stalinism attempts to 
'politicise' the natural sciences. Both fail to recognise the specificity of the human 
sciences and the methodological differences between them and the natural sciences.798 
Lowy cites Lysenkoism as emblematic of the pitfalls firstly, of diamat, and secondly, of "a 
political ideology (the Cold War ideology of the two worlds)."799 Lysenko was a Soviet 
biologist of humble origins who, like many other members of Russia's proletarian and peasant 
classes, benefited from the termination of Lenin's rapprochement with bourgeois experts and 
rose rapidly to not altogether deserved prominence. In 1927, Lysenko made known his 
opposition to a science of plant genetics, developed in the West but with adherents in the 
Soviet bloc, which contradicted his own theories and findings. It wasn't until 1948, however, 
that his theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics received Stalin's full backing and 
became Soviet orthodoxy, whereupon "western genetics was denounced, and its Soviet 
practitioners persecuted, imprisoned and in some cases killed."800 Lowy notes that the year 
which triggered Lysenko's rise to power coincided with a "Cold War conjuncture of 
confrontation between the two blocs" that on both sides led to clampdowns, ideological 
monolithism and witch-hunts.801 
227 
Marxism's status as a scientific worldview thus was taken to extremes by Stalin. Stalinist 
orthodoxy was extended into all spheres of science and culture. In the process, the natural 
sciences lost the relative autonomy accorded to them by Lenin and were subsumed - along 
with the social sciences, since to distinguish between them counted as bourgeois fakery -
under the tutelage and ideological rubric of party and state. 
Another distinctive feature of Stalinism as scientific Marxist mutation is "socialism in one 
country.' Here, Stalin departs markedly from Lenin's notion that socialism in Russia is 
endangered by the absence of proletarian revolutions in highly industrialised countries, and 
that the latter are prerequisites for world revolution. Stalin's assertion that the success of 
socialism in Russia no longer depended on its ability to trigger revolutions elsewhere can be 
interpreted as follows. Firstly, as a pragmatic adjustment to Leninism given that the 
anticipated revolutions in the West still had not occurred. In this respect, Stalinism was a 
product of the defeat and isolation of the world revolution.803 Secondly, the confrontational 
climate of the Cold War facilitated a scenario in which revolution in the West was not 
possible until and unless the Soviet bloc liberated itself from 'capitalist encirclement'. 
America's Marshall plan (designed to revive faltering post-war economies in Western 
Europe) indicated that "the existence of the USSR propelled capital to act against its own 
competitive instincts", and duly was countered by Soviet-backed consolidation of "revolutions 
from above' in East-Central Europe in which "capitalism was destroyed overnight, but so was 
any hope of socialist democracy."804 
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Deutscher summarises as follows Stalin's effect: "Having risen to power, he carried the 
habits of clandestine Bolshevism to a grotesque extreme, and transplanted them into the 
Soviet state and into the life of a whole nation, in which, anyhow, all democratic impulses 
had become atrophied."805 Deutscher further contends that "under Stalin the story of 
Bolshevism came to be rewritten in terms of sorcery and magic, with Lenin and then Stalin as 
the chief totems" the better to secure Stalin's immunity from criticism and attack. 
Deutscher's argument is reinforced by Walicki's assertion that Stalin's "unshakeable belief in 
the magic power of Marxist 'science' justified all sorts of voluntarist experiments with human 
beings, if backed by the authority of the 'most advanced scientific theory.'"807 
In 1956, Khrushchev's secret report heralded an official break between Stalinist and post-
Stalinist versions of scientific socialism. Khrushchev condemned not only Stalin's cult of 
personality but also his use of terror, in particular his persecution of high ranking members of 
the Soviet Communist party.808 The principle of the collective leadership of the Central 
Committee thus was restored post-Stalin, and the party abandoned the purges which had been 
so marked a feature of the Stalinist era. Further, the Soviet Union declared its commitment to 
peaceful co-existence with the West while at the same time retaining its right to leadership of 
progressive forces worldwide. This somewhat contradictory foreign policy was initiated by 
Khrushchev and subsequently formalised by the Brezhnev constitution of 1977 "which bound 
the Soviet state consistently to follow 'the Leninist policy of peace' while simultaneously 
declaring the Soviet commitment to reinforcing the position of world socialism and to 
supporting national liberation (ie anti-imperialist) struggles."809 
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In sum, notwithstanding Stalinist and post-Stalinist declarations to the effect that Marxism-
Leninism constituted the ideology of the Soviet state, Lenin's revolutionary emphasis was 
abandoned by Stalin for 'socialism in one country'. Thereafter, Marxism-Leninism ossified 
into 'actually existing socialism'; this was particularly the case during Brezhnev's lengthy 
period in power (1964-1982) when entrenchment of the nomenklatura as a distinct and 
privileged group - a process which began, albeit insecurely, under Stalin - was consolidated. 
Furthermore, it was a process replicated throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Since 
evidence exists of collaboration between national nomenklatura in East-Central Europe and 
the Soviet prototype,810 Soviet and satellite state nomenklatura can be conceptualised as an 
elite alliance with a joint investment in the survival of the Soviet state and thus of its buffer 
states. In general, 'actually existing socialism' reasonably can be regarded as ideological in 
the sense of obscuring the real condition of society the better to secure the interests of ruling 
groups - hence "the thesis of Brezhnev's regime that maintenance of the existing order is the 
highest state wisdom."811 
Walicki highlights the extent to which both Soviet and American ideological legitimation 
depended on the perceived existence of a powerful and fanatical 'other'. Given their mutually 
reinforcing mythologies of struggle for or against communism, it suited both sides to disguise 
the Soviet bloc's de facto retreat from Lenin's objective of global socialist revolution. The 
Soviet Union feared the loss of its claim to the leadership of anti-imperialist forces in the 
Third World; concomitantly, militant anti-communists in the West exaggerated the global 
reach and strength of Soviet ideology in order to shore up the legitimacy of their anti-
communist crusade.812 Ruling elites on both sides of a Cold War divide were trapped inside 
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their respective ideological laagers - a claustrophobic scenario they endeavoured to reproduce 
in the Third World.813 
Humanist Marxism. 
Given that the ideological phenomena of Stalinism, followed by post-Stalinism in the Soviet 
bloc occurred in tandem with the non-fulfilment of Lenin's prediction of proletarian 
revolution in the West, humanist Marxism became the last - and somewhat beleaguered -
bastion of situationally transcendent Marxist discourse in highly industrialised countries. 
Following in the footsteps of Lukacs, humanist Marxists privilege aspects of 'early' Marx that 
are not amenable to positivist interpretation. Thus, a primary divergence between humanist 
and scientific Marxists hinges on the question of whether Marxism is a science or a 
philosophy.8I4 Whereas, in its capacity as a science of social reality, Marxism enables 
prediction imbued with certainty, as a philosophy, Marxism enables emancipation via 
critique. As Benton puts it, "a genuinely emancipatory social theory will be reflexive and 
interpretive, alive to the potentialities which lie beyond the current situation, rather than tied 
obediently to the depiction of its empirical reality."815 
Humanist Marxists share a notion of critique as a tool of emancipation, along with a notion of 
praxis which emphasises the transformative capacity of human agency as distinct, for 
instance, from Engels' and Lenin's reflection theory of knowledge. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the texture of humanist Marxist discourse contains differentiated strands. As 
Anderson put it when conducting a retrospective assessment of forty years of New Left 
Review (NLR): "Intellectually, the journal devoted much of its energies to the introduction 
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and critical reception of the different schools of Western Marxist thought, a sufficiently large 
enterprise to occupy it for over a decade."8'6 Having defined the journal's intellectual bent, 
Anderson outlines its political trajectory: "Politically, the review set its compass towards anti-
imperialist movements in the Third World."817 
As indicated by a 1974 editorial, the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) shared 
NLR's Cold War era preoccupations and trends. The editorial asserts ROAPE's rejection of 
"the orthodoxy of bourgeois social science", while also describing the journal as "at odds 
with a position claiming the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy."818 Yet the editorial concedes that 
"it cannot be said that even among radical students of Africa there is consensus about the 
diagnosis of the ills, much less about the appropriate cure."819 
Academic journals such as NLR and ROAPE to some extent lend themselves to a supposition 
that during the Cold War era, at least one strand of humanist Marxism sought consolation for 
the defeat of mass politics in the West (xxiii) by shifting its analytical and normative focus to 
Third World anti-imperialist struggles. In the process, this purposively reflexive strand of 
Marxism assisted in the construction of "the legend of the people's war against imperialism 
... with many in the West acting as cheerleaders."820 Arguably, this legend fits the contours 
of Mannheim's delineation of a conjuncture between otherwise disparate Utopian and 
ideological modes, viz, wish projection, (xxiv) While this dissertation does not intend to 
underestimate the value of radical critiques of capitalism and (neo) imperialism, it 
nonetheless is surmised that radical humanist analysis, once transported from home base in 
(xxiii) See Chapter One, p 20 
(xxiv) See Chapter Three, pp 74-75 
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Europe to Third World contexts, tended to assume that the transition to socialism would be 
"the natural outcome of a nationalist war based on the mobilisation of the rural areas."821 In 
this respect and to this extent, it is arguable that humanist and scientific Marxists arrived at a 
not dissimilar destination, albeit via different routes. 
Critical theory 
A less wishful strand of humanist Marxism can be found in the 'critical theory' of adherents 
and descendents of the Frankfurt School which originated in Germany but relocated to the 
United States in 1933. Central to the discourse of the School were the theses of Horkheimer 
and Adorno. The former outlined the basis of critical theory as a critique of positivism.822 
The latter contended that contradictions are inherent in reality and hence cannot be eliminated 
by advances in scientific theory. In consequence, "the essence of critical theory is the 
dialectical method which aims to grasp the contradictory nature of society."823 
According to Delanty, the critical theory that emerged from the ranks of the Frankfurt School 
is renowned for its pessimism824 given a preoccupation with "the fate of critical thought in a 
century dominated by the three great repressive and integrating forces of fascism, Stalinism 
and the culture industry of advanced capitalism."825 Delanty's assessment of critical theory is 
underwritten by Marcuse's826 contention that "at the advanced stage of industrial civilisation, 
scientific rationality translated into political power, appears to be the decisive factor in the 
development of historical alternatives."827 
In Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, the various strands of his hypotheses and argumentation 
are threaded through the framework of a bifurcated world order, defined by Marcuse as 
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hostile coexistence that closes the universe of discourse. "In the contemporary period, all 
historical projects tend to be polarised on the two conflicting totalities - capitalism and 
communism".828 Within each monolithic ideological bloc, choices between alternatives 
primarily are "the privilege of those groups which have attained control over the productive 
process." It is worth noting that in making a close comparison between Western and 
Eastern blocs, Marcuse expands the term 'totalitarian' beyond its conventional usage: 
For "totalitarian' is not only a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a 
non-terroristic, economic-technical coordination which operates through the 
manipulation of needs by vested interests. It thus precludes the emergence of an 
effective opposition against the whole. Not only a specific form of government or 
party rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production and 
distribution which may well be compatible with a 'pluralism' of parties, newspapers, 
'countervailing powers,' etc. 
Marcuse perceives positivist social science as the harbinger of one dimensional thought, a 
cognitive mode as ubiquitous in the Soviet Union as in the West, not least given a mutual 
dependence on the construction of normal "self and deviant "other' via an assortment of "self-
validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic 
definitions or dictations."831 
On both sides of a Cold War divide, the potential for a revolutionary alternative seems 
remote. In this respect, Marcuse describes his overall argument as vacillating between two 
contradictory hypotheses. "(1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing 
qualitative change for the foreseeable future; (2) that forces and tendencies exist which may 
break this containment and explode the society."832 Marcuse believes that the first tendency 
is dominant. Nonetheless, he outlines two putative sites of revolutionary transformation. 
One is located in the possibility that organised labour's resistance to increasing automation of 
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the mode of production without compensating employment - "it insists on the extensive 
utilisation of human labour power in material production, and thus opposes technical 
progress" - will "weaken the competitive national and international position of capital, cause a 
long range depression, and consequently reactivate the conflict of class interests." The 
other is located in "the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted 
of other races and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable"834 that lies beneath 
the conservative popular base of parliamentary democracy. This substratum comprises 
people who exist outside the democratic process and thus "their opposition is revolutionary 
even if their consciousness is not."835 Their forceful resistance, suggests Marcuse, might 
signify "the beginning of the end of a period." However, he appends a caveat: "Nothing 
indicates that it will be a good end."836 
Marcuse does not subscribe to "the often-heard opinion" that the Third World constitutes a 
'"third force' that may grow into a relatively independent power."837 On the contrary, he 
argues that - to the best of his knowledge - there is no evidence that the former colonial areas 
"might adopt a way of industrialisation essentially different from capitalism and present-day 
communism." Moreover, even if such evidence does exist, "the brute limits of self-
determination must be acknowledged"838 given that "indigenous progress would presuppose a 
change in the policy of the two great industrial power blocs which today shape the world -
abandonment of neo-colonialism in all its forms. At present, there is no indication of such a 
change."839 
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Extrapolating from Marcuse's outline of the situation in the Third World, it stands to reason 
that elite configurations in postcolonial countries also will take either of two routes to an 
incipiently totalitarian destination, albeit within the limitations and distortions attendant on 
the twin conditions of underdevelopment and dependency. Despite his depiction of a 
'wretched of the earth' substratum in highly industrialised countries as a potentially - although 
not consciously since they largely are outside the productive process - revolutionary group, 
Marcuse does not suggest that there is similar revolutionary potential in the deprived masses 
of the Third World. Rather, he sketches a possible alternative, namely that in circumstances 
of strong resistance to modernising policies "from the indigenous and traditional modes of life 
and labour",840 a planned policy of extending and improving these modes on their own 
grounds might be sufficient if supplemented by "the gradual and piecemeal aid of 
technology"841 to develop natural resources - enough so, at any rate, to improve the lives of 
the rural majority. Even so, indigenous progress ipso facto is constrained by the neo-
imperialism of global power blocs. 
In short, there is no space in Marcuse's thesis for the legend of the people's war against 
imperialism. On the contrary, he cites the example provided by the Soviet Union of "the 
argument from historical backwardness - according to which liberation must, under the 
prevailing conditions of material and intellectual immaturity, necessarily be the work of force 
and administration". 
To sum up: discrete trends in Cold War era Marxist humanism emerged not least from the 
defeat of the emancipatory capability of the proletariat in highly industrialised countries. 
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Since - in the absence of a collective revolutionary agent - the issue of purposive reflexivity 
seems somewhat abstract,843 one strand of Marxist humanism transferred its quest for 
transformative human agency to the Third World. In the process, this Utopian strand 
overlapped with scientific Marxism in the grey area between a Utopian and an ideological 
idea. Critical theory, however, given its assessment of the ideological stranglehold achieved 
by contending Cold War power blocs, reposed no great faith in the prospect of revolutionary 
transformation, whether in highly developed countries or in the Third World. 
In the light of scientific Marxism's critique of dependency theory, as outlined in a previous 
section of this chapter, it seems that dependistas share critical theory's doubts regarding the 
prospect of world socialist revolution beginning in the regions at the periphery. This is 
variably the case, however, as demonstrated by the next chapter's comparison between the 
theses of Amin and Wallerstein. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
VARIETIES AND VICISSITUDES OF MARXISM IN AFRICA 
Marxism gained currency in Africa in several capacities. It was utilised as a revolutionary 
ideology deployed in resistance to colonial, neo-colonial, and white minority regimes. It also 
served as a would-be legitimating ideology and developmental paradigm for postcolonial 
states, identified by Turok as states "whose ruling parties espouse Marxism or some related 
form of scientific socialism as the official ideology", viz, Ethiopia, Benin, Sao Tome and 
Principe, the Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Burundi, Malagasy, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Mali, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. 4 Further, Marxist analysis was 
deployed by an assortment of scholars and activists either domiciled or temporarily operating 
in African countries. Additionally, Marxist analysis in Africa not infrequently was informed 
by aspects of dependency theory, as illustrated, for instance, in the theses of Fanon, Cabral 
and Nkrumah. 
In the light of the previous chapter's exploration of Marxism's fractured trajectory in Europe, 
it is worth (re-) emphasising that - while post World War Two social democracy in Western 
Europe introduced the welfare state, thus modifying the impoverishing effects of capitalism 
on the working class - Marxism as a theory of socialist transformation failed to acquire a 
proletarian mass base during the Cold War era. Moreover, in the East, Lenin's revolutionary 
trajectory de facto was replaced by 'actually existing socialism', the function of which was to 
reinforce the status quo. 
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Outcomes in Europe duly impacted on the underdeveloped regions in at least two respects. In 
one respect, Marxism in its revolutionary capacity attempted to find an outlet in the Third 
World. In so doing, Marxism - whether science or human centred - in effect projected on to 
the underdeveloped regions a Utopian hope, or alternatively a scientific expectation, of 
socialist revolution. In another respect, Marxism in its Soviet or Soviet-oriented capacity 
exported to Africa, as elsewhere in the Third World, a developmental paradigm designed to 
install and maintain a purportedly 'vanguard' elite while simultaneously serving the interests 
of the Soviet state and its Cold War allies. 
Via a survey of relevant literature, this chapter investigates varieties of Marxism in Africa. 
The chapter begins by detailing and comparing Fanon's and Cabral's respective and 
innovative efforts to combine Marxist tenets with armed struggle against colonial regimes. 
More conformist African perspectives on the presumed scientificity of Marxism then are 
sketched. Finally, the chapter shifts its focus to the neo-Marxist theses of Amin and 
Wallerstein. 
Prior to embarking on an investigation and comparison of the revolutionary theories of Fanon 
and Cabral, it is worth noting that while the theories are comparable in that both are strongly 
influenced by Marxism as well as contextually innovative, there also is a seminal difference. 
Fanon contends that application of Marxism to African contexts requires merely that Marxist 
analysis be "slightly stretched".845 By contrast, not only did Cabral decline to label himself as 
a Marxist, he did not regard decolonising Guinea-Bissau's brand of revolutionary ideology as 
necessarily or inevitably 'socialist'.846 
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Fanon: 'the wretched of the earth'. 
Context-specific departures from Marxism 
In his preface to Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre distinguishes between workers in 
Europe who are free to sell their labour, on the one hand, and on the other, forced labour in 
the colonies. "You said they understand nothing but violence? Of course; first the only 
violence is the settlers; but soon they will make it their own; that is to say, the same violence 
thrown back upon us as when our reflection comes forward to meet us when we go towards a 
mirror."847 Fanon himself, when referring to colonialism, cites - not different classes - but 
different species. "This world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited 
by two different species" - and asserts "the originality of the colonial context", namely that... 
... economic reality, inequality and the immense difference of ways of life never come 
to mask the human realities. When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, 
it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or 
not belonging to a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic 
substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence; you are rich 
because you are white, you are white because you are rich. That is why Marxist 
analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial 
problem. Everything up to and including the very nature of pre-capitalist society, so 
well explained by Marx, must here be thought out again. The serf is in essence 
different from the knight, but a reference to divine right is necessary to legitimise this 
statutory difference. In the colonies, the foreigner coming from another country 
imposed his rule by means of guns and machines. In defiance of his successful 
transplantation, in spite of his appropriation, the settler still remains a foreigner. It is 
neither the act of owning factories, nor estates, nor a bank balance which distinguishes 
the governing classes. The governing race is first and foremost those who come from 
elsewhere, those who are unlike the original inhabitants, 'the others'. 
From the passage quoted above can be distilled a number of suppositions, each flagging a 
context-specific departure from Marxism. These suppositions are explored below. 
Given the near complete reliance of the colonial regime on the threat or use of force, Fanon's 
first supposition is that colonial ideology largely is unable to mask the reality of exploitative 
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economic relations. By extension, a society of the colonised is significantly less infiltrated by 
false consciousness than are workers operating in Western (bourgeois capitalist) states. 
Correspondingly, it is comparatively easy for an African AvantGarde to inject the 
spontaneous violence of the masses with revolutionary consciousness. 
Secondly, Fanon presupposes the conflation of class and race in the colonial context. Prima 
facie, this mirrors the material realities of colonial capitalism, but Fanon takes the notion 
further, extending it into the absolute otherness of the coloniser. Thirdly, and ex hypothesi, 
Fanon presupposes the primacy of race as ontological category. Not only is the accumulation 
of wealth and property in the objective sense exclusively reserved for whites but also, in the 
ontological sense, Fanon adopts from the colonisers a notion of racial essentialism. 
Extrapolating from this, there can be no question of assimilating a colonial 'other' into the 
mass of the colonised. Whereas Marxism posits the expansion of the proletariat via a process 
of incorporating bourgeois elements ejected from their own class by the increasingly zero-
sum nature of capitalism, in Fanon's thesis, a settler is forever alien, irrespective of his or her 
objective position vis-a-vis the means of production. 
Finally, a definitive supposition can be distilled from Fanon's contention that: 
Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated 
by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives 
the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of 
action, there's nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There's 
nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and 
down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the Middle Ages, endlessly 
marking time.849 
Violence, both as cognitive and affective property, and as sine qua non of revolution forms 
the connective tissue between the elements that comprise Fanon's decolonisation thesis. 
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Given the 'originality of the colonial context', violence both creates and in itself is a window 
of opportunity; in short, it is a fully accessible route to the sure and certain destruction of 
colonialism. Further, once that condition has been reached, the advantage of violence as a 
means of transporting expert knowledge to the lived world pithily is summed up by Fanon: 
"To wreck the colonial world is henceforward a mental picture of action which is very clear, 
very easy to understand and which may be assumed by each one of the individuals which 
constitute the colonised people."850 Since the extensive use of violence in its capacity as 
revolutionary praxis requires that settlers either are expelled or extirpated, there is no 
possibility, for instance, of following Lenin's example and retaining the services, pro tern, of 
'bourgeois experts'. 
To break up the colonial world does not mean that after the frontiers have been 
abolished lines of communication will be set up between the two zones. The 
destruction of the colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, 
its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country.851 
Multi-purpose violence 
For Fanon, the violence of the colonised against the coloniser demonstrably has multiple 
significance. For instance, it is the primary ingredient in an alienation-banishing formula, and 
also the catalyst that sets the formula in motion. "At the level of individuals, violence is a 
cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and 
inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect."852 
A psychiatrist by profession, Fanon believed that alienation is inherent in the lived experience 
of the colonised since systemic racism induces acute identity crises in its victims. "Because it 
is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other 
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person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to ask 
themselves the question constantly: 'In reality, who am I?'"853 Such a question, if 
contemplated solely on an abstract plane, leads to unreality, that is, the recreation of an 
imagined past, of wallowing in "the most outlandish phantoms", including "the phenomena of 
the dance and of possession."854 By contrast, when "the native, gun in hand, stands face to 
face with the only forces which contend for his life - the forces of colonialism", he "discovers 
reality and transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into the practice of violence and into 
his plan for freedom."855 Thus for Fanon, it seems, the ontological significance of violence is 
that it configures the path from non-being to being. 
However, the significance of violence is not restricted to an ontological dimension given 
copious instances of the brutal alienation of the colonised from their material base of 
existence: land. "For a colonised people the most essential value, because the most concrete, 
is first and foremost their land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, 
dignity."856 Violence inflicted on the coloniser thus serves a dual function firstly, by restoring 
identity to the native qua self-affirming subject, and secondly, by reinstating land as the 
property of the colonised, hence restoring the dialectical relationship between land and labour 
on which their sense of self ultimately depends. It follows, then, that violence is 
emancipatory praxis, and as such, opens the path not only to substantive decolonisation but 
also to the creative and vigorous construction of national culture. Fanon's dialectical method 
thus invokes a seeming paradox, viz, out of death (of the other) comes life (of the self). "For 
the native, life can only spring up again out of the rotting corpse of the settler." 
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According to Bulhan's reading of Fanon's binary conundrum, revolutionary violence 
demystifies the power of the oppressor, detoxifies all negative accumulations of oppression, 
restores self and group-confidence, and promotes strong social cohesion among the 
oppressed.858 In short, the coloniser dies as a means of ensuring that the formerly colonised 
fully are able to experience life. 
Finally, violence is of instrumental significance inasmuch as it provides both a cognitive and 
corporeal link between intellectuals and masses. In other words, shared belief in the 
revolutionary necessity of violence, as well as collectively violent activity binds the leaders to 
the mass of workers and peasants. Concomitantly, violence generates unity and loyalty 
among its practitioners since both intellectuals and masses have burnt their boats. It closes 
the space for non-violent negotiation and ensures that "know-all, smart, wily intellectuals", 
those "spoilt children of yesterday's colonialism"859 are unable to emerge from the ranks of 
the AvantGarde, since in the eyes of the colonisers they have committed unforgivable crimes. 
"In Algeria, for example ... you could be sure of a new recruit when he could no longer go 
back into the colonial system." 
Given the above cited, less than comprehensive instances of the ubiquity of violence in 
Fanon's theory of decolonisation, it is arguable that Gibson's observation that "with Fanon, 
violence is a problematic, which conceptually has to do too much"861 understates the case. It 
also is arguable that during a process in which Marxist analysis is 'slightly stretched', Fanon 
substitutes violence for science or - put differently - that for Fanon, violence is the alchemistic 
property that transforms an objectively unpropitious set of socio-economic conditions into a 
window of revolutionary opportunity. Certainly, Fanon commits himself to an explicit 
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declaration of specificity attendant on colonialism with his assertion that "it is clear that in the 
colonial countries peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and 
everything to gain. The starving peasant, outside the class system, is the first among the 
exploited to discover that only violence pays." However, as Gibson remarks, "though 
Fanon construes decolonisation as a violent process, violence, whether symbolic or actual, is 
not sufficient for the development of a national consciousness: Fanon insists on a 
concomitant 'enlightening of consciousness.'" 
While Gibson's observation flags a marked change in emphasis attendant on Fanon's 
movement from narrative of violent decolonisation to postcolonial critique, and thus to 
considerations of "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness", my reading of the change in 
emphasis is that in the latter section of Fanon's text, class, not race, is the primary signifier. 
In short, having posited and passionately argued an immediate and readily accessible solution 
to the problematic of decolonisation he, as it were, then returns to the Marxist fold. It further 
is noteworthy that in so doing, he abandons essentialist intimations of race and 'otherness'. 
Revolutionary agency and leadership 
Before turning to Fanon's attack on the counter-revolutionary outcome of non-violent 
negotiation with the colonial oppressor, his appraisal of'the wretched of the earth' as 
revolutionary agent because of their position 'outside the class system' is worth revisiting 
since it overturns a foundational premise of Marxism-Leninism, namely the primacy of class 
agency and class struggle both during the revolution and in the construction of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. It is here that one finds a seminal methodological weakness in 
Fanon's thesis - not only because he effectively restricts his explanation for so unscientific a 
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detour to one short phrase: 'they have nothing to lose' - but also because unlike Cabral, who 
makes a detailed itemisation of discrete groups of peasantry in Guinea-Bissau, Fanon - in the 
text under consideration - tends to treat the Algerian peasantry as an undifferentiated whole. 
The only clear distinction he makes is between peasants in the countryside and "that fraction 
of the peasant population which is blocked on the outer fringe of the urban areas, that fraction 
which has not yet succeeded in finding a bone to gnaw in the colonial system."864 Even then, 
the distinction largely is one of locale since both sets of peasantry, urban and rural, are 
equally marginalised by the system. 
It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shanty towns, at the core of the 
lumpen-proletariat that the rebellion will find its urban spear-head. For the lumpen-
proletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, 
constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionised forces 
of the colonised people.865 
Moreover, whatever difference exists between "even tribes whose stubborn rivalry is well-
known" is completely overcome by the sheer momentum of armed struggle. "Each village 
finds that it is itself both an absolute agent of revolution and also a link in the chain of 
action."866 
If revolution occurs and acquires momentum spontaneously, what role do leaders play? 
Fanon's answer is that leadership provides organisation and staying power. He approvingly 
cites Holden Roberto, leader of Angola's National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA), who reacted to the mass casualties inflicted by colonial troops on a spontaneous 
uprising by reorganising the liberation army, using experience gained in other wars of 
liberation, and employing guerrilla techniques.867 In short, the task of a revolutionary leader 
is rapidly to transform sporadic peasant revolts into revolutionary war. At this juncture in his 
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thesis, Fanon explicates the limitations of spontaneous "hatred and resentment." Such 
emotions, while legitimate, "cannot sustain a war of liberation."868 Nor are they sufficient 
defence against the enemy's strategic retreat into acts of conciliation and courtesy. "Hatred is 
disarmed by these psychological windfalls." In order, therefore, to keep the fires of 
revolutionary violence burning, "in each fighting group and in every village hosts of political 
commissioners spring up and the people ... will be shown their bearings by these political 
pilots."870 In general: "The task of bringing the people to maturity will be made easier by the 
thoroughness of the organisation and the high intellectual level of its leaders."871 
Class and the postcolony. 
Once Fanon has scaled the heights of violent decolonisation, and is descending into the abyss 
of neocolonialism, his frame of reference undergoes a marked alteration. His point of 
departure now is a postcolonial problematic in which "the nation is passed over for the race, 
and the tribe is preferred to the state." He deplores the racist division of Africa along the 
fault-line of the Sahara into 'white' north and 'black' south,873 the chauvinism of neocolonial 
nationalism, and the tribalism engendered by competition between ethnic groups for scarce 
resources.874 In this section of the text, divisions between races and tribes in Africa are 
portrayed as artificial: neocolonial constructs that serve the interests of a dominant, albeit 
epiphenomenal class of comprador bourgeoisie operating in service to a metropolitan master-
class. This notable shift from fighting, triumphal mode in which the alienating effects of 
settler colonialism comprehensively are overcome by the purifying fire of revolutionary 
violence, to a gloomily ominous depiction of the debased and distorted nature of neocolonial 
regimes is disconcerting. Another point - perhaps merely semantic - is that while Fanon 
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repeatedly deploys the word 'violence' in the first section of the text, in a later section, he 
alternates between two words with two different connotations: "force' is positively deployed 
whereas 'violence' is negatively utilised to flag instances of intra-African racism and 
tribalism. 
Given the above disjunctures, it is quite tempting to treat the two sections of text as by-and-
large separate entities, loosely connected by Fanon's consistently impassioned style. This 
said, seeds of "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness" are discernible in "Concerning 
Violence." For instance: 
The national political parties never lay stress upon the necessity of a trial of armed 
strength, for the good reason that their objective is not the radical overturning of the 
system. Pacifists and legalists, they are in fact partisans of order, the new order - but 
to the colonialist bourgeoisie they put bluntly enough the demand which to them is the 
main one: 'Give us more power.' On the specific question of power, the elite are 
ambiguous. They are violent in their words and reformist in their attitudes.875 
The above analysis of the indigenous bourgeoisie during an era of decolonisation dovetails 
with Fanon's subsequent critique of class configuration in a postcolonial era. Here, his 
depiction of the "national bourgeoisie" is compatible with dependency theory's notion of a 
comprador class. He describes the class as "the Western bourgeoisie's business agent", as 
having "practically no economic power", as "completely canalised into activities of the 
intermediary type" and as "a profiteering caste." On these grounds, he raises "the 
theoretical question ... of whether or not the bourgeois phase can be skipped" and asserts 
somewhat obscurely that in underdeveloped countries, the question "ought to be answered in 
the field of revolutionary action, and not by logic." 
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As it transpires, revolutionary action in a neocolonial context translates as a call to oppose the 
national bourgeoisie "because, literally, it is good for nothing."880 By this Fanon means that it 
not only is unproductive in a material sphere, it also is sterile in the field of ideas. He makes 
the point by way of contrasting a "get-rich-quick middle class" in Africa with "a bourgeoisie 
similar to that which developed in Europe."881 A bona fide bourgeoisie, in contradistinction to 
the ersatz variety, "is able to elaborate an ideology and at the same time strengthen its own 
power. Such a bourgeoisie, dynamic, educated and secular, has fully succeeded in its 
undertaking of the accumulation of capital and has given to the nation a minimum of 
prosperity."882 
At this juncture, Fanon's analysis of a comprador class is of particular significance for the 
themes of my dissertation if applied to the seeming inability of Afro-capitalist states to 
elaborate an ideology other than an increasingly authoritarian brand of nationalism.(xxv) Put 
briefly, his argument suggests that ideological vacuity is a consequence of endemic and 
ubiquitous economic dependence. On both levels, a neocolonial dispensation is "not even the 
replica of Europe, but its caricature." Fanon does not stop here, however. He develops his 
sketch of an arid class, "incapable of great ideas or of inventiveness" into a depiction of elite 
criminality "reminiscent of the members of a gang, who after every hold-up hide their share of 
the swag from other members who are their accomplices and prudently start thinking about 
their retirement."884 
(xxv) See Chapter Four, pi00 
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While advocating opposition and offering advice to "a small number of honest intellectuals"885 
in neocolonial counties, Fanon does not appear to be advocating armed revolt against 
incumbent regimes but instead - given his fairly numerous references to Algeria's National 
Liberation Front (FLN) strategies with the peasant masses in Algeria - teaching by example. 
He maintains that "if we have taken the example of Algeria to illustrate our subject, it is not at 
all with the intention of glorifying our own people, but simply to show the important part 
played by the war in leading them towards consciousness of themselves."886 Nor is he 
necessarily arguing for across-the-board use of anti-colonial force. "We know for sure today 
that in Algeria the test of force was inevitable - but other countries through political action 
and through the work of clarification undertaken by a party have led their people to the same 
results."887 This statement imputes that Fanon's theory of revolution, including the necessary 
(because transformative) use of violence is restricted to colonies either where a relatively 
substantial number of settlers would rather fight than concede, or where an intransigent 
metropolitan power refuses to withdraw, and reinforces its decision with troops. It thus is 
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arguable that "Concerning Violence" applies to an extreme version of decolonisation and 
not to decolonisation per se. 
Contrary to popular perception, then, it seems that Fanon does not recommend violence as a 
generally applicable solution to any and all forms of colonial oppression. However, having 
noted his selective application of violent strategies of decolonisation, a question remains: to 
what extent does his argument concerning violence approximate to a theory as such? This 
question generates another: assuming that Fanon's discourse accurately can be termed 
'Marxist,' within which of the Marxist camps is he situated? According to Gibson, Fanon's 
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critique of the nationalist bourgeoisie "is often associated with the underdevelopment school." 
"Yet," continues Gibson "unlike the dependency theorists' preoccupation with external 
relations, Fanon's dialectic enabled him to discern internal social conflicts."889 Gibson also 
defines Fanon as a Marxist humanist "in the sense that he is not championing a static notion 
of human nature, but a notion of human potential 'created by revolutionary beginnings.'"890 
Certainly, Fanon does not evince a noticeable preoccupation with a scientific theory of 
revolution. While he contends, in a style somewhat reminiscent of Lenin's notion of ethics as 
the property of the ascendant class, (xxvi) that: 
In every age, among the people, truth is the property of the national cause. No 
absolute verity, no discourse on the purity of the soul can shake this position ... Truth 
is that which hurries on the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which 
promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the 
foreigners. In this colonialist context there is no truthful behaviour: and the good is 
quite simply that which is evil for 'them'.891 
... Fanon's notion of truth is not configured by a materialist base given that in his thesis, the 
binary opposite of a colonial regime is not a revolutionary class but a nation; furthermore, a 
nation that is built on and by a peasant collective whose revolutionary credentials he has not 
convincingly established. Nor is it clear that the FLN have a substantive claim to AvantGarde 
status. Instructive in this regard is Clegg's assessment of Algeria as "yet another 
revolutionary failure." 
Fanonism as false knowledge: a Marxist-Leninist perspective 
Clegg's point of departure is the hijacking of the Algerian revolution by "a banal state 
capitalism" and "a new bourgeoisie" of "previously unknown careerists and bureaucrats."893 
(xxvi) See Chapter Eight, p 222 
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In other words, not long after independence, Algeria plunged into a version of the neocolonial 
abyss that the purportedly transformative heights of Fanonist revolution were designed to 
avoid. While agreeing with Fanon's premise that the distinguishing characteristic - violence -
of anti-colonial revolution in Algeria "gave expression to the violence already implicit in the 
relations between coloniser and colonised: a violence that was itself a product of the process 
and mode of colonisation",894 Clegg's perception of the role of violence in Algeria's 
decolonisation is diametrically opposed to Fanon's. Far from transforming the consciousness 
of the colonised, the violence with which the anti-colonial struggle was waged "largely 
created the myth of the revolutionary nature of the fight for independence. Fanonism, in 
particular, was responsible for the widespread misconceptions over the nature of the 
struggle"895 given that in reality, the FLN was no more than "a loosely coordinated front for a 
wide assortment of political tendencies and personalities," and that the presence of 
AvantGarde elements within the FLN made no significant difference since "they did not 
control the state and had no mass base among the working class or peasantry."896 
Additionally, Gibson's assertion that Fanon's thesis incorporates internal class analysis cannot 
really be applied to "Concerning Violence" - a lacuna that Clegg highlights: "The lack of 
critical analysis of the modes of class formation stems, once again, from Fanonist-inspired 
simplifications. During the war, the internal class contradictions of the indigenous society 
were largely subsumed under the wider definitions of race and culture."897 Clegg adheres to 
the scientific premise that class-based analysis of objective conditions is the only way to distil 
the true nature of a revolution from the ideological mystifications - in this case, Fanonist -
that envelop it. He contends that the conscious aspirations of the Algerian peasantry reflect 
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the true nature of the struggle in the rural areas, viz, at once nationalist in the sense of 
reclaiming their land from foreign conquerors, and Utopian - "a recreation of a glorious past to 
which all their values are intimately related."898 He likewise disposes of the revolutionary 
role of the "urban sub-proletariat" - whom he describes as existing "in a half world that is 
neither the traditional nor the modern"899 - by contending that "it is this very desperation and 
extreme acculturation which deprives them of the ability to act on the external in a conscious 
manner."900 
Applying class analysis to formerly colonised territories, Clegg identifies three stages of 
struggle. The initial stage is the struggle for national liberation that, once achieved, enables 
the subsequent stages but cannot itself be defined as class struggle given that "it is only after 
independence that the existence of contradictions over and above those of colonialism 
become explicit." 01 Clegg contends that colonialism's primary signifiers, race and culture, 
inhibit the development of class antagonisms and class consciousness among the colonised. 
Further, a struggle in which almost all anti-colonial combatants in the rural areas are peasants 
cannot properly be designated a class struggle since "revolution, as a concept, is alien to the 
peasant consciousness while their relationship to the environment remains one of passive 
endurance rather than active transformation." In other words, taking up arms against 
colonialism does not by definition revolutionize peasant mentalities. 
However, once independence has been achieved, Clegg concedes that the second stage of 
struggle - if it occurs - to some extent is class driven since it ends in the seizure of the means 
of production, and is the product of conflict between "the national bourgeoisie and the mass 
of the population."903 This struggle, however, is incomplete since the state remains under the 
253 
control of party and government bureaucracy. Thus, the third and definitive stage occurs only 
in the event of "conflict between the working class (and peasantry) and the state and party 
bureaucracy, ending in the seizure of the state."9 4 
It is worth emphasising that Clegg's stages theory of revolutionary development allocates 
primacy to the working class while allocating to the peasantry parenthetic status only, thus 
demonstrating fidelity to a Leninist paradigm in which an increasingly proletarianised 
peasantry follow in the footsteps of the workers. While Clegg does not explicitly accuse 
Fanon of abandoning the class struggle, and along with it the scientificity of Marxism, he 
defines Fanonism as "the practice of revolution with no concomitant theory."905 Following on 
from this, "Fanonism is pure ideology."906 A definition of Fanonism as ideology relates to 
Fanon's misrepresentation, hence mystification of the peasantry who in reality are incapable 
of revolutionary praxis given their location outside the class system. It seems likely that 
Clegg's contrast between 'ideology' and 'theory' is informed by Lenin's assertion that science 
is the product of the only truly progressive class, the proletariat. By logical extension, then, 
Clegg conceptualises 'ideology' as false knowledge, 'theory' as true knowledge, and places 
Fanonism in the former category. 
Fanonism: conclusion. 
By contrast to Clegg's austerely scientific onslaught, Gibson takes a more flexible, human-
centred perspective: "Rather than viewing Fanon's Marxism simply in terms of stretching 
class categories in the colonial context, what is especially provocative is the expression of the 
creativity of ideological intervention as a political act."907 However, it seems to me that this 
slightly mystifying observation does not adequately confront the problematic of Fanon's 
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overly extensive deployment of violence in the colonial context, viz, as cause, consequence 
and cure. While Fanon's critical analysis of the generic neo-colonial state is astute to the point 
of being downright prophetic, overall his thesis does not offer a sufficiently substantive 
alternative to the perils of neo-colonialism. In short, I surmise that Fanon is better at tearing 
down than he is at re-building, and therefore - inasmuch as his thesis has European ancestry -
that Fanonism more closely resembles Bakunin's anarchism than it does Marxism. 
Briefly put, Bakunin believed that the ethics of revolution "can only be effectively taught 
among the bewildered masses swarming in our great cities and plunged in the utmost 
boundless misery."908 After visiting Italy, he expanded his premise. He contrasted workers in 
the more industrialised parts of Europe with the revolutionary masses in Italy. The former he 
defined as "dominated by the principles of the bourgeois, by their ambition and vanity, to 
such an extent that they are different from the bourgeois only in their situation and not in their 
way of thinking."909 By contrast, workers and peasants in Italy are revolutionary "by 
circumstances and by instinct" but have no conception of "the true causes of their miserable 
situation."910 However, rather than recommending a potentially lengthy process of political 
education, Bakunin insisted that "we must not teach the people but lead them to revolt."91' 
Joll's interpretation of Bakunin's emphasis on revolutionary immediacy is that he believed 
that "the act of revolution would be sufficiently educational in itself."91 In this respect, at 
least, Fanon made a markedly similar assumption. Conversely, Cabral's thesis of 
decolonisation looks ahead to the national, cultural and normative foundations of post-
independence Guinea-Bissau. 
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Cabral: 'the human beings in our country'. 
While Fanon represented the FLN in Ghana, as well as negotiating with liberation movements 
in other parts of Africa in an effort to open up a new front, his primary task was to generate 
support in Europe, and particularly in France, for the Algerian revolution. Cabral, on the 
other hand, was both the main theoretician and intermittently913 leader in the field of the 
African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). 
A telling disagreement between Fanon and Cabral occurred in 1960, three years prior to the 
onset of liberation war in Guinea-Bissau. As Davidson recalls the episode, Fanon, operating 
on behalf of Algeria's FLN, urged liberation movements in the Portuguese territories to 
launch their armed struggles without further delay. However, only the FNLA in Angola were 
ready to start an insurrection without having prepared it inside the country. The Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Guinea-Bissau's PAIGC instead opted 
to continue their exercises in political education of the masses. Having found only Holden 
Roberto's FNLA amenable to his plan, Fanon "threw Algerian military and political aid 
behind that fruitless 'movement'. Disasters accordingly followed. Cabral and the PAIGC ... 
flatly refused "to begin', and were roundly abused for thus having minds of their own."914 
Differentiated social groups and variable revolutionary potential 
As can be inferred from Davidson's anecdote, Cabral did not perceive the peasantry as 
naturally or axiomatically revolutionary. On the contrary ... 
... it must be said that the peasantry is not a revolutionary force - which may seem 
strange, particularly as we have based the whole of our armed liberation struggle on 
the peasantry. A distinction must be drawn between a physical force and a 
revolutionary force; physically, the peasantry is a great force in Guinea; it is almost 
the whole of the population, it controls the nation's wealth, it is the peasantry which 
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produces: but we know from experience what trouble we had convincing the peasantry 
to fight.915 
Cabral grounds his analysis in a discussion of differentiated social groups. He distinguishes 
between groups whose organisation he identifies as feudal (the Manjacks); semi-feudal (the 
Fulas); "without any defined form of state organisation"916 (the Balantes); and a nomadic 
people who are itinerant traders,917 primarily interested in "bigger and better profits"918 (the 
Dyulas). 
In general, Cabral examines groups of people in Guinea-Bissau according to their dependence 
or otherwise on the colonial regime, and assesses their revolutionary potential in terms of 
whether or not they experience colonialism as immediately and intolerably oppressive. Fula 
peasants, for instance, "have a strong tendency to follow their chiefs." Since Fula chiefs and 
the colonial regime have a long-established relationship of mutual convenience, mobilising 
the Fula peasants requires "thorough and intensive work."919 The Dyula, because permanently 
on the move, have "provided us with a most valuable element in the struggle."920 Even though 
at least some of the Dyula play the same role for the Portuguese, Cabral concludes that their 
value to the struggle as a kind of revolution-broadcasting-and-mobilising service makes of 
them a more positive than negative factor, and merits giving them some reward, "as they 
usually would not do anything without being paid."921 He singles out the Balantes as 
maintaining intact their tradition of resistance to colonial penetration, and hence the group 
"that we found most ready to accept the idea of national revolution."9 
Since Cabral neither treats the peasants as an undifferentiated whole, nor casts them in an 
iconic mould, his detailed analysis and sober tone are in striking contrast to Fanon's 
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impassioned polemic and vivid generalisations. Another example of Cabral's attention to 
detail can be found in his depiction of "declasses". Within this group are two sub-groups. 
The first comprises "really declasse people, such as beggars and prostitutes and so on" and is 
defined by Cabral as "the lumpenproletariat."923 He then shifts his attention to the second sub-
group: 
The other group is not really made up of declasse people, but we have not yet found 
an exact term for it; it is a group to which we have paid a lot of attention and it has 
proved to be extremely important in the national liberation struggle. It is mostly made 
up of young people who are connected to petty bourgeois or workers' families, who 
have recently arrived from the rural areas and generally do not work.924 
In similar vein, he distinguishes between three sub-groups within the category of petty 
bourgeoisie: firstly, higher officials and some members of the liberal professions who are 
"heavily committed and compromised with colonialism."925 Secondly, a group he defines as 
nationalist and revolutionary, and "which was the source of the idea of national liberation in 
Guinea." Thirdly, a vacillating group "which has never been able to make up its mind 
between the national liberation struggle and the Portuguese."926 His depiction of "the 
Europeans" is equally dispassionate. "They are the human instruments of the colonial state in 
our country and they therefore reject a priori any idea of national liberation."927 However, he 
does not treat settler society as an undifferentiated whole. "It has to be said that the 
Europeans most bitterly opposed to the idea of national liberation are the workers, while we 
have sometimes found considerable sympathy for our struggle among certain members of the 
European petty bourgeoisie." 
Cabral's delineation of the awakening of revolutionary consciousness and hence the origins of 
the armed struggle reveals that he perceives urban areas as primary sites of dawning 
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awareness of oppression and inequality. He supports his perception as follows: firstly, 
because - given the relative scarcity of Europeans in the rural areas - rural Africans, unlike 
town dwellers, mostly are unable to make a direct comparison between their situation and that 
of the Europeans. Secondly, because rural peasants by-and-large operate outside or on the 
fringes of the money economy since they are "subjected to a kind of exploitation equivalent to 
slavery."929 By contrast, an urban worker who is doing the same job as a European but earning 
far less is easier to convince that he is being exploited. Cabral simultaneously sums up these 
points and differentiates between Algeria and Guinea-Bissau: "The importance of this urban 
experience lies in the fact that it allows comparison: this is the key stimulant required for the 
awakening of consciousness. It is interesting to note that Algerian nationalism largely sprang 
up among the emigre workers in France. As far as Guinea is concerned, the idea of the 
national liberation struggle was born not abroad but in our country ..."930 
To take my own case as a member of the petty bourgeois group which launched the 
struggle in Guinea, I was an agronomist working under a European who everybody 
knew was one of the biggest idiots in Guinea; I could have taught him his job with my 
eyes shut but he was the boss: this is something which counts a lot, this is the 
confrontation which really matters. This is of major importance when considering 
where the initial idea of the struggle came from.931 
Cabral's analysis of the wellspring of consciousness in Guinea-Bissau leads him to conclude 
that "while many people say that it is the peasants who carry the burden of exploitation",932 it 
would be a mistake to assume that suffering in itself brings consciousness of oppression. The 
production of active awareness requires another ingredient: immediate and personal 
experience of the contradictions inherent in colonialism. In the rural areas, this ingredient in 
the main is restricted to groups such as the Balantes whose tradition, for instance, of 
collective ownership of land, is markedly at odds with private ownership of the means of 
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production in agriculture. Finally, Cabral argues that higher levels of revolutionary 
consciousness in urban areas notwithstanding, "there is no conflict between the towns and the 
countryside, not least because we are only town dwellers who have just moved in from the 
country."934 His argument suggests that the rural origins of every native Guinean comprise an 
important source of collective strength in the struggle against colonialism - but he adds a 
caveat: potential - "which colonialism tries to aggravate" - exists for town-country conflict. 35 
Leadership problematics 
The paper summarised above was delivered in 1964 at a seminar in Milan. Cabral does not 
address in any detail the issue of leadership - but from his concluding observations can be 
inferred a potential hazard for the revolution in that leaders often although not exclusively 
are members of the urban petty bourgeoisie. This is a theme he develops (in 1966 at a 
conference in Havana) as follows. 
In Guinea-Bissau, as in many other colonies, there is no national bourgeoisie per se. Here, 
Cabral, like Fanon, utilises dependency theory's notion of a comprador class, defined by 
Cabral as a "pseudo-bourgeoisie, controlled by the ruling class of the dominating country" 
whose submission to economic imperatives of neo-colonialism "prevents the development of 
the national productive forces." Quite irrespective of how strongly nationalist this class 
believes itself to be, it by definition impedes national development.937 
Revolutionary leadership therefore devolves upon the petty bourgeoisie. However, since 
Cabral defines the petty bourgeoisie as "a class not directly involved in the process of 
production", he concludes that it "does not possess the economic base to guarantee the taking 
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over of power",938 and cannot be considered to constitute, on its own, a vanguard. He 
distinguishes between a highly industrialised setting in which a proletariat conscious of its 
existence constitutes a vanguard class and a colonial situation in which "the generally 
embryonic character of the working classes"939 necessitates the creation of a popular front in 
opposition to colonialism, viz, embryonic working class + peasantry + revolutionary element 
of the petty bourgeoisie = vanguard or, as Cabral also defines it, "nation class".940 Of this 
combination of elements, the petty bourgeois fraction currently has the most developed 
consciousness ... 
... since by nature of its objective and subjective position (higher standard of living 
than that of the masses, more frequent contact with the agents of colonialism, and 
hence more chances of being humiliated, higher level of education and political 
awareness, etc.) it is the stratum which most rapidly becomes aware of the need to free 
itself from foreign domination.941 
Given that the power of the petty bourgeoisie as leaders of the revolution lacks an economic 
base, Cabral fears that it will follow the path already taken by the pseudo-bourgeoisie, ally 
itself with imperialism and betray the objectives of the revolution in order to retain political 
power. As Cabral sees it, there is only one way to avoid the trap of objective conditions lying 
in wait for a leadership cadre whose lack of economic substance potentially makes it easy 
prey for the agents of imperialism. He contends that... 
... the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a 
class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the 
deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong. This alternative - to betray the 
revolution or commit suicide as a class - constitutes the dilemma of the petty 
bourgeoisie in the general framework of the national liberation struggle. The positive 
solution in favour of the revolution depends on what Fidel Castro recently correctly 
called the development of revolutionary consciousness... this shows us, to a certain 
extent, that if national liberation is essentially a political problem, the conditions for 
its development give it certain characteristics which belong to the sphere of morals.942 
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Class suicide 
At this juncture, a nodal point of comparison between Fanon's and Cabral's theses of 
decolonisation is worth elaborating. The contrast between their respective methods of 
transporting expert knowledge to the lived world of a majority (the peasantry) of the 
population is conceptualised as follows. 
For Fanon, mass adoption of violence as primary instrument of the struggle against settler 
colonialism is the binding agent that welds AvantGarde and masses together, at least partly 
because a representation of the colonial world as divided into two distinct and irreconcilable 
race-species in which the rebirth of one is contingent on the death of the other is 'very clear, 
very easy to understand'. Violence thus comprises the shared episteme and method of the 
struggle. It also has an ontological dimension inasmuch as it configures the path from non-
being to being. 
For Cabral, who factors in class distinctions and intra-class differentiations, thus producing a 
nuanced picture of the colonial world, violence is a necessary but insufficient condition of 
national liberation. Put briefly, his argument is that independence will not be achieved in 
settler colonies without "the use of liberating violence by the nationalist forces to answer the 
criminal violence of the agents of imperialism", but that the important thing is to determine 
which forms of violence have to be used in order to ensure the attainment of true national 
independence. Thus, "the normal way of national liberation, imposed on peoples by 
imperialist repression, is armed struggle."943 
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As is his wont, Cabral employs differentiation as a means of isolating the significant 
ingredient, in this case, collective armed struggle. Yet if he believed that armed struggle plus 
political education 'from outside' (a la Lenin) are sufficient to overcome objective 
contradictions between leaders and masses, he would not find it necessary to posit class 
suicide as imperative if neocolonialism is to be avoided. In effect, Cabral's perception of the 
obligation of leaders in Guinea-Bissau is that they should convey expert knowledge to the 
lived world of the people via a process of (re-) becoming the people. As his reference to 'the 
sphere of morals' suggests, this is a normative requirement for putative leaders of the struggle, 
as well as the only way to avoid replicating - in a postcolonial era - the injustices and 
inequities of colonialism. In short, it is an attempt to ensure that a colonial binary of 'self and 
'other' is not passed forward to the postcolonial state. 
According to my reading of Cabral's notion of 'class suicide,' he intended that it should be 
implemented in two related spheres of existence. Firstly, in the material sphere. Given his 
depiction of their objective and subjective position, it is deducible (Cabral does not spell it 
out) that members of the petty bourgeoisie who aspire to lead the popular front against 
colonialism perforce should abandon whatever material advantages and class privileges they 
have acquired under colonialism and actively submerge themselves in the lived world of the 
struggle. Cabral thus posits conscious intervention in the objective conditions generated by 
colonial capitalism, and postulates such intervention as a transformative factor if taken in 
conjunction with the unifying effect of the struggle. In this respect, Davidson's account of a 
conversation with Cabral is edifying. 
'My own view', he said in 1967, 'is that there are no real conflicts between the people 
of Africa. There are only conflicts between their elites. When the people take power 
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into their own hands, as they will do with the march of events in this continent, there 
will remain no great obstacles to effective African solidarity. Already we see in our 
own case how the various people of Guinea are finding cooperation more and more 
possible and useful as they free themselves from attitudes of tribal strife - attitudes 
encouraged, directly or indirectly, by colonial rule and its consequences.'944 
If for Cabral, conflicts between elites in Africa are power struggles between colonially 
constructed comprador classes, and tribal conflict, while pre-existing colonialism, in its 
exacerbated form also is a colonial construct, then nation and continent-wide counter-colonial 
struggle ultimately should negate or at least, very much modify the harmful effects of class 
and tribal divisions. In short, deploying a detailed assessment of the situation in Guinea-
Bissau as his baseline, Cabral extends his thesis to encompass 'effective African solidarity'. 
To arrive at this outcome, his underlying assumption (logically) must be 'class suicide' 
throughout decolonising and postcolonial Africa - or so I deduce. 45 
In the above respect, it is worth noting that generalisation from Guinea-Bissau to the rest of 
Africa by no means is usual for Cabral. For instance, in the paper under consideration, he is 
emphatic that "on the political level our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality of 
others may be - can only be transformed by detailed knowledge of it, by our own efforts, by 
our own sacrifices."946 This said, he adds a rider: "We ourselves and the other liberation 
movements in general (referring here above all to the African experience) have not managed 
to pay enough attention to this important problem of our common struggle." 7 Here, Cabral 
argues two interconnected points. On the one hand, a detailed knowledge of conditions 
specific to each country is a prerequisite for the success of individual national struggles. On 
the other, given a continent-wide experience of the struggle to decolonise, colonialism and its 
consequences are a common problem for Africans. He concludes that: 
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The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology within 
the national liberation movements - which is basically due to ignorance of the 
historical reality which these movements claim to transform - constitutes one of the 
greatest weaknesses of our struggle against imperialism, if not the greatest weakness 
of all. We believe, however, that a sufficient number of different experiences has 
already been accumulated to enable us to define a general line of thought and action 
with the aim of eliminating this deficiency.948 
Thus Cabral posits a continent-wide and continent-specific 'line of thought and action' with 
which to motivate and direct a common struggle not only against imperialism but also against 
postcolonial drift towards neocolonial leadership. He doesn't make the latter target explicit 
but - given his demonstrable concern to avoid the trap of a neocolonial future for Guinea-
Bissau - it can be surmised that he bases his perception of a lived world congruent ideology 
on a continentally applicable notion of class suicide in the material realm, and that a key role 
of such an ideology would be to reduce the gap between the people of Africa and their elites. 
Cultural alienation and its remedy 
The gap between nationalist leaders and the people - and therefore, the remedy - not only is 
material, it also is cultural. The issue of cultural alienation as a weapon of imperialism is 
outlined by Cabral in a paper delivered in 1970 and dedicated to the memory of Eduardo 
Mondlane of Mozambique who was "liquidated with impunity" by "Portuguese colonialism 
and imperialist agents"949 (a fate inflicted on Cabral three years later). Having defined 
Nazism as "the most tragic expression of colonialism and its thirst for domination", he asserts 
that "to take up arms to dominate a people is, above all, to take up arms to destroy, or at least 
to neutralise, to paralyse, its cultural life."950 Concomitantly, "national liberation is 
necessarily an act of culture." 51 Cabral extends his assertion about culture into the realm of 
ideology: 
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The value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact 
that culture is the vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the 
physical and historical reality of the society that is dominated ... culture is 
simultaneously the fruit of a people's history and a determinant of that history ...952 
In regard to culture, Dalmeyr perceives Cabral as operating in a quasi-Marxist vein 
inasmuch as he conceptualises culture as the outcome of the level of productive forces and the 
mode of production, thus lapsing "into somewhat reductive formulations."954 In the main, 
however, Dalmeyr - citing in particular a paper delivered by Cabral shortly before his 
assassination - believes that he favours a more 'culturalist' than determinist approach to 
identity formation. "If one accepts that culture is a dynamic synthesis of the material and 
spiritual conditions of the society ... one can assert that identity is at the individual and 
collective level and beyond the economic condition, the expression of culture."955 
In sum: for Cabral, culture, while a product of history and thus tied in with the development 
of a given society's mode of production, also is a realm of purposive human agency. In the 
case of the petty bourgeoisie, either of two choices are available. They can continue along the 
path on which their feet were set by the Western education and cultural values offered to a 
fraction of the colonised, or they can "return to the upward paths of their own culture which is 
nourished by the living reality of its environment ..."956 Cabral attributes to the former choice 
the failure of some national liberation movements (he doesn't specify which) since the leaders 
have ignored the popular character of the movement, hence the popular nature of liberation 
itself. In so doing, they unnaturally increase the lifespan of a colonial policy of "cultural 
alienation of a part of the population, either by so-called assimilation of indigenous people, or 
by creating a social gap between the indigenous elites and the popular masses."957 
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By adopting the mentality of the coloniser, leaders of independence movements perpetuate 
not only the bifurcation of society into culturally incompatible groups, but also a binary 
division between 'superior' and 'inferior' cultures. "A reconversion of minds - of mental sets -
is thus indispensable to the true integration of people into the liberation movement."958 Such 
reconversion, Cabral contends, is best achieved during the course of the struggle, "through 
daily contact with the popular masses in the communion of sacrifice required by the 
struggle." 5 The struggle itself - the mingling of peoples, ideas and practices - is the crucible 
in which the foundations of a new national culture are created. As the phrase 'upward paths' 
suggests, opting for 'reconversion' does not imply return to a frozen-in-time, traditional 
'essence'. On the contrary, Cabral emphasises the critical importance of cultural progress, and 
for that reason, singles out aspects of traditional culture that constitute impediments to 
upward growth.960 Nor is he an advocate of African cultural unanism. "The fact of 
recognising the existence of common and particular features in the cultures of African 
peoples, independent of the colour of their skin, does not necessarily imply that one and only 
one culture exists on the continent."961 
In the paper cited above, my impression is that the pivot on which Cabral's thesis turns is a 
perception of cultural synergies enabled and empowered by a national liberation struggle in 
which leaders and people engage in a process of reciprocal learning. By bringing together 
various social groups and ethnicities, the struggle encourages peasants to "break the bonds of 
the village universe" and to "acquire an infinite amount of new knowledge."962 Petty 
bourgeois leaders, for their part, re-establish contact with the deep wells of rural culture that 
"survived the storms, taking refuge in the villages, in the forests ..."963 In the final analysis, it 
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is arguable that 'class suicide' corresponds to revolutionary praxis and as such, is intrinsic to 
the maturation and delivery of a cohesive national unit that - midwifed by the struggle for 
liberation - surmounts precolonial and colonial ethnic and class divisions. As Serequeberhan 
(albeit referring specifically to Cabral's concept o f return') puts it: 
European values and skills are thus absorbed into a new synthesis. This is possible 
because in embracing the indigenous historicity - in the very act of doing so - the 
Westernised native purges himself of the Eurocentric frame that structures his 
consciousness. The 'return' is thus a two-way process of cultural filtration and 
fertilisation.964 
Cabral: conclusion 
In rounding off this section of the chapter, it is worth reiterating that Cabral's nationalist 
trajectory, while revolutionary, is not immediately or necessarily socialist. Rudebeck affirms 
that the word 'socialism' in the main is conspicuous by its absence from PAIGC documents, 
and that "according to Cabral... the achievement of a socialist society in Guinea-Bissau is 
very far in the future because Guinea-Bissau is an economically and technologically 
undeveloped agricultural country that has become under-developed through the mechanisms 
of colonial dependency."965 This said, the tenets of the ideology bequeathed by Cabral to the 
PAIGC clearly are anti-imperialist and informed by class analysis.966 
Turok, while defining Cabral as "one of the most important bearers of Marxism in Africa and 
beyond",967 concedes that Cabral never acknowledged himself as a Marxist. According to 
Davidson, Cabral disliked doctrinal labels, not least because "he considered that labels were a 
probable source of error."968 My own impression, distilled from my reading of a selection of 
his papers, as well as from assessments in the literature, is that while Cabral was well-versed 
in the theses of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he primarily was a fiercely independent thinker who 
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operated extra-paradigm in the sense that he did not fear to engage the 'threshold of 
unrespectability' (xxvii) and venture into territory uncharted by 'normal science', using his 
detailed map of Guinea-Bissau to find his way. Furthermore, like Kuhn, he believed that 
paradigm revolution entails a reconversion of mental sets. 
Cabral's critical approach to bedrock paradigmatic assumptions comes across strongly during 
the course of a paper (cited above) delivered in Havana. Addressing an audience comprising 
delegates to the first Tricontinental Conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, he highlights the Eurocentricity of Marx and Engels' contention that "the history of 
all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles"969 by posing the question ... 
... does history begin only with the development of the phenomenon of class, and 
consequently of class struggle? To reply in the affirmative ... would ... be to consider 
- and this we refuse to accept - that various human groups in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America were living without history, or outside history, at the time when they were 
subjected to the yoke of imperialism. It would be to consider that the peoples of our 
countries, such as the Balantes of Guinea, the Coaniamas of Angola and the Macondes 
of Mozambique, are still living today - if we abstract the slight influence of 
colonialism to which they have been subjected - outside history, or that they have no 
history.970 
Another example of Cabral's preference for locus-congruent ideology can be found in his 
statement that "we have certain reservations about the systematisation of phenomena ... We 
are not completely certain that, in fact, the (Cuban) scheme is absolutely adaptable to our 
conditions."971 In regard to Marxism-Leninism's universal applicability qua science, Cabral 
counterpoised an assertion that "national liberation and social revolution are not exportable 
commodities; they are, and increasingly so every day, the outcome of local and national 
elaboration, more or less influenced by external factors ... but essentially determined and 
(xxvii) See Chapter Two, p 34 
269 
formed by the historical reality of each people." In the case of Guinea-Bissau, Cabral's 
legacy - even if it did not long survive his death - in the words of Chabal was "a tough 
indigenous ideology fashioned on the ground."973 
While devoutly opposed to imperialism in all its forms, as indicated by his speech "In 
Homage to Kwame Nkrumah" in which he described Neocolonialism: The Last Stage Of 
Imperialism as "a profound, materialist analysis of reality, the terrible reality which 
neocolonialism is in Africa",974 Cabral was not inclined to emphasise externally imposed 
problematics to an extent that glossed over internal fault lines. "True, imperialism is cruel 
and unscrupulous, but we must not lay all the blame on its broad back. For, as the African 
people say: 'Rice only cooks inside the pot.'"975 Nor did he hesitate to reject European 
Marxism's preoccupation with variations on a theme of epistemological correctness. 
Speaking at the University of London to an audience composed mainly of academics, he 
responded as follows to questions regarding his paradigm affiliation: 
Is Marxism a religion? I am a freedom fighter in my country. You must judge what I 
do in practice. If you decide that it's Marxism, tell everyone that it is Marxism. If you 
decide it's not Marxism, tell them it's not Marxism. But the labels are your affair; we 
don't like those kinds of labels. People here are very preoccupied with the questions: 
Are you Marxist or not Marxist? Are you Marxist-Leninist? Just ask me, please, 
whether we are doing well in the field. Are we really liberating our people, the human 
beings in our country, from all forms of oppression? Ask me simply this, and draw 
your own conclusions.976 
Scientific Socialists. 
Cabral's refusal to succumb to the lure of an iron cage format is in marked contrast to Samora 
Machel's response to a British journalist's definition of his regime as 'Afrocommunist' - a 
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definition Machel believed belittled Frelimo's commitment to carrying out an authentic 
Marxist-Leninist revolution. 
Frelimo identifies with Marxism-Leninism as it is ... as a science of the workers ... as 
a fundamental instrument for the analysis of society ... as the greatest instrument for 
understanding class struggle. The divergencies are secondary. The great thing about 
Marxism is that, it being a science, it can adapt to all conditions. There is no African 
Marxism, Asian Marxism, European Marxism. There is only one Marxism.977 
Similarly, Lara, described by the Ottaways as the MPLA's main theorist, asserted that "for the 
MP LA there has always been only one expression of socialism, known precisely as scientific 
socialism."978 Yet in Angola, according to Bhagavan, employed wage labour in agriculture, 
mining, construction, manufacturing and services comprised less than two percent of the total 
population, and "the employed industrial proletariat, which in Marxist-Leninist theory is 
regarded as the leading revolutionary class, is even smaller, at about one percent. This 
working class is almost totally unskilled."979 Further, the peasantry - by far the largest 
percentage of the population - are "isolated in the countryside and ... involved in a class 
struggle only in so far that their sons in the armed forces are so engaged."980 Likewise, 
despite the contextual incongruities of Marxism-Leninism as official ideology, Siad Barre of 
Somalia declared that "our socialism cannot be called Somali socialism, African socialism or 
Islamic socialism ... our socialism is scientific socialism founded by the great Marx and 
Engels."981 
Nkrumah, initially an influential contributor to the notion of an indigenous African socialism, 
soon enough shifted towards a Marxist-Leninist paradigm. This especially was the case after 
elements of the Ghanaian military with CIA connivance had evicted him from office. In an 
investigation of the "real meaning" of the term 'socialism' in the context of African politics, 
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he distinguishes between two brands of socialist policy in Africa: policies "that do not really 
promote social and economic development"982 and policies that do. He compares the socialist 
divide in Africa with the split in the Second International between social democrats and 
Marxist-Leninists, and concludes that much like its social democratic forebear in Europe, 
'African socialism' is "meaningless and irrelevant"983 and that "its foreign publicists include 
not only the surviving social democrats of Europe and North America, but other intellectuals 
and liberals who themselves are steeped in the ideology of social democracy."984 
Nkrumah further depicts African socialism as espousing an historically inaccurate view that 
traditional African societies were classless, practised communalism, and were imbued with 
the spirit of humanism. Citing African cooperation with slave traders, as well as the feudal 
systems that existed in some parts of Africa before colonisation and involved profoundly 
exploitative social stratification based on the ownership of land, Nkrumah criticises the 
notion that an anthropological approach to traditional African society sufficiently has 
demonstrated the existence of classlessness.985 While conceding that there is evidence of 
principles of egalitarianism in traditional African society, he argues that the implications of 
egalitarianism "for socio-political practice have to be worked out scientifically."986 
Nkrumah maintains that in the absence of "objectively chosen policies",987 humanism is 
meaningless - hence the need for a scientific socialism which "depends on dialectical and 
historical materialism, upon the view that there is only one nature, subject in all its 
manifestations to natural laws and that human society is, in this sense, part of nature and 
subject to its own laws of development."988 Yet, while upholding the connection between a 
science of nature and a science of socialism, thus imputing the natural necessity and universal 
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applicability of scientific socialism, Nkrumah also contends that differences in the particular 
circumstances of the countries themselves necessitate that national policies are shaped by "the 
specific circumstances of a particular state at a definite historical period." He is emphatic, 
however, that the historical particularities which exist within the otherwise universal 
framework of scientific socialism cannot be equated with a supposition "that there are tribal, 
national or racial socialisms", since to so suppose would be to "abandon objectivity in favour 
of chauvinism."989 
For Nkrumah, inasmuch as African specificity exists, it is a product of the impact of Islamic 
civilisation and European colonialism on traditional African values and social organisation. 
This conjoint experience has permanently altered the complexion of African traditions. 
Present day African societies thus "are not traditional, even if backward, and they are clearly 
in a state of socio-economic disequilibrium." African societies are in this condition, Nkrumah 
contends, "because they are not anchored to a steadying ideology."990 For this reason, he 
recommends a synthesis in which "the quintessence of the human purposes of traditional 
African society reasserts itself in a modern context, in short, to socialism, through policies 
that are scientifically devised and applied."991 
Overall, Nkrumah seems to be attempting to arrive at a compromise position somewhere 
between the subjectivity of traditional African humanism and the objectivity of Marxism-
Leninism. On balance, however, he leans towards a science of social reality and away from a 
notion of African specificity in any particularly significant sense. Accordingly, despite his 
nod in the direction of human-centred African traditions, Nkrumah's notion of an anchor to 
hold African societies steady is the universally applicable ideology of Marxism-Leninism. 
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Adoption of a 'steadying ideology' seems all the more urgent in the light of the perils of neo-
colonialism, defined by Nkrumah as "the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise 
it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means 
exploitation without redress."992 Further, Nkrumah's acquaintance with dependency theory 
can be inferred from his contention that "neo-colonialism, like colonialism, is an attempt to 
export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries. The temporary success of this policy 
can be seen in the ever-widening gap between the richer and poorer nations."993 After World 
War Two, colonial policy was reorganised not least to ensure that profits gleaned from the 
colonies were channelled into metropolitan welfare states, thus modifying the worst effects of 
class antagonism in the metropoles. In consequence, "conflict between the rich and the poor 
has now been transferred on to the international scene ..." 
While, as demonstrated above, aspects of dependency theory are deployed by a number of 
radical Africanists, it would be stretching a point to portray the theory as representative of 
general consensus among dependistas. On the contrary, even neo-Marxist dependistas vary, 
for instance, in their approach to the class problematic in the Third World. Accordingly, they 
differ in their assessment of Third World revolutionary potential. Variable responses to the 
anomaly of incomplete class development are illustrated below with specific reference to the 
theses of Amin and Wallerstein. 
Amin and Wallerstein: variations on a 'world systems' theme 
A seminal passage in Unequal Development highlights the 'neo' or explicitly revised texture 
of Amin's Marxism. 
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... the general law of accumulation and of impoverishment expresses the tendency 
inherent in the capitalist mode of production, the contradiction between productive 
forces and production relations, between capital and labour. This contradiction rules 
out an analysis of the capitalist mode of production in terms of harmony, and leads us 
to understand that the quest for an ever increasing rate of surplus value in order to 
compensate for the downward trend of the rate of profit makes a harmonious 
development impossible. This law operates within a concrete historical framework. 
In Marx's time, England provided this framework because the world system was not 
yet established. Today, this framework has been enlarged to include the capitalist 
world as a whole. Hence the 'harmony' achieved here, at the centre, where the rate of 
surplus value cannot be raised, must be counter-balanced by an increasing 
'disharmony' elsewhere, at the periphery, which is made to pay for the fundamental 
contradictions of the mode.995 
According to Amin, the law of the falling rate of profit posited by Marx as a key factor in the 
demise of capitalism was the product of a specific time and place in history, as was Marx's 
contention "that no power would be able to hinder for long the local development of 
capitalism on the European model."996 The rise of monopoly capitalism, a development 
"which Marx could not imagine"997 has frustrated the fulfilment of Marx's predictions. 
Instead, capitalist survival at the centre depends on retarding the capitalist mode of 
production in the periphery. 9 
Amin pinpoints three features that "oblige us not to confuse the underdeveloped countries 
with the now-advanced countries as they were at an earlier stage of their development."999 
Firstly, extreme uneveness of productivity in the periphery that itself is the outcome of prices 
dictated at the centre; secondly, the disarticulation which is the result of the periphery's 
orientation towards the needs of the centre; thirdly, economic domination of the periphery by 
the centre, not least in the form of the dependence of underdeveloped countries on foreign 
capital.1000 The deepening pauperisation of great swathes of the population in the periphery 
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imputes that "these are the masses, in our contemporary world, 'who have nothing to lose but 
their chains.""001 
Amin completes his sequence of neo-Marxist propositions with a conclusion that doubles as a 
prediction, viz, that mass revolt at the periphery will induce a crisis of capitalism at the 
centre. He arrives at this conclusion during the course of analysis and argumentation in a 
section entitled "Social Formations at the Periphery" which is unpacked below. 
"We must try to transcend a sterile controversy.' (Emphasis added) 
The controversy to which Amin refers is between two different premises concerning the 
location of significant - because revolutionary - classes and class conflict. Firstly, "the 
contention of some that the proletariat at the centre remains the principal nucleus of the world 
proletariat." This position, contends Amin, "is not Leninist: it denies the worldwide character 
of the system." Secondly, "the thesis that suggests an opposition between bourgeois nations 
and proletarian nations" also "denies the worldwide character of the system."1003 While prima 
facie this looks like a contradiction in terms, Amin explains that the second position denies 
... the effect that the revolt at the periphery must have on conditions at the centre, and 
implies that the bourgeoisie of the periphery, equally 'exploited'... can oppose its 
counterpart at the centre. But the violence of the main revolt means precisely the 
opposite for the bourgeoisie of the periphery is obliged to make its own proletariat pay 
for the plundering for which it suffers. Furthermore ... the picture that represents the 
proletariat at the centre as being collectively privileged, and therefore necessarily in 
league with its own bourgeoisie in the exploitation of the Third World, is only an 
oversimplification of the facts. 
While on the one hand, it is true that "the proletariat at the centre receives, on average, a 
better reward than the worker at the periphery," on the other hand, "in order to counteract the 
law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall at the centre itself, capital imports labour from 
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the periphery at a lower wage ... in order to depress the labour market and thus assist in the 
process of increasing the misery of the central proletariat."1005 
"In reality, the class struggle takes place not within the context of the nation but within that of 
the world system. "1006 (Emphasis added) 
The above is Amin's statement of position. Firstly, the globalisation of labour is a product of 
the globalisation of capitalism. Secondly, given capitalism's expansion into a world system, 
the capitalist mode of production as class determinant has been replaced by "a system of 
capitalist formations, central and peripheral." Thirdly and accordingly, "the contradiction is 
not between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of each country in isolation but between the 
world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat."1007 
'The problem is: what constitutes the world bourgeoisie and the world proletariat? 'iom 
(Emphasis added) 
Amin's depiction of the constitution of the world bourgeoisie is straightforward. It comprises 
the bourgeoisie at the centre plus, at the periphery, the bourgeoisie that has been constituted 
in its wake, in other words, a parasitic class whose existence is dependent on that of the host 
class at the centre. However, the identity of the world proletariat requires a more complex 
definition which Amin provides at some length, in the process acknowledging the problem of 
incomplete class development in the periphery given its underdeveloped nature. 
For Marx, there was not the least doubt: in his time, the main nucleus of the 
proletariat was to be found at the centre. At that stage of the development of 
capitalism it was impossible to understand the full implication of what was later to 
become the colonial problem. Since the socialist revolution did not take place at that 
time at the centre, and since capitalism continued to develop and become 
monopolistic, the world conditions of the class struggle altered.1009 
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Amin then cites Lenin's prediction that the outcome of the struggle will be decided by 
"Russia, China, India etc." that is, by countries and sub-continents where the majority of the 
world's population is located, and asserts that Lenin "meant that the central nucleus of the 
proletariat henceforth lay at the periphery and not at the centre."1010 The passage quoted 
above, especially if taken in combination with Amin's rendering of Lenin's meaning, 
apparently removes the definitive historical role from the proletariat at the centre, instead 
allocating it to the proletariat in the periphery. This transfer of the revolutionary class from 
centre to periphery is explicated by Amin with reference to an alteration in capitalism's 
modus operandi. In contradistinction to Marx's time, both the rate of surplus value and the 
level of exploitation today are much higher in the periphery than at the centre. 
Overall, Amin's argument suggests that since contradictions generated by capitalism at the 
centre have been ironed out just enough to relieve the Western bourgeoisie of any immediate 
prospect of socialist revolution, revolutionary prospects have been transferred to the 
periphery. However, his conclusion raises a question, viz, how does he preserve the scientific 
integrity of socialist prospects, given the embryonic nature of the proletariat in the periphery? 
... the proletariat at the periphery takes different forms. It does not consist solely or 
even mainly of the wage earners in the large modern enterprises. It also includes the 
mass of peasants who are integrated into the world trade system and who, like the 
working class, pay the price of unequal exchange.10" 
Amin further asserts that even though the social organisation of the peasant masses "is very 
precapitalist in appearance", peasants nonetheless ... 
... have eventually become proletarianised or are on their way to suffering this fate, 
through their integration into the world market system. The peripheral structure - the 
condition for a higher rate of surplus value - also gives rise to an increasing mass of 
urban unemployed. These are the masses, in our contemporary world, 'who have 
nothing to lose but their chains.'1012 
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'Their revolt, the most important one, leads to a worsening of conditions of exploitation at 
the centre ...' (Emphasis added) 
This said, Amin does not explicitly refer to mass socialist revolutions in the periphery. 
Instead he highlights firstly, "the violence of the main revolt"1014 given extremes of suffering; 
secondly, its inevitable effect on conditions at the centre, and thirdly, an implied link, (again, 
he is not explicit) given the world-wide nature of the system, between exploited masses in the 
periphery per se, and peripheral formations at the centre, for instance, the southern half of 
Italy and the black minority in the United States.1015 
Arguably, it is possible to infer from the trend and direction of Amin's thesis that violent 
revolts in the periphery will trigger similar revolts among marginalised peoples at the centre, 
thus heralding the global demise of capitalism. At this juncture, it is worth noting that 
Amin's analysis bears comparison with Marcuse's inasmuch as both scholars locate 
immediate revolutionary potential in marginalised groups at the centre. For Marcuse, 
however, nothing indicates that it will be a good end. Amin - or so I deduce - is less 
pessimistic given his estimation that a chain of revolts in the periphery in time will lead "to a 
worsening of the conditions of exploitation at the centre, since this is the only means 
available to capitalism to compensate itself for the shrinking of its area of influence".1016 
In short, for Amin, the eventual outcome of revolts by incompletely proletarianised masses in 
the periphery, in tandem with similar uprisings on the part of marginalised groups at the 
centre, will be a significant worsening of conditions for the industrial proletariat at the centre. 
Based on his estimate, it can be surmised that the objective conditions that are a prerequisite 
for socialist revolution then will obtain - sufficiently so to rouse the bone fide working class 
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from its status quo-serving passivity, and precipitate scientifically conceived, hence 
epistemologically and methodologically correct, revolutionary action. Marx's prediction thus 
will be fulfilled, albeit in a different era with an altered configuration of revolutionary forces 
in which a series of populist revolts in the periphery ultimately trigger socialist revolution at 
the centre. 
It is arguable, then, that in the final analysis, Amin - like Lenin - relies on the decisive role of 
the scientifically socialist team at the centre. If this is the case, then Amin's version of 
dependency theory does not merit scientific Marxism's critique (xxviii) since he has found a 
way to circumvent the problem of incomplete class formation at the periphery. Nor is his 
thesis notably pessimistic since in the final analysis, he believes that objective conditions of 
capitalism at the centre will oblige the Western proletariat to reinvent themselves as a 
revolutionary class. In short, it seems reasonable to conclude that central to Amin's thesis is a 
presumption that revolts in the periphery in combination will act as a curtain raiser for the 
main event at the centre, thus preserving the integrity of a science 'upon whose maintenance 
depends the future course of the revolutionary process.' (xxix) 
Moving from Amin to Wallerstein: the latter launches a discussion of class and status in 
Africa by distinguishing between classes "au sich and fur sich."mi He argues that in Africa, 
as elsewhere, classes fur sich, that is, classes conscious of themselves as forces for change, 
exist not as axiomatic adjuncts of technological change or social transformation, but in "a far 
rarer circumstance, in a 'revolutionary' situation of which class consciousness is both the 
(xxviii) See Chapter Eight, pp 210-212 
(xxix) See Chapter Eight, p 211 
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ideological expression and the ideological pillar."1018 By contrast, in 'normal' times, "status 
group loyalties are binding and effective in a way that it seems difficult for class loyalties to 
be other than in moments of crisis".1019 Since unlike classes, status groups are not necessarily 
grounded in an economic base, they, firstly, are a transient medium of analysis; secondly, 
serve to conceal the realities of class differentiation, and thirdly, incorporate arbitrary and 
changeable lines of division, whether ethnic, religious or racial. This said, Wallerstein 
allocates significance to race inasmuch as "it is the only international status group category. It 
has replaced religion which played that role since at least the eighth century AD."1020 
Wallerstein's next step is to situate race as status group signifier within the ambit of the 
'proletarian nations'. Arguing that: "As a status group category, race is a blurred collective 
representation for an international class category, that of the proletarian nations", he 
distinguishes between racism and racial discrimination. Whereas racism refers to actions 
that maintain the existing international social structure, and thus to actions within the world 
arena, discrimination refers to actions within relatively small scale social organisations.1021 
It thus is evident that Wallerstein's conceptualisation of race is systemic.1022 Status and 
prestige in the national system cannot be viewed separately from status and rank in the world 
system since the former is a reflection, albeit in microcosm, of the latter, and "in terms of this 
international dichotomy, skin colour is irrelevant. 'White' and 'non-white' have very little to 
do with skin colour."1023 In a national setting, perceived conflict between races in actuality is 
conflict between status groups, which in turn is a reflection of international status group 
differentiation. It is when races or alternatively, ethnicities cease to operate as signifiers of 
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difference that the reality of class differentials surfaces. "If the society were to become 
ethnically 'integrated', class antagonisms would not abate; the opposite in fact is true."1024 
In sum: at both national and international levels, the objective reality of class is cloaked by 
the mystifying effects of status group categories. Further, class formation and conflict cannot 
adequately be comprehended within a context of individual nation states; instead, the world 
capitalist economy is a more apposite medium of analysis. Wallerstein argues the latter point 
as follows: 
In peripheral areas of the world-economy ... the primary contradiction is not between 
two groups within a state, each trying to gain control of that state structure or to bend 
it. The primary contradiction is between the interest organised and located in the core 
countries and their local allies on the one hand, and the majority of the population on 
the other. In point of fact, then, an 'anti-imperialist' nationalist struggle is a mode of 
expression of class interest. This is what Cabral means by using the term 'nation-
class'.1025 
As can be deduced from the above quotation, Wallerstein transfers class struggle to an 
international context in which a proletarian nation such as Guinea-Bissau is locked in conflict 
with a bourgeois nation such as Portugal, and in which the reality of objective class struggle 
has emerged - given a revolutionary situation - from behind the subjective mask of racial 
conflict. 
It is worth emphasising that Wallerstein's thesis of international class struggle does not 
necessarily assume a revolutionary outcome since postcolonial states are enmeshed in a 
systemically configured relationship with global capitalism from which it is extremely 
difficult to extricate themselves.1026 During the course of an analysis of Africa's 
incorporation into the world economy from 1975 onwards, he outlines alternative scenarios. 
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"In the coming fifty years this incorporation will take one of two forms: dependent 
development or revolutionary transformation as part of a network of forces within the world-
economy as a whole, which will further the transformation to a socialist world system."1027 
Thus, in Marcusean vein (xxx) Wallerstein posits two contradictory hypotheses. In a post 
Cold War publication, he elaborates as follows his first hypothesis: 
... states are located within a world system operating on a capitalist logic and ... if 
the state political structures ... seek to make decisions in terms of some other logic 
(and of course they often do), they will pay a heavy price for it. As a consequence, 
they will either change their mode of operation, or they will lose power or their 
capacity to affect the system.1028 
Wallerstein asserts that "this is the clear lesson to be learnt from the collapse of the so-called 
communisms."1029 
As illustrated in this section of the chapter, two versions of radical dependency theory, both 
drawing on class analysis, arrive at presumptively different conclusions. Whereas 
Wallerstein casts a measure of doubt on the scientificity of Marxism-Leninism, Amin - who 
invests heavily in Lenin - tends to affirm it. In light of this significant point of divergence 
between neo-Marxisms, it seems apposite to revisit Lenin's dubious reasoning regarding the 
colonies (xxxi) and relate it to Padmore's decision to resign from Comintern because, as he 
put it, "the oppressed Negro workers and peasants are regarded as 'revolutionary 
expendables' in the global struggle of communism against Western capitalism." (xxxii) In 
short, on the evidence cited in Chapters Eight and Nine of this dissertation, I am inclined to 
endorse Padmore's estimation. 
(xxx) See Chapter Eight, p 233 
(xxxi) See Chapter Eight, pp 225 
283 
Summary and conclusions. 
Chapters Eight and Nine, by examining schisms between varieties of Marxism in 201 century 
Europe, highlight and explicate the positivist texture of Marxism-Leninism in both its 
revolutionary and official guises. By disenabling alternate realities, and by empowering 
purportedly 'vanguard' elites, scientific Marxism not only made a significant contribution to 
despotic outcomes in postcolonial African states but also intentionally inhibited the 
emergence of ideologies adequately congruent with African contexts. Further, from the 
creation of Comintern onwards, Marxism-Leninism effectively shored up the vested interests 
of the nomenklatura in Eastern and Central Europe and thus reasonably can be defined firstly, 
as Eurocentric and secondly, as conflating the centre of truth and the centre of power. 
Humanist Marxism, however, cannot be denoted 'ideological' given its critique of positivism 
and its unabashedly normative identification with the interests of the African masses as 
distinct from their scientifically empowered elites. Nonetheless, it is arguable that in the 
process of transporting itself from highly developed home base to underdeveloped regions, 
humanist Marxism ventured into the ambiguous territory between a Utopian and an 
ideological idea. 
Prima facie, dependency theory, given its Latin American origins and subsequent adoption by 
scholar-activists elsewhere in the Third World, escapes Eurocentricity. However, I surmise 
that to the extent that a given neo-Marxist theory buys into Leninist analysis it - even if only 
implicitly - to some extent leans towards Eurocentrism, hence truth-power conflation. 
(xxxii) See Chapter Five, pi40 
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By contrast, Marcuse's and Wallerstein's respective theses are cited in Chapters Eight and 
Nine as positing, not a single, scientifically assured outcome, but two alternative scenarios. 
In other words, Wallerstein's version of dependency theory, like Marcuse's critical theory, 
avoid commitment to an exclusive version of reality. Both theses therefore elude the 
redundancy inflicted on scientific Marxism by the collapse of Soviet-style communism, and 
their critiques of capitalism and neo-imperialism are of continuing relevance in a post Cold 
War era. 
Two innovatory attempts to adjust Marxist tenets to African contexts are closely examined in 
Chapter Eight. While noting Gibson's definition of Fanon as a Marxist humanist, I offer no 
opinion regarding Fanon's presumed position within Marxist categories. Rather, I suggest 
that aspects of his thesis bear comparison with Bakunin's version of anarchism. Accordingly, 
I argue that - Fanon's astute and enduringly relevant critique of neo-colonial states 
notwithstanding - his substitution of violence for science failed to adequately address issues 
of political legitimacy and social cohesion in post-independence Algeria. Conversely, 
Cabral's detailed and substantive analysis of conditions in Guinea-Bissau launched a process, 
tragically stalled by his assassination, of addressing precisely these issues. 
Overall, Section Two of the dissertation engages with a seminal feature of social science 
discourse in decolonising and postcolonial Africa, namely, a binarised and exclusionary ethos 
generated by two competing sciences of social reality. Both sciences are rooted in 19th 
century European positivism, and both are informed by Cold War superpower rivalry. 
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While the above is a greatly simplified rendition of Section Two's paradigm and literature 
review, it usefully highlights a formative outcome of Cold War era obsession with social 
scientific verities, viz, the reduction of socio-cultural values in Africa to their conformity or 
non-conformity with developmental imperatives. Arguably, the reductionism practiced by 
exogenous paradigms was instrumental in the construction of a normative vacuum, duly filled 
by a host of developmental regimes that were equivalent to dictatorships, whether denoted 
'capitalist' or 'communist'. 
Since the dissertation takes the view that a quest for an alternative, locus-specific route to 
political legitimacy and social cohesion in effect also is a quest for an interstitial, substantive 




CASE STUDY AND CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER TEN 
UJAMAA IN TANZANIA 
For purposes of this dissertation, Ujamaa in Tanzania is conceptualised as a sustained attempt 
to escape ideological and epistemological binaries generated firstly, by the 'either communist 
or capitalist' ethos of the Cold War;1030 secondly, by two dominant and competing sciences of 
social reality that - notwithstanding their incommensurability in other respects - share a 
notion of scientifically-empowered elites that imputes, as residual category, an unscientific 
(or pre-scientific) 'other'. It is argued in this chapter that by situating Tanzanian (and 
African) specificities within a wider context of human commonality, Ujamaa is emblematic 
of a substantive, interstitial space that, while neither A nor non-A, contains elements of both. 
It is further averred that - not least given the innovation-disenabling constraints of the time -
the success of Ujamaa in its capacity as a politically legitimating and socially cohesive 
ideology reasonably can be judged in terms of Tanzania's avoidance of the military takeovers, 
personal dictatorships and, in general, excessively harsh authoritarian regimes that have 
disfigured postcolonial states in Africa. 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of key events and issues in (Cold War era) 
Tanzania. It then moves on firstly, to situate the country within paradigmatic discourse, and 
secondly, to explore the colonial and postcolonial contexts from which Ujamaa ideology 
emerged. The chapter then focuses on the political thought of Julius Nyerere in his capacity 
as Ujamaa's main spokesperson. 
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Overview. 
In 1961, mainland Tanganyika gained independence from the British in their role as United 
Nations' mandated trustee. A predominantly non-violent drive for freedom from colonialism 
had been spearheaded by the country's pre-eminent party of liberation, Tanganyika African 
National Union (TANU) led by Julius Kambarage Nyerere. In the independence elections, 
TANU gained all but one of the seats in the national legislature. In 1963, TANU followed the 
route most travelled by nationalist parties of liberation in post-independence Africa by 
implementing legislation that converted the country from de facto to dejure one party rule. 
In 1964, Tanganyika entered into a loose federal union with three offshore islands, Zanzibar, 
Pemba and Mafia (generically known as 'Zanzibar'). The union, while solving some pressing 
difficulties, also generated potential sources of conflict, for instance, a large admixture of 
Muslims to the mainland's predominantly Christian (except for the coastal area) population. 
Further, a source of tension for the mainland with its comparatively open political system and 
far better than usual human rights record, were the dictatorial methods and human rights 
abuses deployed by Zanzibar's ruling Revolutionary Council under the somewhat dubious 
leadership of Abeid Karume. 
In general, the presence of two major, monotheistic religions in the new United Republic of 
Tanzania, together with an assortment of historically and linguistically differentiated ethnic 
groups were potential arenas of national disunity - a situation exacerbated by the oppressive 
trajectory of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council.1031 Another - and abiding - problematic was 
that post-independence Tanzania's condition of economic underdevelopment was more than 
usually severe.1032 
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However, while adopting an at the time standard one-party solution to potential and actual 
problematics of historical, ethnic and religious differences in tandem with chronic economic 
underdevelopment, Tanzania pursued the road less travelled by formulating and attempting to 
implement an ideology that combined humanist socialist premises with country-specific 
elaboration and articulation. In the process, Nyerere and TANU developed a socialist theory 
that while opposing capitalism, eschewed Marxism.1033 This project is all the more 
remarkable in that it was embarked upon and subsequently sustained in the teeth both of the 
polarising trajectory of the Cold War and of overwhelming tendencies in postcolonial Africa 
either to adopt authoritarian vanguard solutions to problematics of 'nation-building', or to 
take a capitalist route, ideologically - and somewhat contradictorily -justified by an 
authoritarian-elite overlay of African cultural nationalism. Even John Saul, a rigorously 
Marxist commentator on ideology in Tanzania, retrospectively concedes that "Where Nyerere 
saw further than most... was in the fact that he complemented his nationalism ... with his 
own version of a socialist analysis and a socialist vision."1034 
The 'socialist vision' to which Saul refers is Ujamaa socialism. Explaining why the word 
' Ujamaa'' was chosen, Nyerere highlighted two main reasons. "First, it is an African word 
and thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to follow. Second, its literal 
meaning is 'family-hood', so that it brings to the mind of our people the idea of mutual 
involvement in the family as we know it."1035 
Cold War era Tanzania was atypical in a number of ways, not least in its post Arusha 
Declaration focus on rural development.1036 Rural socialism - in its ideal form - typified 
relationships of mutual respect combined with communal ownership, production and 
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marketing, all conducted within an economically self-sufficient environment. In other words, 
it was intended to be an updated, materially more productive and consciously socialist version 
of traditional village life. As Mukandala notes, in every ideology are embedded institutions 
distinctive to it. The Ujamaa village thus was a distinctive institution of ideology in 
Tanzania.1037 
Tanzania in paradigmatic context. 
"The struggle between Marxism and bourgeois ideology is the dominating ideological 
struggle of our time.'"038 Shivji's statement, issued in his capacity as a Marxist critic of 
Tanzania's 'unscientific' brand of socialism, is emblematic of a (predominantly) Cold War 
era binarisation of ideology and epistemology in decolonising and postcolonial Africa. 
Shivji's assertion also is applicable to debates between 'bourgeois' and 'Marxist' scholars in 
Africa. That many of these debates were conducted in - and about - Tanzania testifies both 
to the comparatively open and flexible nature of TANU - subsequently re-named Chama cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM))1039 and to the ideology propagated by the party. 
It is noteworthy, however, that much of the discourse emerging from Tanzania during the era 
under review was socialist of one category or another. A key distinction, then, was between 
Marxist and non-Marxist socialists - although, as Siddiqui observes, Marxist perspectives in 
Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, could not be described as uniform.1040 Having noted that in 
the 1960s, both the University of Dar es Salaam and the Tanzanian civil service appointed a 
number of Marxist and non-Marxist scholars to research and advisory positions, and having 
referred to controversies between the two groups, Siddiqui settles for the terms 'Marxist 
socialist' and 'democratic socialist'. Whereas the latter, on the whole, were sympathetic to 
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TANU's efforts to create and implement Ujamaa socialism, the former were inclined towards 
a more critical view.1041 "Marxist socialist scholars ... hoped that TANU would be 
transformed into a Marxist vanguard party."1042 
Referring to the above-mentioned groups, Pratt makes an initial distinction between 
'vanguard' and 'democratic' socialists. He notes, however, that by-and-large the Marxist 
camp is too diverse to fit an umbrella category of 'vanguard'. On consideration, he, like 
Siddiqui, opts for the labels 'Marxist socialist' and 'democratic socialist'.1043 In a subsequent 
publication, Pratt observes that - given the relative decline of the American dominated 
structural-functional school from the late 1960s onwards - the best example of an active and 
influential school of analysis "is provided by radical scholars broadly identifiable as 
Marxists."1044 Elaborating the term 'school of analysis', Pratt defines it as an active body of 
scholars who share a notion of what is important in their study, along with a view of how it 
should be studied.1045 While taking schools of analysis within social science as givens, he 
highlights a potentially negative outcome, namely, "an uncritical acceptance of ideas and data 
which are commonplace within the writings of the school ..."1046 More specifically, Pratt 
alludes to a bedrock assumption prevalent among Marxist commentators that party and 
government leaders in Tanzania constitute a new ruling class that serves its own interests in 
tandem with the interests of international capitalism. He cites - as a case in point - Issa 
Shivji's publication, The Silent Class Struggle}041 
Perusal of Shivji's work reveals the compatibility of his thesis with aspects of dependency 
theory. He contends that Tanzania's petty-bourgeois leadership incorporates an "economic 
bureaucracy which in turn is allied with the international bourgeoisie." As long as Tanzania's 
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economy remains the appendage of imperialism, Marxist strategies to defeat rural capitalism 
or to take militant decisions will "ultimately mean nothing."1048 Tanzania's economic (or 
bureaucratic) bourgeoisie is too dependent on the international bourgeoisie to merit the label 
'national bourgeoisie'. It is for this reason, Shivji avers, that the struggle against imperialism 
is at the same time a class struggle, both against the international bourgeoisie and against "its 
allies, the local dependent bourgeoisie."1049 
Freund commends Shivji's thesis that Tanzania is a capitalist society marked by class 
differentiation and class struggle. However, he targets Shivji's "too uncritical endorsement of 
'underdevelopment theory.""050 Freund's view of socialism in Tanzania is that it is an 
attempt to apply an ideology of Utopian socialism - as distinct from the scientific variety - "to 
African social conditions by a petty bourgeoisie caught between the values of Tanzanian 
workers and peasants on the one hand and industrial capital on the other."1051 In 
contradistinction to Pratt's assertion that authoritarian tendencies within TANU have been 
counter-balanced by a democratic tendency within Tanzanian political culture "that Nyerere 
has nurtured"1052, Freund contends that grassroots "popular radical culture" in Tanzania is a 
significant factor weighing against right-wing fractions within the regime, and furthermore, 
that this culture has not been nurtured 'from above' by Nyerere. On the contrary, it is "part of 
a sub-continental upheaval, an awakening of a large and extremely oppressed working class, 
in the wake of which class struggle in Tanzania is certain to play its part."1053 By inference, 
then, Freund views Tanzania as a cameo representation of the big picture of class struggle in 
Africa. By extension, Ujamaa socialism is of no particular consequence in the wider scheme 
of things. 
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Freund's thesis is in sharp contrast, for instance, with Bennett's depiction of Tanzania as "a 
country boldly experimenting in democracy and socialism when so many other parts of the 
continent have descended into chaos."1054 In similar vein, Lonsdale asserts the significance of 
Tanzanian specificity: 
.. .Tanzania was virtually alone among the independent nations of Africa in thinking 
through the institutional arrangements for bridging the gap between the governing and 
political elites on the one hand and the common man on the other. Early in ... 1966, 
it seemed that much of the rest of Africa was turning to an alternative means of 
combating the instability that resulted from this gap - namely, the military coup.1055 
As already mentioned, literature emanating from and / or about Cold War era Tanzania 
broadly speaking was embedded in socialist discourse. However, as briefly demonstrated 
above, scholars and commentators were sharply divided in their interpretations of Tanzania's 
postcolonial regime and the ideology it promoted. Arguably, such divisions can be traced 
back to the Second International, and the split between Marxist-Leninists and - as Lenin put 
it - 'the yellow Social Democratic parties', (xxxiii) 
Nyerere's awareness of- and reservations about - application by scholars of paradigms 
whose point of origin is Europe is evidenced by an aspect of his opening speech at the 
International Congress on African History, convened at the University of Dar es Salaam in 
1965. 
I am not saying that the 'non-alignment' of Africa's policies is strictly applicable to 
your subject of discussion. But I am asking that those who adhere to the Marxist 
philosophy of history, and those who adhere to various Western philosophies, should 
both examine honestly the strict applicability of their approach to our problems. An 
exchange of pre-formulated views would be a waste of a great opportunity; what is 
required here is a discussion and a thinking aloud, by scholars of different 
(xxxiii) See Chapter Eight, p 221 
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persuasions, about the extent to which their own approach has proved valid and useful 
in the context of African evidence of history.1056 
Nyerere's distinction between political non-alignment in the struggle between communist and 
capitalist blocs on the one hand, and on the other, scholarship informed by paradigms of 
European origin, indicates that just as adherents of'various Western philosophies' were not 
necessarily supportive of American-style capitalist democracy, nor were Marxists operating in 
Tanzania necessarily admirers of Soviet-style socialism - a point applicable to radical 
Africanists in general. Thus, the Soviet critique of African socialism - a genre of ideology 
which, in the early 1960s, was one of Nyerere's points of departure - represents the official 
ideology of the Soviet bloc as distinct from the wider discourse of Marxist scholarship. 
The Soviet perspective 
Potekhin provides an overview of the Soviet perspective. Briefly put, his thesis runs as 
follows. African countries have a great deal of catching up to do owing to the backward 
condition in which colonialism left them. There are two 'catch-up' paths available: one is 
capitalist - a path defined by economic injustice and social ills. Potekhin quotes the 
Communist Party Programme to the effect that "Capitalism is the road of suffering for the 
people. " l057 The other path to development is scientific socialism. 
Potekhin then confronts the argument that given Africa's underdeveloped condition, objective 
conditions necessary for the accomplishment of scientific socialist objectives are not present. 
He contends that on the contrary, "any honest person"1058 would concede that requisite 
conditions indeed obtain, foremost among them the existence of the world socialist system 
led by the Soviet Union. Not only can socialist countries in Africa depend on the aid and 
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expertise of their forerunners on the scientific socialist path, but also there is a wealth of 
theory available for the purpose. While conceding that "there is no detailed theory of 
noncapitalist development in the works of Marx and Engels", Potekhin maintains that "Lenin 
and his successors were responsible for such a theory."1059 He further contends that "there 
exists in Africa an intelligentsia which has mastered the scientific principles of socialism and 
is ready to devote all its strength and knowledge for the good of its people."1060 In this 
respect, he commends Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party (CPP) for abandoning the 
illusions of African socialism, for example, the notion that it is possible to recreate the 
classlessness of Africa's remote past. "The new CPP programme adopted in 1962 
acknowledges that its ideology 'is based on scientific socialism'."1061 
Potekhin denies that scientific socialism necessarily connotes complete uniformity, and cites 
Cuba as a prime example of the successful application of Marxist-Leninist formulae in the 
Third World. "Why" he asks, "are people who sincerely wish to build a socialist society ... 
unwilling to accept the scientific theory of socialism, tested in practice, and instead engage in 
a search for some other kind of socialist theory?"1062 He argues that the main answer to this 
question lies in "the effect of anti-communist propaganda."1063 He includes Western social 
democrats in the category of anti-communist propagandists, and perceives the democratic 
socialism of the British Labour party, for instance, as false socialist theory which "has created 
much confusion about true socialism."1064 Potekhin wraps up his polemic by quoting Lenin. 
"The great historical service rendered by the founders of scientific socialism is that they 
substituted science for dreams."1065 In sum, as Klinghoffer observes, the position taken by 
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Potekhin and other Soviet scholars was that the nations of Africa must proceed to either 
capitalism or socialism. "There is no third path."1066 
Modernisation and the World Bank 
While Soviet aid to postcolonial Tanzania was relatively minimal,1067 not least, perhaps, 
because Nyerere explicitly rejected the 'revealed truth' of scientific socialism, the same 
cannot be said of the World Bank. The significance of Tanzania's protracted engagement 
with World Bank programmes, more specifically with regard to the distinction between 
'ujamaa' and 'development' villages, is highlighted by Mukangara. Referring to a period of 
intensive villagisation beginning in 1973, he associates the shift from an era of "voluntary 
Ujamaa-isation,, to a somewhat less voluntary exercise in the creation of development 
villages with "the thinking of the World Bank." He adds: 
I want to stress this because people have usually thought that villagisation in Tanzania 
was purely the act of the state of Tanzania. It was not. The idea came from them, 
that's true, but it was fully supported by the World Bank ... which is why I've usually 
argued that villagisation in Tanzania was not collectivisation. It wasn't. This is a 
point I want to emphasise.1068 
Mukangara observes that for the better part of a decade, "the idea of Ujamaa villages had 
been voluntary. From the early '70s, it stops being voluntary - the idea of villagisation, not 
Ujamaa villages. They now called it development villages."1069 
During the period to which Mukangara refers, 13.5 million people were moved from their 
scattered rural homesteads and resettled in approximately 7,500 villages. The operation was 
preceded by a World Bank 'fact finding' mission to Tanzania in 1973. In 1978, by which 
time resettlement was complete, the World Bank allocated approximately $600 million worth 
of credits and loans to Tanzania.1070 
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According to Mukangara, the massive resettlement of scattered homesteaders was in accord 
both with the welfare needs (free provision of primary education, health care, clean water, 
electricity and so on) of rural people, and with the objectives of a socialist regime that "never 
abandoned the idea of the welfare of the people."1071 He further notes that the scheme was not 
applied in the comparatively well-off Kilimanjaro district, where agricultural production was 
sufficiently well organised, not least because the population was not scattered. In general, 
while emphasising that the resettlement exercise was coercive, Mukangara seems to perceive 
viUagisation as - in the final analysis - commensurate with rural welfare requirements.1072 
This said, he highlights an important distinction between on the one hand, welfare provision 
enabled by the creation of development villages, and on the other hand, fulfilment of 
Tanzanian socialist ideology in the form of Ujamaa villages - a separate and "very rare 
species" of which the World Bank "were not at all supportive."1073 
Coulson and Scott respectively contend that modernisation theory informed the trajectory of 
World Bank supported programmes in developing countries. Scott links the underlying logic 
of enforced viUagisation with a 1961 World Bank report associated with Tanzania's first Five 
Year Plan. The report, observes Scott, "was laced with the era's standard discourse about 
having to overcome the habits and superstitions of a backward and obstinate peasantry. The 
report also doubted whether persuasion alone would get the job done."1074 In regard the 
transformation of peasant attitudes, the report warned that it well might prove necessary to 
resort to "enforcement or coercive measures of an appropriate sort."1075 Coulson, referring to 
British colonial policy as well as postcolonial World Bank reports, contends that both 
colonial and World Bank development plans drew on "the ideology of 'modernisation theory' 
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or 'dualism', which distinguishes between the 'modern' and the 'traditional: everything 
'modern' (or Western) is good, while the traditional is bad."1076 
Citing the striking parallels between villagisation in postcolonial Tanzania and late colonial 
policies of economic development in East Africa as a whole,1077 Scott suggests that both the 
Tanzanian government and World Bank planners had failed to learn from the abject failure of 
colonial exercises in large-scale, across-the-board agricultural planning that omitted to take 
into account local specificities and knowledges. Thus, colonial and postcolonial 
developmental endeavours were informed by a science of modernisation that was abstract and 
teleological. Applied uncritically in widely divergent settings, it had disastrous results.1078 
Reinforcing the point, Hobart argues that a largely neglected aspect of severe developmental 
crises in the Third World is the part played in such disasters by Western scientific 
knowledge.1079 For instance, modernisation theory's categories of'traditional' and 'modern' 
are teleologically constructed, that is, defined by reference to the dominant category, itself 
derived from an assumption that the means to progress is scientific knowledge that "requires 
the homogenisation and quantifiability of what is potentially qualitatively different."1080 
Further, modernisation theory views society or culture as an obstacle to change,1081 thus 
imputing coercive measures as a necessary element in the modernisation of traditional 
societies. 
In sum, 'Operation Planned Villages' reasonably can be regarded as a coercive, science-
centred blot on the otherwise humanist and voluntarist landscape of ideology in Tanzania. 
However, it is worth noting firstly, that the exercise was conducted in accordance with the 
only politically 'neutral' developmental alternative to scientific socialism available at the 
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time. Secondly, that failure to achieve the desired economic objectives was at least as much 
the responsibility of a Western science of modernisation and its World Bank adherents as it 
was the responsibility of internal policy formulation and implementation. Thirdly, as Scott -
who in general is highly critical of villagisation as rural developmental blueprint - concedes, 
extensive research and concomitant critical onslaughts were then, and still are facilitated by 
"the relatively open character of Tanzanian political life."1082 
The relative openness of political life in Tanzania not least was the product of a relatively 
open ruling party. In this respect, McHenry's distinction between 'ideological' and 
'pragmatic' socialists is instructive as it highlights the variegated ideological texture of the 
ruling party, ranging from "radical ideological socialists who differ little from Marxists to 
conservative pragmatic socialists who differ little from capitalists."1083 Additionally, Tordoff 
and Mazrui refer to "committed Maoists" within the party.1084 A picture thus emerges of a 
political party able to accommodate a number of ideological trends, some of them distinctly 
oppositional. Locating the intermediate terrain between competing ideologies, and then 
utilising it to inform the overall purpose and direction of governance is a task fraught with 
difficulties - yet between independence in 1961 and his resignation as Tanzania's President in 
1985, Nyerere walked this delicate line. His accomplishment played no small part in holding 
both party and country together despite, for instance, the exacerbation by a revolution in 
Zanzibar of extant internal and external tensions. 
Since the actually and potentially disruptive effects for the mainland of the 1964 Zanzibari 
revolution are closely related to problematics passed forward by colonialism, the next section 
of the chapter illustrates the contexts from which TANU's ideology emerged. 
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Colonial-postcolonial problematics. 
At independence in 1961, mainland Tanzania (at that time still known as Tanganyika) was 
one of the poorest, most underdeveloped countries in the world.1085 It in the main comprised a 
rural society living in scattered settlements and practising subsistence agriculture.1086 
However, there were pockets of indigenous commercial farming - encouraged by the colonial 
administration - such as Kilimanjaro district and the Ismani region of Iringa district. In 
Ismani, for instance, the development of large farms utilising mechanised means of 
production and relying on hired labour had generated a distinction between a landed and a 
labouring class.1087 Settler owned and managed plantations (coffee, rubber and sisal) had 
introduced a third type of agricultural production, in this case with racially differentiated 
categories of 'landed' and 'labouring'. In the main, however, the British had restricted the 
expansion of settlers. 
Iliffe notes that had Tanganyika remained part of German imperial territory, it would have 
become a settler colony since the German administrators "wanted their colony to be a white 
man's country like Rhodesia or Kenya ... Only the expulsion of the Germans after the First 
World War prevented this."1088 While the British, in their capacity as League of Nations 
(followed by United Nations) mandated trustee, limited the alienation of rural Tanzanians 
from their land, this did not mean that subsistence farmers necessarily were free from British 
interference. On the contrary, colonial intervention in farming methods and production 
techniques caused indignation and resistance.1089 
The potential for nationalist - as distinct from local - resistance to colonial rule in the rural 
areas was increased in 1951 when, in a departure from their usual procedure, the British 
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evicted more than 3,000 Meru from their land and replaced them with Europeans. The Meru 
Lands case was taken up by the predecessor - the Tanganyikan African Association (TAA) -
of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and utilised to stimulate nationalist 
opposition to British rule. As one of the TAA leaders put it: "The eviction woke our Meru 
people up to the indignity of being ruled without our consent by foreigners. Now we are 
going to wake up all of Tanganyika."1090 
According to Cliffe and Cunningham, however, rural Tanzanians in the main "do not harbour 
a deep bitterness as a result of oppression and exploitation", given that - with the exception 
of a few expatriate owned units - the colonial mainland harboured no large estates. 
Distinguishing between post-independence Tanzania on the one hand, and on the other, Cuba 
and the People's Republic of China, they contend that there is no "burning demand for land 
redistribution."1091 
Arguably, then, it was in the towns - which at independence contained less than 10% of the 
mainland's population - that the injustice of racial discrimination most strongly was felt. For 
instance, at independence, only 547 of about 4,000 middle and higher-level government posts 
were held by Africans, and the British had left a legacy of minimal educational provision for 
Africans.1092 Less than 15 Africans had completed their degrees at Makarere University in 
Uganda (at that time, the only tertiary institution in East Africa that issued University of 
London degrees). The newly independent country had 1 African civil engineer (compared 
with 83 from European and Asian minorities); 16 African physicians (compared with 168 
from minority races); no African mechanical engineers (compared with 52 from minority 
races)1093 ... and so the list continues, painting a stark picture of protracted discrimination 
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against an overwhelming majority of Africans, with bleak implications for the newly 
independent state. As Coulson and Leys respectively emphasise, Tanzania's national and 
developmental prospects were in the hands of a tiny political and administrative elite,1094 
TANU's mass base notwithstanding. 
Intra-TANU disputes 
Furthermore, this miniscule (relative to overall population) elite group by no means was fully 
supportive of Nyerere's policies firstly, of pre-independence negotiation and compromise 
with the British, and secondly, of post-independence non-racism. In regard to the first arena 
of contestation, Sungura recollects the opposition encountered by Nyerere at a 1958 TANU 
general meeting, convened in Tabora "to discuss responsible government.'"095 More 
specifically, the meeting focussed on the British administration's insistence on holding 
elections during the run-up to full independence in which each constituency would elect one 
African, one Asian and one European member to the Legislative Assembly. As Sungura 
recalls it: 
The colonialists said that they would think of giving us independence and freedom if 
we agreed on three votes. Some of us didn't understand Mwalimu - why was he 
agreeing to vote on three separate rolls? We were after all fighting for the 
independence of the Africans and we didn't want to be given conditions by 
colonialists ... Despite the great difficulty, we finally reached agreement for the three 
votes ... after all, we did have white supporters.1096 
In regard to the second arena of contestation, a proposal, put before the first independence 
parliament in 1961, to extend automatic citizenship to people of any race born in the country, 
and having one parent born in the country, generated an equivocal response. As Leys notes, 
while the proposal was "in keeping with the non-racialist philosophy of Mr. Nyerere",1097 its 
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elevated sponsorship did not prevent heated debate. One TANU MP in particular made an 
impassioned speech against the proposal: 
I think 75% of the non-Africans in Tanganyika still regard an African in Tanganyika 
as an inferior human being. Why is it so? It is because the white population has been 
dominating us, both economically and politically, and their neighbours, the Asians too 
have been economically dominating us, we Africans ... Do you think the ordinary 
African forming the vast majority of the population will agree to have equal rights 
with the Europeans and the Asians? My answer is No.1098 
Nyerere's response to the above and other objections also is worth quoting: 
Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly what we have 
been fighting against. This is what we have formed TANU for ... and so soon, so 
soon, ... some of my friends have forgotten it. Now they are preaching 
discrimination, colour discrimination, as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers 
and begin to glorify the race ... These people are telling us exactly what Verwoerd 
says: 'The circumstances of South Africa are different'. This is the argument used by 
the racialists. My friend here ... talks as if it is perfectly alright to discriminate 
against the whites, against the Indians, against the Arabs, against the Chinaman. It is 
wrong when you discriminate against a black man.1099 
Whereas Iliffe highlights TANU's strengths and merits as a nationalist movement,"00 Leys 
contends that the relative ease of TANU's rise to prominence as the country's pre-eminent 
party of national liberation to an extent was responsible for subsequent altercations and 
divisions between party members. Citing evidence of large promises made by a number of 
TANU candidates to their electoral constituencies, Leys points out that the country's endemic 
poverty made it impossible for the newly elected government to fulfil expectations of rapid 
economic advance. Outcomes were heightened social tensions and a search for scapegoats, 
reflected in the party by a split "between the political leaders who formed the new cabinet and 
so became responsible for the limitations of the government, and those outside, including 
some who had made the largest promises to their followers."1101 
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Poverty and underdevelopment 
At this juncture in the discussion, a post-independence condition of widespread and endemic 
poverty - not least a product of a British policy of "benign neglect"1102 - requires emphasis. 
As already noted, while the countryside contained a limited number of comparatively well-off 
commercial farmers, known in the lexicon of World Bank-style modernisation as 'progressive 
farmers' in contradistinction to scientific socialism's 'kulaks', a majority of rural Tanzanians 
were subsistence farmers. Given the concentration of the population in the rural areas, and 
the deliberately slow pace of colonial-era industrial and urban growth in conjunction with the 
exclusion of Africans from commercial and business opportunities, only a limited amount of 
class differentiation occurred under first German, and then British rule. While a working 
class was in the process of formation, it was very small, if increasingly well-organised.1103 
Moreover, as Coulson points out, at independence the working class "was not predominantly 
an industrial working class, since there were so few industries. The independent country 
would have to arrange most of its own industrialisation in the highly competitive world 
markets of the 1960s and 1970s, starting from a virtually non-existent base.""04 
In regard to the country's extremely low quality of life index (QLI), Legum supplies further 
details of material deprivation and daily struggle for survival. For instance, in 1962, the 
infant mortality rate was 225 per 1,000 live births, and adult life expectancy was 35."°5 As 
Nyerere himself put it: "Our country is bedevilled by its present poverty; people are sick, 
ignorant, and live in very poor conditions because we do not produce enough wealth to be 
able to eradicate these evils.""06 
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To sum up: it is evident that the issue of improvement in economic conditions and, in general, 
material welfare was immediate and urgent. Moreover, as noted, popular expectations had 
been raised by large promises embedded in nationalist discourse. Tensions and divisions 
generated by these issues then were exacerbated by army mutiny on the mainland and 
revolution in Zanzibar. 
Armed revolts and Cold War tensions 
The army mutiny of 1964 was precipitated by inadequate salaries for soldiers in tandem with 
retention of British officers who continued to dominate the army hierarchy. Demands were 
for increased pay, plus the rapid Africanisation of the officer corps. As Pratt puts it: "During 
the five days of uncertainty and irresolute leadership which followed the mutiny, the fragility 
of the power base of Nyerere's government was painfully revealed.""07 
Coulson links the mutiny with the increasing militancy of trade union leaders who were 
campaigning for immediate nationalisation of the sisal industry, as well as much more rapid 
Africanisation of the civil service."08 However, the potential for concerted action on the part 
of mutineers and trade unionists was obviated by the army's lack of a plan to take over the 
state. In consequence, four days after the mutiny began, its leaders "were only beginning to 
negotiate with the more militant trade union leaders.""09 The implications of such 
negotiations precipitated Nyerere's request for British military assistance. The arrival of a 
contingent of British marines effectively terminated the mutiny. According to Karioki, 
"Nyerere was deeply humiliated by the mutiny" given that "to invite the ex-colonial master to 
quell the rebellious army of an independent and proud country was indeed a humbling 
experience."1"0 A second request for military back-up was made, this time to the 
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Organisation of African Unity (OAU) who responded by sending Nigerian troops to replace 
the British contingent. 
Another and costly crisis for the newly independent mainland was a revolution in Zanzibar 
which violently ousted a tradition of autocratic Arab leadership - shored up by the British 
during the period when Zanzibar was a British protectorate - and replaced it with a 
Revolutionary Council led by Karume, comprising members both of the Afro-Shirazi party 
(ASP) and Babu's militant Umma party. According to Pratt, Nyerere had warned the British 
that if- at independence for Zanzibar in 1964 - they continued to facilitate concentration of 
power in an Arab-led minority elite, they would "bequeath to Zanzibar an extremely unstable 
situation.""" As Lofchie explains, the origin of Zanzibar's instability was "the pattern of 
racial inequality in its social structure." Land ownership was monopolised by a small 
minority of Arab descent. Additionally, "the presence of an Asian minority ... which 
monopolised virtually all of the middle-class positions in the society prevented Africans from 
achieving all but a few of the intermediate and clerical positions in government and 
commerce."1"2 Historically divisive problematics of race and class thus were exacerbated by 
British manipulation of electoral processes, and hence of the outcome of Zanzibar's 
independence election, Nyerere's warning notwithstanding. 
Not only did a violent outbreak of revolutionary socialism in Zanzibar operate as a 
contributory factor to army mutiny on the mainland,"13 it also pulled Nyerere and TANU into 
the centripetal trajectory of the Cold War. Whereas the ousted, Arab-dominated Zanzibar 
Nationalist Party (ZNP) had been the beneficiary of continuing British involvement in 
Zanzibari affairs, the new regime and its Revolutionary Council acquired almost instant 
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political recognition and offers of material support from Soviet bloc countries. Clearly, the 
revolution in Zanzibar was regarded as a victory for vanguard-style socialism and, 
accordingly, as a defeat for the West. 
However, at this critical juncture in the build-up of Cold War tensions off the mainland's 
coastline, Nyerere decisively intervened. A few months after the revolution, "suddenly and 
without prior announcement, Nyerere and Karume announced that they had signed an 
agreement of union between their two countries.""14 In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
Karume lobbied for support of the merger by the Revolutionary Council at a time when the 
lead figure (Babu) of the Council's particularly militant element was out of the country. 
Supporters of scientific socialism (or, in Pratt's phrase, "the communist left""15) regarded the 
union of mainland and islands, jointly renamed the United Republic of Tanzania, with 
dismay. In Rey's perception, for instance, "it seemed that the brightest spark in Africa had 
been snuffed when the news came through of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar anschluss"U]6 
Nonetheless, Rey glimpses light at the end of the tunnel. Citing among other factors the 
inclusion - Babu among them - of five members of the Revolutionary Council in the Union 
cabinet, he contends that "there is a good chance that the Union will lead to the 'spreading' of 
the Zanzibar revolution.. .""'7 According to McHenry, however, the union between mainland 
and islands did not - as things turned out - signify an advance in the vanguardist cause given 
that both Karume and Nyerere "feared the consequences of the rise of a militant left in 
Zanzibar.""18 Babu himself subsequently argued that by providing Marxists in the newly 
appointed Union cabinet with the appearance but not the substance of power, Nyerere "used 
the appointments to weaken the progressive forces.""19 
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It seems evident that Nyerere acted not least to contain and thereafter manage the potential of 
the situation in Zanzibar to exacerbate extant race and class based dissonances on the 
mainland. Additionally, given Nyerere's critique of scientific socialism along with the 
Leninist notion of a vanguard party,"20 Marxist-Leninist members of a merged cabinet were 
unlikely to find themselves in a particularly enabling environment. However, Nyerere's 
intervention to reduce the likelihood of violent upheavals on the mainland did not necessarily 
situate Tanzania in a Western ideological camp. Rather, his commitment to non-alignment 
was underlined by the Tanzanian government's refusal to succumb to the Hallstein doctrine, 
according to which West Germany would sever relations with any state that established 
diplomatic relations with East Germany.1121 Instead, Nyerere offered a compromise: East 
Germany would be permitted to open a consulate in Dar es Salaam (now the capital of the 
Union), thus keeping open lines of communication between the two countries, but without 
actually committing Tanzania to political recognition of the East German government. West 
Germany rejected the compromise, and withdrew from mainland Tanzania a substantial 
amount of financial aid and technical advice."22 
Nyerere subsequently summed up the absurdity of Cold War-driven intransigence: 
"The current position ... is that Tanzania does not recognise East Germany: it recognises 
West Germany and has an ambassador from Bonn in Dar es Salaam. Aid from East Germany 
continues to arrive in one part of the union: no aid comes from the West German government 
to any part of the Union.""23 
Finally in this section on colonial - postcolonial problematics, Tanzania's status as a 'nation' 
was not something that Nyerere and TANU could afford to take for granted since, like the 
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vast majority of postcolonial states in Africa, Tanzania was the artificial product of imperial 
design. In a 1966 speech delivered at the inauguration ceremony of the University of Zambia, 
Nyerere addressed a key dilemma for proponents of Pan-African unity: 
None of the nation states of Africa are 'natural' units. Our present boundaries are ... 
the result of European decisions at the time of the scramble for Africa. They are 
senseless; they cut across ethnic groups, often disregard natural physical divisions, 
and result in many different language groups being encompassed within a state. If the 
present states are not to disintegrate it is essential that deliberate steps are taken to 
foster a feeling of nationhood."24 
Taken all round, therefore, Nyerere's definition of a "state of emergency" in his country 
(xxxiv) seems self-explanatory. Given so unpromising a post-independence context, 
maintaining equidistance between the dominant paradigms and ideologies of the Cold War 
could not be done if Tanzania had no distinctive ideology to call her own - an ideology 
which, as Nyerere put it, "involves building on the foundations of our past, and building also 
to our own design. We are not importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to 
smother our distinct social patterns with it."1125 By consciously endeavouring to construct a 
locus-specific category of socialist ideology, Nyerere made a sustained if not invariably 
successful attempt to refrain from invoking the god of the excluded middle. 
The development of Nyerere's political thought. 
It should be noted at the outset that this chapter does not operate on the assumption that 
Nyerere's political thought and Tanzania's ideology necessarily were one and the same 
phenomenon, nor even that Nyerere was the first Tanzanian to articulate premises central to 
the ideology's subsequent elaboration. As Mukandala points out, as early as the 1930s, 
(xxxiv) See Chapter Two, p 48 
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Martin Kayamba and other leading figures in the Tanganyikan African Association "were 
propagating ideas of sharing, of equality, of classless society.""26 Referring to "ownership of 
ideologies", Mukandala asks: 
Who owns these ideologies? Is it the most eloquent? Or does it mean that the most 
eloquent is the originator of these ideas? Or he just picks up, collects these ideas and 
gives them expression (and publicity) in a powerful way? So he becomes associated 
with them but actually, some of these ideas were percolating around here long before 
Nyerere started talking about them."27 
Mukandala cites, for instance, Coulson's comparison between Kayamba and Nyerere."28 As 
Coulson highlights, Kayamba argued against firstly, industrialisation and secondly, the 
emergence of an indigenous class of large land-owners. He observes that "both men had 
visions for the future of their people which in certain respects were remarkably alike"."29 
While Coulson maintains that Nyerere is not the only source of ideology in Tanzania, he 
nonetheless suggests that a weakness of Shivji's seminal work, Class Struggles In Tanzania, 
is that "it is so preoccupied with class struggles that it omits any discussion of Nyerere's 
writing and his role as a creator of ideology .. .""30 
In Siddiqui's view, a study of the emergence of ideology in Tanzania to a significant extent is 
the study of the development of Nyerere's political thought."31 In this respect, Legum sums 
up the mixed results for Nyerere of a close identification between the development of his 
thought and the development of ideology in Tanzania. 
Although by no means an autocrat, Nyerere's personal authority and political 
influence enabled him to stamp his own ideas on the country's societal, constitutional 
and economic pattern of development so strongly that it is not possible to separate 
Tanzania's achievements from the role of its leader, nor is it possible to avoid putting 
the blame on him personally for mistaken policies even though the decisions may 
have been taken against his advice and wishes, as did occur."32 
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Finally in this preface to an investigation of Nyerere's political thought, I revisit Cabral's 
argument that "national liberation and social revolution are not exportable commodities; they 
are ... the outcome of local and national elaboration, more or less influenced by external 
factors ... but essentially determined and formed by the historical reality of each 
people."(xxxv) This argument, among others put forward by Cabral in relation to Guinea-
Bissau, bears comparison with Nyerere's emphasis on constructing a Tanzania-compatible 
ideology. In general, there are some notable similarities in Cabral's and Nyerere's efforts to 
formulate context specific ideologies for their respective countries - the difference being that 
Cabral did not live long enough to deploy his ideas qua crucible of post-independence 
ideology. 
In its earliest published incarnation, Nyerere's thinking evidenced cultural essentialist 
leanings. For instance, in an article written prior to independence, he contends that the ability 
to conduct democratic discussion "is as African as the tropical sun" since "the traditional 
African society ... was a society of equals."1133 Utilising an idealised notion of traditional 
society as a baseline, he argues in favour of African unanism. "The new nations of the 
African continent are emerging today as the result of their struggle for independence. This 
struggle for freedom from foreign domination is a patriotic one which necessarily leaves no 
room for difference."1134 
Here, Nyerere conflates essentialism and instrumentalism within an undifferentiated 
African nationalism. Had his thinking remained trapped within the matrix of reverse 
(xxxv) See Chapter Nine, pp 268-269 
311 
discourse, (xxxvi) it would not have advanced his quest to provide TANU with a distinctive 
theoretical base. However, in January 1962 he resigned from government office and devoted 
the better part of a year - prior to his election as the mainland's President in December 1962 -
to formulating central premises of his party's variation on a humanist theme. 
'Changing the mood' 
In an interview with Cranford Pratt in 1966, Nyerere addressed his reasons for resigning from 
office in 1962. As Pratt records, among other motivating factors was a conversation with a 
TANU branch secretary who wanted to know what he and others like him would get out of 
independence in terms of bigger salaries and so forth. Nyerere responded: "We were seeking 
independence and we have it. It is no use asking what I get out of this." He, however, 
perceived his response as inadequate given that "I was in a weak position to explain the 
difficulties of change as long as I was heading the government."1135 In short, his own position 
in government compromised the moral high ground with which to combat the individual 
economic expectations of Tanzania's governing fraction - expectations that, if fulfilled, 
would further widen an extant gap between leaders and people. As he put it, "I had to leave 
government in order to be an effective teacher. I had to change the mood."1136 
More than three decades later, Nyerere discussed his 1962 mission with Bill Sutherland. In 
this interview, he emphasised elitist tendencies inherent in a rush to acquire government 
posts, and concomitant weakening of the party he regarded as ... 
... the real cement of the country ... It had built the unity of the people, it had 
achieved the independence from colonialism, and it was quite clear to me that if I 
continued in government... the Party, which I saw as more important than 
(xxxvi) See Chapter Four, p 110 
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government for the people, would disintegrate. The cadres we had built up all wanted 
to join the government: they all wanted to join the government! ... 
I had to get out and organise.1137 
That members of TANU at the time were aware of the main thrust of Nyerere's mission is 
suggested by Sungura: "Mwalimu, after being the first Prime Minister in 1960, came to find 
that the government had much power rather than the party, so the party was not fulfilling its 
objectives. He decided to resign so to strengthen the objectives of the party."1138 
It seems evident, then, that for Nyerere, Tanzania was TANU 'writ large'. During 1962, he 
launched an ongoing process of constructing guidelines for both party and country, while 
simultaneously drawing on autochthonous value systems and forms of political and economic 
organisation. From the outset, these guidelines contained overtly ethical connotations, as 
demonstrated by a paper written by Nyerere during his leave of absence, viz, "Ujamaa - The 
Basis of African Socialism.""39 While this paper does not markedly depart from a one 
dimensional portrayal of traditional society,1140 it utilises socialist humanism as an ethical 
baseline from which to confront the predatory tendencies of postcolonial elites in the related 
realms of wealth and power. Having (famously - or infamously from a scientific Marxist 
perspective) defined socialism as "an attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a 
standard political pattern","41 Nyerere denounces "acquisitiveness for the purpose of gaining 
power and prestige" as "unsocialist." Further, "in an acquisitive society wealth tends to 
corrupt those who possess it.""42 
It is therefore up to the people of Tanganyika ... to make sure that this socialist 
attitude of mind is not lost through the temptations to personal gain (or to the abuse of 
positions of authority) which may come our way as individuals, or through the 
temptation to look on the good of the whole community as of secondary importance to 
the interests of our own particular group.1143 
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A National Ethic 
In a 1962 speech to Parliament, Nyerere emphasised the importance of a national ethic as the 
only truly effective means of safeguarding democratic freedoms. "If the people do not have 
that kind of ethic, it does not matter what kind of constitution you frame. They can always be 
victims of tyranny."1144 Extending his definition of socialism as an attitude of mind to 
incorporate democracy as a "declaration of faith in human nature", he contended that "every 
enemy of democracy is some person who somewhere has no faith in human beings. He 
doubts. He thinks he is all right, but other people are not all right.""45 
As was - by 1962 - already evident, Nyerere both drew on broad humanist principles and 
articulated such principles in context-specific mode. His stated objective in the speech noted 
above is a government and a people who say: we cannot implement or tolerate tyrannical 
forms of governance because "it is un-Tanganyikan."1146 
Early in 1966, during a 'meet-the-people' tour of Mafia island, Nyerere elaborated this theme 
in a speech entitled "Leaders must not be masters".1147 Referring to his use of the word 
' Ujamaa', he explained that in the first instance, it "denotes the kind of life lived by a man 
and his family - father, mother, children and near relatives" - an extended family system in 
which "no-one used wealth for the purpose of dominating others."1148 In the second instance, 
Ujamaa is emblematic of a national ethic in which - as far as possible - the nation lives as 
one family.1149 This process of'nation-family' creation embedded in an egalitarian ethos 
requires that the Tanzanian people reject a habit that colonialism attempted to instil, namely, 
that of not questioning their leaders. In order to avoid the replication - in a postcolonial era -
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of binary divisions between leaders and led, oppressors and oppressed, rich and poor, "our 
aim is to remove fear from the minds of our people."1150 
Butiku defines this inclusive principle with which to replace fear-induced colonial binaries as 
inherent in the notion of Ujamaa, which is "a way of life. And the idea is: at national level, is 
it possible to transfer the way of life at the higher level?"1151 He then illustrates the point with 
reference to ethnic differentiation within Tanzanian borders. "We are all living together in 
one country ... we are human. We have needs. Can we continue a life of love, a life of 
working with one another, a life of ensuring that everybody is respected, gets basic needs 
before any of them lives in luxury?"1152 Nyerere's objective, then, was not only to replace the 
exclusivity engendered by a colonial ethos with the inclusivity of an extended family 
tradition, but also to modify colonial legacies of fear and subservience by utilising a notion of 
'love' that according to Butiku, translates as: 
I'm human, you are human, to that extent we are equal. A relationship should be on 
the basis of that equality as human beings. You have a duty towards me, you have a 
duty towards yourself. I have a duty towards you, I have a duty towards myself. Both 
of us together have a duty towards ourselves plus towards humanity as a whole. So ... 
Ujamaa is inclusive.1153 
The inclusivity embedded in the concept of Ujamaa is of particular significance in the light of 
Tanzania's de jure conversion, in 1963, to a one-party state - a conversion that in most post-
independence African states heralded the arrival of that generic phenomenon, the postcolonial 
'developmental dictatorship'. Nyerere's effort to avoid this all too common outcome first 
was articulated at a TANU annual conference in 1963 where he outlined the case for intra-
party, ipso facto, intra-country democracy, and argued that "where there is one party, and that 
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party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than 
they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the 
community.""54 He, however, did not leave his premise stuck on this somewhat polemical 
level. Rather, he substantiated it in terms of institutional requirements for safeguarding 
democratic freedoms. Firstly, TANU should be a mass party, with membership open to all 
Tanzanian citizens. Secondly, elections regularly should be held. He then conflated the two 
requirements: "As long as TANU membership is open to every citizen, we can conduct our 
elections in a way which is genuinely free and democratic."1'55 
In 1965, Nyerere visited the People's Republic of China. Sungura, one of fourteen TANU 
officials subsequently selected to personally investigate socialism in China, recollects the 
frugality of the life-style along with an overwhelming ethic of hard work. He contends that 
the Arusha Declaration of 1967 significantly was influenced by Tanzania's connection with 
China.1156 Lwehabura, however, modifies this contention by describing Tanzania's socialist 
ideology as a mixture of ingredients, some of which were adopted from the ideologies of 
other countries, and then adapted to suit Tanzania's specific needs.1157 Nyerere himself, in an 
otherwise laudatory speech made in honour of Chou en Lai's return visit, inserted a minatory 
note: "Neither our principles, our country, nor our freedom to determine our own destiny are 
for sale."1158 This assertion was elaborated in an address to the International Press Club in 
London in 1965. Having emphasised the concrete results - in terms of much needed financial 
aid - of Tanzania's exchange of state visits with China, Nyerere attributed a Western concern 
that Tanzania has been "'contaminated' by these contacts'" to a polarised and paranoid Cold 
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War ethos. "I gather" he observed, "that even the suits I wear have been adduced as evidence 
of pernicious Chinese influence!"1159 
The Arusha Declaration 
In 1967, Nyerere's draft of the Arusha Declaration was submitted to TANU's National 
Executive Committee (NEC) for consideration. As the preface to the declaration emphasises, 
amendments subsequently were made by the NEC. "The declaration thus is a Party 
document, not the exclusive work of the President." The preface further asserts that the 
declaration "marked a turning point in Tanzanian politics" since "the ideology of the country 
was made specific by it.""60 
Although demonstrably informed by the various strands of Nyerere's thought, differences of 
opinion between the President and the NEC arguably can be detected in aspects of the 
Declaration's content. For instance, whereas in 1963, Nyerere had argued that party 
membership should be open to all Tanzanian citizens, the Arusha Declaration asserted that "a 
socialist society can only be built by those who believe in, and who themselves practice, the 
principles of socialism."1161 This said, 'the principles of socialism' are broadly defined, and 
include "the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of 
association within the context of the law.""62 Further, ubiquitous references in the declaration 
to 'peasants and workers' were modified by Nyerere in his introduction to Freedom And 
Socialism. Here, he contended that it is not necessary to distinguish - for instance - between 
manual labourers, office workers, and professionally trained people since "all who contribute 
to the society by their work are workers."1163 
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Three tenets in particular can be considered central to the Arusha Declaration's attempt to 
construct and, thereafter, implement a pervasively egalitarian ethos in Tanzania. While 
nationalisation of the commanding heights of the economy"54 did not markedly distinguish 
Tanzania from other attempts in postcolonial Africa to implement socialist economic policies, 
two additional - and related - tenets are indicative of Tanzanian specificity. Firstly, 
replacement of a previous emphasis on urban and industrial development with a national 
focus on the development of agriculture."65 Secondly, and perhaps most notably given 
Nyerere's preoccupation with elite / people disjunctures, a leadership code. The Declaration 
defined 'leaders' as members of the NEC, as ministers and members of parliament, as senior 
officials in TANU and TANU-related organisations, and as high and middle level civil 
servants. It prohibited leaders from owning shares or holding directorships in privately 
owned enterprises, from receiving more than two salaries, and from owning houses in order 
to rent them out."65 
At this point in the chapter's exposition of Nyerere's and the NEC's attempt to forestall - or 
at any rate, meaningfully restrict - the development in Tanzania of an entrenched property 
owning"67 elite, it is instructive to revisit Cabral's notion of 'class suicide'. While Cabral 
formulated his thesis in the context of pre-independence armed struggle against a 
metropolitan power, as distinct from the Arusha Declaration's codification of ideology in 
post-independence Tanzania, it nonetheless is arguable that 'class suicide' and TANU's 
leadership code are connected by their respective intentions to anticipate, and thereby short-
circuit, the abiding problematic of the formation and reproduction of rapacious elites in 
postcolonial Africa."68 As Nyerere put it in his introduction to Freedom and Socialism, 
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"there will be no 'masters' who sit in idleness while others labour on 'their' farms or in 
'their' factories. Nor will there be too great a degree of inequality between the incomes of 
different members of the society."1169 
Freedom and Socialism 
In the introduction cited above, Nyerere's opening move is to qualify an earlier and markedly 
essentialist depiction of a hypothetically classless traditional society. While asserting that 
"we have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out of our own roots", he does not claim 
that society in precolonial Tanzania was undifferentiatedly egalitarian. Rather, he avers that 
"we are emphasising certain characteristics of our traditional organisation","70 and argues 
that: 
Speaking generally, and despite the existence of a few feudalistic communities, 
traditional Tanzanian society had many socialist characteristics ... Despite the low 
level of material progress, traditional society was in practice organised on a basis 
which was in accordance with socialist principles.1171 
In short, he contends that there are structures and attitudes already in place that "provide a 
basis on which modern socialism can be built.""72 
As I see it, the significance of the intention to construct socialism on the foundations of 
egalitarian elements within traditional beliefs and practices is that it represents an attempt to 
formulate an ideology that in key respects adequately is congruent with the lived experience 
of rural Tanzanians, hence modifying the impact on lived worlds of iron cage knowledge. In 
this regard, Nyerere's distinction between socialism and science is noteworthy. Rejecting the 
notion of science as absolute and unconditionally applicable knowledge, he argues for its 
finite and conditional application to social reality. 
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A scientist works to discover truth. He does not claim to know it, nor is he seeking to 
discover truth as revealed - which is the job of the theologian. A scientist works on 
the basis of the knowledge which has been accumulated empirically, and which is 
held to be true until new experience demonstrates otherwise ... "73 (emphasis added) 
Nyerere then highlights the extent to which Marx's thesis was the product of a specific time 
and place, viz, "Europe in the middle of the 19th century.""74 Arguing that "it is ... 
unscientific to appeal to his writings as Christians appeal to the Bible, or Muslims to the 
Koran", he concludes that 
It is no part of the job of a socialist in 1968 to worry about whether or not his actions 
and proposals are in accordance with what Marx and Lenin wrote, and it is a waste of 
time and energy to spend hours - if not months and years - trying to prove that what 
you have decided is objectively necessary is really in accordance with their 
teachings."75 
Given Nyerere's finite and cautious estimate of knowledge that qualifies as scientific, it is not 
surprising that he does not launch an attack on capitalism from a scientific baseline. Rather, 
his critique is humanist and normative. Having stated that "under socialism, Man is the 
purpose of all social activity","76 he lambastes the "social evils" of capitalist systems in which 
progress is judged according to the production of consumer goods, preceded by the creation 
of a market, and in which man qua consumer is king.1177 Such systems generate destructive 
(because overly-competitive) individualism, along with social aggressiveness and a 
proliferation of human indignities."78 In short, instead of treating people as equal in their 
humanity, their right to dignity, and their need for respect, capitalism's cult of consumerism 
both entrenches and glorifies inequality. 
Further, since Tanzania is attempting to minimise the damage wrought by class, ethnic, 
religious and racial divisions, Nyerere defends the suitability of one party - albeit inclusive 
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and consensual - democracy. He asserts that that this brand of democracy was adopted in 
response to Tanzania's specific conditions and "special problems."1179 He adds that: 
The resultant constitution is not perfect but we believe that it suits us better than any 
system operating elsewhere, and we believe that it safeguards the people's sovereignty 
at the same time as it enables the effective and strong government so essential at this 
stage of our development.1180 
Nyerere moves on to query the notion that 'true' socialism necessarily is the product of a 
violent upheaval. Cautioning that "socialism does not spring ready-made out of the womb of 
violence", he highlights a "legacy of bitterness, suspicion and hostility"1181 attendant on 
violent solutions to oppression and discrimination. While conceding that violent revolutions 
on occasion are "a regrettable necessity" since they represent the only available way forward, 
he asserts that "violence cannot be welcomed by those who care about people",1182 ergo: 
Violence itself is the opposite of a socialist characteristic. Brigands can govern by 
violence and fear; dictatorships can establish themselves and flourish. Socialism 
cannot be imposed in this way, for it is based on equality. It denies the right of any 
individual or small minority, to say, 'I know and the others are fools who must be led 
like sheep.1183 
Nyerere then addresses problems of building socialism in postcolonial contexts. As he sees 
it, the postcolonial state has inherited a dilemma attendant on nationalism's lack of an 
inclusive, forward-looking ideology, hence its tendency simply to demand Africanisation -
the replacement, as he puts it, of white and brown faces by black ones - as an end in itself. 
Creating still more difficulties was the fact that the colonialism we fought against was 
that of a people who happened to be of a different race than ourselves. It was fatally 
easy to identify the thing you were fighting against as people of this other race ... "84 




The beneficial effects for Tanzania of Nyerere's focus on an inclusive notion of humanity as 
distinct from the reproduction - in a postcolonial era - of colonialism's 'self and 'other' 
binaries, is argued below. I do not contend, however, that Ujamaa was an unmixed success. 
Had the ideology adequately fulfilled its economic objectives, Tanzania would not have had 
to implement a World Bank structural adjustment programme in 1982, nor - in 1985 - agree 
to undertake economic liberalisation (with all attendant social welfare reductions) in return 
for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. Indeed, given Tanzania's status as one of the 
world's least developed countries in tandem with a world order unfavourable to poor 
countries,"86 it seems reasonable to speculate that Ujamaa's long-term objective of economic 
self-reliance was doomed from the start. As Saul observes: "Here it is important to 
underscore the correctness of the basic premise from which Nyerere's policies flowed: the 
global capitalist system did not then, does not now serve Africa well."1187 
My retrospective, however, is not utilised to minimise - by dismissing as futile or 
significantly misconceived - TANU-CCM's attempt to construct and implement a mode of 
development congruent with social realities in Tanzania. Rather, it is suggested that under 
Nyerere's guidance, the party made a sustained effort to avoid following in either capitalist or 
communist footsteps by adopting a formula that Marcuse tentatively defined as the only 
available alternative for Third World countries, namely, a planned policy of extending and 
improving traditional modes of life and labour on their own grounds, (xxxvii) 
(xxxvii) See Chapter Eight, p 235 
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Since - in the first instance - humanist voluntarism was at the heart of this policy, the party in 
its capacity as vehicle of ideology in the main abstained from coercively conveying iron cage 
or expert knowledge to the lived world of Tanzanians. In the second instance, however, 
voluntarism was abandoned in favour of rapid modernisation of traditional environments, 
informed by a universal, purportedly neutral science of development, and thus - while 
facilitating welfare objectives - was inconsistent with the humanist trajectory of Nyerere's 
thought, and his repudiation of ideology as universally applicable development paradigm. 
In regard to this conundrum, it is instructive to revisit Nyerere's focus - arguably, his over-
focus - on the party in its role as the glue that held together the otherwise fissiparous texture 
of decolonising and postcolonial Tanzania. While intra-party democracy was practiced in 
Tanzania to an extent unreplicated elsewhere in dejure one party states in Cold War era 
Africa, the act of outlawing opposition parties itself is of questionable democratic legitimacy, 
and potentially imputes an authoritarian outcome, thus underwriting Gellner's inference that 
in developing countries, separation between iron cage and lived world is not really a viable 
option, (xxxviii) There is thus a contradiction at the heart of Nyerere's thesis which 
expressed itself in a tendency to view the party as knowing better than did the people 
themselves what was good for them.1188 It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, that this 
tendency enabled - at certain junctures - a supposition that the party represented the 'general 
(or real) will' as opposed to the 'apparent will' of the people.1189 
(xxxviii) See Chapter Two, pp 47-48 
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However, it also is arguable that Nyerere was aware of this incipiently authoritarian 
contradiction between his humanist beliefs, on the one hand, and his stout defence of one-
party democracy on the other, and that he felt it was justified as long as Tanzania's party and 
government elite adequately conformed with the strictures of the Arusha Declaration's 
leadership code, and as long as the welfare needs of the people were given priority. Since 
Tanzania's 1985 agreement with the IMF, signed into effect after Nyerere had stepped down 
as President, decimated the network of state subsidised welfare previously available to 
Tanzanians, and since CCM's 1991 abrogation of the leadership code removed both 
justifications for maintaining dejure one party rule, it is unsurprising that Nyerere's voice 
was foremost in calling for the legalisation of opposition parties. 
By way of elaborating the above argument, I revisit Mannheim's notion of'relative Utopia' as 
a set of transcendent ideas that part company with wish projections if and only if the Utopian 
conception is in close alignment with currents already present in society, (xxxix) At the 
juncture, therefore, where structures that had underpinned a relative Utopia in Tanzania 
definitively were eroded, CCM transmogrified into a party that - by combining wish 
projection with defence of the status quo - embodied an 'ideological idea'. At this juncture, 
Nyerere no longer was able to sustain a Utopian vision, and thus ceased to endorse the notion 
of intra-party democracy, instead advocating inter-party competition. Viewed in this light, his 
change of direction is consistent with his democratic principles. By challenging the 
legitimacy of CCM's claim exclusively to represent the people, Nyerere was instrumental 
(xxxix) See Chapter Three, pp 74-75 
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in reviving the flagging (given a marked decline in party membership1190) legitimacy of the 
Tanzanian state. 
Lastly in this conclusion, I address the proposition that Ujamaa has continuing and beneficial 
effects for Tanzania. It has to be said that the proposition generates a potential problem for 
this dissertation. If, in 1985, Ujamaa in its capacity as a politically legitimating and socially 
cohesive ideology effectively was rendered obsolete in the economic sphere by International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored liberalisation, is it feasible to argue that the ideology 
nonetheless has endowed post Cold War era Tanzania with a substantive political and social 
legacy? After all, as Mukandala puts it: 
There are people who maintain that there were aspects of Ujamaa ... the social 
policies were good; the economic policies were disastrous. But my point to them is: 
this is a package. The schools were run on the profits of the nationalised banks. If 
you did not have nationalised banks generating these profits, the school system 
wouldn't have run, and so on."91 
However, Mukandala, having imputed a problem for the research, subsequently supplies an 
answer. Referring to social cohesiveness and a sense of national unity in Tanzania, he 
observes that "these things are not given, they are not given. These were the results and 
products of Ujamaa policy ... to the extent that they are valued even today. And so the 
leadership will not go beyond a certain point to undermine this.""92 Citing an outbreak of 
police brutality in Zanzibar in which (at least) thirty people were killed, he attributes a 
subsequent government decision to "put in place a mechanism to correct these problems"1193 
to the lasting effects of Ujamaa which "made people feel that they were valued. That they 
counted." He further contends that in Tanzania there still exist "strong feelings of equity, of 
fair play and so forth, which, I think, is a legacy of Ujamaa". "94 In similar vein, Butiku 
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underlines the inclusive humanism of Nyerere's vision. "People ... at first they thought he 
was just fighting for black people. No. Here, he fought for humanity ...", and asserts that 
Tanzanians remember Nyerere to this day "because he gave them peace and unity. The peace 
they see; the unity they see."1195 
In sum, by combining elements of socialist humanism with Tanzania-specific articulation in 
the form of Ujamaa, Nyerere - as Masolo puts it - came up with a crucial statement about the 
role of the community in the shaping of personhood. This sociality of personhood in which 
the role of the community and the responsibility of the individual closely are intertwined, "is 
at the very foundation of being human, part of the human ideal."1196 Masolo markedly 
distinguishes between this project of 'relationism', as he terms it, and postcolonial regimes in 
which "rule by the dictator became the way of life" paradoxically justified with reference to 
"the consolidation and preservation of the national community."1197 
I conclude that Ujamaa occupies a "third space of enunciation" that, while not axiomatically 
liberatory, contains liberatory possibilities.1198 By exploring and building on such 
possibilities, the ideology succeeded in creating a national ethic that served the country well 
in the related realms of peace and stability, and that continues to inform state-societal 




This conclusion begins by revisiting the conceptual base of hypotheses, themes and 
argumentation that in combination constitute the dissertation. In the process, links between 
concepts are systematised and clarified. Having itemised the contributions made by 
exclusionary paradigmatic epistemology to ideological outcomes, I then outline the 
dissertation's concluding arguments. 
The study is premised on a notion of 'African crisis', specifically a crisis of the state in the 
related spheres of political legitimacy and social cohesion. Since both spheres fall within the 
operational ambit of the concept of 'ideology', the dissertation hypothesises that - far from 
being irrelevant to an investigation of state crisis - a failed ideology both contributes to and is 
an aspect of state crisis. 
The better to investigate the problematic of ideology in Africa, the dissertation distinguishes 
between ideology per se and phenomena or practices deemed 'ideological'. In regard the 
latter category, I avoid oversimplification of complex issues by utilising Mannheim's nuanced 
definitions. According to Mannheim, an 'ideological idea' manifests itself in two main ways. 
One ideological manifestation can be found in a representation of reality which emerges from 
ruling groups, usually political parties, and which is configured by an intention to suppress 
alternate realities. Mannheim's definition does not necessarily impute conscious mendacity 
on the part of ruling groups. Rather, he suggests that this type of ideological manifestation is 
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a product of unconscious denial, the function of which is to protect and maintain the status 
quo. (xl) The second manifestation of an 'ideological idea' includes an intention - or wish -
to transform the status quo, and in this respect at least, is not dissimilar to a situationally 
transcendent 'Utopian idea', (xli) 
It is noteworthy that both ideological manifestations share with Utopia a wish projection 
element that obscures certain aspects of reality. However, whereas the status quo 
manifestation by definition resists transformation of the existing order, and thus is clearly 
distinguishable from a Utopian idea, a would-be transformative, if ineffectual, ideological idea 
can be difficult to distinguish from a Utopian idea. In short, Mannheim's thesis imputes a 
grey area in which ideological and Utopian ideas co-exist. 
In the final analysis, however, Mannheim defines a Utopian idea as - unlike its ideological 
counterpart - drawing from currents already present in society, and giving expression to 
them, (xlii) Thus, the ineffectiveness of a would-be transformative idea is explicable in terms 
of its failure adequately to connect with extant social realities: hence the designation 
'ideological' appended to it by Mannheim. Further, it is argued in the dissertation that 
Mannheim's conception of a Utopian idea bears comparison with Gramsci's depiction of an 
organic ideology as informed by popular conviction in contradistinction to a mechanistic or 
arbitrary ideology that by definition is insufficiently rooted in social beliefs, (xliii) 
(xl) See Chapter Three, p 73 
(xli) See Chapter Three, pp 73-74 
(xlii) See Chapter Three, p 75 
(xliii) See Chapter Three, pp 75 
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The dissertation draws on Mannheim's and Gramsci's respective definitions and distinctions 
when considering the ability of ideology in Africa to surmount the formidable obstacles 
passed forward to postcolonial states by their colonial forebears. In this respect, it is 
contended that ideologies at least adequately congruent with the lived worlds of African 
societies have attained - both in decolonising and postcolonial contexts - levels of political 
legitimacy and social cohesion unreplicated by nationalist movements and political parties 
that buy into exogenous, purportedly universal models. 
In general, it seems reasonable to suppose that an ideology which to an adequate extent is 
informed by the lived world to which it applies itself is less rather than more ideological. 
Conversely, an ideology that imposes a uniform, universalised grid on complex and diverse 
local realities is more rather than less ideological, issues of good faith or transformative 
purpose notwithstanding. 
The hypothesis outlined above is closely linked to another, namely that two dominant social 
science paradigms in Cold War era Africa - modernisation theory and scientific Marxism -
are implicated in the crisis of the state. Accordingly, the dissertation develops and elaborates 
the concept of an 'ideological paradigm' by exploring the positivist roots of modernisation 
and Marxist paradigms, and also by investigating the interface between ideology and science. 
It is noted that from this interface emerged a notion that ideology is the property of the 
'other' while science is the property of the 'self. 
In other words, beginning with the European Enlightenment, ideology increasingly came to be 
defined as false knowledge, science as true knowledge. This dispute over the 'real' or 
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'proper' grounds of knowledge reached its apotheosis in a Cold War dispute between 
Western and Soviet epistemological positions. Each side defined its own epistemology as 
scientific, hence true, while defining the epistemology of the other as ideological, hence false. 
States in the underdeveloped regions of the world duly were affected by the epistemological 
dichotomy that characterised the Cold War era inasmuch as they were presented with two 
competing modes of development, one purportedly scientific, the other purportedly 
ideological - and vice versa. 
The dissertation contends that the struggle to apply contextually apposite ideology also is a 
struggle to formulate an epistemological base that, while substantive, eludes the inflexibility 
and reductionism of the Euro- North America-centric epistemological binaries that inform 
the dominant social science paradigms of the Cold War era. Further, to the extent that the 
post Cold War era is characterised by the dominance of a neoliberal paradigm, (xliv) this 
contention is of continuing relevance. 
In order to clarify and round-off the above argument, I now summarise and elucidate key 
features of an ideological paradigm. 
A paradigm qualifies as ideological firstly, if its linear and teleological trajectory in effect 
conflates the centre of power and the centre of truth. In the respective cases of modernisation 
theory and scientific Marxism, teleological endpoints are located either in Europe or in North 
America, thus effectively relegating Africa to the periphery both of knowledge and of power. 
(xliv) See Chapter One, pp 20-25 
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Secondly, and concomitantly, a paradigm is deemed ideological if it is embedded in a realist 
formula that conclusively disempowers alternate realities. Drawing on Gellner's thesis, (xlv) 
the dissertation likens an 'X = either A or non-A' binary formula to the 'god of the excluded 
middle', and argues that this formula, if adopted by developmental regimes, enables the 
coercive conveyance of iron cage or expert knowledge to the lived world. Bearing in mind 
that the scientificity of the dominant paradigms in Cold War era Africa respectively endorse a 
wholesale concentration of power in the hands of nationalist elites, (xlvi) both paradigms 
reasonably can be charged with contributing to an outcome in which "social and intellectual 
legitimacy belong to those who hold power and who believe themselves to be authorised to 
define, often violently, the standards of behaviour.""99 
Thirdly, a paradigm qualifies as ideological if it subscribes to a positivist interpretation of 
social reality as closed-ended, hence amenable to the imposition of scientifically conceived 
solutions and future predictions. Here, the dissertation draws on Bhaskar's critique of 
empiricism and Gramsci's critique of positivist trends in Marxism (xlvii) in order to highlight 
the implications of a quest for certainty in the social sciences. This problematic quest, and its 
interconnectedness with the reigning ideologies of the Cold War, is summed up by the 
Gulbenkian Commission: 
Social scientists, no less than political or religious leaders, have missions; they seek 
the universal acceptance of certain practices in the belief that this will maximise the 
possibility of certain ends, such as knowing the truth. Under the banner of the 
universality of science, they seek to define the forms of knowledge that are 
scientifically legitimate and those that fall outside the pale of acceptability. Because 
the dominant ideologies defined themselves as reflecting and incarnating reason, both 
presiding over action and determining presumptively universal paradigms, to reject 
(xlv) See Chapter Two, pp 44-48 
(xlvi) See Chapter Four, pp 93-102 
(xlvii) See Chapter Two, pp 56-60 
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these views was said to be choosing 'adventure' over 'science', and seemed to imply 
opting for uncertainty ...1200 
In short, this dissertation defines as ideological any social science paradigm that perceives 
itself as operating 'under the banner of the universality of science.' 
Fourthly, a paradigm qualifies as ideological if it incorporates a self-sustaining mythology in 
which the 'other' (that is, the human object/s of social science research) is held culpable for 
the presence of an anomaly, or problem for the paradigm. Basing my analysis on Kuhn's 
thesis of paradigm change in the natural (or 'hard') sciences, (xlviii) I surmise that a social 
science paradigm is in danger of becoming 'a monster' if it elides the reflexivity of theory in 
the sense of a mutually constitutive relationship between researcher and researched, whether 
purposive or not, welcome or not. To deny all and any responsibility in the event of 
unintended and / or unwelcome outcomes in the lived world, while at the same time asserting 
the universality of one's paradigm is logically untenable. As the Gulbenkian Commission 
puts it: "If social science is an exercise in the search for universal knowledge, then the 'other' 
cannot logically exist, for the 'other' is part of 'us' - the us that is studied, the us that is 
engaged in studying."1201 
Fifthly, a paradigm qualifies as ideological if- by claiming equivalence with the 'hard' 
sciences - it markets itself as a purveyor of scientifically guaranteed progress. In so doing, it 
absolutises itself as a scientific world view, thereby reducing the pluralism and multiple 
realities of the lived world to a single common equation.1202 In short, it resorts to 'scientism', 
that is, a denial that there are significant differences in the methods appropriate for studying 
(xlviii) See Chapter Three, pp 64-70 
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social and natural objects,1203 combined with an assertion that a social science paradigm is 
capable of- and should - replicate the precision and objectivity of the 'hard' sciences.1204 
By identifying knowledge with science,1205 scientism excludes from substantive consideration 
human values, and norms of 'right conduct', whether culturally specific or generally 
applicable, thus relegating socio-cultural ethics to the shadowy domain of quasi-phenomena. 
Further, since proponents of scientism by definition cannot seriously entertain alternate 
possibilities, it seems reasonable to suppose that paradigms stand or fall by the efficacy and 
accuracy - or otherwise - of their solutions and predictions. 
The dissertation thus suggests not only that modernisation and Marxist paradigms failed in 
their respective developmental endeavours in Africa, but also that they are implicated in the 
normative vacuum at the heart of many, if not most, developmental one-party states in Cold 
War era Africa. Overall, the universal pretensions of paradigms are queried. Instead, the 
study leans toward Mudimbe's perspective on the social sciences. 
All social sciences can be really understood in the context of their epistemological 
realms of possibility. The histories of these sciences as well as their trends, their 
truths as well as their experiences, being derived from a given space, speak from it 
and primarily about it.1206 
However, the dissertation does not endorse the notion of an exclusively African 
epistemology, not least since to do so would be to uncritically accept the 'counter-myth' or 
'reverse discourse' of cultural nationalism which, in the process of inverting a realist formula, 
paradoxically reproduces its ontological and epistemological binaries, (xlix) 
(xlix) See Chapter Four, pp 114-120 
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Moreover, to the extent that intellectual and political elites in Africa have represented 
themselves as possessors and interpreters of truths derived from an essentialised notion of 
African culture, they are culpable of imposition 'from above' of undifferentiated cultural 
presumptions. I argue that such an imposition has disturbing implications. It is all too easy, 
for instance, to reject a universal discourse of human rights on the basis that it is 'un-African' 
and thus does not reflect indigenous cultural norms and practices. In general, elite-privileging 
deployment of an assumed cultural essentialism potentially enables the binarisation of 
African peoples into A (authentically African) or non-A (not African enough, or not really 
African at all) and thus putatively underwrites coercive conversion (or expulsion or slaughter) 
of the 'other'. 
In a discussion of the search for an autonomous framework of knowledge in Africa, Ashcroft, 
commenting on "the difficulty many people have with the apparent ambiguity of 'using the 
master's tools to dismantle the master's house"', contends that this difficulty stems from an 
extremely restricted perception of identity.1207 Against this restricted perception, Ashcroft 
asserts the diversity and pluralism of African identities. Elaborating his argument, he cites 
Masolo's critique of a common misconception, namely, the assumption ... 
... first, that all formerly colonised persons ought to have one view of the impact of 
colonialism behind which they ought to unite to overthrow it; second that the 
overthrow of colonialism be replaced with another, liberated and assumedly authentic 
identity. So strong is the pull toward the objectivity of this identity that most of those 
who speak of Africa from this emancipatory perspective think of it only as a solid 
rock which has withstood all the storms of history except colonialism. Because of the 
deeply political gist of the colonial / postcolonial discourse, we have come to think of 
our identities as natural rather than imagined and politically driven.1208 
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In sum, by asserting the objective, 'out there' existence of a monolithic African cultural 
identity, nationalist elites in effect subscribe to the binarisation of human knowledge and 
human groups into 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' categories. In this respect and to this 
extent, cultural nationalism shares both with colonialism and with Cold War era (exogenous) 
sciences of social reality, a coercive impulse. Given that widespread deployment of state or 
state-sanctioned coercion both entrenches and symbolises the state's lack of legitimacy, an 
overbearing cultural nationalism is implicated, along with modernisation and Marxist 
paradigms, in the crisis of the state in Africa. 
Kom asks the question: "Today just as in the past, doesn't everything happen as if most of the 
countries in Africa were irredeemably extrovert, the quest for knowledge being organised 
mainly so as to be able to claim some sort of extra-continental legitimacy?"1209 To this 
question, however, he appends a caveat: "Obviously, the autonomy that is being claimed has 
nothing to do with a type of intellectual nationalism, confinement or entrenchment in a 
suicidal isolation.'"210 Reflecting on Kom's question, Ashcroft suggests, as 'legitimate' 
African knowledge, a transcultural amalgam of knowledge which, while addressing local 
needs and local purposes, would not need - in the name of intellectual nationalism - to 
dispense with "the technologies of knowing." Legitimation, he concludes, "may not depend 
upon the establishment of an 'autonomous framework' of knowledge so much as a direction 
of appropriated forms of knowing to local uses, and the interpolation of global systems with a 
locally specific practice."1211 
The dissertation argues that both Amilcar Cabral, leader of the liberation struggle in Guinea-
Bissau and Julius Nyerere, main spokesperson for Ujamaa in Tanzania, made innovative 
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contributions to the construction of a hybridised epistemology on which to base a locus-
specific ideology. Neither leader focussed exclusively on Africans (as distinct from a non-
African 'other'.) Rather, they spoke of human beings, thus situating their countries within a 
wider, human-centred discourse. In so doing, they avoided ideological dogmatism and 
doctrinal rigidity. As Chabal points out: 
Cabral, who used Marxist theory in his analytical texts, consistently refused to be 
drawn into ideological discussions or definitions. He emphasised to the PAIGC 
cadres and to the outside world that a successful national revolution would evolve its 
own ideology partly from the general body of socio-political doctrines but more 
importantly from the economic, social and political reality it faced in the country 
itself2'2 
Chabal further emphasises that the PAIGC expressed its revolutionary nationalist ideology 
"through a medium readily intelligible to all cadres and villagers." By avoiding ideological 
and abstract jargon, separation between "those who know how to manipulate the changing 
ideological idiom" and those who do not significantly was reduced. Additionally, the absence 
of an "immutable body of 'correct ideas'" facilitated both party and national unity.1213 
Similarly, Nyerere's rejection of doctrinal (scientific) socialism as unsuitable for the 
economic, social and political realities of his country, coupled with his critique of capitalism 
as producer of profound socio-economic inequalities, enabled the emergence of an open-
ended, composite ideology, that is, both locus-specific and infused with generally applicable 
principles of human-centred socialism. Further, the innovatory trajectory of Ujamaa made it 
possible for TANU-CCM, much like the PAIGC,12'4 to pursue a policy of non-alignment that -
unusually in sub-Saharan Africa - was more substantive than rhetorical, polarising 
imperatives of the Cold War notwithstanding. Moreover, Nyerere's accessible mode of 
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articulation and his people-friendly style signified a genuine and sustained, if not necessarily 
or invariably successful, attempt to - like Cabral - bridge the chasm between expert 
knowledge and the lived world. 
Finally, the dissertation argues that the examples offered by (decolonising) Guinea-Bissau 
and (postcolonial) Tanzania, specifically in the realm of politically legitimating and socially 
cohesive national ideologies, contain instructive lessons. It is contended that these lessons are 
of relevance not only for regimes in Africa that continue to pursue coercive, hence de-
legitimating and socially fragmenting routes to acquiring and / or maintaining power; but also 
for social scientists in regard to an epistemological challenge, namely, how not to entrench 
and absolutise a perceived gap between those who know and those who do not.'215 
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